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Preface 
The countries in the Horn of Africa, a region known for being a conflict hotspot, 
are actively engaged in finding lasting solutions to regional conflict and fostering 
sustainable development, as a fundamental part of human security. The causes of 
these conflicts range from governance constraints, colonial legacy, post-election 
violence, over ethnic- and clan conflict to competition for resources. These are just 
some of the challenges pertaining to the region. Conflict stands in the way of 
development and progress to take root in the region and it must be addressed in 
order for the region to prosper, and for the nurturing of human security and 
development and secure rights for its peoples.
The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) was established in 2007 to 
augment better understanding of conflict in the Horn of Africa, in particular, and 
the continent, in general. The objectives of IPSS are to enhance excellence in 
research and the teaching and learning of peace and conflict issues, to educate 
society about peace, and to serve as a think tank for actors keen to promote peace 
and security in the region. The Royal Embassy of Denmark to Ethiopia has been a 
partner of IPSS from the beginning, both financially and, equally importantly, in 
spirit, and has commended the work of IPSS as an Institute and as a focal point for 
peace and security work in the region.
The Institute has already achieved significant outcomes in its short life. It has 
graduated four cohorts of graduate students and conducted a series of short courses 
for participants from various sectors of Ethiopian society. And recently IPSS 
launched a PhD programme, further strengthening and consolidating its research 
base. IPSS also cooperates with a range of institutions to strengthen networks and 
its ability to act as a centre of excellence on issues of peace and security in the 
region. The Embassy hopes that the work of IPSS will contribute towards the 
development of a research community, which will work to better understand the 
cause of conflict and ways to prevent it.
This book is a step in this direction. The adverse impacts of climate change are 
predicted to severely constrain the lives and livelihoods of Africans. Pastoralists 
are among the most vulnerable population groups. Considering the fact that the 
Horn of Africa has a large concentration of pastoral communities and that 
pastoralist conflicts are rife in the region, many fear that climate change-induced 
scarcity will increase the incidence and severity of pastoral conflicts during the 
coming decades. 
V
Research into this phenomenon will assist all actors, for example, policymakers, 
academics, and civil society organisations, to make better, more informed decisions 
on how to approach the enhancement of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. 
We hope that this book will contribute to this goal.
Pernille Dahler Kardel
Ambassador, Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Vi
r, l anish Emba sy in A dis Ababa, Ethiopia
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Introduction
Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and Jean-Bosco Butera
Climate change: the most challenging threat to pastoralists in the Horn of 
Africa
Globally, climate change is the biggest challenge of the twenty-first century. Rising 
temperatures, changes in seasonality and amount of rainfall, rising sea levels and 
the associated physical impacts of climate change threaten to adversely affect the 
wellbeing of human beings across the globe. Poverty, poor infrastructure and 
governance institutions, and too much reliance on primary sectors of production 
render Africa the most vulnerable continent. 
Africa took a long time to recognize the importance and impact of climate change 
on its population. Vulnerability varies across the continent and depends on various 
physical and socio-economic factors. In general, politically and economically 
marginalized areas are more vulnerable. Pastoralist regions in the Horn of Africa 
have been affected by natural disasters like droughts, with dramatic consequences 
on populations, since the 1970s. Climate change is feared to increase the likelihood 
of extreme weather events (drought or floods) in this part of the continent.
This scenario depicts a grim future for the 15-20 million pastoralists of Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The region 
contains the largest remaining concentration of pastoralists in the world, with their 
livelihoods predominantly dependent on livestock, rangeland and water. The very 
nature of their livelihoods makes pastoralists particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters, especially drought. For example, the drought of 2011 has affected close 
to 12 million pastoralists, the most affected being those in Southern Somalia as a 
result of decades-old violence and breakdown of institutions. Even under normal 
circumstances, they often face extreme challenges in meeting their basic needs, due 
to significant reductions in pasture and water as a result of desertification, bush 
encroachment, soil erosion, population growth, and political and economic 
marginalization. 
Pastoralism is also under pressure created by social changes and modern 
development, for example the decrease in available land for pasture due to the 
acquisition of land for other activities such as (commercial) farming. Tensions 
resulting from under-development and scarcity of resources like water and land are 
common. As a result, pastoral communities have been increasingly involved in 
violent clashes against each other on the one hand, and against the state on the 
other.
In recognition of the environmental impacts on the livelihoods of communities, 
states in the region established the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
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Development (IGADD) in 1986, a milestone in Africa, which later developed into 
the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) broadening its 
objectives to wider political and economic cooperation among the states. The
regional body established several programs to meet its objectives among which the 
Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN), which monitors
conflicts in the Horn of Africa (HoA) is one. From its inception, CEWARN 
focused on monitoring conflicts in the pastoralist communities with the main 
purpose of giving governments in the region a tool to prevent violent conflicts and 
to develop responses that will foster durable solutions.
IGAD’s CEWARN and others have done several studies around the issue of 
pastoralism but there is a limitation in properly investigating how the communities 
in the affected areas have traditionally responded to the challenges of harsh 
climatic conditions and how these communities have coped (or not) with climate 
change and its social impacts, such as pastoral conflicts. It is this gap that the 
Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University and the 
Africa Programme of the University for Peace (UPEACE) undertook to examine 
through the research project “Traditional knowledge and adaptation to adverse 
impacts of climate change among pastoralist in the Horn of Africa”. This volume 
presents fifteen papers selected and edited after presentation at a conference 
organized as part of the research project.
This book is not only attempting to understand and document the problem, and 
analyze the interventions but also to understand the traditional coping mechanisms 
of pastoral communities and evaluate whether external interventions streamline 
those mechanisms. Environmental disasters are not new phenomena to this region, 
thus pastoralist communities are assumed to have developed coping mechanisms to 
survive such disasters which have allowed them survive across the generations. 
However, there isn’t sufficient research and literature that addresses whether the 
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) of the member states and the 
activities of IGAD and various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
streamline these traditional mechanisms into their interventions. It is important to 
understand the traditional coping mechanisms and see if they are incorporated into 
external interventions and identify the benefits and difficulties of doing so in 
addressing the threat posed by climate change. 
Furthermore, there is a need to fill this knowledge gap by providing empirical 
evidence for some of the correlations that seem to be taken for granted by writers 
and academics. For example, a positive correlation between resource scarcity 
(pasture and/or water) and conflict is assumed, and provision of modern education 
to pastoralists is considered as a step in the right direction towards resolution of 
their problems, with little or no empirical evidence. There is a need to test these 
notions using case studies and provide supporting empirical evidence, if they prove 
to hold true. 
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Outline of the book
The desktop research and the associated international conference carried out by 
IPSS and UPEACE had four key objectives: 1) identifying the different aspects and 
manifestations of climate change in the HoA, particularly in the Karamoja Cluster; 
2) investigating the use of traditional coping mechanisms as a way of adapting to 
the challenges of climate change; 3) investigating the extent to which traditional 
knowledge and coping mechanisms have so far been used by governments and 
other actors in devising adaptation and development strategies in the region; and 4) 
understanding the linkage between climate change and pastoral conflicts in the 
region. 
This book includes 15 papers categorized under four chapters, each covering a 
more or less clear theme matching the aforementioned objectives. The first chapter 
consists of four papers covering paleoclimatic and linguistic evidence of climate 
change, its consequences in pastoralist areas and its use in vulnerability 
assessments for the HoA region. The second chapter, with three papers, attempts to 
cover the traditional coping mechanisms for climate change in the region. The third 
chapter includes three papers focusing on issues related to the nature of 
interventions by governments and climate change adaptation projects. The last 
chapter includes five papers that discuss the nexus between climate change and 
violent conflicts in the region, and local and regional conflict resolution 
approaches. The key messages in each of the papers are summarized hereunder. 
1. Evidence for and vulnerability to climate change in the Horn of Africa
The first paper by Mohammed Umer and Agazi Negash is a historical review of 
pastoralism. The paper explains pastoralism as a way of life that uses extensive 
grazing in rangelands for livestock production, a key food production system in the 
world's drylands. It refers to archaeological and genetic evidence that indicate the 
early Holocene domestication of cattle in North Africa and elaborates, using 
paleoclimatic data, that continued dryness completed the desiccation of the Sahara 
around 5000 years ago, rendering it a desert, which seems to have obliged pastoral 
communities to move towards the Horn of Africa region, among others. Since then, 
low amplitude climate fluctuations along with the internal dynamics of the 
savannah as well as human interference have affected the equilibrium between 
bush and pasture. Climate variability on annual and inter-annual scales is 
documented which has been producing droughts and famines in the region, and 
sometimes correlates with the El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon. 
These have been endangering the lives of humans and livestock.
The second paper, by Sagal Joshua Mark and J.T. Grade, discusses linguistic 
evidence for climate change in Karamoja, Uganda. This can be seen as an 
alternative approach to examining historical climate change in an area where long-
term climate data is unavailable. It outlines the names and meanings given to the 
months for 11 di?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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the ethnic groups simply number the months, an indication of loss of traditional 
knowledge. The remaining eight groups name the months according to 
environment or weather dependent activities, many names being held in common. 
It suggests that such work may be used as a tool not only to keep the language alive 
but also to examine historical climate change. 
The paper written by Joshua W. Busby, Todd G. Smith, and Kaiba L. White 
follows the definition of vulnerability developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), and assumes it to include exposure to physical hazards as 
well as socio-economic and political factors that magnify the effects of these 
hazards. The study considered four baskets of equal weight in assessing 
vulnerability: physical exposure (droughts, rainfall variability, floods, cyclone 
winds, wild fires, coastal inundation etc); population; community/household 
vulnerability (measured by health status, education, access to food, water and 
healthcare); governance and political violence (as measured by voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, global integration, political stability and 
presence of violent events). The composite vulnerability map depicts much of 
Somalia (especially Southern Somalia), the Somali region, the South Omo Zone 
and western Ethiopia, and much of South Sudan in the highest vulnerability 
quintile. Changing the weighing scheme didn’t bring much change in the 
distribution of the most vulnerable quintiles. A further finding was that models do 
not seem to agree on their predictions of the future climate of the HoA. 
Comparison of the distribution of aid and adaptation funding with the vulnerability 
maps shows that aid money is not reaching the most vulnerable parts of the region.
The fourth paper by Russell F. Schimmer, Roland A. Geerken, and Yancey A. Orr, 
discuses how the unintended consequences of some pastoralist cultural responses to 
climate variations (such as re-stocking) could contribute to drought conditions 
through a case study of Northern Kenya. The paper analyzed climate records over 
ten-, twenty-, and sixty-year spans to understand the relationship between 
precipitation, environmental stress and cultural responses in the region.
Remarkably, years of below-average rainfall do not correlate highly as catalysts to 
recorded drought events. Even more surprisingly, in some cases vegetation vigour 
was found to be negatively correlated to precipitation increases, an indication that 
resource management is a key factor to maintaining environmental integrity. It 
argues that traditional resource management practices, as cultural responses to 
multi-year climate cycles, can contribute to the frequency and severity of drought 
events. It concludes that the most important responses that set the conditions for 
drought occurrences likely take place during average rainfall periods and above-
average rainfall years when pastoralists restock their herds. 
2. Coping with the adverse impacts of climate change through traditional means
The first paper by Asnake Kefale and Fana Gebresenbet examines the traditional 
coping mechanisms used by the Dassanech and Nyangatom pastoral groups from 
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the Ethiopian sector of the Karamoja Cluster. The paper enumerates the traditional 
community coping mechanisms as herd diversification, herd splitting, income 
diversification, restocking, local alliances and others. The paper contends that 
interventions by governmental and non-governmental development agencies by 
and large overlook the capacity of traditional methods of adaptation to climate 
change. It cites the Ethiopian government’s key strategy of ‘settlement’ as an 
example, and questions whether settlement could bring pastoral communities a 
“stable and secure” way of life, and also doubts whether the introduction of large-
scale commercial farming would bring pastoral communities more challenges than 
opportunities. 
The following paper by J.T. Grade, under the title ‘Karamoja (Uganda) pastoralists 
wild plants use as hunger and famine foods’ discusses the particular coping 
mechanisms of the Ugandan Karamojon towards climate change. It is based on a 
survey of un-domesticated wild edible plants that have been, and currently are,
used in Karamoja as a coping mechanism towards hunger and famine. A total of 
132 ‘hunger foods’ are identified, the majority being plants (126) whilst six are 
animal/insect protein based. The most common plant form used in Karamoja for 
hunger or famine foods are trees (51) and herbs (47). The most common plant parts 
used are fruits (45) and tubers/roots (31). Most (84.5%) of the hunger foods listed 
require some preparation, and 60.7% require a significant amount of time. Four 
food categories were defined: famine, hunger, normal and special. Of the 132 foods 
identified, 63 are hunger foods, 35 are normal wild foods, 29 are famine foods and 
5 count as special and preserved foods. The paper underscores the value of such 
information culturally and for development, and emphasizes the need to consider 
the domestication of under-utilized wild edible plants.
The next paper, by Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale, discusses how indigenous people living 
in the Kakamega forest, Western Kenya, have responded to mounting pressure 
from pastoral migrants. It analyses the local forest resource management 
institutions and the adaptive socio-cultural methods employed by the indigenous 
Luhya people in the face of pastoral migrations and changing climate. The paper 
discusses the following questions: how do the Luhya people perceive migrant 
pastoralists? How are the newcomers incorporated in relation to forest resource 
usage? Are they assimilated? Through an ethnographic study the paper attempts to 
illuminate the local adaptive mechanisms adopted by the Luhya to manage local 
forest resources amidst mounting migration by the Pokot and changing climate.
3. Government intervention and adaptation to climate change in the Horn of 
Africa
This chapter consists of three papers. The first paper, by Martha Wagar, outlines 
some of the unintended consequences of the rise in formal education in Karamoja. 
Some of these negative experiences are: reduction in communities’ capacity to 
cope with environmental change due the loss of traditional knowledge; young 
people’s isolation from elders; disruption of traditional models of status and 
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subsequent loss of respect for and connection with traditional wisdom. In its worst 
form, it results in widespread disruption of traditional governance systems. The 
paper argues that the increasing numbers of school-leavers that return home to find 
no job prospects resort to plundering the fragile environment (for example, by 
selling firewood and charcoal) and contribute to the further degradation of the 
environment. The paper attempts to see if any mechanisms exist to modify the 
formal education system and other education programmes like Alternative Basic 
Education for Karamoja (ABEK), in order to facilitate transmission of the 
traditional knowledge which is critical at this time for the Karamojong people to 
cope with climate change and address other socio-economic factors contributing to 
the escalation in environmental degradation.
The second paper, by Yohannes Aberra, highlights the importance of examining 
the National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA) of the states in the HoA and 
how they address pastoralist vulnerabilities in their policy framework. 
Furthermore, it tries to review policies related to pastoralism and explore the 
preparation processes of the NAPA for four HoA countries (Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, and Uganda), and evaluates their friendliness to pastoralism in a 
comparative manner. In spite of some largely superficial differences in policy 
attitudes amongst the four states there seems to be consensus about the fate of 
pastoralism: its gradual disappearance. The NAPA documents also have 
differences in their methodologies and how they have addressed stakeholders and 
vulnerabilities, but their unmistakable vagueness in the phrasing of the priority 
projects vis-à-vis pastoralism reveals the prevailing dilemma about what should be 
done with this particular system of livestock production.
The paper by Tesfaye Tafesse examines the history and importance of cooperation 
by the riparian states of the Nile Basin. Regional organisations play an 
indispensable role for the sharing of climate data and experience related to water 
infrastructure development. He further argues that pastoralists in the Horn will 
benefit from such cooperation, as most member states of the Basin have a sizable 
pastoral population. He concludes that a similar regional cooperative arrangement 
should be initiated, in order to effectively enable pastoral communities to cope with 
the impact of climate change.
4. Climate change and pastoral conflicts
The first paper by Todd G. Smith starts by reviewing the environmental security 
literature from the last two decades which examines the relationship between 
rainfall variation and conflict, and concluding that there is, as yet, no consensus 
about the nature of the relationship or the causal pathways involved. It points out 
that case-based studies have presented several potential mechanisms but lack 
generalizability, while empirical studies have focused almost exclusively on 
international or civil war onset as the dependent variable, to the exclusion of other 
types of conflict. Using the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD), the paper 
contends that both too much and too little rain leads to conflict through distinctly 
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different causal mechanisms. Contrary to widely-held belief, below-average 
rainfall is found to have no effect on the likelihood of social conflict on a 
continental scale, but significantly reduced conflict risk in the IGAD region.  
The second paper, written by Wario R. Adano under the title ‘Pastoralist resources, 
conflict and climate change in East Africa’, attempts to examine long-term trends 
in pastoral conflict in the dry lands of northern Kenya. It uses rainfall and conflict 
data from the Marsabit and Turkana districts. The data shows no evidence of 
increasing violent conflict incidents in the long-term perspective. Moreover, long-
term rainfall and violent conflict data consistently indicate more violent casualties 
in wet years than in dry years, and wide deviations in inter-seasonal and inter-
annual variability in rainfall. Thus, the author claims that the scarcity-causes-
conflict argument in the dry lands lacks empirical support. Instead, it maintains that 
it is the recent subdivision of communal grazing areas into ethnic territory through 
the creation of more administrative boundaries that severely limits pastoral 
mobility, hinders efficient use of resources, constrains the pastoral production 
system and alters traditional mechanisms for negotiating access to rangeland 
resources. Ethnicization of administrative boundaries has produced a new reality: 
eruption of conflicts over territory and further marginalization of pastoral groups 
and increased poverty. In its conclusion, the paper asserts that adverse impacts of 
climate change and increased climate variability in the dry lands call for better 
local knowledge of fluidity in property rights and access to pastoralist resources, 
adaptations tailored to climate change and cooperation over available resources.
The paper by Paul Omondi highlights the role of Darfur’s rapidly deteriorating 
natural environment in the generation of conflict. It takes the view that an 
important impact of these environmental stresses was scarcity, which had 
significant implications on the security of the area, and interrogates the relationship 
between environmental scarcity and human security taking two types of evidence. 
The first relates to supply-induced scarcity, i.e. the declining trend and volatility of 
the rains from the mid-1970s through to the 1980s. The second relates to demand-
induced scarcity, i.e. the marked increase in population density since the mid-1970s 
that has put pressure on both farming and pastoral livelihood systems. In view of 
that, the ensuing ecological deterioration, which affected the northern part of 
Darfur most, forced the nomadic inhabitants of the north to gradually move into the 
southern parts in search of water and pasture. It finally argues that environmental 
pressures, cemented by ethnic differences in livelihood strategies, provided fertile 
ground for the civil war to emerge.
Gebre Yntiso’s paper explores the conflictual relationship between two Atekers: 
the Nyangatom of Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya. The paper conceptualizes 
inter-ethnic pastoral conflictas as a confrontation that prevails between groups of 
people who have, or perceive themselves as to have, competing interests in 
resources (in this case, pasture and water points), power, opportunities etc. The 
paper suggests that violence could be averted by addressing the root causes of 
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conflict and by preventing the triggering factors, both of which require the creation 
of conditions for the opponents to feel safe, united and benefiting from a mutual 
connection. It further recommends that interventions should attempt to identify 
commonalities between the conflicting parties in order to use them as connectors or 
peace capacitors and suggests considering joint border area projects targeted to 
promote cultural and socio-economic integration as ways of addressing the 
conflicts.
The last paper, by Yonas Ashine, starts by discussing the severity of environmental 
problems and their impacts in the HoA, particularly in the pastoralist areas. It claims 
that this problem is complicated by the division of pastoralists and their grasslands 
by the political boundaries of states and indicates that the trans-boundary nature of 
the problem calls for new regionalism. It further points out that this trend has 
attracted the attention of states and urged them to collaborate since the late 1980s, 
the time when the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development 
(IGADD, which later became IGAD) was created. The paper has two separate but 
interrelated objectives, examining not only the presence but also the viability of new 
regionalism in the HoA, and exploring the evolution and the effectiveness of 
IGAD/CEWARN in addressing pastoralist conflict in the region. In its findings the 
paper claims that the application of regionalism as an approach to address conflicts 
is growing. However, weak state-civil society relations, donor fatigue and the 
reluctance of member states to contribute membership fees are identified as factors 
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the new regionalist approach in addressing 
conflicts in the region. 
Findings from the various papers can be grouped into four broad categories:
1) Manifestations of climate changes go far back in the history of the 
continent
2) Pastoralist populations have established knowledge and mechanisms for 
adapting to climate change
3) Government interventions are often not in harmony with the needs and 
interests of pastoralist populations 
4) A direct causal relationship between climate change and conflict is yet 
to be established firmly and conflicts in pastoral areas are complex. 
Theme 1
Evidence for and Vulnerability 
to Climate Change in the Horn 
of Africa
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Historical Review of Pastoralism and Climate Change 
in the Horn of Africa, With Special Emphasis on Ethiopia
Mohammed Umer and Agazi Negash
Abstract
Pastoralism, the use of extensive grazing in rangelands for livestock production, is 
one of the key food production systems in the world's drylands. Seventy percent of 
Africa’s surface is covered by desert, open grassland, or shrub land, i.e. arid or 
semi-arid landscapes. Ever since the Eocene, the environmental history of Africa 
has been characterised by the expansion of open habitats and arid-adapted 
vegetation, and the evolution of fauna well adapted to coping with open and arid 
conditions. Archaeological and genetic evidence indicate the early Holocene 
domestication of cattle in North Africa. Starting at around 5,000 years ago, climate 
became drier and led to a complete desiccation of the Sahara, rendering it a 
desert. This situation seems to have pushed pastoral communities to move towards 
the Horn and East African regions. In this region closed woodlands started to 
transform into open savannah, fed by water from the surrounding highlands. Since 
then low amplitude climate fluctuations, with the internal dynamics of the 
savannah, as well as human interference have affected the bush-pasture 
equilibrium. Climate variability, on annual and inter-annual scales, has been 
documented as producing drought and famine in the region and sometimes these 
events correlated with the ENSO phenomenon. These have endangered the lives of 
humans and livestock.
1. Introduction
Over the last several decades much research has been conducted on reconstructing 
millennial scale climate changes in Africa. The results from tropical Africa, mainly 
based on lake sediment records, have shown synchronous evidence over wide 
spatial coverage. Because the Horn of Africa fits within the same context, it is 
possible to link the climate history of the region with the area supposed to be the 
origin of pastoralism, i.e. the Sahara. In this paper, the evidence from climate 
archives is compared with archaeological evidence, in order to make linkages 
between pastoral activities and climate change in the north eastern African region. 
It tries to bring together information regarding the timing for the establishment of 
aridity in Africa, the climatic context in which pastoralism developed in Africa, 
and the context in which pastoralism was established in the Horn of Africa region.
It is to be noted, however, that there are limitations to this research. The limitations 
originate from the fact that climate data sets and the archaeological information 
utilised may not have the same spatial and/or temporal coverage; age controls may 
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not be congruent; and for smaller time scales (century/decadal scales) 
archaeological data may not be available. 
1.1 Roots of the spread of aridity
Pastoralism, the use of extensive grazing in rangelands for livestock production, is 
one of the key production systems in the world's dry lands (Blench, 2001). Bobe 
(2006) states that 70% of Africa’s surface is covered by desert, open grassland, or 
shrubland, i.e. arid or semi-arid landscapes. Bobe (2006) also suggests that the
roots to aridity can be traced back to the Eocene time (for the actual ages of 
geological time-terms refer to Table 1). Although Africa supports an astonishing 
diversity of environments, ranging from tropical rainforests to deserts, the 
continent as a whole has a relatively arid landmass. In eastern Africa the proportion 
of arid and semi-arid environments is close to 83% (Foley et al., 2005).
There is much evidence to indicate that in the past Africa was a wetter continent 
than it is today, and that it was covered by extensive woodlands and forests (van 
Zinderen Bakker & Mercer, 1986). This, on broad temporal and spatial scales, 
resulted from the extinction of large herbivores at the end of the Mesozoic period 
(65 million years ago, Ma here after) and the warming of the earth in the early 
Cenozoic, which provided suitable conditions for the expansion of woody 
vegetation and closed environments (Wing & Sues, 1992). The warm temperatures 
of the Paleocene and Eocene were associated with high precipitation, while the 
disappearance of large Mesozoic herbivores temporarily eliminated a suite of 
animals that could open up forests by knocking down trees and consuming fresh 
growth (Wing & Sues, 1992). 
Table 1: Actual ages of geological time-terms
Era Epoch Period Age (in million years)
Cenozoic Quaternary Holocene 0.1
Pleistocene 1.6
Teritiary Pliocene 5.3
Miocene 23.7
Oligocene 36.6
Eocene 55
Paleocene 65
Declining global temperatures and lower precipitation in many parts of the planet 
prompted the expansion of more open habitats. Ever since the Eocene, the 
environmental history of Africa has involved the expansion of open habitats and 
arid-adapted vegetation, and the evolution of fauna well adapted to coping with 
open and arid conditions. These environmental changes were characterised by 
multiple fluctuations, and a complex interplay of climatic, tectonic, and biotic 
factors (Potts & Behrensmeyer, 1992).
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1.2 History of climate change over the past 20,000 years
This part will present climate changes in Ethiopia during the last 20,000 years, 
which encompasses the transition from hunter-gatherer to domestication and 
agricultural activities.
It is now well known that quaternary climate oscillations (or fluctuations of the 
climate during the last 2 million years) had a dramatic impact on regional 
environments at a global scale. Tropical Africa has experienced hyper arid and wet 
phases, and the very high summits also went through glacial and de-glacial 
conditions. Large fluctuations in precipitation, and thus water resources, have 
driven biological and human activities (Chalie & Gasse, 2002). This could also 
have impacted on the rise and fall of civilizations.
The most hyper arid and cold conditions in Africa occurred between 20,000-10,000 
Before Present (BP); in its intermediate years (10,000-5,000 BP) there was a very 
wet climate, and during the latter portion (after 5,000 BP) it was relatively dry, 
although abrupt climate shifts and low amplitude fluctuations were superimposed 
on these broad patterns. Human adaptation, during the hyper arid phases, might 
have forced migration to suitable habitats (refugium). The community may have 
dispersed again during the humid phase of the early Holocene, when records of 
very high lake levels were seen (e.g., Umer et al., 2004).
1.2.1 Conditions during the hyper arid and cold phase (20,000-10,000 BP)
A sedimentary core segment, recovered from the central part of Lake Tana, source 
of the Blue Nile, at 24m below the modern lake surface, has indicated a complete 
drying of the lake 17,000 years ago. Clay overlain by a papyrus swamp peat, as 
well as diatom flora extracted from these sediments, evidence this event. Over 500 
years, the lake waters gradually rose to over flow the papyrus, before abruptly 
spilling into the Blue Nile gorge, some 14,700 years ago. The timing of these 
events is similar to the drying and refill and overflow of the White Nile's headwater 
lakes, 1,500km to the south. It seems that the entire Nile system was reduced to an 
ephemeral stream, before the monsoon rains returned and the overflowing lakes 
filled the Nile once again (Lamb et al, 2007a).
A palaeosol, with in situ grass remains and dated to between about 17,000-16,000 
years ago, indicated the drying of lake Abhé —as well as several lakes in the Afar
Rift portion of the Ethiopian Rift System. Similarly, very low levels were recorded 
for the Ziway-Shalla basin lakes, before the lakes started rising dramatically about 
12,000 years ago (Gasse, 1977; Umer et al., 2004).
The above evidence shows that the whole north, eastern, western and central 
regions of Ethiopia were hyper arid between about 20,000 to 15,000 years ago. One 
can therefore hypothesise that the most suitable habitat at this time, where plant, 
animal and human population existed, was the south western Ethiopian highland 
regions, a region which still receives the highest rainfall in Ethiopia.
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1.2.2 The rising of lakes and the Early Holocene Climate Optimum (15,000-5,000
BP)
Stepped fluctuations led to the slow rise of lake levels until dramatic high stands 
were observed about 11,000 to 10,000 years ago. After this time the lakes of the 
Ziway-Shalla basin merged to form a single lake that reached an outlet level and 
overflowed northward into the Awash River (see Figures 1a and b). During these 
intervals, Lake Abhé in the Afar depression, received water from both the modern 
drainage area of the Awash River and the Ziway-Shalla overflow. Also during this 
period Abhé was a large, closed, freshwater lake, and 160m deep (Gasse, 1977). 
Fig. 1a:  Early Holocene +120m high lake levels at which the Ziway-Shalla lakes were 
united as one Mega Lake (Gillespie et al., 1983).
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Fig.1b: Early Holocene high shore lines (+120m), which receded once after 5,000 years ago 
(Gillespie et al., 1983). SD=specified datum; kyr=thousand years
Moreover, lakes and extensive ground water reserves were established in the 
present day deserts of the Sahel and Sahara. About 9,500 years ago nearly all lakes 
between latitudes 0 to 22o N were high as were the lakes of the Sahara desert and 
the Sahel (Gasse, 2000). The groundwater that we see today in these deserts is,
therefore, fossil in nature and as old as this interval of Africa’s humid phase.
The humid conditions led to the re-establishment of vegetation belts, which were 
depressed during the previous dry and cold climate. The vegetation belt or line rose 
to high altitudes along with the melting of ice on the high summits of the Bale, Arsi 
and Semien mountains, as a response to warming. The vegetation history of the 
Bale Mountains, as recorded by pollen data for the past 17,000 years, clearly 
evidences this situation (Umer et al., 2007). 
This event has allowed humans, plants and animals to disperse to then extensive 
suitable habitats—including the Sahel-Sahara region, coinciding with the 
domestication of animals in the region.
1.2.3 Establishment of arid and semi-arid climates, seasonal rainfall and 
agriculture on the Ethiopian Highlands (5,000 BP) 
Regional aridity 5,000 years ago made lake levels gradually drop to their present 
levels, with phases of moderate rises and falls. This prolonged aridity was felt 
across the regions of Tropical Africa (Gasse, 2000). The Sahara was transformed 
into a desert and the Sahel into a semi-arid region. Vegetation responded to 
moisture deficit in lowland areas across eastern Africa. Dry upland forest with 
Podocarpus and Juniperus expanded in the same region, on the highlands, in 
response to low moisture and, perhaps, accentuated seasonality (Umer et al., 2007). 
During this period the Savannah grassland became more extensive, with species 
which could tolerate arid conditions (Lamb et al. cited in Sagri, 1998). 
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1.2.4 The last 2,000 years - climate change and human impact 
Marshall et al. (2009) provide independent evidence, based on diatom and stable 
isotope records of Lake Ashenge, of increased wetness in northern Ethiopia
between 2.2 and 1.5 cal kyr BP, when the Aksumite Empire rose to power in the 
northern Ethiopian highlands. Machado et al. (1998) also found evidence for a 
wetter period during this time, from in-filled valley deposits in the northern 
Ethiopian highlands. These data, therefore, support Butzer's (1981) hypothesis that 
an extension of the growing season (probably with a change to a strongly bi-modal 
rainfall) allowed enhanced agricultural output, necessary to support the significant 
increase in population. However, it appears that the change to a wetter climatic 
regime occurred at least 200 years prior to Aksum's rise to prominence, during the 
so-called ‘pre-Aksumite’ phase, when some of the first evidence for complex 
societies on the plateau of northern Ethiopia is found. Although any climatic shift 
did not trigger an immediate rise of the Aksumite empire, it provided the suitable 
conditions, which the local population increasingly utilised (Marshall et al., 2009).
There is evidence, from the Lake Ashenge diatom and stable isotope records, that 
soon after 1.5 cal kyr BP (500 AD) there was a rapid increase in aridity. This 
supports Butzer's (1981) another conjecture that there was a shift back to a drier 
climate (to uni-modal rainfall) in the northern Ethiopian highlands, which reduced 
the growing season and was, perhaps, a significant factor in the decline of the 
Aksum. However, the Ashenge data indicate that the arid shift occurred some 250 
years prior to that suggested by Butzer (1981), when Aksum was at the height of its
power. This, therefore, indicates that there was no abrupt population collapse, but 
more likely a gradual move away from a region that could no longer provide the 
resource base required to support such a large population. Higher resolution 
reconstructions constrained by more robust age-depth models are required to 
confirm these proposed short-lived climate shifts (Marshall et al, 2009).
Lake Ashenge also yielded pollen data useful for reconstructing vegetation history. 
Abrupt Podocarpus decline and enhanced soil erosion occurred ~1,500 BP (500 
AD), coincident with intensive land use following the shift towards dry conditions. 
In Wollo the records from the sediments of Lakes Hayke and Hardibo indicate that 
deforestation started at 500 BC and secondary vegetation persisted for 1,800 years 
(Darbyshire et al., 2003). This was superimposed by drought, from 1,200-1,400
AD. Juniperus forest with Olea and Celtis then expanded from 1,400-1,700 AD, 
perhaps due to drought induced depopulation, that was followed by increased 
rainfall (Darbyshire et al., 2003; Lamb et al, 2007b). 
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Fig. 2: Climate driven level fluctuations for Lake Hayk, Northern Ethiopia (Lamb et al, 2007b).
2. History of climate and pastoralism in the Horn of Africa
New archaeological and genetic data support the early Holocene domestication of
cattle in the marginal areas of North Africa, and the patchy spread across the 
Sahara to the south as climatic conditions deteriorated, mainly around 5-4 thousand 
years BP (Marshall & Hildebrand, 2002). Plant domestication came rather late in 
Africa (after 4,000 BP), perhaps because of the high mobility of the herders and 
risk associated with cultivation in arid environments (Marshall & Hildebrand, 
2002). This trend is assumed to be unlike other parts of the world, where 
domestication was the result of settled hunter gatherers in well watered places with 
abundant resources, rather than in marginal areas. 
Based on genetic and archaeological evidence, there seems to be general agreement 
among investigators that pastoralism in North Africa was fully developed by 7,000 
BP. Many sites in eastern and central Sahara (e.g., Wadi Bahkt, Enneri and 
Gabong) were, by this time, occupied by cattle and caprine pastoralists, who also 
utilised wild plants (Close & Wendorf, 1992). At some sites (e.g., Nabta Playa) 
there was intensified utilisation of wild plant resources for a long time. By 8,000 
BP the sorghum recovered from Nabta Playa had already started to show some 
characteristics of cultivated (but not of domesticated) varieties (Wendorf et al.,
1992). By 6,000 BP pastoral sites had become common in the Sahara; on many of 
them pottery and grinding stones have been found (Close & Wendorf, 1992).
Heavy reliance on small stock, at the expense of cattle, and more importantly the 
move south of the Sahara to wetter areas, appears to have been the response to 
deteriorating climatic conditions. At Adrar Bous, Arlit and other sites (in the 
Sahara), cattle were present by the 6th to the 4th millennium BP, while in the east, in 
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the Sudan, evidence of cattle from as early as 6,500 BP has been found. The Sahara 
had become dry by the 4th millennium BP, and was almost deserted by the 3rd
millennium BP (Close & Wendorf, 1992; Wendorf et al., 1992).
Clark (1954, 1988) and others suggest that the mid-Holocene aridity of the Sahara 
forced pastoralists to migrate into the Horn of Africa in search of pasture. 
Unfortunately, there are only a few sites that have yielded evidence of pastoral 
(animal) remains in Ethiopia and the Horn.
Excavations at Lalibela and the Natchebiet caves near Lake Tana (Dombrowski,
1970; Dombrowski, 1971) have yielded the charred remains of barley, legumes and 
chickpeas,  associated with ovicaprids and possibly domesticated cattle, pottery, 
grinding stones, and a microlithic industry dating to no earlier than 2,500 BP. 
However, the crops are of the "Near Eastern Complex" and therefore only provide 
minimal age estimates for the use of these domesticates in Ethiopia.
Other evidence for early food production in northern Ethiopia in the form of 
livestock, include cattle and possibly donkey bones—identified from deposits 
excavated in the 1940's at the Quiha rock shelter near Mekele (Barnett 1999 a, b; 
Clark 1954, p. 324; Clark, 1988). These bones were found associated with ceramic 
bearing Late Stone Age/Neolithic assemblages, and were composed of obsidian 
microliths, small scrapers, blades and blade cores. While Clark (1988) suggests that 
this lithic assemblage, particularly the "blades with marginal retouch [are] not 
unlike those of the East African [Kenya, Tanzania] Elementeita1-Industry", 
Fattovich (1977) refers to them as "traces of Elementeita-like industry". On the 
other hand, Bower (1988, 1991) sees connections between the pottery from Quiha 
and those of Narosura Ware (one of the several pastoral Neolithic ceramic types of 
East Africa) and suggests southward, pastoral movement from this part of northern 
Ethiopia to East Africa. However, more data is needed before confirming these 
propositions. Clark (1988) further states that there is very little doubt about the 
similarity between the Quiha pottery, those of Agordat (Arkell, 1954), and those of 
the Atbai tradition of Eastern Sudan (Fattovich et al., 1984). However, although 
Clark (1988) postulates a 4,000-3,000 BP date for the ceramic bearing obsidian 
artifacts, obsidian hydration dates put them considerably later.
At the site of Danei Kawlos, also in northern Ethiopia some 70 km (as the crow 
flies) northwest of Quiha, a direct date of Bos lower third premolar from layer 5 of 
the site, yielded an age of 3,358 +/- 47 BP. At this level there was also charcoal 
dated to 3,380 +/- 160 BP and provides one of the first securely dated contexts for 
the presence of domestic livestock in the Horn of Africa. The fauna were 
associated with decorated ceramics and a microlithic dominated industry. 
However, on this site, and at the lower levels of the nearby site of Ba’ati Ataro, the 
inhabitants also relied heavily on small wild animals, particularly dik-diks, 
1 An archaeological culture named after the type site of Elementaita in Kenya.
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indicating dependence on water resistant animals and, thereby, demonstrating the 
arid conditions of the time (Negash, 2001). This is consistent with the 
paleoclimatic reconstructions of the period.
Similar evidence is to be found in Gobedra, near Aksum in northern Ethiopia, 
which has yielded probable domestic cattle remains. These were associated with 
pottery and stone artifacts dating to 856 BC, while the lower stratum of the site that 
yielded a camel tooth has been brachiated to between 7,000-3,000 BP (Phillipson,
1977). At Lake Beseka, near Metehara in central Ethiopia, cattle occurred around 
3,500 BP in the Late Holocene Phase of the Beseka Industry period (Brandt, 1982). 
The domestic cattle were associated with a lithic assemblage largely composed of 
end and convex scrapers, made of obsidian, together with pottery, grinding stones, 
and a possible stone bowl fragment. At Laga Oda, a rock shelter close to Dire 
Dawa, remains of camel and cattle associated with microliths have been recovered 
in the more recent levels of the site. Clark and Prince (1978) suggest a mid-second 
millennium BC for the levels that yielded these fauna.
Other evidence for livestock presence in Ethiopia and the Horn at the beginning of 
the mid-Holocene period comes in the form of rock art. In the Horn, rock art is 
found in the form of paintings and engravings. Although some rock art sites display 
some wild animals the overwhelming majority show domestic animals. The focus 
on domestic animals has compelled scholars to describe the rock art of Ethiopia 
and the Horn as pastoral (Negash, 1997a). Of the domestic animals displayed cattle 
are the most represented. Sometimes the art shows humans plowing or milking 
cattle. Although the exact number is still unknown, such rock arts are found in the 
Harar-Dire Dawa area in eastern Ethiopia, in the Temben-Agame area in northern 
Ethiopia, and in the Welaita Sodo area in southern Ethiopia (Anfray, 1967; 
Graziosi, 1964: Joussaume, 1981; Negash, 1997b). Therefore, these rock art finds 
suggest the presence of a food producing economy (pastoralism and/or agro-
pastoralism) in the Horn in prehistoric times.
The rock art of the Horn is divided into two main stages (Cervicek, 1979). The first
stage, the Surre-Hanakiya stage, contains a naturalistic painting of humpless cattle, 
and is tentatively dated to between 5,000-3,000 years ago. The second stage, the 
Dahthami stage, is divided into early and later art forms. It is suggested that the 
earliest form of the second stage coincides with the return of the ameliorating 
humid conditions that occurred during the late Holocene (around 2,000 years ago), 
while the later form, dated to around the 4th century AD, contains depictions of 
humped cattle, and reflects the arid conditions of the time (Brandt & Carder, 1987).
Current opinion favours that domestic animals were imported into East Africa 
(Kenya and Tanzania) from areas to the north (Ambrose, 1984; Bower 1988, 1991; 
Marshal, 1994). This is largely because excavations at the few but geographically 
well distributed sites, that date to the late Pleistocene and early Holocene (e.g., 
Lake Turkana basin, Lake Nakuru basin), have not yielded wild progenitors of 
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domestic stock; neither did the pre-Neolithic faunal assemblages from the Sudan. 
Therefore, the most likely place from which domestic stock could have been 
introduced into East Africa is the eastern Sahara, migrating through either southern 
Sudan or southern Ethiopia. This does not create any chronological disagreement 
as the earliest agreed date for the origins of pastoralism in East Africa is ca 4,000 
BP. Unfortunately, only a few sites from this time have been excavated in East 
Africa and, as a result, the extent to which pastoralism was adopted in East Africa 
between 5,000-4,000 BP is poorly understood.
Bower (1991) states that domestic fauna in East Africa was extremely rare before 
3,000 BP, and he has looked for other supporting evidence. He cites a single rock 
shelter in Kenya that contains depictions of humpless domestic cattle and notes 
their resemblance to pictures of animals found in eastern Ethiopia—that are 
tentatively dated to 5,000-3,000 BP. However, there is an abundance of domestic 
cattle in the assemblages dated to and after 3,000 BP. On a morphological and 
metrical basis (Marshal, 1994) an argument has been made for the presence of zebu 
cattle in East Africa by 2,000 BP; while a single horn core belonging to the short 
horn breed (Gifford, 1998) was found at Narosura, a site that has been dated to 
2,360 ± 110 to 2,760 ± 115 BP. Although not in large quantities, there are some 
livestock remains at the site of the Enkapune Ya Muto rock shelter, in the Central 
Rift of Kenya, predominantly associated with hunting-gathering occupation levels 
and dated to around 4,000 BP (Marean, 1992).
Other early but securely dated (4,000 BP) faunal remains come from Dongodien in 
northern Kenya, along the eastern shores of Lake Turakna. The site contains 
microliths and pottery. Based on recovered domestic cattle and caprines, as well as 
fish and other small wild animals at this site, Marshall (1994) suggests that the site 
represents populations who kept herds but who also practiced hunting and fishing. 
No plant remains were recovered from this site. 
In conclusion, the preceding discussion clearly indicates that pastoralism was 
introduced from the Sahara, as there is no indication of wild ancestors of animal 
domesticates in the Horn of Africa or East Africa. The pastoral movement from the 
Sahara occurred as a result of its complete desiccation after 5,000 BP. At this time 
a semi-arid climate was established in the East African lowlands, supplying pasture 
and well watered areas that were also fed by streams from the surrounding 
highlands, where pastoralists might have taken refuge.
3. Savanna ecosystem over the last 5,000 Years: Case study from the 
main Ethiopian Rift Valley
Pollen and charred epidermal fragments from a small crater lake, Tilo, in the Main 
Ethiopian Rift Valley indicate a transition from woody savanna to drier grassland 
occurred at 5,000 BP (Lamb, 2001). This transition marked the change from 
Hyparrhenia species dominance to more diverse grassland, with Themeda and 
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Heteropogon species. This transition could also mark the expansion of grazing and 
pastoral systems. By 2,000 BP Chloris and Aristida species had become more 
abundant, perhaps indicating increased anthropogenic grazing intensity. Indicators 
of cultivation, such as maize and ruderal plants, which appeared very late (about 
100 years ago), perhaps show a transition from pastoralism to agriculture.
4. History of bush encroachment over the last 2,000 years: case study 
from Dawcha Ridge
One major impact of climate, and also humans, on savannah over century scale 
variability is related to the issue of bush encroachment. Bush encroachment is a 
significant phenomenon in savanna environments, as it affects wildlife and local 
livelihoods by preventing new pasture generation. In Ethiopia this has been studied 
from pollen records in hyrax middens from the Dara range in the Mago National 
Park, south western Ethiopia (Gil-Romera et al., 2010). Their investigation centred
on whether bush encroachment is a new phenomenon in this region, prompted by 
recent overgrazing and uncontrolled burning, or whether it conforms to a normal 
succession phase in a non-equilibrium context, in accordance with a state-and-
transition savanna model, as suggested by Meyer et al. (2007). The findings for the 
last 2,000 years show that the vegetation of the region remained open savannah 
while bush encroachment, based on abundance of encroaching taxa, such as 
Grewia and Capparaceae species, took place at c.a. BC 150, and AD 180, 450, 
1050, 1280 and 1750. 
Gil-Romera et al. (2010) also examined whether the savannah dynamics observed 
in the Dewachaga record are linked to well-described regional palaeoclimatic 
events or human induced processes, or both. They tried to compare the bush 
encroachment index Detrended Correspondence Analysis ((DCA), axis 1 on Figure 
3) at Dewachaga with other records, such as the East African lake levels—within 
limitations such as the shortage of regional palaeo-environmental records, the fact 
that the sites are relatively far from the study area, and that there could be 
chronological uncertainties (although comparison is only done with calibrated 
calendar years (BC/AD)). Interestingly, however, they found that long-term, non-
encroaching phases, namely those in which DCA axis scores remained constantly 
low, appear during relatively wetter periods. The coincidence was interpreted as 
wet phases may facilitate grass expansion up to a certain threshold, following 
which trees can then outcompete grasses, expanding their cover until self-thinning, 
intra-competitive processes, or persistent drought allows the grass layer to spread 
again. 
This succession would explain the rise and fall of encroaching species between ca 
AD 100 and 300 and the relatively stable herb layer between ca AD 1,250 and 
1,750 at Dewachaga (Fig. 3), when lake levels rose in response to increasing 
rainfall (Verschuren et al., 2000). Lake Turkana remained relatively low for much 
of the first millennium AD, which would be consistent with a rather open 
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landscape at Dewachaga. During this period grass expansion might not have been 
linked to increasing precipitation but could have been the final consequence of a 
persistent tree-grass fluctuating dynamic since ca BC 300. The continuing aridity 
would have played a determinant role, favouring grasses over trees. Trees would 
later recover as a consequence of the wet pulse, reflected in Lake Turkana levels 
around AD 1,000. The Medieval Warm Period (MWP), between AD 1,000 and 
1,270 in some East African regions, has been characterised as an extremely dry 
phase in which lake levels generally decreased (Verschuren et al., 2000; Umer, 
2005). In Dewachaga, an abrupt decline in the encroachment trend ca AD 1,200 
marks the start of a relatively open landscape that continued until the end of the 
sequence. This last phase of open landscape corresponds to the Little Ice Age 
(LIA), ca AD 1,270–1,850, (Verschuren et al., 2000), which in East Africa is 
widely recognised as a relatively wet phase. It can be seen how the vegetation at 
Dewachaga presented a threshold response to this environmental change, where 
increasing precipitation may favour a particular plant functional type until the
threshold is crossed, triggering a dramatic change in the ecosystem.
Fig. 3: Pollen diagram from Dewachaga, in the Dara range, showing phases of bush 
encroachment and climate (Gil-Romera et al., 2010).
Verschuren et al. (2000) acknowledge that landscape transformation could also 
have been driven by human activities, although the best guess is that the Mursi 
occupied the area only in the early to mid-nineteenth century. However, there is 
evidence of former occupation by hunters, agriculturalists and pastoralists, who 
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may have had similar cultural systems and been involved in similar subsistence 
activities to the Mursi. In the acquired data the only obvious signs of these 
activities are found at AD 1,700, through the presence of cereal pollen (sorghum 
and maize). This does not imply an absence of human activity in earlier times, but 
could suggest that agriculture was then less important than pastoralism. Thus, 
faecal and fungi spores, which might be related to pastoralism, are consistently 
present from ca. AD 1,000. Pastoralism would probably imply increasing fire 
activities, although no clear correlation was found between the spores and charcoal 
abundance. Verschuren et al. (2000) conclude that while human activity may have 
been an important driver of the system, it was probably not a transformative one.
Fig. 4: Arboreal (tree) pollen (AP) and non-arboreal pollen (NAP) proportions and the DCA 
index showing encroachment and climate phases (Gil-Romera et al., 2010).
5. History of drought and famine
Marshall (2010) has provided a good summary of the history of drought and 
famine in his PhD dissertation, partly based on the following literature. Degefu 
(1987) wrote on the long-term history of the occurrence of drought and famine in 
Ethiopia, utilising references cited in the works of Shove (1977) and Nicholson 
(1979), and information obtained from the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation 
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Commission (RCC) and the Economic Commission for Africa Report (1984). A 
total of 27 events are noted, with evidence derived from old Nile flood level 
records, Ethiopian documentary archives (AD 1,400 onwards), and meteorological 
records (since the 1950s). Although no obvious local climatic trend is evident from 
the long-term record (Degefu, 1987), a correlation is suggested between these 
drought/famine events in Ethiopia and the occurrence of the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) (Haile, 1988) (see Table 2).
Table 2: Chronology of El Niño and drought/famine in Ethiopia
El Niño 
Years
Drought/Famine 
Years
Region(s)
1539-41 1543-62 Harar (eastern)
1618-19 1618 Northern Ethiopia
1828 1828-29 Shewa (central)
1864 1864-66 Tigray and Gondar (northern, north western)
1874 1876-78 Tigray and Afar (northern, north eastern)
1880 1880 Tigray and Gonder (northern)
1887-89 1888-92 Ethiopia
1899-1900 1899-1900 Ethiopia
1911-12 1913-14 Northern Ethiopia
1918-19 1920-22 Ethiopia
1930-32 1932-34 Ethiopia
1953 1953 Tigray and Wolo (northern, north eastern)
1957-58 1957-58 Tigray and Wolo
1965 1964-66 Tigray and Wolo
1972-73 1973-74 Ethiopia, Tigray and Wolo
1982-83 1983-84 Ethiopia
1986-87 1987-88 Ethiopia
1991-93 1990-94 Ethiopia
1997-98 1999-2000 Ethiopia (flooding in 1998)
Source: Adapted from Wolde-Georgis, 1997; Caviedes, 2001
Table 2 shows the high degree of correlation between El Niño events (warm 
ENSO) and drought/famine years in Ethiopia. Drought can be seen to either 
coincide with, or follow, El Niño events, with more northerly regions of the 
country often being the worst affected. The coincidence of warm ENSO episodes
and drought became evident after the El Niño of 1957-58, as the phenomena seem 
to have become more frequent and intense more recently, possibly as a result of 
contemporary global warming (Comenetz & Caviedes, 2002).  
Regarding rural vulnerability to famine, Wolde-Mariam (1986) presents evidence 
that the occurrence of recent El Niño-forced droughts has had disastrous 
consequences for agricultural and pastoral communities in Ethiopia. Whenever the 
summer monsoon is weakened or late to arrive, as a result of El Niño, crops 
planted in the early summer are either stunted or fail altogether (Comenetz & 
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Caviedes, 2002). With most cultivation powered by oxen, the failure or delay of 
rains causes critical shortages of fodder that leads to cattle mortality (Wolde-
Georgis et al., 2001). Wolde-Mariam (1986), analysing drought occurrences 
between 1958 and 1977, indicated that a spatial pattern of drought progression 
across the country appeared to have taken place.
5.1 The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-1892
During the late nineteenth century, Ethiopia suffered one of the worst famines in 
the country’s history. Pankhurst (1966a, b) gives a detailed contemporary 
description of the episode, referred to in Ethiopian history as Kifu Ken (meaning 
harsh or evil days).  Numerous contributing factors, such as cattle plague epidemic 
(rinderpest), harvest failure, an outbreak of insect swarms, and a meteorological 
drought, combined to cause serious deleterious effects, which cumulated in acute 
starvation throughout Ethiopia.
In 1888 both the kiremt (summer) and the belg (mid-year) rains failed to come, 
triggering catastrophic drought. In November 1888 there were reports that the lack 
of rain had caused a large proportion of the crops to perish. By January 1889, in 
certain areas of the country, the sun had burned all the remaining crops. To make 
matters worse, in the same month, masses of caterpillars appeared and destroyed 
any crops that had survived. Swarms of locusts followed and annihilated the little 
that was left. By February, the harvest failure and insect infestation had reduced 
much of the country to misery, with grain production in some areas falling by as 
much as 97% (Pankhurst, 1966a). Though the failure of the harvest was initially 
caused by the meteorological drought, the impact was exacerbated by the 
rinderpest epidemic that killed almost all the oxen, and, therefore, brought an end 
to ploughing. Peasant farmers began to give up hope, and many left their land to 
become fallow (Ibid).
The harvest failure led to a doubling in the price of provisions by as early as 
November 1888. Pankhurst (1966a) draws on a wide range of documentary 
archives to illustrate how these increases were felt across the whole of the market. 
Between 1889 and 1890 the cost of grain increased by one to two hundred times; 
plough oxen by twenty to thirty times; and cattle by thirty to forty times. The value 
of salt, historically used as a trading currency, rocketed in response to the increased 
transportation costs resulting from the shortage of livestock. Food became difficult 
to obtain at any price, with employees refusing to be paid in anything but grain. 
The food supply shortage throughout Ethiopia led to a “famine of the most acute 
proportions” (Pankhurst, 1966a, p. 112). Pankhurst (1966a, p. 113) quotes a 
missionary from 1890 as reporting “Everywhere I meet walking skeletons and even 
horrible corpses, half eaten by hyenas, of starvelings who had collapsed from 
exhaustion.” A degree of civil unrest ensued, as the peasants refused to work and 
taxes were no longer paid.
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The existence of large numbers of unburied animal and human corpses led to a 
substantial deterioration of sanitary conditions (Nicholls, 1993). The famine was 
accompanied by the outbreak of epidemics and a dramatic increase in the death rate 
through illness, as enfeebled famine victims lacked the stamina to fight infection 
(Pankhurst, 1966a). Outbreaks of smallpox, typhus, cholera, influenza, bronchitis, 
and dysentery were reported from many parts of the country, which killed large 
numbers of people. The famine and subsequent epidemics are believed to have 
resulted in the death of one-third of the entire population of Ethiopia (Pankhurst, 
1966a). Considerable depopulation and migration occurred, causing massive 
demographic changes. After the great famine, the population was concentrated 
around the central regions, where the new imperial seat of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa,
was located. Some areas of the north were abandoned, while others were 
intensively over-farmed. The population shifts and environmental degradation that 
occurred seriously affected the ecological make-up of Ethiopia, making it highly 
susceptible to future drought (Fesseha, 2002).
5.2 Drought and famine in the 1970s and 1980s
The most devastating drought since meteorological records began started in 1972 
(Degefu, 1987). Although the drought affected many parts of Africa, the most 
pronounced impact was felt in Ethiopia. The event is also important as it was the 
first time that the negative consequences of the occurrence of warm ENSO 
anomalies in regions of the tropics was fully appreciated (Caviedes, 1982). 
Globally, the 1972-73 El Niño was not extremely severe, when compared to past 
episodes, but regionally, the consequences in Africa were the most calamitous of 
recent decades (Comenetz & Caviedes, 2002). This event substantially upset the 
hydro-meteorological regimes of eastern and sub-Saharan Africa, initiating the 
infamous drought and subsequent famines of the Sahel (Kates, 1981).  
In Ethiopia, a complete failure of the belg rains and a partial failure of the kiremt
rains dramatically reduced the harvest season of 1972, particularly in the north 
eastern region of Wolo. By 1973 the ENSO episode had become more apparent, as 
the kiremt rains again failed to materialise, which extended the drought further into 
the northern highlands (Comenetz & Caviedes, 2002). By mid-1974 the spectre of 
famine covered most of the country (Wolde-Mariam, 1986).  
Degefu (1987) cites figures from an RCC publication of 1982 to illustrate the 
severity of the 1970s drought and famine episodes on the Ethiopian people. 
Famine-related deaths for Tigray, Wolo and northern Shewa are given at around 
200,000, although Degefu (1987) also provides other estimates given at 400,000 to 
one million for Tigray and more than 100,000 for Wolo. In these northern areas, it
is reported that 80% of cattle, 50% of sheep, and 30% of goats perished. Poor 
harvests, as a partial result of drought, were still occurring in these regions towards 
the end of the decade. In 1977-78 at least 75% of the main harvest was destroyed 
due to “unfavourable climatic conditions” (Degefu, 1987, 31). 
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The premature development of an El Niño event in May 1982 caused a two-month 
delay in the kiremt rains, which again resulted in crop failure in northern Ethiopia, 
particularly in parts of the Gonder and Wolo regions. Below average rainfall 
persisted during the rest of the year and continued into 1983. The belg rains arrived 
at the start of October, but during the second week of this month they ceased and 
aridity prevailed throughout the country. The continued dryness caused widespread 
migration and the dislocation of rural populations who moved in search of grass 
and water (Degefu, 1987). Thousands of both domestic and wild animals perished 
as a result of severe dehydration, and the outbreak of forest fires caused 
incalculable damage to the environment and to the forest-based economy of the 
country (Degefu, 1987).  
It was following the 1982-83 El Niño that led to the 1984 drought and famine, that 
the National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA) first initiated the 
application and incorporation of El Niño information into its early warning strategy 
for the 1987 drought. Although improvements are apparent, a current failing of this 
technique is the “predictability gap” (Nicholls, 1993) which describes the period of 
time between the recognition that an El Nino event is apparent and the rains failing. 
Currently this gap is not sufficient to fully prepare for or mitigate the effects of El 
Nino.
6. Conclusion
The environments of tropical Africa in general, and the Horn of Africa in 
particular, have been affected by global scale natural climate oscillations that have 
forced humans to adapt, through migration and innovation at various time scales. 
Under natural conditions ecosystems have the power to recover, provided that 
stress is relieved and extreme climate is ameliorated. Although it is possible that a 
number of factors led to the transition from hunting and gathering to domestication 
and food production, climate must have played a role in determining the spatial and 
temporal availability of water and pasture. In the long term this led to regional 
migration, while in the short-term locally diverse habitats, such as oasis in deserts 
or altitudinal migration, provided temporary resources. It is necessary to conserve 
such sites while a more feasible adaptation strategy is determined.
Potential suitable habitats, which can withstand climate stress, must be identified 
and protected from degradation and already degraded areas should be rehabilitated.
The trajectory of future anthropogenic climate change, mainly temperature rise, is 
now established. Changes in rainfall regimes and related hydrological and 
ecological shifts still need to be understood at regional and local levels. In any case 
environmental protection and innovation, rather than migration, are the most likely 
future instruments of adaptation—combining indigenous and scientific knowledge.  
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Potential Tool to Support Climate Change Research in
Karamoja, Uganda: Historical Month Names and Meanings
Sagal Joshua Mark and Jean T. Gradé
Abstract
Karamoja, 28,000 km2 in northeastern Uganda, is inhabited by 1.2 million people. 
???? ?????????? ???sist of eight Nilotic groups in the plains and three Kuliak 
??????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??????????????? ??????????
pastoralists continue to utilize a unique calendar system based on historical 
seasonal events. Data on rainfall has not been well kept nor regularly analysed. 
Therefore, this paper examines another approach to historical climate change. It 
????????? ?????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????????????????????????????-
pastoral groups. The study of linguistic change over time–philology or historical 
linguistics–within a language can help give more evidence or reconstruct events 
from long ago. Methodologies used include literature review, personal 
observation, group discussion and systematic survey. Three of the ethnic groups’ 
num???? ??????????? ????? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???????
????????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????????? ????????? ????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ???????
according to environment- or weather-dependent activities. Many names are held 
in common. The results show that month names have not changed, but the climatic 
events associated with their naming have shifted in Karamoja for 10 of the 12 
months. Only two months have retained their original meanings; these are the two 
hottest and driest months in the area, L????? and L????? (January and 
February, respectively), thus correlating with climate change. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time that the majority of the ethnic groups living in 
Karamoja, Uganda, have had their month names and their meanings documented. 
This work may be used as a tool to keep the language alive, and may be relevant to 
the larger body of climate change research, especially historical changes where 
meteorological data is non-existent. 
1. Introduction
Karamoja is an arid/semi-arid region, 28,000 km2 in area, located in the north-
eastern part of Uganda at 1°30´ - 4°00´N and 33°30´ - 35°00´E. Karamoja is 
inhabited by approximately 1.2 million people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
(UBOS), 2008) distributed among eleven different ethnic groups1: Bokora, 
?????????? ???? ????? ????? ????????????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??????? ??????????
??????? ???????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? Figure 1). Each group has a different 
1 Historically, the literature would not use the term people or ethnic group, but rather tribe. Local 
people will likewise use the term ‘tribe’. However, terms like tribe or clan can be controversial terms 
implicating cultural superiority; we prefer to use people or ethnic group.
Evidence for and vulnerability to climate change
35
language.2 Six are Nilotic ethnic groups living in t??? ??????? ???????????????????
????? ???????? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????
?????????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???? ???? ?????
?????????? ??? ?? ??????????? ?????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????? ??????? ???????? ?????
?????????? are agro-pastoralists who put great value on cattle and livestock; 
however, the Labwor and Kuliak groups are less cattle-centric. Culturally, the 
?????????? ??????? ???? ?????????????????????????? ???? ??????????????????? ???? ?????
strong social networks. The people of Karamoja rely on their cattle and, thus, are 
dependent upon the land and other natural resources. They use indigenous 
knowledge and cultural systems to interpret and forecast events, both social and 
ecological.
?????????????? ???????????????????? ???men by interpreting and predicting the 
behaviour of the environment using, for example, ants and anthills, bird migrations 
(e.g. white pelicans, known as ???????) and flowering trees (e.g. Acacia senegal). 
??????????????????????????????????????????e the sky, stars, meteors, the moon and 
the sun to foretell seasonal climatic events. They also use the smell of particular 
winds to predict what weather is going to occur in the near future.
Figure 1: Map of Karamoja, Uganda - showing the 11 ethnic groups interviewed (Credit: M. 
Lejeune)
2 ????? ????? ???????? ??????? ???????? ???? ??????? ????? ????letely different languages and are 
unintelligible to any of the other 11 groups; while others (Pian, Bokora, Matheniko, Dodos and Jie) 
can understand one another.
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???? ?????????? ????? ?????????????? ???????? ????? ????? ???????????? ??????
environment into their daily culture. For example, most clans are named after their 
favourite animals, birds, trees or other natural objects. They enjoy and respect the 
environment and all of its natural resources because they know that everything in 
nature is useful to them.
One other issue is their community social system, based on love for one another. 
Like many African cultures (Legesse, 1973; Mbiti, 1989)?? ?????????????????????
believe and follow the “I am because you are, and since you are, therefore I am”
philosophy. There is a great spirit of belonging to the community, no-one in their 
culture lives like an island but, rather, everyone is intricately connected and shares 
responsibility in the community. Within the community, any elder has the authority 
to discipline a misbehaving child or person according to their cultural norms; for 
example, there can be a public whipping as the order of the day at community 
gatherings for a serious offence (i.e. killing or offending a community member). 
The social punishment structure is broken into gender roles, the women will 
discipline women, and the men will discipline men. This is done so that everyone 
knows the effect they have on the entire community, not just themselves. Parents 
are also affected by their child’s offence–they are obliged to sacrifice a bull by 
spearing it or brew beer to appease the offended person and the entire community. 
This is meant to bring a general, peaceful cleansing. Another aspect of their 
communal living is how they share food. Milk and meat are given to a family that 
has no livestock. But climate change has caused change in the social structure of 
???? ??????????? ?????? ?????? ????? ????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??
diminished spirit of sharing together or having a unified social discipline. People 
now live for themselves and there is no spirit of sympathy as there was some 
decades ago. Climate change has affected other aspects of behaviour as well, for 
example, there is now an increased tendency to move to towns away from the 
traditional villages. Most of the young generation has forgotten to count and name 
months in the traditional way and they have greatly diminished traditional 
environmental knowledge. Modernization and the system of government have 
corrupted the pastoralists’ culture.3
Despite the challenge of modernizat????????????????????????????????????????????????
their unique calendar. This observation based calendar provides a schedule for 
weather and climatic changes, environmental happenings (like trees shedding their 
leaves and mushrooms coming out) and even when certain animals will give birth. 
The names of months in most European languages are derived from Roman times 
and some celebrate Roman deities and emperors, which have little to no meaning 
for most people today. Native American months were named after the full moon 
with an environmental awareness, e.g. the moon of the wolf, the moon of the snow,
3 This paragraph are direct observations by the primary author, a 41 year old Pian 
??????????man, in good community standing and awareness, well-travelled and known 
throughout the entire Karamoja region.
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flower, hunter, cold, etc.4 Some African cultures likewise, name their months 
according to seasons. Few references are available documenting traditional month 
names worldwide. Those found include, Aztec, Maya (which have more  months 
and less days), Gregorian, Julian, Chinese, Jewish, Islamic, Burmese, Japanese, 
Belarusians, Celtic, Berber, Ethiopian, Maori and Oromi.5 Some advanced 
societies, like Japan, have shunned the traditional names and now just number 
them. However, sometimes one or two traditional months’ names are used in 
poetry.
???????????????????????????????????????????????-word idiom and explains what 
event will happen with the weather or the environment. The naming system plays a 
????? ?????????? ????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ????
directing local communities as to when it is better to prepare land, sow seeds, 
perform marriage ceremonies or when their livestock can migrate out in search of 
pasture, water and shade areas.
Physically, in recent years (from the mid-1980s) the region has experienced 
changes in seasonal patterns and alterations in the climate. This includes natural 
events such as: stormy rains, floods,6 landslides,7 high temperatures, irregular 
winds, poor vegetation growth, diminishing species of grasses, herbs and trees, and 
soil changes. Other weather phenomena have also appeared: including extreme 
heat and/or little or too much rains are causing rocks to fall, creating landslides and 
other hazards for the local people.
Disease outbreaks in Karamoja; such as malaria, cholera, yellow fever, hepatitis 
and elephantiasis; may be due to climatic changes (Patz, Campbell-Lendrum, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????8 They say “Why 
are there such strange diseases happening now? Long ago these diseases were not 
here and such destructive events never used to take place.” This suggests the need 
for rapid action to help pastoralists adapt to climate change, as it has serious 
repercussions for public health, food security and general effects on the 
environment. The impacts of climate change create challenges for the poorest 
communities as their livelihoods are likely to be more sensitive to change 
(Tompkins & Adger, 2004).
4 http://americanindian.net/moons.html
5 For details see Legesse, 1973;  http://www.mexconnect.com/articles/1554-aztec-calendar,
http://www.everyculture.com, http://www.oromia.org, http://www.belarusguide.com/,
http://www.calendarzone.com, http://calendopedia.com;http://calendarhome.com)
6 Karamoja, a semi-arid land prone to droughts experienced a flood in 2007 that swept away villages, 
gardens and roads. Dozens people died and boats were used for transportation as all major roads were 
cut off. Annual flash floods are not uncommon, carrying a few people who attempt to cultivate in the 
river beds in 2011 at least 8 people were killed (New Vision newsaper, September 2007).
7 A mudslide in Kaabong (N. Karamoja) killed 7 people in 2011 and over 23 villages were destroyed. 
Karamoja cut off by floods (New Vision newspaper, August 2011)
8 The first author claims that in 1970 there were no mosquitoes in most subcounties of Karamoja, but 
today they are everywhere.
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In the absence of reliable and affordable climate forecast or information and high-
quality tools, the rural ?????????? ???? ?????? ???? ???????????? ???? ???????????? ???
cope with climate variability and change. Although they realize a serious issue is 
approaching, they are still using natural and handmade objects as their metrological 
stations. 
In recent years, researchers and development agencies have been looking for 
evidence of climate change and are considering how to design appropriate 
measures to adapt to impacts of climate change. This evidence includes rainfall 
data, temperature, wind, etc. Unfortunately, for Karamoja, these data points are 
rare and unreliable. The best data available is that from the 50’s and 60’s when the 
British government representative and researcher Mr. Wilson was based in Moroto 
(Wilson, 1962). In mid-2010, a weather station was put up in Moroto; the ‘capital 
city’ of Karamoja, but it broke down after functioning for just a few months.9
Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) has recent data points, but 
they are based in Entebbe and have limited data that doesn’t differentiate areas 
within each district. Moreover, the available data on rainfall is not well kept, 
consistent or regularly analysed. Even the new stations are providing some 
questionable data (KALIP technical report, 2009). Therefore, this paper will look at 
other ways to find historical evidence of climate change. One of these ways is to 
look at the names and meaning of the months for the 11 unique people groups 
living in Karamoja. Since these names reflect what the weather patterns have been 
in the past, they could provide insight into historical patterns and recent changes. 
To address these problems, this paper suggests the need for reflection on the 
traditional calendar system. This paper outlines, for 11 different agro-pastoral 
ethnic groups in Karamoja, the names of the months, their direct translations and 
the fuller meanings of the names. This could give great insight into historical 
climate change. It could also provide an additional tool for scientific research. The 
study of linguistic change over time, known as philology or historical linguistics, 
can give evidence for or reconstruction of events long ago.
2. Methodology
A variety of methods were used, including literature review, personal observation, 
group discussion and systematic survey. The results in the form of names, 
translations and community activities during those months, were tabulated in an 
Excel spreadsheet and analyzed using pivot tables. Data from six key Ik (Teuso) 
informants was provided by resident linguist, T. Schrock,10 whereas the all of the 
other data was personally collected by the two authors.
9 Personal communication with district weather officials, August 2011.
10 Terrill Schrock is a PhD candidate in African linguistics at Leiden University that has been living 
among the Ik people for two years. He has his MA in Applied Linguistics and is the project leader for 
SIL language development efforts with the Ik. He conducted in depth one-on-one interviews on 
month names in the local language with trusted key informants and painstakingly deciphered the
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Over the course of four months, eleven ethnic groups residing in Karamoja, 
Uganda were interviewed to ascertain the common naming of their months, 
translations, general meanings and activities during the said months. The groups 
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????11”); Dodos; Ik; 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(69 men, 19 women, see Table 1 for details). All participants were adults and the 
average estimated age was 50 years–which is considered very old by the 
??????????
Table 1: Informants listed according to ethnic group and gender
Ethnic group Location Male Female Total
Bokora Iriiri, Kangole, Lotome 4 1 5
Matheniko Moroto 2 1 3
Pian Nabilatuk, Lolachat 18 8 26
Dodos Kaabong 12 1 13
Ik Timu 5 3 8
Jie Kotido 13 4 17
Labwor Abim 6 0 6
????? Karenga 3 0 3
?????? Karenga 4 1 5
Tepes Mt Moroto 1 0 1
Upe Amudat 1 0 1
Total 69 19 88
3. Results
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ???
recent years? Even mushrooms are growing at the wrong month, crops begin 
flowering in June or July!” As such, they are feeling a change and realizing that 
certain negative consequences are occurring, like floods and mosquito infestation 
??? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????? ????????? ??at 
something different is happening, especially during the months of March to 
August. Elders confirm the changes have become more difficult to understand and 
cope with. According to the memory of the informants, it appears that the stars “no 
longer rhyme with the changes of the seasons.”
unwritten language into phonetic letters and translated the month meanings. Two other Ik, students in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
used to interview all other participants.
11 ???????? ???? ??en a unified ethnic group, now these three sub-groups (Bokora, Matheniko and 
Pian) are unique that is, they engage in tribal warfare against one another and have linguistic 
differences.
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Many people, when interviewed, would initially only use numbers (1-12) to 
number the months. After encouragement, most would eventually reveal the local 
names for most or all of the months. Three of the ethnic groups simply number the 
months (Labwor, Tepes ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
according to the environment (weather, vegetation changes) or activities. However, 
we were able to find one Labworian man who actually remembered the fourth 
month’s name, OTHEGERE, although he did not know the meaning nor know any of 
the other names. 
Table 2 presents the local language names according to each of the 11 people 
groups (for detailed translation and meanings, refer to Tables 7, 8 and 9 below). 
Some informants exhibited hesitation in remembering the proper order in one-on-
one interviews and in group interviews, discussions and arguments over order and 
the correct name could ensue. Some months have more than one name. The 
?????????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ???????? ????????
language with slight tonal differences, have a catchy song (see Table 6) that they 
use to help remember the order, which is the same as listed in Table 2 for the 
Bokora people. Informants believed that this song was developed by a local school 
teacher to help students remember the order of months. 
All groups, except the Upe, have months named ‘white mushrooms’ and ‘white’. 
The white mushroom month (LOMARUK – B, D, J, M, P, SOLOMARUK – N and 
KINAM – I) is named after a large, edible, white mushroom and coincides with 
when these mushrooms emerge from termite mounds, in the 3rd or 4th month. The 
Ik refer to February as ‘white’, whereas the six other ethnic groups call January 
‘white’.
Three translated names are common across six groups: ‘green and lush’, TITIMA,
referring to when crops and other vegetation are flourishing, typically sorghum is 
knee-high or mid-thigh; ‘trees shed leaves’, LORARA, in November when leaves 
finish dropping off trees; ‘covering’, LOMUK, referring to the trees sprouting buds, 
typically in December.
Three translated names are common in five ethnic groups: ‘dirty mingling stick’, 
‘dividing the season’ and ‘hartebeests deliver’. LOMODOKOGEC translates to ‘dirty 
or stained mingling stick’; informants said that this refers to the time when food is 
available from the garden and the joy and excitement that the three pronged 
mingling stick (EGEC) always has some food on it, i.e. is never fully cleaned. The 
Ik talk of dirty cooking utensils (????????) in August, not necessarily the mingling 
sticks, but for the purpose of this discussion it is including in the category ‘stained 
mingling stick’. Dividing the season, LOTIAK, is the bridge or separation between 
the wet season rain and the dry season. Even though hartebeests are not commonly 
seen after the 1980’s, five groups name September or October LOLABAI/LOLABAE,
which refers to when the hartebeests give birth.
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The Jie pointed out that most of the sorghum is ready in LOLABAE and that ripe 
???????? ??? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
SAMAWE, or the month of the lions – referring to the month when the lions eat the 
hartebeest calves. They were the only ethnic group that had the ‘lion’ month.
Of those eight groups that name the months, rather than count or number them, 
there are many common names. Table 3 shows translated month names according 
to frequency of occurrence within these eight ethnic groups. 
Table 3: Translated month names in order of occurrence in different ethnic groups
Translation of month 
name 
Frequency of occurrence 
(in the 8 ethnic groups)
ethnic group*
white mushrooms 7 B,D,J,I,M,N,P
white 7 B,D,J,I,M,N,P
covering 6 B,D,J,M,N,P
L?????† 6 B,D,J,M,N,P
mingling stick 5 B,D,I,M,P
trees shed leaves 6 B,J,I,M,N,P
crops green, lush & 
knee-high
5 B,J,M,N,P
dividing the season 5 B,D,I,M,P
hartebeests give birth 5 B,J,M,N,P
ceremonies 4 B,D,M,P
cooking many foods 4 B,J,M,P
faeces divided 4 D,I,J,N
flowering 4 B,M,P,U
red mushrooms 4 D,I,N,U
white ants 3 D,I,J
chaff 2 I,J
muddy 2 D,N
red road 2 D,J
stars 2 P,U
*B-Bokora, D –Dodos, I – Ik, J-Jie, M-Matheniko, N –???????????– Pian, U-Upe (Pokot)
†L????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
language groups (B, J. M, P) it means to push on quickly, for Dodos it is the name of a food made of 
white ants (edible termites) that are typ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
the luggage that carries harvested sorghum.
The Ik had three unique month names, and the Upe had at least12 8 unique names. 
The Upe data only had two names, ‘flowering’ (9th month) and ‘stars’ (11th month) 
12 We can only say ‘at least’ because two of the months, although they were named, no informants 
knew their meaning. Therefore, the Upe may have up to 10 unique month names. See Table 8.
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that were similar to the other seven groups; two of their months (6th and 10th) have 
yet to be correctly translated (see Table 9).
One common month name, L?????, is used for February by six ethnic groups, but 
the informants gave three translations for L?????, ‘the push’ (Bokora, Jie, 
Matheniko and Pian), ‘white ants’ (Dodos) and ‘head luggage’ meaning harvested 
????????????????
Most of the months refer to environmental observations such as weather, 
agriculture, tree growth, wild-life or livestock mating or birthing (hartebeest, 
rabbits, goats etc). Even the months that are named after cooking utensils or 
ceremonies are related to environment and agriculture as these events follow the 
start and end of harvest, respectively.
Many of the eight ethnic groups use names with basically the same translations, as 
??? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Turkana of Kenya, whose languages are very close to ???????????, have their 
month names listed in the dictionaries referred to in Table 6. However, the actual 
time of the months may not be the same; for example, ‘white mushrooms’ is a
month name for all but one of the eight groups who name their months, but can 
refer to March or April. This could be explained by different rainfall patterns 
across Karamoja, i.e. those that call March, the month of the white mushrooms, 
would have historically received the first rains in earlier (in March). In the study 
year (2011), the white mushrooms were not harvested until August. Some years, 
certain events in the month names never happen. This phenomenon can even last 
for a few years when a particular named month just never comes. For example, the 
‘muddy month’ was missing for four years during a drought in Jie.
According to our informants, the names of the months have not changed, but the 
events which define the month names have shifted in many cases. The two 
exceptions are January and February. January is called L?????, which means 
whitish-dry, indicating the dry season in Karamoja. February is called L?????,
which usually means ‘to push off quickly’ due to the hot and intense dry season, 
when the livestock, people and grasses are ready to die or to ‘make it’ to the 
expected rainy season, even when the mushrooms are expected to grow (see Tables 
7, 8 and 9). A Pian elder, Sagal Mawa, explained, “You need to plan properly to 
know how to cross into the next season; you will be pushed off to live to the next 
season or to die.” In summary, both January and February still retain the original 
seasonal events for which they were named generations ago.
Events in the other 10 months have changed; to illustrate this point, three examples 
will be given. The first, LOMARUK—the 3rd month in South Karamoja and the 4th
month in North Karamoja—means the season when the white, edible mushrooms 
grow out of termite mounds. The informants confirmed that, since 1985, the white 
mushrooms no longer come in March or April, but first appear in July and August. 
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In 2011, they also appeared in July and August which continues to surprise the 
Karamojong. The second example, TITIMA—means lush, green crops to knee-high 
levels which correlate to the 4th ???????????????????????—the 5th for the Jie and 6th
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the lush green crops do not reach knee-high level until the 6th month; the Jie of 
Kotido claim that TITIMA has been in July since 1979.13 In Namalu, a South 
Karamoja green belt inhabited by the Pian, crops reach knee height in May to June 
while, in other districts, pastoralists are either beginning to plant (in the north) or 
are in the middle of planting in the rest of Karamoja. Therefore, TITIMA does not 
show its real meaning because the events have shifted. The third example, YELIYEL
means the season when the crops, grasses and other plants bloom and open up (5th
?????? ???? ???? ????????? and 9th month for the Upe). However, in Pian since 
1980,14 the crops will not flower until late June or July.
Table 4: Discrepancies in Pian month naming
Month TH elders* 6
informant
youth also†
female elders
15 informants
Ikjatubo, 
?????????????????
????????????
Tiyan‡
1 elder
mixed 
group**  5 
people
1 ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
2 ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
3 Lomaruk Lomaruk Lomaruk Lomaruk Lomaruk
4 Titima Titima Titima Titima Titima
5 Eliyel Yeliyel Yeliyel Yeliyel Yeliyel
6 Lomodokgec Lomodokogec Lomodokogec Lomodokogec Lomodok’gec
7 Losuban Lopoo Lopo Losuban Lopoo
8 Lopo Losuban Losuban Lotiak Lolobai
9 Lolobai Lotyak Lotiak Lolobae Lorara
10 ?????? Lolabae Lolobai/Lopoo Lopoo Losuban
11 Lorara Lorara Lorara Lorara Lotyiak
12 Lomuk Lomuk Lomuk Lomuk Lomuk
* key male elders whom the authors have long (12years) standing relationships with, they are all 
traditional healers (TH) whom typically have deep insight to the culture. Their responses mirror those 
of the available dictionary, see Table 6
†Although not all interviewed together, male youth and female elders gave the same answers to the 
month names
‡names of informants; **mixed gender and age group from interviews held in April and May 
13 Although many informants are not well versed with years of events, including their birthdays, they 
will refer to years by their major events. This (1979) is the year General Idi Amin’s army ran away, 
killing wild animals and leaving the meat to rot, meanwhile the Matheniko raided the barracks to 
become the first heavily armed ethnic group in Karamoja.
14 The year of “the big famine that killed many people, the only satisfied one were the vultures”
In 20 ey also ap eared in July and August which continues to surprise the 
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Table 4: Discrepancies in Pia month naming
Mont elders* 6
formant
youth also†
female eld rs
15 informants
Ikjatubo, 
?????? ? ?? ? ??
???????? ?
Tiyan‡
1 elder
mixed 
group**  5 
people
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2 ??? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??????
3 aruk Lomaruk Lomaruk Lomaruk Lomaruk
4 iti a Titima Titima Titima Titima
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9 lobai Lotyak Lotiak Lolobae Lorara
10 ? ?? Lolab e Lolobai/Lopoo Lopoo Losuban
1 rara Lorara Lorara Lorara Lotyiak
12 uk Lomuk Lomuk Lomuk Lomuk
* key lders whom the authors have long (12years) standing relationships wit , they are all 
traditio lers (TH) whom typically have de p insight to the culture. Their responses mirror those 
of the a le dictionary, see Table 6
†Altho t al  interviewed togeth r, male youth and female elders gave the same an wers to the 
month 
‡names f rmants; * mixed gender and age group from interv ews held in April and May 
13 Alth any informants are not well versed with years of events, including their birthdays, they 
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14 The f “the big famine that killed many peopl , the only satisfied one were the vultures”
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The Pian people were the most heavily interviewed (29 of the total 63 informants), 
and there are discrepancies in the reported order of the names, especially from the 
7th to the 10th months, even though all the names were consistent. Table 4 shows 
discrepancies within five different interview groups: elders, youth, women and 
mixed.
Curious is the unique name, L?????, so-named by a group of five male traditional 
livestock healers for October. No other informants ever mentioned this term. Even 
the elders themselves could not clearly articulate what L?????15 means. One idea 
that others confirmed in follow-up one-on-one interviews was ???????????????? –
shifting and changing positions of the stars or milky way, whereas another was that 
it could be L?????, the time for two wild foods to be ready, hence ???????????
?????—to mean ‘I’m leaving your hospitality because I can find food elsewhere, at 
my home from the harvest or even in the bush.
Similarly, there are discrepancies in the information collected from the Ik (Table 
5). One group interview (with 6 key informants) was done systematically by an 
expatriate linguist (T. Schrock); two surveys were completed by Ik students. We 
called upon the resident linguist as he not only knows this difficult and relatively 
unwritten language; he has built relationships with key older informants who are 
well versed with the Ik culture and language that is being rapidly absorbed by the 
neighbouring ethnic groups (T. Schrock, personal communication). 
The two students filled in the survey themselves and have listed the names in the 
???????????????????????????????????????? which is the  medium of instruction in 
their schools. The use of dominant local languages could be among the chief 
reasons contributing to the numbering of months, rather than naming, by some of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????s.
The following Table shows a literature review of five basic lexicons;16 three from 
Karamoja, and two from linguistically similar neighbours, Teso of Uganda and 
Turkana of Kenya (see Figure 1: Map of Karamoja, Uganda - showing the 11 
ethnic groups interviewed (Credit: M. Lejeune)). Table 6 also includes a song 
commonly sung in schools to memorise the order of the months. This table shows 
similarities in naming, although some names occur in different periods. 
15 Strangely, this was also the name that was used in all three available dictionary primers (Table 6)
for October, although no definition was given.
16 These basic pocket dictionaries were printed locally as aids to incoming missionaries and primary 
school children. 
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Table 5: Discrepancies of months’ names within Ik (Teuso) informants
Months Interview Survey 1 Survey 2
1 Kupon ?????? ??????
2 ???s’ ?????? ??????
3 D?? Lomaruk Lomaruk
4 Lomoe Titima Titima
5 Kinám Weliwel Yeliyel
6 Nama?ar Lomodokogec Lomodokogec
7 I????????? ?????? Losuban
8 I???????? ????? Lotiak
9 Nakari? Lolaba Lolobae
10 Terés Loipo Lopoo
11 Káwés Lorara Lorara
12 Ráráán Lomuk Lomuk
- Mr. Schrock is the expatriate linguist and the columns, Survey 1 and 2, present 
findings of the surveys filled in by students. 
- For meanings of local names, see Table 9.
The only written information that is accessible is found in the above dictionaries, 
only two of which have an ISBN number. The others are dated, out of print and 
were published locally. Unfortunately, the dictionaries only went so far as to list 
the month names, with no attempt in translation. The mos?? ??????? ??????????
dictionary (Logiro & Ilukori, 2007) seems to have just directly copied the earlier 
dictionary work of Loor (1976), where there are some unique month names which 
are no longer being used, and which probably used no direct field work or 
interviews. For example, L????? is given for October–yet only a few elderly Pian 
men used this word.
Table 7, 8 and 9 show full translated meanings for each month according to the 
ethnic group as well as how the translated meanings relate to seasonal weather 
patterns, events and environmental happenings. The purpose of these tables is to 
show the importance of the indigenous Karamojong calendar and how it both 
supports and disagrees with current and past weather patterns. Table 7 lists the 
?????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ??????????????????? ???? ???????Table 8 lists the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
northern-most district in Karamoja, and Table 9 shows the Pokot and Jie.
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4. Conclusion
This paper has laid out the names of the months and their meaning for 11 ethnic 
groups in Karamoja. Three of the groups just name the months according to a count 
from one to twelve; however, eight of these ethnic groups name months according 
to environmental and climatic events. This data could be relevant to the larger body 
of climate change observation, especially historical changes where meteorological 
data is non-existent.
These results show that the local names of the months have not changed, but the 
climatic events associated with their naming have shifted for 10 of the 12 months 
in most of Karamoja. Only two months still experience the events associated with 
their original meanings, these are the two hottest and driest months, January and 
February. This correlates with the expected drying due to climate change. The 
impacts of climate change create challenges for the poorest communities as their 
livelihoods are likely to be more sensitive to change.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the majority of the ethnic 
groups living in Karamoja have had their month names and meanings documented 
and tabulated in one manuscript. The only other written information that is 
accessible is found in dictionaries from Karamoja (three), Teso in Uganda and 
Turkana in Kenya. Only two of these have an ISBN number, the others are dated, 
out of print and were published locally. 
Thousands of the world’s languages are vanishing at an alarming rate, with 90% of 
them expected to become extinct with the current generation (Krauss, 1992). In 
????????? ???? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ????? ?????? ????? know their language. 
Meanwhile, the Ik students seem to have ‘forgotten’ their own month names and 
????? ???????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ???????? ?????
having a living document, like a song, helps to reinforce the names of the months 
????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
keep the culture alive and vibrant. It is important to go into more depth with those 
three ethnic groups that apparently only number the months (Tepes, Labwor and 
???????? ?? have shown that the Labwor at least have historically named their 
months because one elder knew the name of the fourth month. Losing language and 
cultural norms is due to introduced education system, prosperity and rural-urban 
migration; therefore, cultural centres should be established and traditional norms 
should be taught to the younger generation to sustain the culture and traditional 
knowledge.
This documented work may be used as a tool, not only to keep the languages alive, 
but to use the month names and their meanings to substantiate (or not) climate 
change over the course of history as rainfall data is very erratic or non-existent in 
Karamoja and in other remote pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa. This method 
could usefully be further investigated and developed in those areas.
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Climate Security and East Africa: A GIS-Based Analysis of 
Vulnerability
Joshua W. Busby, Todd G. Smith, and Kaiba L. White
Abstract 
The 2011 famine in Somalia and the broader drought in the region raised 
challenging questions about what made the region vulnerable to climate-related 
hazards and whether climate change was responsible for the underlying drought 
affecting the region. By drawing on an on-going research project to map chronic 
climate security vulnerability in Africa, this paper seeks to contribute to the first 
question, about understanding the sources of vulnerability. This paper develops the 
idea of climate security vulnerability; the potential for large numbers of people to 
be put at risk of death from exposure to climate-related hazards. This paper applies 
a continent-wide model of climate security vulnerability to East Africa and 
identifies the hot spots of concern, based on the confluence of physical exposure, 
population, household and community resilience, and governance and political 
violence. We found that large parts of South Sudan, notably in Warrap and Jonglei 
states, and southern Somalia, the area affected by famine in 2011, are the most 
vulnerable. Other smaller pockets of high vulnerability are also noticeable in 
western Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, and the Karamoja triangle area of Uganda, 
Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. Our maps of water scarcity, based largely on data of 
past droughts and precipitation variability, are compared to preliminary findings 
of a mid-21st century climate projection. Most notably, we find parts of southern 
Somalia are projected to be vulnerable in the future and have historically faced 
severe droughts and water scarcity. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of 
our findings and include an overlay of World Bank and African Development Bank 
active projects in the region on our vulnerability maps. These suggest that foreign 
assistance dollars from these institutions have been directed to areas with better 
governance and lower overall vulnerability, rather than highly vulnerable areas 
like Somalia and South Sudan. 
1. Introduction
In summer 2011, in the wake of a crippling drought, the world witnessed the worst 
humanitarian crisis to affect the Horn of Africa in two decades. Failed rains across 
two agricultural cycles in late 2010 and early 2011 led to crop failures, loss of 
grazing areas, and constricted drinking water supplies. Together with rising food 
prices, agro-pastoralist communities across the arid Horn ran down their food 
reserves and lacked the resources to purchase sufficient food to feed their families. 
Pastoralists faced significant loss of livestock. 
Fighting in the Rain: Monthly Rainfall Extremes and Social 
Unrest in Africa 
Todd G. Smith1
Abstract
Over the past two decades, studies in the environmental security literature have 
examined the relationship betwee  rainfall v riation and co flict outcomes in an 
attempt to bett r u derstand potenti l future conseque ces of climate change on 
political stability. The literature, however, has yet to conv rge on a consensus 
bout the nature of the rel tionship or the causal pathways involved. Case-based 
studies have present d several potential mechanisms but lacked generalizability 
while empirical studies have focu ed alm st exclusively on international r civil 
war nset as the dependent variable to the exclusion of other types of conflict. In 
this pape  I advance the lit rature in two signific nt ways. First, using the newly 
released Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD), I broaden the commonly use  
definition of conflict t  include strikes, riots, demonstrations and comm nal 
c nflict, bot  violent and non-viole t. Second, I use deviations i  monthly rainfall 
patt rns as the independent v riable rather th  annual aggregates as used by 
e rlier empirical studies. This is more appropriate because: (1) clim t  scientists 
predict increas d intra-annual rainfall variability and more frequent extreme 
events – droughts and floods; a  (2) changes in historic lly stablished rai fall 
patterns can negatively affect agricultural productivity in African countries reliant 
on rain-fed agriculture. I find that, on the continental scale, receiving overly 
abundant rainfall in a given m nth significantly nd substa tially increases the 
likelihood of social conflict, but receiving too little rain does not seem to have such 
an effect, at least in the ho t-term. When the analysis is limited to the nine 
countries of IGAD an  EAC, the significant effect of too mu h rain disapp ars d 
receiving too little rain actually reduc s the likelihood of unrest. I argue that 
receivi g to  much r too little rain leads to conflict through distinctly diff rent 
causal mechanisms. Additional res arch using this approach complemented by 
case study investigations is needed to illuminate causal mechanisms between 
rainfall variability and conflict. 
1. Introduction
The dramatic political tumult in Tu isia, Egypt and Libya in early 2011 has quite 
clearly demonstrated how social or political unrest can be politically destabilizing 
and can quickly spread throughout an entire region. Whil  decades of political 
repr ssion undoubtedly reated conditions ripe for evolution, worseni g economic 
conditions in the rec nt past clearly played an important r le in triggering the 
1 This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U. S. Army Research Laboratory 
and the U. S. Army Research Office under contract/grant number W911NF-09-1-0077. 
*
*
Evidence for and vulnerability to climate change
57
While countries throughout the region were affected by the drought, the 
consequences have been most severe in Somalia, where as many as 3.7 million 
people were estimated to be food insecure (of which 3.2 million were deemed to 
need life-saving assistance to prevent starvation). Analysts estimated that more 
than 29,000 Somali children under five died between May and the end of July 2011. 
In Somalia, with the absence of a functioning state and an ongoing civil war, aid 
organizations had difficulty providing the necessary services to prevent the 
situation from escalating into a full blown disaster. Malnutrition and mortality led 
the United Nations (UN) to declare parts of southern Somalia to be suffering from 
famine in July 2011. In August 2011, that famine zone was later extended to 
include more extensive portions of the southern part of the country. 
With the Somali state virtually absent and unable to provide emergency relief 
services, and international aid organizations initially constrained from operating in 
the region because of violent intimidation from the al Shabaab militia, Somalis 
responded the only way they could; they left. The crisis led to a mass exodus of 
internally displaced persons as villagers fled rural areas to violence-plagued 
Mogadishu in the hopes of securing food aid. The crisis also spurred hundreds of 
thousands of Somali refugees to make the difficult journey across state borders to 
Kenya and Ethiopia, where refugee camps swelled to unprecedented numbers. 
Dadaab, a town in eastern Kenya, houses four refugee camps; the complex became 
the largest refugee camp in the world, with its intended capacity of 90,000 housing 
in excess of 440,000 people. The UN estimates that as many as 12 million people 
were affected by the crisis, seen as the worst drought to affect the region in 60 
years (the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET), 2011). 
Beyond the heartbreaking suffering, the famine in Somalia and the broader drought 
in the region raise challenging questions about what makes the region vulnerable to 
climate-related hazards and whether climate change is responsible for the 
underlying drought affecting the region. By drawing on an on-going research 
project to map chronic climate security vulnerability in Africa, this paper seeks to 
contribute to the first question, about understanding the sources of vulnerability. 
Some observers of the famine have suggested that politics and the absence of 
governance in Somalia were overwhelmingly important in explaining the crisis, 
and why famine stops at the borders between Somalia and its neighbours (Barder, 
2011; Carr, 2011). Others have suggested that drought is becoming more frequent 
in the region, a telltale sign, in their estimation, that anthropogenic climate change 
is already affecting East Africa (DeCapua, 2011; Good, 2011; Hersh, 2011; Sachs, 
2011). 
Our own view is more nuanced. While acknowledging the importance of politics, 
Fighting in the Rain: Monthly Rainfall Extremes and Social 
Unrest in Africa 
Todd G. Smith1
Abstract
Over the past two decades, studies in the environmental security literature have 
examined the relationship between rainfall variation and conflict outcomes in an 
attempt to better understand potential future consequences of climate change on 
political stability. The literature, however, has yet to converge on a consensus 
about the nature of the relationship or the causal pathways involved. Case-based 
studies have presented several potential mechanisms but lacked generalizability 
while empirical studies have focused almost exclusively on international or civil 
war onset as the dependent variable to the exclusion of other types of conflict. In 
this paper I advance the literature in two significant ways. First, using the newly 
released Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD), I broaden the commonly used 
definition of conflict to include strikes, riots, demonstrations and communal 
conflict, both violent and non-violent. Second, I use deviations in monthly rainfall 
patterns as the independent variable rather than annual aggregates as used by 
earlier empirical studies. This is more appropriate because: (1) climate scientists 
predict increased intra-annual rainfall variability and more frequent extreme 
events – droughts and floods; and (2) changes in historically established rainfall 
patterns can negatively affect agricultural productivity in African countries reliant 
on rain-fed agriculture. I find that, on the continental scale, receiving overly 
abundant rainfall in a given month significantly and substantially increases the 
likelihood of social conflict, but receiving too little rain does not seem to have such 
an effect, at least in the short-term. When the analysis is limited to the nine 
countries of IGAD and EAC, the significant effect of too much rain disappears and 
receiving too little rain actually reduces the likelihood of unrest. I argue that 
receiving too much or too little rain leads to conflict through distinctly different 
causal mechanisms. Additional research using this approach complemented by 
case study investigations is needed to illuminate causal mechanisms between 
rainfall variability and conflict. 
1. Introduction
The dramatic political tumult in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in early 2011 has quite 
clearly demonstrated how social or political unrest can be politically destabilizing 
and can quickly spread throughout an entire region. While decades of political 
repression undoubtedly created conditions ripe for revolution, worsening economic 
conditions in the recent past clearly played an important role in triggering the 
1 This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U. S. Army Research Laboratory 
and the U. S. Army Research Office under contract/grant number W911NF-09-1-0077. 
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our model of chronic climate security vulnerability gives equal weight to physical 
exposure and political factors, alongside population density and a basket of 
household and community resilience indicators. Our model of climate security 
vulnerability is designed to identify the places where large numbers of people 
could be exposed to mass death as a result of exposure to climate-related hazards. 
At the same time, we also acknowledge that scientific understanding about the 
likely effects of climate change in East Africa is contested, with many climate 
models suggesting that the region is likely to become wetter with climate change 
rather than drier. Given that the La Niña effect is thought to have an especially 
strong influence on the drought of 2011, we think it is premature to ascribe 
causality to anthropogenic climate change. 
Even if climate change has an uncertain causal relationship with the 2011 drought, 
we think it is appropriate to identify the places of potential concern that, if past 
climate hazard exposure is any guide, are likely to be vulnerable in the future. At 
the same time, we report some initial findings, based on regional climate model 
projections for Africa, that we hope provide some purchase for the expected future 
consequences of climate change in East Africa. 
This paper applies our continent-wide model of climate security vulnerability to 
East Africa and identifies the hot spots of concern. The paper is divided into four 
sections. In the first, we develop the idea of climate security vulnerability and 
explain our emphasis on exposure to extreme weather events. In the second section, 
we explain our methodology. In section III, we report our findings, which include 
our maps of chronic vulnerability and preliminary findings of a mid-century 
climate projection. In the fourth section, we discuss the policy implications of our 
findings and include an overlay of World Bank active projects in the region on our 
vulnerability maps. 
We find that large parts of South Sudan, notably in Warrap and Jonglei states, and 
southern Somalia, the area affected by the 2011 famine, are the most vulnerable. 
Other smaller pockets of high vulnerability are also noticeable in western Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Burundi, and the Karamoja triangle area of Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and 
Ethiopia. As Figure 1 shows, the most vulnerable areas in our composite map of 
chronic vulnerability, the dark red areas, largely correspond to Somalia’s famine 
zone, identified by FEWSNET (see Figure 1, page 68). 
2. Climate security vulnerability 
Growing out of the environmental security literature of the 1990s (Homer-Dixon, 
1999; C. Kahl, 1998; C. H. Kahl, 2006; Levy, 1995; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 
1998), a host of studies since 2005, largely from think tanks, advocates, and the 
broader policy community, have identified climate security concerns as a distinct 
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issue, with weather-related effects of climate change—droughts, floods, storms, 
and cyclones—contributing to dislocation and migration, competition over scarce 
resources, and, in turn, functioning as a “threat multiplier,” that could increase the 
risks of conflict and even state failure. This grey literature has run ahead of 
academia with recommendations, (Campbell et al., 2007; CNA Corporation, 2007; 
Fingar, 2008; Herman & Treverton, 2009; High Representative and the European 
Commission to the European Council, 2008; Podesta & Ogden, 2008; Solana, 
2008; UN Security Council, 2007; WBGU, 2007) even as the scholarly community 
has questioned whether or not climate change is associated with the increased 
likelihood of civil conflict (Gleditsch, Nordås, & Salehyan, 2007; Nordås & 
Gleditsch, 2009; Raleigh, Jordan, & Salehyan, 2008; Salehyan, 2008). 
Most of the scholarly work in this arena relies on quantitative data on historic 
rainfall, drought, or storm patterns and seeks to ascertain whether climate 
phenomena are correlated with the increased frequency or onset of violent conflict, 
controlling for other factors (Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug, et al., 2008a; Burke, et al., 
2009; Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Levy, et al., 2005). To date, the findings of this 
literature have been mixed and somewhat disappointing, in part because of the lack 
of adequate data (Buhaug, et al., 2008b; Busby, 2009a, 2009b). More importantly, 
by focusing on the links between climate change and conflict, the academic 
community has narrowed its conception of security to lose sight of more pressing 
and imminent threats posed by extreme weather events like the on-going drought in 
East Africa. Extreme weather events already pose a security challenge for which 
both national governments and the international community need to prepare. 
Extreme weather events—such as Hurricane Katrina, cyclone Nargis, Pakistan’s 
floods of 2010, and Australia’s of 2011—require the mobilisation of militaries for 
humanitarian relief.1 If scientists are right that climate change will deliver more 
numerous and/or more severe events like these, (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate change (IPCC), 2007a) then governments will increasingly need to divert 
attention from urgent war-fighting efforts or from protecting the homeland to 
address these sorts of events (Busby, 2007, 2008). 
Can scholars of security studies, who typically seek to explain past patterns of 
conflict and violence, offer any insight on how to identify areas of potential
concern? By coupling innovative geospatial mapping techniques with insight about 
governance and political violence, we have developed an approach to map sub-
1 Scientists continue to debate whether anthropogenic climate change had anything to do with these 
particular events. Large concentrations of people and infrastructure concentrated on coasts or along 
rivers in environmentally degraded locations indubitably transformed such weather episodes into 
human disasters. Even if the science of attribution of specific events remains unproven, and the likely 
regional consequences of climate change remain uncertain, the expectations in the aggregate are clear: 
climate change should yield a world of more extreme weather events (Ananthaswamy, 2010; Curry, 
2011; Lehmann, 2011; Pielke Jr., 2011; Tebaldi, 2010). 
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national security vulnerability to climate change, defined as situations in which 
large numbers of people are put at risk of mass death as a result of climate related 
phenomena. Our approach is based on the recognition that security vulnerability is 
about more than physical exposure to climate hazards. It is a function of other 
contributing factors, including demographics, household and community resilience, 
and governance and political violence. This approach offers a way to identify “hot 
spots” of concern at a sub-national level, enabling scholars to focus on these areas 
for further case study investigation and for national governments and the 
international community to prioritise resources accordingly (Friedman, 2010). 
We emphasise the potential security consequences of climate change, including but 
not limited to conflict, to encompass situations where weather-related phenomena 
put large numbers of people at risk of mass death. The security focus makes our 
work different than the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), which focuses on mortality and economic losses from 
disasters (UNISDR, 2009). We are especially interested in the impact of climate 
related hazards where physical exposure, compounded by other sources of 
vulnerability, will likely put large numbers of people at risk of death and suffering, 
which local emergency rescue personnel cannot cope with. In those instances, 
emergency relief will often require the mobilisation of domestic and foreign 
militaries. In some cases, such crises will make internal conflict more likely and 
contribute to other potential security outcomes of interest, including internal and 
international migration. 
Even before the famine of 2011, Africa had been buffeted by a number of climate 
related weather events over the previous decade that were, in damages and lost 
lives, severe enough to qualify as disasters. In the period 1999-2010, climate 
related weather “disasters” in Africa, according to the Emergency Events database 
(EM-DAT), killed more than 12,500 people, made homeless 2.8 million, and 
affected in the order of 190 million people (Centre For Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 2011). Of these, a significant share of deaths 
(30%), people made homeless (36.5%), and affected populations (52.2%), occurred 
in East Africa, defined for the purposes of this study as the eleven countries 
comprising the regional groups, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC). These include Burundi, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and 
Uganda.
Though a number of high profile “disaster” events of all kinds in the 2000s were 
located outside Africa—such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2010 Haitian 
earthquake, the 2010 Pakistani floods—Africa typically received a large percentage 
of resources from bilateral donors and the international community for disaster 
assistance. Between fiscal year 2000 and 2009, the U.S. government allocated 
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more than 58% of its total humanitarian funding for disasters to Africa ($14.6 
billion of $25.3 billion in constant 2009 dollars), with a significant share of these 
funds dedicated to East Africa, particularly to Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia.2 For 
example, in fiscal year (FY) 2009, of the more than $2.1bn the U.S. government 
spent on disaster relief in Africa, nearly 70% was directed to East Africa, with 
more than 40% of the total directed to Sudan and another 16% to Ethiopia. East 
Africa also commanded more than 70% of U.S. humanitarian funding in FYs 2005, 
2006, 2007, and 2008 (USAID-OFDA, 2010). 
Our approach ranks locations within Africa in terms of their relative security 
vulnerability to climate change. The vulnerability rankings are relative to other 
African countries rather than the entire globe. Thus, countries and localities 
exhibiting low relative vulnerability within Africa may still be highly vulnerable to 
climate change, compared to the world as a whole. The challenges posed by 
climate change are not uniformly distributed within East Africa. In order to identify 
areas of security vulnerability and prioritise limited resources, it is not sufficient to 
say “Ethiopia is vulnerable” without explaining which parts of Ethiopia are 
particularly vulnerable and for what reasons. In the next section, we explain our 
methodology more fully. 
3. Methodology 
The consequences of climate change are likely to emerge based on the confluence 
of various forms of vulnerabilities.3 We consider four broad processes important in 
an area’s overall total vulnerability to the security-related consequences of climate 
change. They are: 
• Climate Related Hazard Exposure: First, at a minimum, areas must be 
physically exposed to climate related hazards to be considered vulnerable. 
• Population Density: Second, policymakers are generally more concerned 
about places where people live. Therefore, all else being equal, more 
2 Within that total, 65% of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding was 
spent in Africa (about $2.45 billion of $3.8 billion in constant 2009 dollars). This expenditure 
included spending on complex emergencies, particularly for Darfur (which may have some relation to 
historic drought conditions). Exclusively climate related disasters accounted for about 12% of 
OFDA’s total (excluding complex emergencies but including floods, droughts, fires, winter 
emergencies, typhoons and food security). The Department of Defense (DoD) assists in about 10% of 
the overseas’ disaster emergencies. Between FY 2005 and 2010, the Joint Staff in the DoD estimated 
the DoD assisted in 30 disasters, 21 of which were weather related, though only one was in Africa 
(the Algerian floods of FY 2006). This estimate does not, however, include additional efforts by the 
Combatant Commands (Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (PSO), 2010; USAID-
OFDA, 2010).  
3 This section builds on our previous research in Busby, et al. (2010).
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densely populated areas that are highly exposed to climate related hazards 
tend to command more attention from decision-makers.  
• Household and Community Resilience. Third, the first line of defence for 
many people will be what resources they have at the household and 
community level to protect themselves from physical hazards and enable 
them to respond in the event of climate related emergencies like floods, 
droughts, or storms. Communities where many people are sick and have 
inadequate access to health care and basic amenities are likely to be less 
resilient than those that are healthier and have greater access to services. 
Where people are poorly educated, they may have fewer entrepreneurial 
skills to avoid those hazards or minimize their effects.  
• Governance and Political Violence: Fourth, weather emergencies 
frequently exceed the ability of local communities and emergency services 
to respond adequately, requiring national level mobilisation to rescue 
people from rising waters or from being trapped under rubble and to 
provide food, water, and shelter for people left homeless or otherwise 
affected by extreme weather events. Countries with poor or unstable 
governance, however, may be less able or even unwilling to provide such 
services, especially in areas with a history of political violence. Venal and 
incompetent governments can transform even small physical effects, like 
the modest drought in Somalia in the early 1990s, into major humanitarian 
disasters. Failing a national response, the international community—i.e. 
foreign militaries, humanitarian relief agencies, and Diaspora 
communities—may marshal resources to respond. Some countries, 
however, can be difficult places for these actors to operate. Many 
international organizations withdrew from Somalia in the 1990s and 
insecurity in some regions continues to be a challenge for many relief 
agencies. Foreign journalists have been severely restricted in Eritrea and 
the international community may be unaware of emerging humanitarian 
crises in the country. Places with a history of violence may be more 
difficult to deliver services to and may have additional localised 
governance challenges. 
Our operating assumption is that the most vulnerable places are likely to be those 
where high physical exposure to climate related hazards conjoins with high 
population density, low levels of household and community health and education, 
and poor governance and widespread political violence. 
Each of these four baskets—physical exposure, population density, household and 
community resilience, and governance and political violence—is represented in our 
maps by observable and measurable indicators. In all but the population density 
basket, multiple indicators have been selected to represent the basket. We selected 
these particular indicators based on review of the existing literature, with some 
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statistical tests to eliminate indicators that were highly correlated. We also selected 
these indicators with the intention of identifying sub-national data sources for a 
continent where data availability is problematic. 
Within each basket, indicators are assigned weights and aggregated. Following 
conventions among many studies that employ indexes, such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI), Vulnerability Resilience Indicators Model (VRIM), and 
the Commitment to Development Index (CDI), all four baskets have equal weight 
in the final vulnerability analysis.4 We then classified the vulnerability categories 
into quintiles with the least vulnerable 20 percent represented by yellow and the 
most vulnerable 20 percent represented by the colour red. These quintile 
classifications are relative to the rest of Africa, not the rest of the world. So, while 
all of Africa might be vulnerable to climate change, some areas are more 
vulnerable than others (see Figure 2 for a representation, page 68). We also 
conducted some sensitivity analysis to see how our maps of hot spots changed with 
different weights attached to different baskets. 
From the four baskets, we developed a composite map combining all four baskets 
of vulnerability. We started the process by mapping physical exposure to climate 
related hazards on its own and then created an additional map of population density, 
another of community/household resilience, and, finally, a fourth map of 
governance and political violence. At each stage, we also created a map adding 
each new dimension to the previous one (such as climate exposure + population 
density). We then mapped the difference between the simpler map and the more 
complex one, which allowed us to identify the places that showed up as more or 
less vulnerable with the addition of each basket. 
As our composite model of vulnerability demonstrates, places that are physically 
exposed to climate hazards and are densely populated may be resilient to climate 
change because individuals and communities are better prepared to protect 
themselves and their governments are willing and able to help when needed. But in 
several countries in East Africa, this was not true. The incremental addition of our 
population density, household/community resilience, and governance/violence 
baskets showed the value of a more holistic approach to vulnerability. 
4. Findings
We used historic exposure to climate-related hazards to represent physical 
exposure. Models of future climate vulnerability for Africa notoriously engender 
4 The Human Development Index adopted a more complex methodology in November 2010. For a 
discussion of the virtues of equal weights in composite indices, see Stapleton and Garrod (2007). For 
a discussion of problems with equal weight-based indices, see Chowdhury and Squire (2005).
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widespread disagreement among scientists about what is likely to happen. For that 
reason, we began with past exposure to climate-related physical hazards (see Table 
1 for a list of data sources). Later in the paper, we included some early findings 
from our collaborative work with climate modellers, that aimed to provide a better 
job of mirroring past weather patterns in Africa and which produced data on 
timescales and indicators that would be more useful for policy audiences than 
existing global climate models. 
Our map of climate hazard exposure shows that in the 10 countries under 
investigation (11 counting South Sudan), those most exposed to extreme climatic 
events are much of Sudan, pockets of western Ethiopia and northern Kenya, the 
Karamoja region of Uganda, part of the Somali coast surrounding Mogadishu, and 
two pockets in Tanzania, which correspond to the Serengeti National Park and 
Selous Game Reserve (see Figure 3, page 69). For the most part, these are areas 
that are already arid or semi-arid and where food security and livelihood are 
already tenuous and failing rains can have a more adverse effect. 
Table 1: Climate related hazard exposure data 
Hazard Type (weight) Data Source Year(s) of Data Used 
Cyclone Winds (.17) UNEP/GRID-Europe 1975-2007 
Floods (.17) UNEP/GRID-Europe 1999-2007 
Wildfires (.17) UNEP/GRID-Europe 1997-2008 
Aridity (Coefficient of 
Variation) (.17) UNEP/GRID-Europe 1951-2004
Droughts (.17) Global Precipitation Climatology Center (GPCC) 1980-2004
Inundation (Coastal 
elevation) (.17) USGS DEM 1996 
However, where these effects occur in sparsely populated areas, like the Tanzanian 
parks, they may not generate great concern. Whether or not physical exposure to 
climate hazards actually translates into large-scale potential loss of life, damage, or 
security consequences, like those explored in this paper, ultimately depends on 
other factors, the first of which is whether large numbers of people live in an area 
that is physically vulnerable. Because this work focuses on the direct impact to 
human populations, we excluded unpopulated areas from our analysis. 
Our population map, which relies on data from Landscan, show that the most 
densely populated areas in East Africa are central Ethiopia, the Great Lakes or 
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, and the area around Nairobi (see 
Figure 4, page 69). 
We next created a map of household and community resilience and added it to 
climate related hazard exposure and population density (see Table 2 for data 
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sources). This basket includes eight national level indicators—two in each category. 
In the education basket are national level indicators for adult literacy rates and 
primary school enrolment rates. Similarly, we relied on national level indicators for 
the access to healthcare. These were national health expenditure per capita and 
nursing and midwifery density. The health basket includes a national level 
indicator for life expectancy at birth and a more finely tuned sub-national indicator 
for infant mortality rates. The daily necessities basket is the highest resolution with 
two sub-national indicators; percentage of underweight children from Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and an indicator of 
access to improved water sources, at the first-level administrative division that we 
constructed from USAID, UNICEF, and WHO household survey data. 
As shown by Figure 5 (page 70), large areas and, in some cases entire countries—
for example Sudan and Uganda—in this basket appeared in the same quintile even 
though there may have been some sub-national variation (see Figure 5). At the 
regional level, however, there was high variation between the IGAD/EAC 
countries. Uganda and Kenya are among the most resilient countries in Africa 
while Somalia and large areas of Ethiopia are some of the least resilient. 
Our final basket measures the potential effectiveness of any governmental response 
during and after exposure to climate hazards and whether or not an extreme 
weather event becomes a disaster. Five variables comprise this basket: (1) 
government accountability, (2) government effectiveness, (3) global integration, 
(4) political stability, and (5) presence of political violence. We used national-level 
indicators for the first four variables to develop a national composite score for each 
variable. We combined these scores with sub-national data on political violence to 
create a final quintile score for individual grid cells (see Table 3 for data sources.) 
Table 3: Governance and political violence data 
Variable Indicator (weight) Source Year(s)
Government 
Responsiveness  
Voice & 
Accountability (.2) World Governance Indicators 2008 
Government 
Response Capacity  
Government 
Effectiveness (.2) World Governance Indicators 2008 
Openness to External 
Assistance 
Globalization Index 
(.2) KOF Index of Globalization 2009 
Government Stability 
Polity Variance (.1) Polity IV Project 2000 - 2009 
# of Stable Years (.1) Polity IV Project 1855 - 2009 
Presence of Violence Battles & Violence against Civilians (.2) 
Armed Conflict Location and 
Events Dataset (ACLED) 1997-2009 
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Figure 1: Composite vulnerability and FEWS NET risk of famine 
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Figure 3: Climate related hazard exposure in East Africa 
 
 
Figure 4: Population density 
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Figure 5: Household and community resilience in East Africa 
 
 
Figure 7: Governance, battle and violence against civilians 
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Figure 8: Composite vulnerability in East Africa 
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Figure 9: Composite vulnerability in East Africa using four weighing schemes 
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Figure 10: Change in number of drought days per year from present day to mid-century  
 
 
Figure 11: Drought frequency and intensity (1980-2004) 
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Figure 12: Precipitation coefficient of variation (1951-2004) 
 
 
Figure 13: Aid projects and composite vulnerability in Africa 
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The chart of East African governance ratings in Figure 6 draws on national-level 
data of indicators of voice and accountability and government effectiveness, an 
index of global integration, and measures of political instability to rank IGAD and 
EAC countries against the rest of Africa. From this it is apparent that the region has 
suffered many governance challenges in recent history. Tanzania has the highest 
ranking governance in the region, but still ranks only 16th on the continent, largely 
due to limited integration into the global economy. Kenya has a better global 
integration score but suffers from recent political instability. Unsurprisingly, 
Somalia ranks 53rd, the worst on the continent and Sudan ranks 51st, very near the 
bottom. (In this chart, Sudan includes both Sudan and South Sudan). 
When we incorporate sub-national data on battles and violence against civilians, 
Somalia and Sudan still remain in the worst quintile. Some sub-national variation 
becomes apparent. For example, the civil war against the Lord’s Resistance Army 
in northern Uganda has left a legacy of instability that is still felt, and which is 
reflected in our maps (see Figure 7, page 70). 
Figure 6: East Africa governance indicators  
Putting these four baskets together, we arrive at a composite map of climate 
security vulnerability (see Figure 8, page 71). This map reveals that large parts of 
South Sudan, notably in Warrap and Jonglei states, and Southern Somalia, the area 
affected by the 2011 famine, are in the most vulnerable quintile. Other smaller 
pockets of high vulnerability are also noticeable in Western Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Burundi, and the Karamoja triangle area of Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. 
This map of hot spots of chronic vulnerability is largely robust to what weights we 
attach to individual baskets. South Sudan and Southern Somalia appear particularly 
vulnerable across different model specifications (see Figure 9, page 72). 
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While these maps of chronic vulnerability provide a point of departure, places that 
have historically faced intense exposure to floods, droughts, and other climate 
related hazards might not be affected in the same way by climate change. Existing 
general circulation or global climate models have shown wide disagreement about 
the likely effects of climate change on the African continent. 
Models agree that Southern and Northern Africa are likely to get drier, but 
elsewhere, including parts of East Africa, there is less consensus. Based on its 
review of multiple studies, the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment concluded: “There is 
likely to be an increase in annual mean rainfall in East Africa” (IPCC, 2007b). The 
A summary of model projections of rainfall by the IPCC report show nearly 20 
models projecting higher rainfall over East Africa in most months.  
Despite the apparent convergence of climate models, suggesting East Africa will 
become wetter with climate change, there are some reasons to be sceptical. First, 
there is less model convergence for all of East Africa. Moreover, the results 
reported by the IPCC are based primarily on global circulation model (GCM) 
projections, which may not be well suited to produce regional climate projections 
in all locations. Third, some studies suggest that East Africa may, in fact 
experience more episodes of drought in the future, and attribute the 2011 drought 
conditions to the emergent effects of climate change—rather than an especially 
strong La Niña episode. Geographer Chris Funk, along with colleagues from the 
U.S. Geologic Survey (which also advises FEWS NET), has made this argument 
most persuasively in a number of studies. In a 2011 paper, with A. Park Williams,
he suggests drier conditions in East Africa will continue because of climate change 
(Williams & Funk, 2011). Funk attributed the lack of rain to warming over the 
eastern Indian Ocean and the extension of the Tropical Warm Pool, which 
originates in Indonesia: 
It’s warmed about a degree over the last 30 or 40 years and maybe 
about half a degree over the last 20. But the reason that it’s important 
is that it’s already really, really warm. And so, as far as we can tell, 
that warming has triggered more rainfall over the central Indian Ocean. 
And that rainfall basically pulls in moisture from the surrounding area 
and prevents it from going onshore into Africa. 
The sea surface temperatures in the Indian Ocean are really well 
correlated with global temperatures. So, the past 150 years, as far as 
we can tell, the Indian Ocean has gone up and down very closely with 
global temperatures. I’m not sure that we fully understand why that is, 
but it seems to be an area that as we’re experiencing global warming 
the Indian Ocean is warming up right in step with that. 
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His views are a bit more nuanced as he noted that other areas in East Africa might 
get wetter the closer they are to Lake Victoria (DeCapua, 2011). 
Given the problems of global circulation models (GCMs) in validating local 
climate patterns at more fine-grained resolution, and the lack of model agreement 
for Africa broadly and East Africa in particular, we have worked to develop a 
regional climate model (RCM) for application over Africa. This model, which is 
derived from the National Centre for Atmospheric Research’s Weather Research 
and Forecasting Model (WRF), aims to validate better than GCMs, meaning that 
the simulations of historic rainfall and temperature patterns are a closer fit with 
historic observed data (at least compared to GCMs). A reasonable validation of the 
historical rainfall and temperature patterns is viewed as a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for a confident future prediction. While most GCMs focus on 
end of the 21st century projections of 2080-2099, our model focuses on mid-
century projections; a time frame more relevant to policymakers. 
While space forbids a more detailed discussion of the model, we have run a mid-
21st century ensemble under the IPCC AR4 mid-line A1B emission scenario (see 
Cook and Vizy, 2012; Vizy and Cook, 2012 for a full description of the model 
design). We are currently in the process of developing multi-year simulations in an 
effort to capture dynamics in the seasonality of rains. Nonetheless, we can present 
some of the preliminary findings based on the initial ensemble. In terms of drought 
dynamics, which we define as 21 consecutive days with less than a 1mm of rain, 
we find a mixed picture in East Africa. Parts of the Somali coast are projected to 
experience an increase in drought days, as is much of western Ethiopia. However, 
large swaths of the region, including Central Uganda, Northern Kenya, and Eastern 
Ethiopia, are all projected to experience a significant decline in the number of 
drought days (see Figure 10, 73). We expect the next iteration of projections will 
provide more clarity about changes in the seasonality of rain, in terms of timing, 
intensity, and total amounts, as well as the mechanisms that affect these dynamics. 
How well do these patterns of future drought match historic exposure? Here, two 
maps of historic rainfall patterns may be relevant: our maps of drought derived 
from the Standardized Precipitation Index (which captures rainfall anomalies) and 
our maps of the coefficient of variation, which does a better job at capturing areas 
of chronic water scarcity (see Figures 11 and 12, pages 73 and 74 respectively). 
Both the patterns of historic droughts and chronic water scarcity are different from 
projections of future drought days. The areas of congruence are along the Somali 
coast. Of course, these measures of historic drought and water scarcity are based on 
slightly different indicators. It may be more valuable to have comparable before 
and after metrics for future analysis. Nonetheless, on the basis of our composite 
Evidence for and vulnerability to climate change
77
maps, and the preliminary findings of our climate models, we are confident that 
Somalia’s Southern coast will likely continue to experience continued exposure to 
climate hazards and, given its other problems, be particularly vulnerable in the 
future.
5. Policy implications 
In light of these observations, what are the implications for policy? In the midst of 
an on-going humanitarian emergency in Somalia, there are a number of available 
short-run interventions that could prevent people from dying. However, a number 
of these short-run decisions have long-run implications for the recovery of the 
population and the future of the Somali state, and major implications for the rest of 
the region. Busby has written elsewhere about the short-run emergency needs of 
finance and access as well as the larger challenges of fostering a functioning 
Somali state (Busby, 2011). 
Most observers have focused on the need for a longer-term development vision for 
the region, and indeed, if climate change will have deleterious effect on parts of 
East Africa, as our maps and models suggest, then long-run finance must be 
mobilised to help the region adapt. However, when one looks at the geographic 
location of active projects from the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) (across all sectors, not just adaptation-specific projects), overlaid on 
our climate security vulnerability maps, money is flowing to governments in the 
region—Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia—with the most capacity to absorb aid and 
spend the money well (see Figure 13, page 74).  
By and large, multi-lateral donor assistance is not going to countries like Somalia 
and Sudan that may need it the most, in order to minimise the adverse 
consequences of climate change. With Somalia lacking a functioning government, 
and the Khartoum regime still largely an international pariah, these funding 
patterns are understandable, particularly since the Bank may be constrained to 
work with state actors rather than channel money directly to civil society, as many 
bilateral governments do. 
Although the fledgling South Sudan is still struggling to build governmental 
capacity, it will be interesting to see how quickly aid patterns change. Of course, 
the World Bank and AfDB are just two donors and their actions may not reflect 
wider bilateral lending and giving patterns, but they are two very important donors 
and they often reflect broader donor tendencies. It must also be noted that this map 
may not be fully representative of spending patterns, since each dot represents a 
project rather than the amount involved. Some of the projects may account for a 
disproportionate amount of funding and per capita giving may be higher in some 
countries. Moreover, projects could be stacked in a single location, which is not 
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visible in this map. Nonetheless, the dearth of projects in Somalia and Sudan is 
important and raises the question of whether funding should be directed to 
countries that can spend the money well or to those that need it. 
When we look at project commitments from the World Bank, in terms of dollar 
amounts, these trends are largely corroborated, with Somalia and Sudan receiving 
little or no assistance from the Bank and  Ethiopia (somewhat vulnerable) and 
Tanzania (less vulnerable) receiving the largest volumes of assistance. Tanzania 
receives the largest Bank assistance per capita (see Table 4).5
How representative are World Bank projects of broader patterns of overseas 
development assistance? In terms of other donors, the portrait is mixed. When we 
look at AfDB projects by country, some similar patterns emerge, with projects 
concentrated in total dollar amounts and per capita terms in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Kenya. According to AidData, a database of bilateral and multilateral donors and 
recipients of foreign assistance,6 of the nearly $6 billion in African Development 
projects in 2009 and 2010, more than 40% was dedicated to two projects in 
Ethiopia, a project to improve electricity transmission and a smaller project to 
protect basic services. Another 28% was dedicated to Tanzania (AidData, 2010). 
Table 4: World Bank active projects and total commitments as of February 3, 2011 
Country Activeprojects
Total amount 
($US mil)
Per capita 
(2008 pop.)
Burundi 14 $414.8 $51.37
Djibouti 7 $50.9 $59.94
Eritrea 2 $75.3 $15.28
Ethiopia 32 $3669.9 $45.47
Kenya 33 $2166.96 $55.90
Rwanda 13 $460.88 $47.41
Somalia 0 $0 $0
Sudan 2 $13.7 $0.33
Tanzania 42 $3120.92 $73.46
Uganda 30 $1708.26 $53.96
Source: World Bank 
5 It should be noted that there are some multi-country World Bank projects not reflected in Table 6. 
There are an additional 11 projects totalling $877.5 million. All of these projects are located in the 
EAC region, except for two that include Somalia. Both of those are fisheries projects in the Indian 
Ocean, which list Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania as recipients. 
6 AidData is a database of bilateral and multilateral donors and recipients of foreign assistance. It 
includes traditional OECD donor countries as well as non-traditional bilateral donors, such as Brazil 
and China and 15 multilateral lending agencies. 
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However, as the earlier discussion of U.S. disaster spending noted, both Sudan and 
Somalia have been major recipients of humanitarian assistance. When we looked at 
AidData statistics of spending for all multilateral and bilateral donors, for which 
information was available, we found more significant spending in Somalia and 
Sudan across all sectors (see Table 6). 
Table 5: African Development Bank active projects and total commitments, 2009-2010 
Country Activeprojects
Total amount 
($US mil)
Per capita 
(2008 pop.)
Burundi 2 $75.265 $9.32
Djibouti 0 $0.00 $0.00
Eritrea 1 $15.66 $3.18
Ethiopia 2 $2,474.10 $30.65
Kenya 7 $1,490.09 $38.44
Rwanda 6 $121.61 $12.51
Somalia 0 $0 $0.00
Sudan 0 $0.00 $0.00
Tanzania 7 $1,648.88 $38.81
Uganda 3 $164.50 $5.20
Source: African Development Bank 
In terms of spending on climate adaptation, a cursory approach defined adaptation 
in two ways, a broad definition and a narrow definition. 7  Broadly defined, 
adaptation projects nearly encompassed the majority of the projects, while 
narrowly defined very few of the projects in the region were adaptation-related. 
7 The aid community has yet to agree upon a definition for climate change adaptation aid. Rather, 
several actors have proposed schemes that classify aid based either on purpose or effect. AidData and 
other CCAPS researchers have worked to code aid projects according to these classification schemes. 
The broad definition of adaptation aid is based on the assumption that populations are better able to 
cope with the consequences of climate change when they are healthier and better educated and when 
they have more diverse livelihoods and access to better transportation, shelter and production 
infrastructure. Therefore, many traditional development projects qualify as adaptation aid under this 
broad definition. In contrast, only projects that directly seek to control or lessen the expected 
consequences of climate change qualify as adaptation aid under the narrow definition. Examples of 
such projects are promotion of drought resistant crops in areas that are expected to receive reduced 
rainfall in the future or construction of seawalls to protect against rising sea levels or saltwater 
intrusion in low-lying coastal areas. For more information on these definitions see Weaver and 
Peratsakis (2010). 
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6. Conclusion
Space prevents a more detailed examination of donor giving trends in foreign 
assistance, but it is fair to say that support for the most vulnerable countries in the 
region, such as Somalia and Sudan, has been directed towards emergency crisis 
response rather than long-term developmental needs. Because these countries, 
especially their conflict-ridden southern regions, are subject to recurrent problems, 
including exposure to climate related hazards, and the absence of investment in 
long-term development programs to enhance their resilience, emergency relief 
efforts every few years is required on a massive scale. The neighbouring countries 
in the region, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, have created relatively better 
social safety nets, food for work schemes, income support, investment in 
agriculture, and income diversification programs, which meant that the 2011 
drought had a less severe impact on affected communities. Still, these countries 
continue to suffer detrimental spill-over effects from their less developed 
neighbours, such as a large influx of refugees. The maps of chronic vulnerability in 
this paper suggest that the agro-pastoralist zones of Southern Somalia and South 
Sudan, among other areas of East Africa, are particularly vulnerable to recurrent 
crisis, given the confluence of physical exposure of large numbers of people in 
communities that lack local resilience, and in states that lack capacity or the 
willingness to assist the population in times of need. In light of these findings, and 
the existing sources of foreign assistance and relief, these maps raise a number of 
questions about where and for what future foreign assistance ought to be directed. 
They are, nevertheless, merely a starting point for these discussions and should not 
be considered conclusive distribution plans. 
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Pastoralist Cultural Responses to Climate Variations Potentially 
Contributing to Drought Conditions in Northern Kenya
Russell F. Schimmer, Roland A. Geerken, and Yancey A. Orr
Abstract
During the period 2007-2010, pastoralists in the semiarid region of Northern 
Kenya and south western Somalia reported progressively severe drought 
conditions. Locals complained of diminishing water resources and some groups 
reportedly came into conflict while competing to sustain economically vital 
livestock herds. To understand the relationship between precipitation, 
environmental stress, and cultural responses in the region, we analysed climate 
records over 10, 20 and 60-year spans. Remarkably, years of below-average 
rainfall (RF) do not highly correlate with years with recorded drought. Even more 
surprisingly, in some cases vegetation vigour recorded by the Normalised 
Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) was negatively related to precipitation 
increases, which is an indication that resource management is a key factor for the 
maintenance of environmental integrity. The absence of a consistent relationship 
between RF and drought, in addition to the importance of livestock grazing and 
herd sizes on vegetation health and water resources in the region, implies that the 
number and management of livestock in Northern Kenya are determinants which 
influence environmental vulnerability. We argue that traditional resource 
management practices, as cultural responses to multi-year climate cycles, can 
contribute to the frequency and severity of drought events. The most important 
responses that set the conditions for drought occurrences likely take place during 
average RF periods and above-average RF years, when environmental conditions 
are suitable for increasing herd sizes.
1. Introduction
It is innately difficult to form hypotheses, let alone conclusions, about regions 
described as socio-politically and environmentally complex. Many regions in the 
Horn of Africa are such places. We looked to available documented materials and 
scientific data to find a starting point to understand how rainfall, climate change, 
herding, and social systems interacted to produce such an extreme form of 
suffering as drought and famine. From these data, we derived a 60-year narrative of 
climate and cultural responses in the pastoralists’ region of semiarid Northern 
Kenya (Figure 1). 
During the period 2007–2010, pastoralists in the region of Northern Kenya and 
south western Somalia reported progressively severe drought conditions. 
Neighbouring tribes, e.g. Pokot, Borana, and Turkana, complained of diminishing 
water resources and some groups were reported to have come into conflict while 
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competing to sustain economically vital livestock herds. Locals named 
unpredictable seasonal rains and decreased rainfall (RF) as reasons which 
contributed to these stressful environmental conditions. 
For many pastoralists of this region, the number of livestock owned by an 
individual, household, or community is a sign of wealth. Livestock, specifically 
goats, also offer a far better return on investment, even after drought, than other 
forms of investment, such as interest from local banks (McPeak, 2005). Sustaining 
or increasing herd size is a priority for a family’s unity and survival (Henriksen, 
1974). Thus, traditional cultural responses (McCabe, 2004) and economic 
rationality (McPeak, 2005) promote propagating livestock herds whenever 
environmental conditions are suitable. However, these anthropogenic responses to 
short-term climatic oscillations can contribute to environmental stress and 
subsequent losses of livestock and exacerbate social tensions and regional 
instability. 
Fig. 1: Research Area
We examined RF estimates for the region during the period 2001–2010 using 
Meteosat Rainfall Estimates (RFE). In addition, we examined NDVI estimates for 
the region using Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) 
products. An expected correlation response of NDVI to RF is conformity; i.e. in an 
equilibrium system NDVI is expected to increase with increased RF. By combining 
RF and NDVI analyses with cultural responses and historical records, it is possible 
to study human interactions with environmental change and potential contributing 
factors to events such as drought. 
For the examination of longer climate trends, we used rain station-based estimates 
over a 60-year period, 1948–2007, a product prepared by the Global Precipitation 
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Climatology Centre (GPCC). Using Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer 
(AVHRR) NDVI products we analysed vegetation responses to GPCC estimates 
for a 25-year period, 1982–2006. By categorising drought events based on these 
historical data, we determined that the most recent drought event (2007–2010) 
could not be attributed to climate alone. We suggest that normative cultural 
responses contributed to the duration and severity of this prolonged drought event.
2. Methods and Materials 
2.1 Research area
We studied an area that covered the five major districts of Northern Kenya, viz. 
Turkana, Marsabit, Moyale, Wajir, and Mandera (Figure 1). This is a particularly 
fragile environment inhabited primarily by agricultural and pastoral groups. It is a 
region that experienced a prolonged drought from 2007 to 2010. The research area 
covers ~255,000 km2. The climate is classified as semiarid and the predominant 
biome is semiarid desert. The dominant land cover types are Northern Acacia-
Commiphora bushlands and thickets in the western districts; Masai-Xeric 
grasslands and shrublands in the central districts; Somali Acacia-Commiphora 
bushlands and thickets in the eastern districts; and East African Montane Forests 
sporadic throughout but mostly in the west. Lake Turkana and the Lake Turkana 
Reserve are dominant features in the northwest. We used two RF-measuring 
products and two vegetation-monitoring products to analyse intra- and inter-annual 
trends of RF correlations to recorded drought events and vegetation responses over 
a 60-year period in the study region.
2.2 Rainfall (RF) data
In the expansive and sparsely populated districts of Northern Kenya obtaining 
accurate RF data is problematic. Because of limited availability of point station 
data, satellite acquired data offers a reliable source of information for precipitation. 
For Africa, several products are available that differ in spatial resolution, temporal 
resolution, and temporal coverage. We examined two available products, Deutscher 
Wetterdienst (DWD) Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC) estimates 
and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(EUMETSAT)’s Meteosat rainfall estimation (RFE). A third product, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s Tropical Rainfall Measuring 
Mission (TRMM), also provides RF data for the region, but we do not include 
those findings in this report, primarily because TRMM pixel sizes are over six 
times larger than RFE and temporally cover about the same period (TRMM 1998–
2010 and RFE 2001–2010). 
Satellite-based data sets have advantages and disadvantages if compared with in 
situ measured station data. For example, satellite data acquisition ensures spatial 
and temporal homogeneity and comparability, and available products often offer 
adequate spatial precipitation variations, unbiased by interpolation procedures that 
typically do not consider e.g. topographic influences on RF distribution. These data 
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are particularly useful for temporal and spatial trend analyses. Thus, these 
precipitation products provide more reliable temporal and spatial continuity in 
certain regions of the world where RF stations are widely dispersed or station 
records are unreliable. For example, we examined station data from five locations,1
Figure 2
Lodwar, Marsabit, Wajir, Moyale, and Mandera, for the period 1976–2010 (Figure 
1). We found unexplainable gaps in the station records and discontinuity with the 
other two precipitation data sets ( ).
Although many satellite climate-monitoring products use station data for 
calibrating satellite acquired precipitation amounts, the main disadvantage to these 
precipitation products is that, unlike reliable station records, these products provide 
information about “precipitable water” in the atmosphere. These estimates may not 
be synonymous with the actual precipitation reaching the ground. Thus, the mean 
RF values reported here should not be considered as actual ground level 
accumulations but representative of these accumulations. We calculated an “annual 
RF mean” on daily or monthly records comprising a calendar year, and we 
calculated a multi-year record from the average of annual means for that period. 
We use the term “RF period” to describe a temporal unit either longer than a year 
or which traverses parts of two subsequent years, thus distinguishing a period from 
a calendar year.
Figure 2: Annual mean rainfall data, GPCC, NCDC, Meteosat
a These data were provided by NOAA’s National Climate Data Center (NCDC).
http://gis.ncdc.noaa.gov/map/isd/
1 NOAA’s National Climate Data Center (NCDC) provided these data. 
http://gis.ncdc.noaa.gov/map/isd/ 
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2.3 GPCC and RFE estimates     
Temporal coverage of the GPCC data set starts in January 1901,2 making it 
particularly suitable for monitoring long-term precipitation variations and trends. 
Due to its coarse temporal (monthly) and spatial resolution (0.5o – 2.5o), the data 
are less suited for local studies but rather for regional, including large watershed or 
basin analyses. For this study, we used GPCC’s version 004 product produced at 
the 0.5o resolution, or pixel area of ~ 3080 km2, and covering the period from 1901 
to 2007. The data set is a reanalyses product based on interpolation of 
measurements from station data. Temporal coverage for the RFE daily product we 
used in this study starts in January 2001.3
2.4 NDVI
RFE data are available in different 
temporal intervals, e.g. daily and decadal, and spatial resolutions. The daily product 
we used for this research has a spatial resolution of ~ 120 km2 pixel area.
In addition to RF, we examined two NDVI estimates for the region captured by 
multispectral satellite instruments, NASA’s MODIS-Vegetation and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s Advanced Very High 
Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR). Since 1982, NOAA’s AVHRR has captured 
daily spectral data suitable for NDVI in the visible (0.58–??????????????????????????
(0.725–??????????????????????????????????????spectrum with global coverage in an 
8 km spatial resolution (64 km2 pixel size).4 NASA’s Terra missions include the 
MODIS instrument, which collects NDVI data globally on a one-to-two day basis 
at a 250 m spatial resolution (0.0625 km2 pixel size).5
2 http://kunden.dwd.de/GPCC/Visualizer
3 http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/fews/africa/web/dwndailyrfe.php
4 http://phenology.cr.usgs.gov/ndvi_avhrr.php
5 http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/about/
Intra- and inter-annual changes in NDVI prove a reliable monitor for plant growth 
(vigour), vegetation cover, and biomass production, from multispectral satellite 
data produced in nearly cloud-free weekly and bi-weekly composites. The principle 
behind NDVI is that chlorophyll causes considerable absorption of incoming 
sunlight visual light in the red-light region of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
whereas a plant's spongy mesophyll leaf structure creates considerable reflectance 
in the near-infrared region of the spectrum (Tucker, 1979; Jackson et al., 1983; 
Tucker et al., 1991). As a result, vigorously growing healthy vegetation has low 
red-light reflectance and high near-infrared reflectance, hence high NDVI values. 
The algorithm produces output values in the range of -1.0 to 1.0. Increasing 
positive NDVI values indicate increasing amounts of green vegetation. NDVI 
values near zero, and decreasing negative values, indicate non-vegetated features, 
such as barren surfaces (rock and soil), water, snow, ice, and clouds. 
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3. Findings
3.1 The GPCC Sixty-Year Rainfall Record (1948–2007) 
Although the GPCC, 0.5 o RF data set covers the period 1901–2007, we chose to 
examine a 60-year period from 1948 to 2007 (Figure 3) for the purpose of this 
study, as a statistically suitable sample which both honours the Central Limit 
Theory and is within  and individual’s life-span (Table 1). The GPCC 107-year 
mean RF is 560 mm and the 60-year mean is 559 mm; essentially equal. Thus, 
mean RF during the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century is nearly 
unchanged. A time series trend analysis of the GPCC estimates for the period 
1948–2007 results in a negative fitted trend equation, Yt = 569.492 - 0.357768*t, 
with mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of 18.3%. Although this is a mild 
negative trend, the most recent 20 years (1988–2007) have a mean RF decrease of 
10% (544 mm) from the 60-year mean (559 mm). In addition, the data are not 
normally distributed (Figure 4), p-value < 0.005 at 95% C.I., and contain three mild 
outliers for the above-average RF years 1951, 1961, and 1997 (Figure 5).
In the districts of Northern Kenya from 1948 to 2007, United Nations agencies and 
their sources have recorded 25 years as experiencing drought events (Table 1)
(UNDP, 2004), and the period from 2007 to 2010 is essentially a period of 
continuous drought (see UNICEF Humanitarian Action Reports, Kenya). Thus, we 
further divided the RF data among three 20-year periods because time series 
patterns of droughts revealed clustering in three 20-year periods, 1948–1967, 
1968–1987, and 1988–2007 (Table 2). Furthermore, each of these periods contains 
at least one year with RF ???????????????-year mean (1951, 1961, 1977, 1982, and 
1997), of which three are mild outliers (1961, 1981, and 1997). Although not 
statistical outliers, mean RF for the years 1973 and 2000 were ?? -40% of the 60-
year mean. According to the Oceanic Niño Index (ONI),6
6http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/ensostuff/; 
http://ggweather.com/enso/oni.htm
1951 and 1977 were 
weak El Niño years; 1997 was a strong El Niño year; 2000 a weak La Niña year; 
and 2007 a moderate La Niña year.
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Figure 3: GPCC annual mean rainfall (1948–2007)
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Table 1: GPCC RF estimates, 1901–2007
Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
1901 508 -9 -9 0
1902 617 10 10 10
1903 766 37 37 37
1904 477 -15 -15 -15
1905 658 18 18 18
1906 793 42 42 42
1907 569 2 0 0
1908 524 -6 -6 0
1909 685 23 23 23
1910 499 -11 -11 -11
1911 536 -4 0 0
1912 593 6 6 0
1913 603 8 8 0
1914 768 38 38 38
1915 547 -2 0 0
1916 708 27 27 27
1917 690 23 23 23
1918 423 -24 -24 -24
1919 424 -24 -24 -24
1920 573 3 0 0
1921 382 -32 -32 -32
1922 417 -25 -25 -25
1923 776 39 39 39
1924 497 -11 -11 -11
1925 Northern Rift Valleyb 610 9 9 0
1926 665 19 19 19
1927 403 -28 -28 -28
1928 461 -17 -17 -17
1929 492 -12 -12 -12
1930 677 21 21 21
1931 469 -16 -16 -16
1932 477 -15 -15 -15
1933 360 -35 -35 -35
1934 529 -5 -5 0
1935 572 2 0 0
1936 643 15 15 15
1937 630 13 13 13
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Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
1938 Widespread b 433 -22 -22 -22
1939 Widespread b 485 -13 -13 -13
1940 648 16 16 16
1941 676 21 21 21
1942 516 -8 -8 0
1943 439 -21 -21 -21
1944 620 11 11 11
1945 507 -9 -9 0
1946 454 -19 -19 -19
1947 657 18 18 18
1948 519 -7 -7 0 241 247
1949 399 -29 -29 -29 193 150
1950 460 -18 -18 -18 316 102
1951 830 49 49 49 395 390
1952
Droughts 
followed by 
floods, cattle 
mortality 
~70-80 % in 
Maasai land b 1 468 -16 -16 -16 242 190
1953
Droughts 
followed by 
floods, cattle 
mortality 
~70-80 % in 
Maasai land b 4 577 3 0 0 304 250
1954
Droughts 
followed by 
floods, cattle 
mortality 
~70-80 % in 
Maasai land b 4 511 -8 -8 0 301 170
1955
Droughts 
followed by 
floods, cattle 
mortality 
~70-80 % in 
Maasai land b 4 391 -30 -30 -30 182 170
1956 423 -24 -24 -24 257 161
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Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
1957 631 13 13 13 385 227
1958 523 -6 -6 0 305 184
1959 548 -2 0 0 347 158
1960 Drought widespread b 3 517 -7 -7 0 339 178
1961 Drought widespread b 3 911 63 63 63 263 596
1962 572 2 0 0 328 221
1963 667 19 19 19 346 299
1964 573 3 0 0 321 234
1965 495 -11 -11 -11 195 265
1966 618 11 11 11 340 211
1967 742 33 33 33 350 340
1968 755 35 35 35 418 327
1969 519 -7 -7 0 298 202
1970 602 8 8 0 421 115
1971 507 -9 -9 0 263 229
1972
Drought 
widespread; 
human-
livestock 
deaths 
northern 
districts; 
Massai cattle 
losses ~80% 
b 3 638 14 14 14 301 282
1973
Drought 
northern and 
eastern-
central 
provinces b 4 337 -40 -40 -40 118 163
1974
Drought 
northern and
eastern-
central 
provinces b 4 496 -11 -11 -11 279 159
1975 Drought widespread b 4 476 -15 -15 -15 263 155
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Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
1976 489 -12 -12 -12 229 183
1977 Drought widespread b 2 804 44 44 44 366 388
1978 655 17 17 17 342 291
1979 605 8 8 0 386 198
1980 Drought widespread b 1 463 -17 -17 -17 239 169
1981 Drought widespreadb 4 760 36 36 36 547 182
1982 780 40 40 40 420 334
1983 Drought widespread b 1 464 -17 -17 -17 237 164
1984
Drought 
north-eastern, 
central, Rift 
Valley, and 
eastern 
provinces b 4 343 -39 -39 -39 145 160
1985 549 -2 0 0 396 147
1986 508 -9 -9 0 270 181
1987 508 -9 -9 0 343 111
1988 611 9 9 0 333 248
1989 633 13 13 13 344 250
1990 584 5 5 0 399 188
1991
Drought 
northern, 
central, 
eastern 
provinces b 1 467 -16 -16 -16 265 160
1992
Drought 
northern, 
central, 
eastern 
provinces b 4 494 -12 -12 -12 186 262
1993 545 -2 0 0 427 111
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Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
1994
Drought 
northern, 
central, 
eastern 
provinces b 1 500 -10 -10 -10 190 262
1995 Drought widespread b 4 486 -13 -13 -13 287 189
1996 Drought widespread b 4 479 -14 -14 -14 270 135
1997 El Nino 892 60 60 60 260 683
1998 535 -4 0 0 394 119
1999 Drought widespread b 1 375 -33 -33 -33 172 184
2000 Drought widespread b 4 338 -40 -40 -40 103 173
2001 490 -12 -12 -12 238 196
2002 581 4 0 0 277 282
2003 550 -1 0 0 334 197
2004 Drought widespread b 3 575 3 0 0 282 268
2005 Drought widespread c 4 407 -27 -27 -27 250 104
2006 755 35 35 35 307 428
2007
Drought 
northern 
provincesd 3 582 4 0 0 243 279
Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual 
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
107-year Mean (1901–2007) 560 0 0 0 N/A N/A
60 Year Mean 1948 - 2007 559 0 0 0 297 227
60 Year StDv. 1948 - 2007 130 23 23 23 83 106
60 YEAR Max. 1948 - 2007 911 63 63 63 547 683
60 YEAR Min. 1948 - 2007 337 -40 -40 -40 103 102
30 Year Mean 1948 - 1977 567 1 0 0 297 232
30 Year Mean 1978 - 2007 550 -1 0 0 296 222
20 Year Mean 1948 - 1967 569 2 0 0 298 237
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Year Commentsa Drought Category
Annual
Mean
Rainfall 
(mm)
% 60-
year 
Mean
% 60-
year 
Mean 5% 
Threshold
% 60-
year 
Mean
10% 
Threshold
Mean
LR
Jan.-
June
Mean
SR
July-
Dec.
20 Year Mean 1968 - 1987 563 1 0 0 314 207
20 Year Mean 1988 - 2007 544 -3 0 0 278 236
a Recorded drought events listed are only those covering the study region. b UNDP, c UNICEF, d UNICEF 
Table 2: GPCC sixty-year and twenty-year annual mean rainfall estimates
Rainfall estimates in 
mm 1948–2007 1948–1967 1968–1987 1988–2007
Mean 559 569 (+2%) 563 (+1%) 544 (-10%)
Max.  911 911 804 892
Min.  337 391 337 338
StDv. 130 136 135 125
Frequency ???????? 19 6 8 5
Frequency ??????–) 30 10 11 9
Reported Droughts 25 6 9 10
Frequency of 
Droughts
1 drought per 
2.4 years
1 drought per 
3.3 years
1 drought per 
2.2 years
1 drought per   
2 years
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GPCC Annual Mean Rainfall (1948 - 2007)
Statistics: N = 60; Median = 529; Mean = 559 mm;
IQR = 136; Q1 = 481; Q3 = 617; Mild Oulier >= 821; Extreme Outlier >= 1025
Figure 5: GPCC Boxplot. The data are negatively skewed thus a higher frequency 
of annual rainfall values are less than the median but the data set contains three 
positive mild outliers for the years 1961, 1997, and 1951.
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3.2 Deriving annual RF percentages from the sixty-year mean and the 5% and 
10% thresholds
In order to better analyse the rainfall data, we calculated annual means as 
percentages of the 60 year mean (Table 1). In addition, we processed the data into 
two sets of thresholds, 5% and 10%, based on these mean RF percentages (Table 1,
Figure 6 and Figure 7). For the 5% threshold, we considered that the range -4.99% 
to 4.99% typifies an average RF year and for the 10% threshold, the range -9.99% 
to 9.99% typifies an average RF year. Using these thresholds, we were better able 
to analyse correlating patterns between annual RF estimates and recorded drought 
events (Table 3). 
We found that historical drought events correlated with 64% of the ?? -10% 
threshold years but only with 8% of the ?? -5% threshold years. Moreover, drought 
events correlated with 16% of the ????????????????????????????????????????????????
determined that an average rainfall year, i.e. with an annual mean rainfall that alone 
could not explain the onset of a drought, is in the range of -9.99% to 9.99%. In the 
following sections, we describe how we used this standard to categorise types of 
drought, as well as make other determinations about the climate record and its 
correlation with NDVI. 
Figure 6: GPCC % of 60-year Mean RF (1948–2007) 5% adjusted threshold
Other notable observations include: (1) the frequency of below-average RF years is 
32% higher than above-average RF years, but the magnitude of above-average RF 
years is 41% greater than below-average RF years; and (2) the frequency and upper 
range, or magnitude, of positive RF years in the ??????????????????????????????????
for negative RF years.
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Figure 7: GPCC % of 60-year mean RF (1948–2007) 10% adjusted threshold
Table 3: Drought categories and GPCC estimates, 5%, 10%, and 25% thresholds of annual 
% of 60-year mean
Threshold Frequency in years
Drought 
Category-1
Drought 
Category-2
Drought 
Category-3
Drought 
Category-4
?-+25% ?????? 9 1 1 1
?-+10% 15 1
????? 19
-4.99% –
+4.99%
11 2 1
??-5% 30 1 1
??-10% 22 5 5
??-25% ??-40% 7 1 5
3.3 Determining the drought categories 
As we discussed in the previous section, we determined that the range -9.99% to 
9.99% describes an average rainfall year in Northern Kenya. Using this baseline, 
and examining the groupings and frequency of recorded drought events, we created 
four categories by which to group droughts (Table 3). The twenty-five droughts 
recorded during the 60-year period resulted in an average of one drought per 2.4 
years, but the frequency of droughts in the last 20 years of the record has increased 
to one drought per two years. 
A Category-1 drought is a correlated same-year response of a recorded drought 
event to a below-average RF year, but not directly preceded either by a recorded 
drought event or by a below-average RF year. A Category-2 drought is a recorded 
drought event responding to a ??? -year period of consecutive below-average RF 
years but not directly preceded by a recorded drought event. A Category-3 drought 
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is a recorded drought event occurring during an average or above-average RF year 
but not directly preceded by either a Category-1, -2, or -4 recorded drought event, 
or a below-average RF year. A Category-4 drought is not otherwise categorized;
hence we define it as a confluence of the other three categories within a multi-year 
period.
Note that the frequency of below-average RF years falling in the adjusted ?? -5% 
category is ~37% greater than for the adjusted ????? category and contributes to 
64% of the 25 recorded droughts during the 60 years. But of these 25 droughts, 
only two are attributed to the ?? -5% < -10% range. In addition, all Category-1
(direct response) droughts we attribute to below-average RF years in the ?? -10% 
range. Finally, Category-4 (the confluence category) corresponds to the greatest 
number of recorded droughts (13 events) distributed throughout the threshold 
ranges but with a high frequency in the ?? -10% range. Thus, we attribute 24% of 
the recorded drought to sudden decreases in RF with a magnitude ?? -10% and the 
remaining 76% of droughts to a confluence of factors and multi-year responses.
3.4 AVHRR NDVI correlations with GPCC recorded long rains (LR) and short 
rains (SR) 
Northern Kenya traditionally has two RF seasons per year, the long rains (LR) and 
the short rains (SR). LR occurs during the first half of the year and SR during the 
second half. We conducted a 25-year (1982–2006) correlation analysis of AVHRR 
NDVI responses to GPCC RF during these LR and SR periods and found that the 
dominant NDVI triggering LR occurred between January and April and the 
triggering SR between September and December—but are most dominant in 
October. Essentially, this comprises one period from September through to April. 
However, November and December rains are sporadic. Over the 60-year study 
period LR have a mean of 297 mm with a standard deviation of 83 mm; and SR 
have a mean of 227 mm and a standard deviation of 106 mm (Table 4 ).
We tested the two populations, LR and SR, for normal distribution of the means 
and equal variances (Figure 8). LR are very well distributed (p-value = 0.707, 95% 
C.I.), with one mild outlier for 1981. However, the short rains are not evenly 
distributed (p-value < 0.005, 95% C.I.) and the data are skewed toward the 
negative values, but with mild positive outliers in 1997, 1961, and 2006. In 
addition, the two populations have statistically equal variances (Levene’s test 
statistic = 0.10 and p-value = 0.747, 95% C.I.).
We conducted similar tests for the 20-year sample periods; three periods per 
population. We conducted one sample T-tests for each twenty-year period, LR and 
SR, based on each population’s mean. At a 95% C.I., we found no statistically 
significant observations. In addition, we tested equal variances among the three 
periods for each population using an F-test for the LR samples and Levene’s test 
for the SR samples. At a 95% C.I., the six tests, three combinations per population, 
resulted in no statistically significant observations.      
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Table 4: GPCC LR and SR Estimates
Category LR (January–June) in mm SR (July–December) in mm
60-year Mean (1948–2007) 297 227
60-year StDv. (1948–2007) 83 106
60-year Max. (1948–2007) 547 683
60-year Min. (1948–2007) 103 102
20-year Mean (1948–1967) 298 237
20-year StDv (1948–1967) 62 109
20-year Mean (1968–1987) 314 207
20-year StDv (1968–1987) 102 77
20-year Mean (1988–2007) 278 236
20-year StDv (1988–2007) 81 130
During the three 20-year periods, both LR and SR fluctuate, one distinction might 
have relevance for understanding the increase of recorded drought events during 
the 1988–2007 period, namely, the contributing factor to the 10% decrease in mean 
annual RF from the 60-year mean is entirely attributed to LR—a 7% decrease from 
the 1948–1967 period and an 11% decrease from the 1968–1987 period, with 
relatively no change in SR means for all three periods (Table 4). Although SR 
decreased 13% from the 1948–1967 period to the 1968–1987 period, they 
increased 13% during the 1988–2007 period. Thus, the smallest difference in mean 
RF between LR and SR occurred during the 1988–2007 period.
No discernable pattern emerges that links SR estimates immediately preceding a 
recorded drought event in the following year, other than the occurrence of 
Category 1 and 3 droughts—which have the highest tendency to describe these 
events. In the period 1979–1998 a series of five Category 1 events followed each 
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other. In certain cases, especially for Category 3 droughts, we looked to see if the 
preceding year’s SR (October–December) was a contributor to the following year’s 
recorded drought event, but found no correlation.
Finally, RF variations affect agricultural cycles. Although the standard deviations 
for both LR and SR vary considerably during the three 20-year periods, these 
variations remain statistically insignificant. Still, the highest result (130 mm) 
occurs during the SR 1988–2007 period; 23% higher than the 60-year standard 
deviation for the short rains. In such a fragile environment, this variation 
potentially contributed to the increased number of recorded droughts during this 
period. 
With regard to AVHRR NDVI responses to GPCC RF, we calculated the 
correlation coefficients for both LR and SR for the period 1982–2006 using 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient.7
Furthermore, in all but one set of two consecutive drought events, NDVI responses 
to consecutive annual decreases in LR means correlate well (>0.7) for the first year 
and not well (<0.4) for the second year (Table 5). The one outlier in this pattern 
occurs in the mid-1990s during a period of multiple consecutive drought events. 
However, 1991 and 1992 fit the pattern; 1993 was not a reported drought year; 
1994 and 1995 reversed the pattern, but 1995 and 1996 also fit the pattern. One 
fundamental question is whether this equilibrium is sustainable during periods of 
decreased RF. The data appear to suggest that decreasing RF is less disruptive to 
vegetation responses in the first year of LR during a multi-year drought but highly 
disruptive during the second and, sometimes, the third. In addition to human and 
livestock resource extraction, this pattern is likely to be influenced by a decreasing 
We expected that NDVI responses would 
conform to RF; i.e. more rain should cause a positive vegetation response, as 
measured in NDVI. During consecutive years of non-drought events, correlations 
between NDVI and LR are consistently high (> 0.7) and punctuated by single 
poorly correlated years (< 0.5), e.g. the period 1985–1990. Furthermore, all first 
years following a drought event resulted in a high correlation, ranging from > 0.6 
to > 0.9. 
One reason for these patterns might be that reduced livestock herds place less stress 
on recovering vegetation, which is rebounding to increasing water availability 
(Schimmer, 2009). But in subsequent years, as livestock herds replenish, more 
stress is placed on vegetation, and its response to rainfall becomes less correlated. 
Thus, after the first or second years of intensified breeding, to replenish herd 
populations following a drought, vegetation begins to respond less well to RF until 
an equilibrium is reached.
7 Pearson's correlation coefficient calculates values between -1 and +1 where 0 equals no correlation. 
A negative value indicates an inverse correlation and a positive value indicates conformity; a resulting 
p-?????????????????? ????????????????????????????s is rejected thus the correlation is not zero.
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amount of water resources banked in the environment, for which vegetation, 
livestock, and humans compete.
Whereas NDVI responses to LR reveal a number of patterns, we did not observe 
any similar patterns of NDVI responses to SR. None of the correlation coefficients 
for the same drought events is > 0.6 and the majority (82%) is < 0.5. Thus, NDVI 
responses do not correlate well with SR during drought events. Moreover, we did 
not observe consistency between LR and SR responses for the same or consecutive 
years. Compared to non-drought years during the period 1982–2006, LR remains 
consistently highly correlated with NDVI, either negatively or positively. In 16 of 
the 25 years analysed (67%), LR correlated with NDVI at > |0.7|. Conversely, in 
only five years (21%) over the same period, did SR correlate at > |0.6|. This finding 
further suggests that LR in confluence with human responses to these rain periods 
have a greater influence on triggering drought events than do SR.
Table 5: GPCC-AVHRR Correlations NDVI Responses to LR and SR
Year
(drought year shaded)
GPCC-AVHR 
Correlation 
1st Half (1982–2006)
GPCC-AVHR Correlation 
2nd Half (1982–2006)
1982 0.89 0.67
1983 0.95 -0.13
1984 0.37 0.45
1985 0.65 -0.43
1986 0.48 0.10
1987 -0.93 0.82
1988 0.77 0.02
1989 0.90 -0.13
1990 0.96 0.51
1991 0.85 0.57
1992 0.38 0.38
1993 0.93 0.27
1994 0.04 0.34
1995 0.94 0.60
1996 -0.19 0.38
1997 0.74 0.71
1998 0.92 0.19
1999 0.76 0.32
2000 0.33 0.29
2001 0.91 -0.17
2002 -0.29 0.14
2003 0.01 0.02
2004 0.71 0.01
2005 -0.98 0.19
2006 0.91 -0.25
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between the statistically predicted and the measured NDVI, measured in units from 
-1 to +1 where positive units above ~0.4 generally represent vegetation. Statistical 
NDVI predictions are based on the best correlating rainfall period, as explained 
above. In Figure10, we see vast areas in the study region’s eastern part where the 
NDVI shows an increasing (light grey) responsiveness to rainfall (up to 0.018 
NDVI response units per year), meaning a total increase in NDVI intensity over a 
25-year period of 0.45 units. Areas displayed in dark grey to black respond 
increasingly worse to rainfall with maximum losses of 0.009 units per year, 
accumulating to a total 25-year loss in NDVI of 0.225 units.
3.5 The RFE ten-year record
In order to process and analyse the RFE data, we used many of the same methods 
used for evaluation of the GPCC data (Table 6, Figure 11). Because the period is 
much shorter, we also checked RFE correlation with GPCC data for the 10-year 
period (Figure 12). The RFE data are normally distributed, with a mild outlier of 
above-average rainfall, in 2006 and indicate a mild positive trend for the decade. 
We tested the two data sets for equal variance and found them to be normal; 
Levene’s Test p-value = 0.379. In addition, the Pearson’s Correlation statistic for 
RFE and GPCC is 0.943 (p-value 0.001), hence the two data sets are highly 
correlated. Based on yearly percentages of the ten-year mean and the 10% 
threshold, the RFE record contains three below-average RF years, 2001 (-30%), 
2005 (-34%), and 2009 (-21%), and two above-average RF years, 2002 (20%) and 
2006 (60%). The remaining five years fall within the -9.99 – +9.99 threshold range 
of average RF.
Figure 11: Meteosat RFE mean RF estimates (2001–2010)
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Figure 12: GPCC and Meteosat RFE annual mean RF estimates
Table 6: Meteosat RFE mean RF estimates
Year
Annual 
Mean RF 
(mm)
%
60-year 
Mean
5% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold
2001 231 -30 -30 -30
2002 394 20 20 20
2003 339 3 0 0
2004 334 2 0 0
2005 215 -34 -34 -34
2006 525 60 60 60
2007 297 -9 -9 0
2008 349 6 6 0
2009 260 -21 -21 -21
2010 337 3 0 0
Avg. 328
StDv. 89
GPCC v. RFE (2001-2007) Corel. Coef. 0.94
3.6 MODIS NDVI responses to Meteosat RF, 2001-2010
A time series trend analysis of the Meteosat annual mean RF data for the period 
2001–2010 results in a mild positive fitted trend equation, Yt = 319.267 + 
1.60606*t, with MAPE 19.85%. A time series trend analysis of the MODIS NDVI 
data set over the same period results in a much stronger negative fitted trend 
equation, Yt = 4662.73 - 20.5333*t, with MAPE 8.0%. A Pearson’s Correlation of 
the two data sets results in a 0.837 correlation statistic (p-value = 0.003). Thus, the 
data conform well but for two inverse relations in the years 2003 and 2008 (Figure 
13). However, time-series trend lines for the two data sets reveal opposite trends—
the mean RF increased while mean NDVI decreased. Thus, some factor other than 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
M
ea
n 
R
ai
nf
al
l m
m
GPCC (1991-2006) Meteosat (2001-2010)
Annual Mean GPCC (1991-2007) and Meteosat RFE (2001-2010)

Evidence for and vulnerability to climate change
111
There are a number of reasons a man desires to have more livestock. The more 
livestock a man has the greater the number of wives he can attain and thus increase
the number of children. These children will eventually provide labour and, in the 
case of daughters, produce bride wealth. 
Larger livestock numbers allow for greater social networks, which are built on the 
reciprocal giving and receiving of livestock between men. A larger herd provides 
more security against the effect of livestock raiding. Because there has been, until 
recently, little access to other forms of investment in the region, livestock also form 
a currency from which interest accumulates in the form of calves and a source from 
which things can be bought and sold (Henriksen, 1974; Jones, 1984; McCabe, 
2004; McPeak, 2005). However, herders are increasingly diversifying their 
economic activity, including working as casual labourers and fishermen, and
producing market oriented products, such as honey (Lesorogol, 2008; Haro et al, 
2005). 
The Turkana have a communal ownership system for land, water and other 
resources that cattle use, as well as a semi-nomadic lifestyle directed by the needs 
of the herds. Such an “open access” system in which traditional control held by the 
elders is dwindling, combined with a cultural and economic system that values 
larger and larger herds, results in only a few factors which limit herd size. Stricter 
controls on maximizing extraction of common resources are more often found in a 
social system limited by landownership rights and closed access (Hardin, 1968). 
Typically, an increase in family size is thought to decrease the amount of resources 
available per family member, as there is another mouth to feed. 
This is not the case with the Turkana social and economic system because with 
additional wives, and their subsequent children, there is an increased potential for 
labour for the family herd. This open property arrangement can be compared to 
ranch systems in which individuals own both livestock and the land on which it 
grazes. Over several decades, there have been attempts to create landownership 
within certain pastoralist communities, e.g. the World Bank’s pastoral development 
schemes (de Haan, 1994). The traditional absence of individual land ownership has 
been an obstacle for these programs and these attempts have often resulted in little 
change in average wealth, though private land ownership has decreased the amount
of economic mobility (Lesorogol, 2008). Moreover, such land ownership 
conditions can push poorer pastoralists into other economic activities, such as 
commodity production and selling their labour.
Recent studies present evidence that other resources, particularly water (and not the 
vegetation growth associated with it), may act as a perennial limit to herd size (Butt 
et al, 2011; McPeak, 2004). This would provide a more constant check to the 
growth of herds by (1) limiting water resources necessary to support a large 
number of animals and (2) increasing the distance and frequency of a herd’s 
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movement. In addition, deficient water resources can lead to weakened animals, 
resulting in the spread of disease among herds (Lesorogol, 2008).
Theoretical debates have considered how to conceptualise such an ecological and 
social system that continuously taxes the limits of environmental resources. The 
most striking factor, which social and environmental scientists must explain, is that 
the most effective herd size regulation method is population collapse. This collapse 
is the result of degraded environmental conditions from overgrazing, a decrease in 
precipitation, or disease, as well as combination of the three (Henriksen, 1974). As 
is seen in the history of drought and famine, precipitation of 10% below average 
can result in decimated herds (see the recorded droughts of 1972, 1980 and 1983). 
These factors create an ecological system that exists at disequilibrium rather than a 
stable population size that linearly adjusts to external inputs, such as RF and 
vegetation, over an extended period of time (McCabe, 2004). Scholars have 
debated whether to consider such an ecological system adaptive or not. Some have 
argued that highly fluctuating population sizes are simply a different form of 
adaptation. However, others have contended that a system, in which the only 
mechanism for controlling itself is through its own dramatic collapse, cannot be 
described as “adaptive” in the same sense as a system that adapts without near
collapse (Ingold, 1988). This debate may not take into account other limiting 
factors of herd size in East Africa, such as access to water and not the vegetation 
growth associated with it. For example, if drinking water for livestock is a 
continual limiting factor on herd sizes, as some scholars have  proposed (Butt et al, 
2011), then punctuated drought may not be critical to the analysis, but rather 
should be acknowledged as an expected event interlaced with systematic cultural 
responses.  
5. Discussion
5.1 A narrative of climate, NDVI, and cultural responses, 2001–2010
Over the last ten years, the average RF in Northern Kenya was approximately 10% 
less than the GPCC 60-year mean. Such a decrease in precipitation has likely 
contributed to the increasing number of droughts experienced in this region. 
However, this trend does not satisfactorily explain whether climate alone caused all 
the recorded drought events during this period. Conversely, the categorical 
paradigms we used on which to base these observed patterns in the 60-year period 
provide a better starting point for our analysis of causal elements during the most 
recent prolonged drought period, 2007–2010.      
We have reported that inverse relationships exist between NDVI and RF, best 
expressed seasonally and annually. In a natural system where RF and vegetation 
are in balance, vegetation responses to variations in rainfall should be positively 
correlated. When they are negatively correlated, assumptions must be made that 
other factors, natural or anthropogenic, are likely to be contributing to the inverse 
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observations (Celis, 2007; Schimmer, 2009). Based on our findings of this 
research, we suggest that following 2005, a below-average RF year, a cultural 
response to the abundance of RF in 2006 contributed more to the drought period of 
2007–2010 than the below-average year in 2009; i.e. below-average RF in 2009 
exacerbated an existing drought but it cannot explain the instigation nor wholly 
account for the severity of the drought period 2007–2010. In this analysis, we use 
the last ten years of the GPCC record (1998–2007), in combination with the RFE 
record (2001–2010), to analyse RF and the MODIS record (2001–2010), in order to 
analyse NDVI. 
Following three years of below-average RF years (2002–2004) and two recorded 
droughts (1999–2000), a near three-year recovery period (2002–2004) ensued. 
Average and above-average RF allowed livestock herds to replenish while 
vegetation and water resources recovered. The NDVI data recorded this process, 
which is especially evident in the inverse correlation between RF (decrease) and 
NDVI (increase) in 2003. In 2004, a Category-3 drought disrupts this trend, which 
annual mean RF (neither LR nor SR) cannot explain. The drought continues as a 
Category 4 in 2005 (GPCC -27%, Meteosat -34%). But the abnormally copious RF 
(GPCC +35%, Meteosat +60%) the following year likely stimulated an increase in 
livestock numbers, as NDVI rebounded to well above the ten-year average (+20%). 
But a Category-3 drought is again recorded in 2007, although GPCC reports an 
average year and Meteosat reports a below-average year (-9%), but not exceeding 
the adjusted ?????????????????
According to the records, this drought persists at different levels of severity for the 
following three years (2008–2010) as a Category-4 drought; 2009 is the only 
below-average RF year (Meteosat -21%) and the other two, 2008 and 2010, are 
average RF years. Similar to 2003, NDVI responds inversely to RF in 2008; i.e. 
NDVI decreased in spite of an increase in RF. Moreover, although NDVI results 
show good positive correlations to annual mean RF fluctuations, except in two key 
years 2003 and 2008, the ten-year NDVI trend is strongly negative—thus not 
conforming to the slightly positive trend of increasing RF for the decade.
In summary, three important observations suggest that factors other than climate 
contributed to the two drought periods of the last decade: (1) a poor correlation 
with the onset of recorded drought events or periods and below-average RF years; 
(2) an inverse correlation between RF and NDVI for two years, of which one 
preceded a drought year not explained by below-average RF for that year; and (3) 
an inverse correlation between a slight positive trend in RF and a strong negative 
trend in NDVI for the decade.
We provide two potential explanations, either (1) local communities are over-
responding to positive RF periods in ways not sustainable during negative RF 
periods, or (2) local community demands on environmental services and resource 
availability can only be sustained during normal and positive RF years. Historically 
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drought events occur in sets of two-four consecutive years. Thus, the recent 
increasing frequency of drought events is best described as fewer normal years 
between drought events rather than more consecutive years of drought. However, 
we are more interested in the highs not lows, because cultural responses to high RF 
periods appear to contribute to the onset and severity of droughts.  
Based on isohyets’ mapping, a desert is classified as an environment consistently 
receiving less than 100 mm annual mean RF. Drought is generally defined as a 
period of prolonged deficiency of water supply in a region. The 100-year annual
mean RF record for this semiarid region of Northern Kenya is 560 mm and the 60-
year mean is 559 mm. During the last 20 years, the region has received ~544 mm 
annual mean RF. Southern Arizona received on average ~416 mm annual mean RF 
for the period 1971–2000.8
What is a cultural response? Cultural responses vary among groups but are 
predictable based on historical understanding of how certain social groups and 
polities will respond to social, political, and environmental stimuli. Responses can 
evolve based on resource availability, technology, external influences, and political 
dynamics, at the local, national, and international level. For example, sustaining 
livelihoods depends on factors such as the geographic range available for a 
particular form of resource extraction; the level of production given a defined 
space; the level of technology available to exploit a resource, either finite or 
renewable; and the security or access to these resources. Cyclical environmental 
What is drought in Northern Kenya? Is drought defined by an institutional or 
international response or a documented imbalance in environmental services and 
resource availability? There is no acceptable single operational definition of 
drought; in meteorological terms, annual drought (the failure of two successive 
rainy seasons) may occur anytime with a frequency of between one every three 
years and one every thirty years (Orindi et al., 2007).
We do not attempt to answer these questions but establish them as a fundamental 
parameter for research which addresses the following. Which organisation or 
organisations, whether NGO or sovereign government, is a reliable source for 
recording the period and magnitude of a drought? Defining these sources is 
important for the establishment of a guideline for the documentation of a historical 
record of drought events, similar to historical climate records. Moreover, what was 
the standard for classifying a drought in 1955 versus 2005? For this research, we 
relied on sources reporting either a drought event or a response to drought-like 
conditions, for example, provision of humanitarian aid. In the absence of a clear 
definition, we chose consistent sources to ensure some continuity, namely United 
Nations agencies, such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
8 http://www.currentresults.com/Weather/Arizona/yearly-average-precipitation.php
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conditions, whether seasonal, decadal, or multi-decadal, influence cultural response 
patterns.
Garrett Hardin (1968) describes the tragedy of the commons as resulting from 
imbalances between resource extraction and resource availability. Hardin argues 
that eventually the cumulative of this competition will lead to a destruction of the 
environment on which they rely to maintain their gains but this occurs less often in 
societies organized by private property. Conversely, converting traditional 
community property into private or regulated property is not necessarily a desired 
or functional approach among pastoralist groups—for example the failed outcomes 
of the “Ranching Phase,” promoted by World Bank pastoral development schemes 
in the 1980s (de Haan, 1994). 
Recent research argues that educational or management approaches must embrace 
the structure of livelihood systems among the cultural groups of these fragile 
environments (Young, 2009).  John McPeak (2005) argues that the record of failure 
in pastoral development in Northern Kenya may be partially due to a faulty 
conceptual foundation. He suggests that facilitating herd accumulation may offer 
more promise than discouraging it. Thus, strengthening pastoralists’ positive 
adaptive responses to climate variations and resource management, based on 
traditional understanding of the environment, is a preferred and viable option to 
creating cycles of reliance on external resources (Tarekegn, 2009).
How can climate and vegetation monitoring inform resource management 
approaches? Acknowledging the effect of short- and long-term influences of biotic 
and abiotic stresses on individual plant species, plant communities, and cultivated 
species, and vegetation responses to the combined influence of climate and human 
activities, will correlate well to intra- and inter-annual RF fluctuations and land-use 
cycles. Although this does not, per se, exemplify a steady state, the correlation does 
indicate a predictable response pattern (Celis, 2007).
In addition to human management of water quality and quantity, a number of 
natural variables affect water resources. As an important source of water, the 
amount of RF is important. When and where rain falls, and how the environment 
consumes, reacts, and distributes the water is fundamental to ensuring the 
sustainable availability of the resource and sustaining vegetation health. For 
example, varying utilities of water use and conservation by different plant species 
can attribute to both negative and positive latent responses in NDVI (Celis, 2007).
In addition, the level and consistency of water resources contributed by watersheds 
in adjacent regions, the capacity and recharging of groundwater, and the loss of 
water due to surface runoff and inadequate catchments, can further contribute to 
the depletion of water during a period of decreased RF. Finally, intense agricultural 
activities, especially wet farming, will increase NDVI in spite of periodical 
diminished precipitation, so long as water resources are available to maintain 
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production (Celis, 2007). Conversely, overgrazing in open ranges during periods of 
increased precipitation can inhibit positive NDVI responses.     
But not all cultural responses to assure sustainability can remain localised; certain 
factors lie beyond local geographic and political influence. A geographic example 
in Kenya is the Mau Forest deforestation problem and its effect on the forest’s 
important role as a watershed catchment for lowland agricultural regions (Baldyga 
et al., 2008). Our research area does not include the southern portions of the 
Ethiopian Highlands. Thus, we cannot study how these highlands contribute to 
water resources in many of the lowland grass and shrub lands we discuss in this 
research. Watersheds are particularly important to supplement water resources in 
lower elevation environments that receive erratic seasonal or annual RF. 
Furthermore, watersheds can replenish aquifers, which provide an additional 
source of water during dry periods.
Finally, we also acknowledge the balance between water quality and water 
quantity. Water availability comprises three concerns, access, quantity, and quality. 
These nuances are not easily assessed without in depth field surveys. But we 
emphasise that water quality is a fundamental objective of resource management. 
6. Conclusion
In applying these findings to the inquiry into whether below-average RF was the 
primary catalyst for the prolonged 2007–2010 in Northern Kenya, our findings 
suggest that this was not entirely the case. We argue that traditional resource 
management practices, as cultural responses to multi-year climate cycles, can 
contribute to the frequency and severity of drought events. The most important 
responses likely occur during average RF periods and above-average RF years.
Thus, in order to understand what climate factors trigger drought, it is important to 
determine what occurs in the periods between droughts—that are not recorded in 
the climate record. Primarily, how are resources being extracted and managed and 
how do positive climate events, e.g. above-average RF years, contribute to cultural 
responses that potentially lead to environmental stress during average RF periods, 
and subsequently contribute to the severity of below-average RF periods. We 
suggest that cultural responses to climate occurring during the average to above-
average RF periods contribute to environments that are more fragile during periods 
of decreased RF. 
In terms of monitoring the environment as a means to facilitate adaptive cultural 
responses to climate variability, the 5% threshold range presented in this paper 
might provide a baseline to monitor and measure cultural responses to climate 
variations and help achieve levels of sustainability in resource extraction. This 
could lead to greater stability during the years when RF decreases below the 
adjusted 10% threshold and, hence, provide an additional 5% buffer. Managing 
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positive cultural responses to events and periods of increased RF is critical to 
mitigating losses and the impact of the severity of bad years on local human and 
livestock populations, and to maintaining food security and adequate water 
resources.   
Climate Change and Pastoralism
118
References
Baldyga, T. J., Miller, S. N., Driese, K. L., & Gichaba, C. M. (2008). Assessing 
land cover change in Kenya's Mau Forest region using reomtely sensed data. 
African Journal of Ecology , 46 (1), 46-54.
Butt, B. (2011). Coping with Uncertainty and Variability: The Influence of 
Protected Areas on Patoral Herding Strategies in East Africa. Human Ecology,
39(3), 289-307
Celis, D., De Pauw, E., & Geerken, R. (2007). Assessment of Land cover and land 
use in Central and West Africa and North Africa: Part 2. Hot Spots of Land Cover 
Change and Drought Vulnerability. Aleppo, Syria: International Center for 
Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA).
de Haan, C. (1994). An Overview of the World Bank’s Involvement in Pastoral 
Development. Pastoral Development Network, 31b, London: ITDG Publishing.
Evans, J., & Geerken, R. (2004). Discrimination between climate and human-
induced dryland degradation. Journal of Arid Environments, (57), 535-554.
Haro, Guyo, Godana Doyo and John McPeak. 2005. Linkages Between 
Community, Environmental, and Conflict Management: Experiences from 
Northern Kenya. World Development, 33(2), 285-299.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science , 162, 1243-1248.
Henriksen, G. (1974). Problems of Development in Turkana. Bergen: University of 
Bergen Press.
Herskovits, M. (1926). The Cattle Complex in East Africa. American 
Anthropologist , 8(2).
Ingold, T. (1988). Hunters, Pastoralists and Ranchers: Reindeer Economics and 
their Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, R. D., Slater, P. N., & Pinter, P. J. (1983). Discrimination of growth and 
water stress in wheat by various vegetation indices through clear and turbid 
atmospheres. Remote Sensing of the Environment, 15, 187-208.
Jones, D. K. (1984). Shepherds of the Desert. London: Elm Tree Books.
Lesorogol, C. (2008). Land Privatization and Pastoralist Well-being in Kenya. 
Development and Change, 39(2), 309-331.
Evidence for and vulnerability to climate change
119
McCabe, T. (2004). Cattle Brings Us to Our Enemies; Turkana, Ecology, Politics, 
and Raiding in a Disequilibrium System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
McPeak, J. (2005). Individual and Collective Rationality in Pastoral Production: 
Evidence from Northern Kenya. Human Ecology , 33 (2), 171-197.
Orindi, V. A., Nyong, A., & Herrero, M. (2007). Pastoral Livelihood Adaptation to 
Drought and Instititutional Interventions in Kenya. Human Development Report 
2007/2008 .
Schimmer, R. (2009). Satellite Evidence of Large Scale Environmental Change 
Caused by Violence in Darfur Since 2003. In M. Leroy (Ed.), Environment and 
Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur (pp. 320-338). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 
University for Peace, Africa Programme.
Tarekegn, B. (2009). Pastoralism and Adaptation to Climate Change. In M. Leroy 
(Ed.), Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur (pp. 170-180). 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: University for Peace, Africa Programme.
Tucker, C. J. (1979). Red and photographic infrared linear combinations for 
monitoring vegetation. Remote Sensing of the Environment , 8, 127-150.
Tucker, C. J., Newcomb, W. W., Los, S. O., & Prince, S. D. (1991). Mean and 
inter-year variation of growing-season normalized difference vegetation index for 
the Sahel 1981-1989. International Journal of Remote Sensing , 12, 1113-1115.
UNDP. (2004). Kenya Natural Disaster Profile. United Nations Development 
Program.
Watson, D. J., & Binsbergen, J. v. (2008). Livestock Market Access and 
Opportunities in Turkana. International Livestock Research Institute Research 
Report 3 .
Young, H. (2009). Pastoralism, Power and Choice. In M. Leroy (Ed.), Environment 
and Conflict in Arrica: Reflections on Darfur (pp. 181-209). Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia: University for Peace, Africa Programme.

Theme 2 
Coping with the Adverse 
Impacts of Climate Change 
through Traditional Means 

Coping with the adverse impacts of climate change
123
Discrepancies between Traditional Coping Mechanisms to 
Climate Change and Government Intervention in South Omo, 
Ethiopia
Asnake Kefale and Fana Gebresenbet 
Abstract 
Pastoral groups in the Horn of Africa are politically and economically 
marginalized. Marginalization has, unsurprisingly, led to their extreme poverty. 
They even fare very badly in terms of social and physical infrastructure as 
compared to the (internationally low) national averages of their countries. Climate 
change brings newer and more complicated challenges. It is expected that the 
frequency and severity of extreme weather events will increase in the region, 
making the probability of flooding and drought high. This will have devastating 
implications for the peoples of the region in general and the pastoral communities 
in particular. This paper examines traditional coping mechanisms that the 
Dassanech and Nyangatom pastoral groups of the Ethiopian sector of the 
Karamoja Cluster use. The two groups are located in the Omo valley of the 
Ethiopian southern region.  
Using primary and secondary data, the paper contends that there are visible signs 
of climate change in the Omo valley where the two groups are located. Amongst 
others there is recurrent drought and extreme weather events. The pastoralists of 
the region use traditional coping methods, including migration, herd 
diversification, herd splitting, income diversification, restocking and local 
alliances. The interventions of governmental and non-governmental development 
agents by and large overlook the capacity of traditional methods of adapting to 
climate change. The Ethiopian government, for instance, focuses on settlement in 
its development intervention in the southern Omo. It believes that settling pastoral 
communities would bring them a ‘stable’ way of life. Introduction of large-scale 
irrigation schemes in the Omo valley by both the government and private investors 
would bring pastoral communities more challenges than opportunities.
The paper’s major conclusion is that the adoption of viable policies to cope with 
the adverse impacts of climate change in the Omo valley requires a concerted 
effort to efficiently utilize the traditional knowledge of pastoral groups. 
1. Introduction
The Karamoja Cluster is home to fourteen ethnic groups which share language, 
traditions, culture and means of livelihood. Despite their close affinities, the 
peoples of the Cluster have been divided amongst several countries in the region. 
They are found in north-west Kenya, north-east Uganda, south–west Ethiopia and 
south-east South Sudan. These groups have been politically and economically 
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marginalized. Marginalization, unsurprisingly, has led to their extreme poverty. 
They even fare very badly in terms of social and physical infrastructure as 
compared to the (internationally low) national averages of the countries in the 
region. The ensuing social tensions on top of climatic stresses and the proliferation 
of small arms have made the Cluster a very volatile and conflict-prone area (United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2002). 
Though the Cluster is not short of challenges, climate change brings newer and 
more complicated challenges. It is expected that the frequency and severity of 
extreme weather events will increase in the region, making the probability of 
flooding and drought high. This will have devastating implications for pastoral 
communities. For instance, this year’s drought in East Africa is exacting a heavy 
toll on Somalia. Many pastoral groups in Ethiopia and Kenya are also affected.  
Pastoralists of the Cluster have traditional coping mechanisms which have evolved 
over centuries in response to the harsh environmental conditions they live in. They 
used their traditional wisdom to cope with past climatic stresses and will continue 
to do so, especially given the fact that government intervention in these areas 
remains insignificant. It would even be plausible to assume that traditional coping 
mechanisms will be more effective than ‘alien’ concepts imposed by policy 
makers, state development agents or non-state actors. 
Traditional coping mechanisms have been used for generations and are 
incorporated into the cultures and day-to-day lives of pastoralists. Thus, 
governmental and non-governmental development agencies should learn from 
these mechanisms. Examining the resilient and time-tested traditional coping 
mechanisms of the pastoral communities of the Cluster would help development 
agents to better plan their interventions. In turn, they could help strengthen 
traditional coping mechanisms, if they developed a good appreciation of the—often 
despised and neglected—traditional knowledge.  
Despite the huge potential that traditional knowledge offers for climate change 
adaptation, research efforts on the effectiveness and appropriateness of this 
knowledge have, so far, been limited. Furthermore, there are no proven approaches 
to integrate traditional coping mechanisms into mainstream adaptation efforts. 
In light of what has been stated above, this study examines the coping mechanisms 
of the Dassanech and Nyangatom pastoral groups of southern Ethiopia. The two 
groups constitute the Ethiopian part of the Karamoja Cluster. This paper has three 
major objectives. First, it examines how local people perceive climate change. 
Second, it considers how the two groups use their traditional wisdom to cope with 
the adverse impacts of climate change. Third, the paper also examines how 
development agents of the government and non-governmental organizations use or 
ignore local traditional knowledge in their interventions.  
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This paper is based on primary and secondary information. The primary materials 
for this paper were gathered during fieldwork which the authors undertook in May 
2011 in the Dassanech and Nyangatom wereda of the South Omo Zonal 
Administration of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region 
(SNNPR) of Ethiopia. During the fieldwork, numerous interviews and focus group 
discussions were held. The informants comprised elders and officials at zonal, 
wereda and local levels. 
Figure 1: Map of the study area 
We tried to use meteorological data in order to correlate the perceptions of people 
about climate change with rainfall data. However, meteorological data is not 
available for the study areas, and what is available from nearby areas is unreliable. 
This paper is divided into the seven sections. The first provides the introduction. 
The second part discusses how climate change threatens pastoralists and highlights 
the importance of traditional coping mechanisms in the design and implementation 
of adaptation-related activities. The next part provides a background to the study 
area and the pastoral communities residing there, the Dassanech and the 
Nyangatom. The fourth section discusses the perception of local people on how the 
climate has changed in the past decades and their interpretation of the causes. The 
following part provides a survey of the various coping mechanisms utilized by the 
pastoral communities to withstand climatic threats. The sixth part gives a summary 
of interventions, by governmental and non-governmental organizations, which are 
aimed at decreasing the vulnerability of pastoral communities in the study area. 
Finally, brief concluding remarks are made. 
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2. Pastoralism, climate change and traditional coping mechanisms  
Climate change threatens vulnerable minority groups, including pastoralists. Some 
of the smaller groups are feared to become extinct and others might migrate and 
disperse as environmental migrants. Some are even being forced to change their 
traditional livelihood strategies completely (Mihlar, 2008). 
Pastoralists have highly respected traditional governance structures, with rules 
governing the use, management and conservation of natural resources, and 
sanctions against those failing to observe these rules. Recent decades, however, 
have seen the erosion of these values, norms and governance structures. 
Effective traditional coping mechanisms for drought helped pastoralists pass 
through the most trying times of their existence. However, these coping 
mechanisms could prove inadequate in the face of frequent severe droughts as well 
as socio-economic and political changes and long-term climate change (Orindi 
et al., 2007). Moreover, improper interventions by government and donor agencies 
tend to produce unintended negative consequences (Orindi et al., 2007), among 
which is the erosion of local administration and coping mechanisms. 
Traditional knowledge can be understood as “a collection of knowledge that is 
passed down and is developed through generations within these communities” 
(Mihlar, 2008). From a broader perspective, traditional knowledge includes a 
variety of information; from being able to predict weather patterns and identify 
medicinal plants, to adapting new plant and animal conservation techniques 
(Mihlar, 2008). 
Discourse on the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, including 
pastoralists, vis-à-vis climate change has been largely limited to the mitigation of 
those factors that are believed to contribute to climate change. This is despite the 
fact that many indigenous communities and pastoralists, who usually live in 
marginal areas, are not only vulnerable to future climate change but also are 
suffering from its adverse effects currently. The few studies that have dealt with 
adaptation did not acknowledge the adaptive strategies and capacities of local 
communities which are, by and large, informed by their traditional knowledge 
(Macchi, 2008). 
Reducing the vulnerability of such marginalized groups to the adverse impacts of 
climate change requires a multifaceted effort. Macchi (2008), for instance, argues 
that ‘a good starting point’ would be to reverse their marginalization and recognize 
and support their coping mechanisms. Similarly, Mihlar (2008) adds that 
pastoralists have ‘traditional knowledge’ which is immensely helpful in developing 
adaptation and mitigation strategies, as these communities have survived through 
cycles of environmental change. A report by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
of the UN on the humanitarian challenges of climate change (2009) also stipulates 
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that, to shield pastoralists from the impacts of climate change their inherent 
adaptive capacity should be strengthened and they should participate in decision-
making. Moreover, some studies presented detailed analysis of the importance of 
having a participatory approach in devising adaptation strategies (Leary et al., 
2007). These approaches emphasize that effective responses to climate change 
should strengthen livelihoods at the local level and respond to local needs. Leary 
et al. (2007) further argue that “adaptation is place-based and requires place-
specific strategies.”  
Another argument supporting local adaptation is the easily discernible differences 
in vulnerability to climate change impacts across and within villages and 
households (Conservation Development Center, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development and Saferworld, 2009). The same document further 
argues that the poorest possess the most developed climate adaptation and coping 
mechanisms and, as a result, may not necessarily be the most vulnerable.  
Many have attested that African populations employed various sophisticated, 
evolving techniques to respond to risks and take advantage of opportunities 
presented by climate variability in the past centuries (for a few examples read 
Hampshire & Randall, 2007; Hesse & Cotula, 2006; Nyong & Fiki, 2005; Smit, 
1998). Notwithstanding this, some (such as Boko et al, 2007) fear that many 
Africans will not be able to keep pace with the scale and speed of current climate 
change. They argue that an increase in the severity of climate variability due to 
climate change, and also to other factors which are entirely unrelated to 
environmental conditions (such as poverty, weak governance and political 
marginalization), limit the capacity of Africans to adapt to climate stress.  
The choice of local coping strategies, whether at the household or community 
level, is made taking into consideration the types of resources, economic activities 
and social networks that the people can access. Another factor increasing the 
palatability of strengthening local institutions is their easy accessibility and 
adoption coupled with lower technological and capital requirements (Orindi & 
Eriksen, 2005). 
However, state policies often ignore the rights and livelihood strategies of 
pastoralists. A case in point is the fate of pastoralists in the Karamoja area of 
Uganda. As Mwebaza (2005) states, 36% of this area is notified as a protected area 
(thus, no entry) and the remaining 64% is designated as a controlled hunting area, 
permitting grazing, settlement and resource use. In 1996 part of this area was given 
to marble and gemstone mining companies. The same is true on the Ethiopian side 
of the Karamoja Cluster and its adjoining areas (South Omo) with the 
establishment of the Omo and Mago National Parks and the sugarcane plantations 
under consideration. This often leads to resource scarcity and conflict (see Unruh, 
2005).  
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Given the fact that wildlife are more adapted to conditions in the marginal semiarid 
lands and the comparative advantage Africa has in this sector, some have argued 
that sustainable utilization of wildlife will benefit pastoralists. However, this would 
materialize only if pastoralists are given the role of making natural resource 
management choices, thus enabling multispecies management (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2001). 
Institutions, both local (including modern organizations, informal associations, 
kinship networks and traditional institutions) and provincial/national/international 
ones, play a crucial role in adaptation efforts, thus the need to have strong 
institutions. Therefore, remnants of traditional institutions, whose roles have been 
diminished by various factors, provide a framework which could be revitalized and 
exploited (Leary et al., 2007).   
Non-pastoralists, too, have a lot to learn from pastoralists with respect to adaptation 
to climate change. Understanding the coping mechanisms and adaptation strategies 
of pastoralists, therefore, would also be beneficial to farmers, owing to the increase 
in complexity, non-linearity and non-equilibrium situations everywhere caused by 
the adverse impacts of climate change. This is the exact situation pastoral 
communities have thrived under for many centuries, meaning that their traditional 
knowledge is a mine yet to be exploited (Scoones, 2004). Past failures of 
development initiatives in dry lands are mainly due to the unwillingness of 
development agents to recognize the traditional knowledge of pastoralist 
communities. Even if we couldn’t learn the ‘how’ of living with uncertainty from 
pastoralists, we should at least not impose adaptation strategies which do not 
account for the high uncertainty in pastoralist environments. Most development 
agents (government, donors, NGOs) have not yet realized this dynamic, and remain 
stuck in policies designed to bring a ‘stable’ way of life to pastoralists (Scoones, 
2004). For instance, in Ethiopia there is a remarkable continuity of government 
policy about the ‘need’ to bring a stable way of life to pastoralist communities. 
Such an attitude fails to appreciate how the pastoralist way of life was developed 
over many centuries as a response to environmental challenges.  
Climate change predictions warn about increases in uncertainty and recurrent 
extreme weather events. This means living with uncertainty is one of the 
challenges most of the human race will have to learn to live with. However, 
pastoralists have been living in uncertain environments for millennia (Mehta et al., 
2001; Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJ), 2009). There is a lot that can 
be learned from their institutions and local knowledge. At the very least, 
development interventions should not be imposed on pastoralist communities 
without considering their traditional knowledge.  
Long-term livelihood security is embedded in adaptation strategies, while coping is 
just about getting past the current challenge. Notwithstanding the fact that 
adaptation to long-term climate change will be driven by responses to individual 
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events in the short term (Phillips, 2003), i.e. coping mechanisms, many authors 
argue, will compromise long term adaptation and future coping ability. Many 
coping mechanisms, such as selling household goods or crop harvests to pay debts, 
erode the asset base of the household and lead to destitution (Eriksen & Lind, 
2005; Orindi & Eriksen, 2005). Thus, concerted efforts must be made to strengthen 
the adaptation capacities of pastoral communities. 
Furthermore, existing coping mechanisms are restricted by current realities—such 
as market economy, private property ownership, government intervention and the 
erosion of traditional institutions (Orindi & Eriksen, 2005)—rendering them less 
helpful for long-term adaptation. The same authors go on to say that ‘most coping 
strategies are mainly aimed at responding to known extreme or seasonal events like 
floods and drought; however, fewer strategies may exist that are aimed at dealing 
with longer term changes brought by global warming.’ 
3. The Dassanech and Nyangatom pastoral groups of South Omo: 
General background 
The Dassanech and Nyangatom pastoral groups are located in the southern 
borderlands of Ethiopia, in the lower parts of the Omo-Gibe basin and at the mouth 
of the Omo River. Neither group is confined to Ethiopian territory. They settle 
across the boundaries of Ethiopia into neighbouring Kenya and South Sudan, 
respectively. In this respect, the territory of the Dassanech includes the 
northernmost part of Lake Turkana. The Nyangatom, for their part, have their 
ethnic kin in the newly independent South Sudan. Under the current administrative 
structure, the two groups have their own separate wereda1 within the South Omo 
Zone of the SNNPR. While the Dassanech wereda is home to a single ethnic group, 
the Nyangatom wereda is home to the Koyego (also called Muguji) and Murle 
minority groups as well. 
The South Omo Zone has some sixteen ethnic groups, most of whom are 
pastoralists. The Zone is characterized by weak physical and socio-economic 
infrastructure and poor integration with the national economy. The different 
indigenous ethnic groups in the zone have small populations (see Table 1) and 
often engage in bloody conflicts, usually over land resources such as pasture and 
water points. Pastoral conflicts in southern Ethiopia have a cross-border character. 
In particular, there is a bloody feud between the Dassanech and Nyangatom of 
Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya. There are also occasional conflicts between the 
Dassanech and Nyangatom over land resources.  
1 Both ethnic groups were under a single wereda, the Kuraz wereda. In 2006, the Southern regional 
government granted the Nyangatom their own wereda as they had to travel long distances in “enemy 
territory” (well into Dassanech land) to get justice, aid, medical supplies etc
Climate Change and Pastoralism
130
Table 1: Ethnic composition of the South Omo Zone 
Ethnic Group Livelihood Total population 
Ari Farmers  290,453 
Malie Agro-pastoralist 98,114 
Dassanech Pastoralist 48,067 
Hamar Pastoralist  46,532 
Bena Pastoralist 27,022 
Nyangatom Pastoralist 25,252 
Tsemay Pastoralist 20,046 
Mursi Pastoralist 7,500 
Bodi Pastoralist 6,994 
Arborie Pastoralist 6,840 
Brayle Pastoralist 5,002 
Bacha Pastoralist 2,632 
Koyego Pastoralist 1,974 
Karo Pastoralist 1,464 
Murle Pastoralist 1,469 
Dime Pastoralist 891 
Zone Total 590,252 
Adapted from: Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia, CSA (2008) 
The Kuraz wereda, brought the Dassanech and the Nyangatom under a single local 
administrative structure. It was established at the end of the 1980s when the former 
military regime, the Derg, restructured provincial administrations following the 
adoption of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) constitution in 
1987. Initially, the wereda was made part of the South Omo Administrative Zone 
with its capital at Omorate. This setup persisted for nearly fifteen years, even after 
the downfall of the Derg regime. In 2006, the Kuraz wereda was split into two: 
Dassanech and Nyangatom. While there is traditional animosity and competition 
between the Nyangatom and the Dassanech over land resources, the three groups 
that comprise the Nyangatom wereda have good relationships and there are 
intermarriages among them. 
Both the Dassanech and Nyangatom trace their origins to neighbouring countries. 
According to the narrative of the Dassanech, their forefathers migrated from 
Eastern Somalia to “Pupe” in north-eastern Kenya but, as they couldn’t co-exist 
with tribes in that locality, they migrated onwards to “Akologn” and later to 
“Ngmamari” in Ethiopia. In contrast, the forefathers of the Nyangatom came from 
Karamojong, Uganda (SNNP profile, 2009). Legend has it that the first of the 
Nyangatom came to areas around the Kibbish River in search of lost cattle. 
Astonished by the vegetation of the area and its suitability for cattle rearing, they 
settled there; others went back and stimulated the next rounds of migration. 
Currently, the cultural importance of Kibbish is one the decline due to the drying-
up of the Kibbish River and invasion of the grazing land by prosopis; it is now 
among the most drought-stricken places in the wereda.
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Livestock are seen as a sign of wealth in both communities, and more emphasis is 
given to herd size than quality. As can be seen in Table 2, the Dassanech have 
more livestock; they therefore feel that they are more affluent than the Nyangatom. 
Table 2: Number of livestock in the Dassanech and Nyangatom wereda2
Wereda Cattle Sheep Goats Equine Camel Poultry  
Dassanech 280,0003 156,740 206,185 41,172 265 16,650 
Nyangatom 100,000 80,000 63,513 20,635 - 3,200 
Source: Zone expert 
Irrespective of their many similarities,4 there is seldom peaceful co-existence 
between the two ethnic groups. The major differences between them are with 
respect to language and body and hair decorations. The Nyangatom have more 
linguistic similarity with ethnic groups across the border: the Turkana in Kenya and 
the Toposa in South Sudan. Although there is no shared border, the Nyangatom 
language is similar to that of the Karamojong of Uganda. Both the Dassanech and 
the Nyangatom have ethnic kin across the border in Kenya and South Sudan, 
respectively. However, the Nyangatom have used this to their advantage more than 
the Dassanech. As mentioned above, the Nyangatom used the conflict in South 
Sudan to their advantage (Yohannes et al., 2005) by getting military training and 
weapons from the SPLA.5
Pastoralism is the main livelihood strategy in the area. Both ethnic groups also 
practice flood retreat agriculture on the river banks of the Omo and the surrounding 
flats. The settlement pattern of the Dassanech favours this type of agriculture, as 
the river divides their land into two, making more land available for flood-retreat 
agriculture than the Nyangatom have, who live on the western side of the river 
only. Communities which do not have access to flooded land buy sorghum6 from 
those bordering the river. In the case of the Dassanech, grazing land is also 
seasonal: on the east bank of the Omo river from November to March and on the 
west bank for the remaining months (Elfmann, 2004). The same source also asserts 
that agriculture plays an equivalent role in the economy of the Dassanech. As a 
result, diet shows remarkable shifts: agricultural products and milk dominating in 
‘time of plenty’ (beginning from December, when the first harvest is reaped) and 
meat dominating from June (‘time of want’) as milk production drops and grain 
stores become exhausted (Almagor, 1978: 52-54 as cited in Elfmann, 2004). 
2 These estimates were for 2003 E.C (2010/11). They were provided to us by the South Omo Zone 
Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau.  
3 According to the expert, some estimates put the total cattle population of the Dassanech much 
higher, but that is only due to the fact that cattle are seen as a sign of wealth and there is a tendency to 
exaggerate herd size. 
4 These include mobility, dancing style and a strong patriarchal culture. 
5 The opportunities include easy and cheap access to weapons, bullets and military training. 
6 The staple food, and main agricultural crops, of these communities is mainly sorghum, maize, butter 
and milk. 
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The southern boundary of the Dassanech is marked by Turkana Lake, and those 
residing in that vicinity (5% of the Dassanech) also practice fishing, which is 
considered to be a shameful activity (Tosco, 2001). Almagor (1978) as cited in 
Elfmann (2004) adds that, although most Dassanech dislike fish, it is eaten as a 
supplement during the dry season. The Koigu who live on the edge of the Omo 
River practice retreat agriculture and fishing. For the Koigu, pastoralism is only a 
recent phenomenon emerging as a result of increasing wealth. The Nyangatom 
have recently adopted bee-keeping/traditional apiculture from the Murle.7
4. Climate change in South Omo: Local perceptions of the Dassanech 
and the Nyangatom 
Ethiopia, like many other countries in Africa, is vulnerable to the adverse impacts 
of climate change because of its reliance on rain-fed agriculture and nomadic 
pastoralism. According to Aklilu and Alebachew (2009, p. 22), the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identified three major areas which are threatened 
by climate change: food security, water resources and health.  
The fact that there are changes to climate in this part of Ethiopia is clearly visible 
from every aspect of the life of the pastoralist communities. The decline in the 
amount of rainfall, the decrease in the length of the rainy season and the increase in 
temperature are the most-cited changes. Moreover, the late onset of the rains and 
increased rainfall variability are also causing strains on the local economy. 
Meteorological records of monthly maximum and minimum temperatures and 
monthly rainfall representative of the study area could not be found from an 
ecologically representative area. There are meteorological stations in two areas at 
Turmi and Dimeka, both of which are found in nearby Hamar-Bena wereda. Even 
in these areas, the latest available readings are available until 2007, and the oldest 
from 1980 (Turmi) and 1987 (Dimeka). The records are intermittent and not fit for 
analysis, as data are missing for several dozens of months. For instance, data on 
monthly minimum temperatures for Dimeka is missing for more than 53 months. 
Moreover, the length of less than thirty years for the data makes it unsuitable for 
analysis with respect to climate change. One should also not forget the high spatial 
variability of rainfall in the lowlands, thus the uncertainty of working with station 
data.
Communities in the study area, however, directly and indirectly explain aspects of 
climate change by narrating severe changes that have happened to weather patterns. 
In this respect, elders stated that the rains were much better during the time of the 
Emperor (before the 1974 revolution). The rainy seasons were longer and there was 
no problem with pasture. According to the elders, compared to now there used to 
7 The Murle language is dominated by the Nyangatom language and is on the brink of disappearing. 
Currently, the mother tongue of Murle children is Nyangatom. The Koigu are also very small in 
number and will face the risk of being assimilated into the Nyangatom.
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be good vegetation coverage during the imperial period. During the Derg regime 
(1974-1991), the rainy season became shorter and the rains started to come late. 
Drought started to last as long as two consecutive years and, as a result, the volume 
of water in the rivers and streams began to decline as did the vegetation coverage.  
The social impacts of climate change in the Omo valley are pervasive. The increase 
in temperature has led to changes in the dressing customs of the people. Many 
young people these days, for instance, wear caps to cover their heads from the 
scorching sun. In addition, the increase in the duration of the dry season, which is 
called akamu, has decreased the festivities, length and beauty of different rituals 
and cultural activities normally undertaken in the rainy season. A similar account 
of local perceptions of climate change has been recorded from Nyangatom elders 
by HoA-REC and GTZ (2010). The same source cites an elder man as saying, 
‘Nowadays nobody wants to dance during the daytime anymore. The heat is 
unbearable! You get tired after a short time. That’s why all our ceremonies became
kind of boring.’ 
Another aspect of local culture threatened by climate change is the naming of 
months. For example, the Nyangatom traditionally divide the year into two major 
seasons of equal length, months of abundance called akuporo and months of dry 
season called akamu. The meanings of the names of each of the months correlate 
with seasonal weather condition. Thus, the names tell what to expect and what to 
do in each month. However, due to climate change the meanings attached to the 
months are being lost and, along with this, traditional knowledge about cattle 
breeding and farming is also lost.8
Retreat agriculture produces most of the sorghum and maize consumed among the 
pastoralists of the Omo valley. Thus, flooding of the river banks and the flat areas 
near the Omo River is a welcome event. The amount of flood water and alluvial 
soil brought with it depends on the amount of precipitation in the upper parts of the 
basin. Thus, extent of flooding does not necessarily correlate well with the amount 
of rainfall in the pastoral lands. The pastoral communities are affected by the 
variability of the flood water. If the rains in the upper catchment area of the Omo-
Gibe basin are low, the river may not flood out of its course and there would be 
drought. In some instances, when the rainy season is heavy in the central highlands, 
the flooding in the lower stream of the Omo River would be high and would have 
devastating impacts on both human and animal lives. To predict the amount of 
flooding in the Omo valley, the Dassanech and Nyangatom rely on traditional 
methods.9 But in 2006, 2007 and 2008 the pastoralists of the Omo valley were 
8 An informant mentioned that the month of our fieldwork (May 2011) is called Lokoto, which means 
“month of mud”, but there was, in reality, no rain let alone mud. The paper by Sagal Joshua Mark and 
Jean Grade in this volume presents in detail how climate change threatens the naming of months in 
Karamoja district, Uganda.
9 These involve the studying of goat intestine by elders and are reputed to be very accurate. This 
practice is also used to check if an enemy is going to attack.
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severely affected by the overflowing of the Omo River. The 2006 flooding, in 
particular, was devastating. The Dassanech were hit hard; they lost 364 people and 
an estimated 3,000 livestock. The flooding also displaced 15,000 people from 14 
villages (Aklilu & Alebachew, 2009, p. 44).  The fact that a large number of the 
Dassanech during the time of the floods were on islands10 contributed to their 
significant losses. These islands are found in the lower course of the Omo River at 
the point where it joins Lake Turkana, and provide the Dassanech with dry season 
pasture.
The 2006 floods were also remarkable as they demonstrated the difficulty of using 
traditional Dassanech ‘early-warning’ methods to predict high floods. The 
development of irrigated farms and the installation of hydroelectric dams 
(Gilgel Gibe I, II and III) in the upper catchment of the Omo River appear to have 
undermined the ability of the pastoral communities to predict high floods (Ibid.). 
The erection of dams in the valley has been controversial. On the one hand, the 
Ethiopian government argues that the new dams, in addition to their contribution to 
national development, would help regulate the waters of the Omo River and 
prevent flooding in the lower course of the river, where pastoralist groups like the 
Dassanech are found. On the other hand, environmentalists complain that no 
adequate environmental and socio-economic impact assessment was made before 
the dams were constructed (Aklilu & Alebachew, 2009, p. 44). As a result, the 
development interventions in the Omo valley could adversely impact on the lives 
of pastoralist groups like the Dassanech and Nyangatom.  
Local people blame climate change for the 2006 flooding. Before the flooding, 
extreme drought forced both the Dassanech and Nyangatom to settle near the river 
and, in the case of the Dassanech, on the islands. On top of this, it rained heavily in 
the upper catchment area while there was only little rain in the lowlands.11 When 
the floods arrived in the lower course of the Omo River they were consequently 
devastating.
Droughts have also increased in both frequency and intensity. While the dry season 
lasted for a few months some four decades back, in recent decades it has lasted for 
as much as two consecutive years. This has debilitated the asset base of the 
pastoralists and reduced their resilience and coping capacity, thus effectively 
increasing their vulnerability to future droughts. The extent of drought is not 
uniform in the Omo valley; areas farther away from the Omo River (like Bubuwa 
of the Dassanech) are exposed to more frequent, severe and entrenched drought 
and consequent food insecurity. With respect to severity, as a Nyangatom 
informant has aptly put it, the drought got so bad that [the Nyangatom] people 
10 These land masses, in the strict sense of the term, are not islands, but are conventionally referred as 
such.  
11 This means little or no pasture and water in areas away from the river. In normal years, as the river 
gets full it would have rained long enough for the lowlands to re-grow pasture and sustain the 
livestock. Thus, both people and livestock used to be safe from flooding risks.
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travelled to faraway places like the Suri territories, where they have never been. 
The same informant added that some pastoralists are contemplating the possibility 
of being relocated to a completely different locality by the government. 
Locals cite different causes for the changing climate.12 The elders of the two 
communities relate the changes that have happened to the climate to human 
misdemeanours. The Nyangatom elders, for instance, argue that the rains dried up, 
the land started to be less productive and the whole situation turned against them 
after the 1980s, because they disappointed their traditional leader who is 
considered as a father figure for the group. According to their narrative, in the mid-
1980s the Nyangatom waged war on all of their neighbours. In response, the 
Kenyan military13 intervened – with implicit approval from the Ethiopian 
government, they claim – and killed a large number of them. To escape from the 
attacks, the majority of the Nyangatom fled from Kibbish, against the wishes of 
their leader. The old leader who was deserted by his people died after cursing his 
group. Currently, there is no single elder who has replaced the vacated post. 
Moreover, many Nyangatom believe that the extreme hardship of the local climate, 
environment and animosity with neighbouring tribes is due to his curse. 
A similar account relating the changes in climate with violent conflict is also found 
in the narrative of the Dassanech elders. They also perceive that the climate started 
to change during the Derg period, and correlate it with the rampant bloodshed at 
that time. They recite a local saying: “Shedding man’s blood dries the rains”. They 
also state that the climate got harsher as the animosity and misdeeds between local 
groups increased.  
Young people in the locality state a more plausible reason. The high number of 
livestock14 and unpredictability of rainfall are cited by most of them as the prime 
causes for the decline in pasture. Some refer to unsuitable soil types, like the sandy 
nature of the soil in Bubuwa, for local variations in food insecurity.  
5. A survey of mechanisms for coping with climate change by the 
Dassanech and Nyangatom 
As it has been stated above, pastoralists have traditional coping mechanisms which 
have evolved over centuries. It is only because of their efficient, effective and 
sophisticated tools for coping that pastoralists were able to survive the 
unpredictable climates of the lowlands. They also use their knowledge to adapt to 
12 None of the interviewees related with the proven cause of climate change, greenhouse gas 
emissions.
13 Elders argue that military helicopters and planes were used in that assault. 
14 The high value these pastoral communities put on livestock, as a sign of wealth, status and also 
dowry, means that it will be a pretty challenging task to convince them to go for a smaller but higher 
quality herd. Sometimes, the harsher conditions might even force pastoralists to opt for larger herd 
sizes as an insurance against possible cattle deaths in the future. 
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the adverse impacts of climate change and increased climate variability. Most 
coping mechanisms can be summarized as resource management mechanisms. 
These mechanisms are flexible and spread the risk among the community (Doti, 
2010). 
The main mode of adaptation in pastoral areas remains autonomous—with little or 
no help from the government. This makes traditional coping mechanisms even 
more helpful. The main goal of these mechanisms is to minimize losses or facilitate 
recovery after drought events (Orindi et al., 2007). Local innovations by 
pastoralists (for example purchasing water, purchasing with credit and adopting a 
cut and carry system of forage from protected areas such as parks) can also be seen 
as changes in traditional coping mechanisms to match current socio-economic 
realities and climate challenges (Yohannes & Mebratu, 2009). 
Interventions by government, and non-state actors as well, should therefore build 
on what is already available in the stock of traditional coping mechanisms, or at 
least go in line with these mechanisms. Informal strategies are the main paths 
through which pastoralists cope with climatic stresses, not government or market-
based instruments (Heltberg & Siegel, 2008). Therefore, future adaptation activities 
should not try to replace, but should complement and strengthen these informal 
approaches (Parry et al., 2009). To do this, a comprehensive study on traditional 
coping mechanisms and their effectiveness should be carried out. This will help 
identify those traditional coping mechanisms that could be streamlined into 
government policies. In the following section we survey some of the most 
important coping mechanisms used by the Dassanech and Nyangatom pastoral 
communities.  
5.1 Pastoral ‘early warning’ methods
People with the skill of predicting seasons (whether good or bad) are highly 
regarded by pastoralists. Such predictions are made by observing stars, wind and 
cloud patterns, specific wild animals or the flowering of some plants. 
In the study area, drought will be imminent if the Omo River doesn’t become full 
and floods its banks and the adjoining flat areas. According to informants in the 
study areas, local pastoralists have a traditional ‘early warning system’ which relies 
heavily on astrology15 and the careful observation of wild animals, especially birds. 
They use such observations to predict the coming of rains and their intensity. Based 
on this information, different decisions will be made. For example, they will move 
away from the Omo River, or the islands in the case of the Dassanech, if flooding 
is expected. This decision will be passed to the youth of the group who will take 
the herd to a safe location. Birds also tell when and where to migrate.16
15 In the past, it was only the elders who had this knowledge. Now many people, including the young, 
know it. 
16 A ritual will be held before the young embark on a major migration; goats will be slaughtered and 
their intestines studied to check if there will be an attack by their enemies. 
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5.2 Migration
Migration basically defines the pastoralist way of life. Among the Karamojong, 
mobility is critical to the viability of survival strategies (Easterling et al., 2007; 
Galvin et al., 2004; Orindi & Eriksen, 2005). Herd owners move in search of water 
and pasture to different locations during different times of the year. This has also 
the benefit of reducing pressure on the marginal ecosystems in which they live. 
Migration is augmented by communal ownership and management of natural 
resources, which is something not recognized by states. Before embarking on a 
seasonal migration, pastoralists estimate how long they will have to go (longer in 
drier years) and also compare livestock deaths from migration and staying on the 
sub-optimal lands (Orindi et al., 2007). In recent years, pastoralists (like Somalis in 
Ethiopia) have started taking fuel when migrating, so as to ensure easy access to 
water from boreholes by using water pumps (Yohannes & Mebratu, 2009, p. 15). 
However, migration often brings contact with other pastoral communities and/or 
farmers. This often leads to resource competition and social tension. Traditional 
mechanisms, such as the creation and maintenance of grazing corridors, have 
proved crucial in abating the risk of violent conflict.  
When we come to the Dassanech and Nyangatom, the distance to be covered and 
direction of migration depends on a lot of factors. The most important input to this 
decision is the intimate knowledge that pastoralists have of their environment. 
Depending on the severity of the drought, pastoralists may take their herd into 
enemy territories while being well aware that conflict will erupt and lives will be 
lost.
The Dassanech have the geographical advantage of going onto one of the islands 
on the northern tip of Lake Turkana during dry times, while their neighbours the 
Hamar and Nyangatom migrate to the Mago and Omo National Parks, respectively. 
In times of severe drought, the Dassanech migrate deep into the borderlands of 
neighbouring Kenya and the Nyangatom into Omo National Park,17 increasing the 
risk of conflict with the Turkana and Mursi, respectively. A Nyangatom elder 
added that, in times of drought, ‘we will go wherever there is grass, to the lands of 
the Dassanech, Hamar, Karo and Mursi. We also go to Kenya and the Sudan. We 
do that irrespective of the conflict that our movement brings to us.’ 
Migration is not only a coping strategy for shortage of pasture or drought but also a 
method that pastoral groups like the Dassanech use to escape the overflowing of 
the Omo River. In such instances, the Dassanech move into Hamar and Nyangatom 
lands. Migration to towns, to find work as petty traders and daily labourers is not 
17 The Park is also liked by the livestock for its salty soil. 
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very common in the study area. The Nyangatom effectively exploit18 the linguistic 
and cultural similarities they have with the Toposa and their ethnic kinsmen across 
the border, and use the good quality pasture near/in Southern Sudan (a locality 
called Naita) in years of hardship. 
5.3 Consumption of wild fruits and roots  
The consumption of wild fruits and roots, which are not consumed under normal 
conditions, is a common coping mechanism in many communities in Africa.19 In 
times of hunger, these wild plants are usually consumed by human beings; as an 
interviewee said, “cattle are picky”. Sheep and goats eat branches, and herders cut 
down high branches for them. Interestingly, an informant20 mentioned that eating 
fish, especially in the case of the Dassanech, could be seen as a coping mechanism. 
Additionally, as stored cereals are used up, meals prepared from meat and butter 
will dominate. The meat will be dipped in butter and it will have a longer storage 
life, of more than a month. 
     
5.4 Selling livestock 
Neither the Dassanech nor the Nyangatom rear livestock for commercial purposes 
and selling is not a common practice. Furthermore, in both communities, a 
pastoralist who often sells cattle will be ostracized. 
However, during extended droughts both communities will sell their livestock. In 
the past, as access to markets in Ethiopia was limited because of poor roads, 
pastoralists of the South Omo used to go to the Kenyan side to sell or barter their 
animals. Currently, both communities sell their cattle in nearby markets (Omorate 
and Kangaten) within Ethiopia. One interviewee also added that the Nyangatom 
sell honey, too. 
5.5 Herd diversification 
Pastoralists have a good understanding of the importance of keeping mixed herds, 
especially of grazers and browsers. They do this to take advantage of the 
heterogeneous nature of the environment and to use different resources (such as 
grasses, shrubs, twigs etc.). Diversification helps prevent a total herd loss by 
keeping animals with different tolerance levels to climatic stresses (Hendrickson 
et al., 1996; Orindi et al., 2007). Reports from the Somali Region of Ethiopia show 
that herd composition is changing to shoats (sheep and goats) from camels and, 
among the Afar, from cattle to goats and camels (Yohannes & Mebratu, 2009). The 
Borana of Ethiopia, who are traditionally averse to camel husbandry, have also 
started keeping camels due to their resilience to drought and climatic stress.  
18 The Nyangatom used this similarity to get guns, bullets and military training during the North-
South civil war in the Sudan during the 1980s and 1990s. This has created the opportunity to benefit 
from cattle rustling.  
19 For detailed information on the types of plants, plant parts and processing of hunger foods see the 
chapter by Jean Grade. 
20 Both the Dassanech and Nyangatom have minority sub-clans who eat fish. 
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Herd diversification is not, however, traditionally used in the study areas. It is only 
recently, and after encouragement from the government and NGOs, that 
pastoralists of the study area started keeping camels. The Dassanech used to raid 
camels from the Turkana in the past, but the Hamar and Nyangatom got their first 
camels (originally bought from the Borana zone) with NGO support. In Nyangatom 
areas the adoption is so slow that most camels are still in government hands.  
Locals have started consuming camel meat and drinking camel milk. It is also 
appreciated that a camel can provide more milk than a cow. In the Dassanech areas, 
a clear increase in the proportion of camels is seen as one moves away from the 
Omo River, reaching as high as 20% of the total herd in some locations. Moreover, 
camels and donkeys are not treated as well as cattle/goats, mainly because the 
former are seen as hardy. To a small extent, the Dassanech and Nyangatom have 
also started keeping poultry and bees. 
5.6 Herd splitting 
The impact of climate events (like drought) will not be equally felt in all 
vulnerable/affected areas. The same is true of the risk of raids and outbreaks of 
animal diseases. As a result, herd splitting is practiced by pastoralists as a way of 
mitigating the adverse impacts of climate change. Herd splitting allows pastoralists 
to easily restock after extreme weather events (Orindi et al., 2007; Orindi & 
Eriksen, 2005). While herd splitting is not normally practiced by the two groups, 
there are slight variations between the Dassanech and the Nyangatom. For the 
Dassanech, splitting their herd is uncommon.21 The Nyangatom, however, practice 
it to a limited extent and not in the exact sense of the term. If pasture becomes poor 
in their locality, they send their cattle to relatives in areas with better pasture, 
especially to a place called Naita.  
A variant of herd splitting was also recorded in the study area. It is customary for a 
man to give a dowry of as much as 100 livestock (a mixture of cattle and goats) to 
the father of his future wife. All these animals are, however, not given at the same 
time. The husband only has to give the agreed amount of livestock in his lifetime. 
Taking advantage of this, the father of the bride can demand the remaining 
livestock after a drought shock. 
5.7 Income diversification 
During severe droughts pastoralists cope by increasing their proportion of off-farm 
income, by engaging in non-pastoral activities (Galvin et al., 2004; Scoones, 2004). 
Examples of such activities include charcoal making, seeking employment and 
raiding (Orindi et al., 2007). Other activities include collection of wild fruits 
(Eriksen, 2000; Orindi & Eriksen, 2005), living on remittances from relatives who 
21 Informants argue that this is because cattle are worth so much that they don’t want to give them to 
anyone else. 
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have migrated to towns and cities, engaging in petty trade and sale of assets (Orindi 
& Eriksen, 2005).  
These livelihood diversification schemes usually constitute a shift into low income 
and unsustainable use of environmental resources, which could be taken as 
maladaptive practices (Young, 2009). Most of the aforementioned adaptation 
practices are possible for those pastoralists located closer to urban centres. As a 
result, they have little relevance to the Dassanech and the Nyangatom. The 
Dassanech are comparatively better positioned than the Nyangatom, as Omorate 
town is much older than Kangaten and has a higher number of residents and civil 
servants. 
5.8 Taking advantage of ‘good’ years 
Given the highly unpredictable environments they live in, pastoralists take the 
opportunity to get prepared for ‘bad’ times during the ‘good’ years. Firstly, in the 
‘good’ years, they put productive female livestock in their herd. This ensures the 
easy replacement of lost livestock. It is also beneficial from a nutritional point of 
view as pastoralists mainly get their dietary requirements from milk (Orindi et al., 
2007). Secondly, pastoralists expand their herd size during the ‘good’ years and 
this serves as an insurance against future losses (Easterling et al., 2007; Orindi 
et al., 2007). In spite of the usefulness of this mechanism, numerous calls have 
been made by development agencies for de-stocking. Without a proper 
understanding of pastoral livelihood systems, some tend to blame high livestock 
populations for environmental degradation and desertification (Orindi et al., 2007). 
Restocking, after a climatic shock, might take pastoral households many years. 
Given the increased frequency and severity of climate variability due to climate 
change, not restocking in good times makes pastoralists more vulnerable. Different 
actors have contributed to change this situation, the best example being the 
response to the August 2006 flooding which especially affected the Dassanech. 
After the provision of relief aid, government and non-governmental organizations 
have bought and distributed livestock to the affected groups of pastoralists. 
5.9 Alliances with neighbouring communities 
The first impact of drought on pastoral households is a reduction in milk 
production and, thus, levels of nutrition. Pastoralists, in such times, supplement 
their diet by exchanging livestock products for cereals (see Orindi et al., 2007 for 
the case of the Maasai and Kikuyu in Kenya, and Hendrickson et al., 1996). 
In the study area, the Dassanech produce more sorghum and maize as they are 
located on both banks of the Omo River. Thus, the Nyangatom buy cereals in 
peaceful years from the Dassanech to supplement their diet. The Nyangatom, 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s, were efficient at utilizing their close linguistic 
affinity with the Toposa of South Sudan and their ethnic kin across the border. 
They can graze their livestock closer to and well over the border in times of 
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drought without fear of stealing and/or conflict. They also received armaments, 
including weapons, from South Sudanese clans (Yohannes et al., 2005).  
6. Interventions by governmental and non-governmental organizations  
Poor human capital and physical infrastructure are some of the major factors which 
make Ethiopia one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change. The 
situation in its pastoral lowlands is much worse than the national average. In the 
study areas, there is poor road, electricity and telephone coverage. Furthermore, 
both the number of schools and student enrolment are dismally low.22
The various development works (such as expanding school coverage, mobile 
telephone network, road construction, and the like) will have the long term benefit 
of decreasing the vulnerability of local pastoralists. However, if climate change 
adaptation concepts are not mainstreamed into these projects, an increase in 
pastoral resilience to climate change will not necessarily materialize. For example, 
education might speed up the loss of traditional knowledge and culture, thus having 
the negative externality of eroding the coping capacity of pastoralists.23
Different state and non-state actors play a significant role in the two wereda. Their 
endeavours range from relief aid and emergency assistance during times of 
drought, flooding and other emergencies, to long-term development-oriented 
activities. Recently, these actors have been embarking on different projects to help 
pastoral communities adapt better to climate change. Scholars argue that 
understanding the traditional coping mechanisms of pastoralists and building on 
these mechanisms will be more effective than imposing an externally-inspired 
adaptation policy. 
However, government policies usually take the pastoral way of life as backward. 
But the poor and ineffective presence of government institutions in pastoral areas 
leaves adaptation to be a mainly autonomous activity, and thus heavily reliant on 
traditional knowledge. There might also be the risk of maladaptation as policy 
makers often do not fully grasp the ecological, cultural and livelihood realities in 
the lowlands. Therefore, what different actors implement with a genuine interest in 
helping pastoral communities might, in fact, be counterproductive and further 
increase their vulnerability. 
Looking at the activities that different actors undertake with the intention of 
increasing the adaptive capacities of pastoral communities in South Omo Zone 
provides a mixed picture. On the one hand, different NGOs and government 
institutions are seen as augmenting the traditional coping mechanisms of pastoral 
communities. On the other hand, they also impose modern development initiatives. 
22 Officials in Jinka claim that Alternative Basic Education (ABE) is proving to be better at attracting 
more students. 
23 See the paper by Martha Wagar Wright in this book.  
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A review of some of the major instruments of intervention by governmental and 
non-governmental actors in the two wereda follows.
6.1 Productive safety-net programme and aid 
This programme is running in both wereda. Local administrators argue that the 
programme has the intended long-term benefit of helping pastoralists build their 
household assets through the community development works in which they 
participate.24 The community work, which is mainly about natural resource 
conservation, is also beneficial to the pastoral groups. Payments are normally made 
in cash (40 Birr per month) for three months and in food rations (15kg cereal, 1kg 
pulse, 0.5 litre cooking oil and 4.5kg nutritious food), for the following three 
months.25 In years of severe drought, however, food rations are provided for the 
whole duration of the programme. 
On a theoretical level, it can be argued that a pastoral household could build 
household assets by participating in the programme over a few years and graduate 
from aid dependency. This, however, is not the case on the ground. On the one 
hand, no participant has graduated out of the safety net coverage. This is attributed 
to the communal way of life of pastoralists and the fact that a community shares 
whatever is available, thus halting the asset accumulation process. On the other 
hand, it creates dependency, as being covered by such programmes is considered as 
a privilege and pastoralists feel that if you are covered once you are covered for 
life. The major problem with the policy is the intention to build the assets of 
individual households, whereas pastoralists tend to be egalitarian and to share their 
resources.  
Notwithstanding the negative consequences of having a community living on aid 
(such as the development of dependency), aid has been viewed as one of the major 
coping mechanisms in times of drought/flood in recent decades. The moral 
imperative of helping communities in hunger drives and sustains the aid industry in 
western countries. What pastoralists add is that humanitarian aid should include 
forage and drinking water for their livestock.26
6.2 Settlement 
Some pastoralists are opting to settle, mainly around river banks, and practice 
irrigated crop cultivation. Reportedly, the number of Dassanech who stay on 
islands on Lake Turkana is increasing, as this has the benefit of easy access to 
water, pasture and fish, and also shields them from raiding attacks (Yohannes & 
Mebratu, 2009).  
24 These works include the construction and repair of gravel roads, ponds, schools, health posts etc. 
for six months of a year. 
25 One should note that in, monetary terms, it is better for an individual to get the food ration than the 
cash. 
26 They argue that, even if human beings survive a drought episode, their life will mean little without 
their livestock. 
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Though controversial, the major policy goal of the government is to settle 
pastoralists along the river banks and acculturate them to (irrigated) farming. This 
is hoped, in the eyes of policy makers, to bring a stable way of life. The best 
evidence for this is the speech that PM Meles Zenawi gave in Jinka, on the 
occasion of the 13th annual Pastoralist Day, when he outlined his government’s 
priority on water development (irrigation systems) in pastoralist areas like South 
Omo. He said that a solution to the water problem would help bring productive and 
modern ways of animal husbandry by providing better pasture. The development of 
irrigations systems also allows pastoralists to settle and practice farming. Affirming 
the commitment of his government to ‘transform’ the pastoralist way of life, the 
PM said: 
There are some people who say they are concerned for the 
pastoralists, but what really they want is the permanent 
preservation of pastoralists and their lifestyles as tourist 
attractions. But the pastoralists do not want to live as tourist 
attractions. They want a stable and improved life. We are 
standing strongly by the idea of creating opportunities for 
pastoralists to live a secure life according to their own interests 
(Meles, 2011). 
6.3 Small-scale agriculture 
In what could be construed as a ‘scaling up’ of the traditional flood retreat 
agriculture, the government and different NGOs are distributing water pumps for 
small scale agriculture in the adjacent areas of the Omo River. Pastoralists produce 
vegetables, fruits, maize and sorghum, and sell at the nearest markets.27
The administrator of the South Omo zone confirmed to us that the efforts to expand 
traditional flood retreat farming by the pastoralists coincides with the government’s 
goal of bringing a stable way of life to pastoralists. This effort is led by what the 
administrator called a ‘command post’28 structure. In this arrangement, 
development activities are directed by a combined leadership of the ruling party–
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democracy Front (EPRDF)–and the local 
administration. The ‘command post’ idea was taken from the EPRDF’s campaign 
machinery for the 2010 national and regional elections, which the local officials 
assert led to massive mobilization of voters. This structure is vertically organized 
and allows easy flow of information from the federal to local levels and vice-versa. 
27 Market access seems to favour the Dassanech, as Omorate town is much older and has much higher 
number of civil servants and petty traders than Kangaten, in the Nyangatom wereda.
28 The effectiveness of such a mechanism was known in the aftermath of the 2010 elections and now 
it is being implemented in development works. Reports are prepared every three days and transferred 
hierarchically to the federal government. Relevant people at different levels discuss developments 
every day, according to our informant.  
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The government, in its drive to expand irrigated agriculture along the banks of the 
Omo River, uses model pastoralists and cooperatives that were able to buy their 
own water pumps. Women are arguably better than men in agricultural skills and 
constitute 50% of water user associations. There are many challenges to the small-
scale irrigated agriculture that is being promoted in the two wereda. A fundamental 
challenge in practicing small-scale irrigation is land ownership. River banks are 
owned by different clans and sub-clans, and also serve as boundaries, sources of 
fodder and sources of wild fruit in the riparian forest. There are institutional 
problems, too: in the past, irrigation issues were handled by the Wereda Water 
Bureau and agricultural issues by the Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau. 
This made cooperation between different bureaux indispensable and contributed to 
the slow progress of implementation. This problem has been resolved since the 
regional government decided to bring irrigation under the purview of the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau. Moreover, there is a problem 
regarding the distribution of pumps. Local irrigation experts say that the small 
pumps are enough to irrigate 5-8 hectares, but under current arrangements a single 
pump is shared by eight individuals, each cultivating only 0.125 ha of land. Thus, 
pumps are not being used efficiently and the sharing of a pump by many farmers 
raises the possibility of competition and failure. Moreover, the suction tubes do not 
seem to withstand the high temperatures of the lowlands. 
6.4 Irrigated agriculture investments29
The potential of the lower Omo valley for irrigated agriculture has been known for 
a long time now. Attempts to harness this potential began as long ago as the late 
1980s. The Tringole State Farm, which was established by the Ethio-(North) Korea 
Joint Agricultural Development Project, was planned to irrigate 10,000 ha of cotton 
when it reached its full capacity. In 1991, after the collapse of the military regime, 
the Korean staff based at Omorate left and the North Omo Agricultural 
Development Enterprise30 took over (Richard Woodroofe and Associates, and 
Mascott Ltd., 1996).  
In Nyangatom area, a Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission (SPCM)31 was
working on training local pastoralists to use pumps, and also opened a mission 
church, school and clinic at Kibbish. 
29 In Ethiopia, agricultural investments on less than 200 ha are taken as small scale, 200-3,000 ha as 
medium scale and more than 3,000 ha as large scale (Yacob, 2007). 
30 We were informed that an Italian investment group took the land and planted palm, which one can 
see before entering the town. They were not successful and the land is now vacant. The electric 
generator which was used to power the water pumps now generates electricity for residents of Jinka, 
the Zone capital. 
31 The mission is closed now and its buildings house government offices. Of the accomplishments of 
the Mission, education seems to have lasted best. While the Dassanech had to drop out when they get 
to high school, some Nyangatom finished. The researchers also observed that young Nyangatom 
informants based in Jinka speak better English than their Dassanech counterparts. 
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Of the 221,411 ha of irrigable land prepared for investors in the two wereda,
currently only 15% is given to investors (see Table 3 below). Local experts believe 
that, in the coming few years, as roads and other infrastructure are expanded, 
investors will move in and develop the remaining land.    
Table 3: Irrigable land prepared for investors and land given to investors 
Wereda Land available (ha) Land granted to investors (ha) 
Dassanech 118,411 30,027 
Nyangatom 103,000   3,755 
Total 221,411 33,782 
Source: Zone officials (May, 2011) 
6.5 Planned sugarcane plantations and sugar industries 
The Omo-Gibe basin is the third largest in Ethiopia, with an annual flow of 17.9 
bcm (the first and second being: Abbay with 52.62 bcm and Baro-Akobo with 
23.24 bcm) (Yacob, 2007) and the Omo River is the second largest river in 
Ethiopia (Richard Woodroofe and Associates & Mascott Ltd., 1996, vol. 5). The 
Omo-Gibe River Basin Integrated Development Master Plan Study (Richard 
Woodroofe and Associates, and Mascott Ltd., 1996) exhaustively presents the 
different natural resources found in the basin and outlines possible projects. 
Of the projects deemed economical and recommended by the consultants, most are 
agricultural. The lower Omo Valley has agricultural potential, which the 
government wishes to tap. The government’s intentions do not generally stem from 
concern for local populations. The government plans to massively expand the sugar 
industry because of a number of interrelated factors. First, the need to meet the 
growing demand for sugar. Second, the potential of the industry to employ a large 
number of people. Third, the prospect of earning foreign exchange by exporting the 
surpluses from the domestic market. And fourth, the significance of the sugar 
industry for the production of bio-ethanol, to be mixed with petrol. According to 
the government’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), in five years (2011-
2015) the government intends to open ten sugar factories, increasing the number 
from three to thirteen and increasing many-fold the land covered by sugarcane 
plantations.32
Government officials argue that pastoralists would make up a good proportion of 
the individuals taking advantage of the hundreds of thousands of job opportunities 
that will be created by the plantations and factories. Moreover, pastoral 
communities will be given water for agriculture and also for their livestock by the 
plantations. Furthermore, the government will prepare land and give it to 
32 The current total acreage under sugarcane plantation nationally is 25,000-30,000 ha. Tendaho 
plantation (in Afar Regional State) will have about 25,000 ha of plantation (from the originally 
planned 70,000 ha). News articles put the acreage of sugarcane plantations in South Omo at 150,000 
ha.    
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pastoralists to act as ‘out growers’ (to grow sugarcane and supply the factories) and 
also to start ranching. There is a 10,000 ha community farm allocated for 
pastoralists in Dassanech wereda for this purpose, but none in Nyangatom wereda. 
The introduction of the sugar industry in the lower Omo valley could have both 
positive and negative consequences. The planned provision of water and expansion 
of irrigated agriculture could help the pastoralist communities gain stable access to 
water. As the experiences of the Awash valley show, the introduction of new users 
to the common resources of pastoralists invites competition and conflicts. The 
introduction of plantations in the Awash valley limited access to grazing lands for 
pastoralists there. The Awash River was also polluted by the sugar plantations. As 
the experiences of the Afar and the Karaayu pastoralists show, more often than not 
government development policies and their implementation in the pastoral areas 
show little attention to the plight of pastoralists.  
Resource conflicts with large scale irrigation schemes were also among the 
challenges indicated by the Master Plan, especially if little attention is paid to their 
interests (Richard Woodroofe and Associates, and Mascott Ltd., 1996, vol. XII, p. 
65). This assertion was made in relation to conflicts between the Tringole Farm 
developers and local pastoralists. Recently, a dispute that happened at the  
commercial farm in Brayle, which was  established on the banks of the  Woyto 
River and is found a few hundred kilometres to the north of the study area, claimed 
the lives of hired farm workers.  
On the part of the pastoralists, there could be difficulties in taking advantage of the 
employment opportunities which such factories would bring. This is mainly due to 
cultural reasons and their acculturation to a nomadic life style. 
7. Conclusion
Climate change is one of the many challenges that humanity is facing today. The 
increase in temperature, unpredictability of weather patterns, prolongation of the 
dry season and recurrence of drought are some of the major aspects of climate 
change in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is one of the sub-regions of the 
world that is highly affected by recurrent drought and the resultant famine. 
Countries like Ethiopia, whose economies are reliant on rain-fed agriculture, are 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Pastoralists, because of their 
historic marginalization from the politics and economics of the countries of the 
Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, are very vulnerable to the adverse impacts of 
climate change. The same is true of the Dassanech and the Nyangatom of the South 
Omo valley. There are already visible signs of climate change in the South Omo. 
There are recurrent droughts (extended dry seasons), a rise in temperature and 
extreme weather events (floods). The elders of the Dassanech and the Nyangatom 
communities narrate how their environment has been changing by using historic 
milestones–the imperial period prior to 1974, the Derg period (1974-1991) and the 
Coping with the adverse impacts of climate change
147
present times (since 1991). Some of the major trends of climate change according 
to the narratives of the two groups include: decline in vegetation; rise in 
temperature; increasing unreliability of weather patterns; decline in land resources 
such as pasture and water. Because of these dramatic changes, the normally 
resilient pastoral way of life is being threatened. In the face of the adverse impacts 
of climate change, the Dassanech and the Nyangatom communities use time-
honoured traditional coping mechanisms such as migration, use of wild fruits and 
roots, herd diversification and splitting, taking advantage of good years, selling 
livestock, and income diversification. 
Development policies by both governmental and non-governmental actors do not, 
however, use the traditional knowledge of pastoralists that has been developed over 
the centuries. For instance, the major policy goal of Ethiopian governments past 
and present is settlement. Settlement is hoped to bring a stable way of life to 
pastoralists. But the emphasis that is given to settlement reduces the crafting of 
policies and practices that would take advantage of pastoralism, which the people 
of the region are well versed in. While the voluntary settlement of the pastoral 
groups from the two wereda on the banks of the Omo River needs to be 
encouraged, settlement schemes by direct and indirect government pressure need to 
be avoided. Forced and poorly planned settlement schemes across the world have 
brought more problems than advantages. 
The planned introduction of large scale irrigated agriculture and of the sugar 
industry in the South Omo valley brings both opportunities and challenges at 
national, regional and local levels. At the national level, the realization of the plan 
to erect large sugar mills across the country could help absorb hundreds of 
thousands of unemployed youth. Moreover, it helps generate foreign exchange. But 
at the local level, the sugar industry and large scale irrigated farms bring several 
challenges. The pasture land which is available to the pastoralists of the region will 
be reduced. Pastoralists could also face shortages of water. These would bring 
competition and conflicts among the different resources users. 
Therefore, there is a need to mainstream traditional pastoralist instruments of 
coping with climate change. For instance, one of the major instruments through 
which pastoralists overcome drought and shortage of pasture is migration. This 
should be recognized by governments and policies that help its practice should be 
adopted. With the increasing shortage of pasture and ethnicization of territory, 
pastoral migration is becoming more difficult. Governments should realize this and 
adopt policies that help minimize conflict among common resource users. At the 
regional level, the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan should also 
develop policies that recognize the movement of South Omo valley pastoralists 
across national boundaries and develop appropriate policies and practices that 
minimize conflicts among common resource users.  
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There is also a need to synchronize pastoral early warning systems with modern 
climate prediction models in order to prepare for extended periods of drought and 
flooding. 
The contribution of the government and other development agencies in the 
provision of camels as a way of herd diversification is something that should be 
encouraged. The same approach should also be extended to the identification and 
study of wild fruits that pastoralists use to survive during extended periods of 
drought. 
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Karamojo? (Uganda) Pastoralists’ Use of Wild Edible Plants: 
A Traditional Coping Mechanism towards Climate Change 
 
Jean T. Gradé1
 
Abstract 
 
Pastoralism came about over 6,000 years ago as an adaptation to climate change, 
and pastoralists might now provide important answers to the question of 
adaptability. The transhumant agro-pastoralists of arid/semi-arid Karamoja in 
Uganda experience hunger on a daily basis, with long streaks of drought and 
famine. Their diet is primarily sorghum and wild greens, tubers, fruits and insects, 
moderately supplemented with relief food. This paper is a preliminary survey of 
wild, un-domesticated foods which have been and currently are used in Karamoja 
as a coping mechanism to hunger. A total of 132 wild edible foods are identified, 
the majority being plants (126) although 6 foods are animal/insect protein-based. 
The most common plant forms used in Karamoja for hunger foods come from trees 
(51) and herbs (47). The most common plant parts are fruits (45) and tubers/roots 
(31). Most (84.5%) of the hunger foods listed require some amount of preparation, 
and 60.7% require a significant amount of time to prepare. Four food categories 
were defined: famine, hunger, normal and special. Of the 132 wild foods identified, 
63 are ‘hunger foods’, 35 are ‘normal wild foods’, 29 are ‘famine’ and 5 are 
‘special’. Sixty-seven of these foods have multiplication potential. This is 
invaluable information both culturally and for development initiatives related to 
household food security. This information should be further examined for 
domestication of wild, under-utilised edible plants. Finally, the paper concludes 
that use of wild plants continues to be one of the major coping mechanisms in 
pastoral areas, thus should be recognised in food security interventions. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Climate change is a complex, non-linear phenomenon. It is, then, unpredictable and 
difficult to prepare for. People reliant upon natural resources and those already 
considered ‘marginalised’ are most affected by the deleterious effects of climate 
change (Thompkins & Adger, 2004). Pastoralists have, in response to the harsh 
environments they live in, developed adaptive coping mechanisms to manage range 
resources: two key mechanisms being livestock keeping and mobility (MacOpiyo 
et al., 2008; Morton, 2007). 
 
                                                 
1 Thanks to the knowledge keepers of Karamoja for sharing their wealth of knowledge and for sharing 
their roots, shoots and berries with me, especially Olum Peter of the Pian Traditional Livestock 
Healers’ Association. Acknowledgments are also in order to research assistants, Sagal Joshua Mark 
and Miriam Lejeune. Support for the research was made possible through the Christian Veterinary 
Mission. 
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A typical area is Karamoja, 28,000 km2, located between 1°30´ and 4°00´ N and 
33°30´ and 35°00´ E in north-eastern Uganda. The region has two rainy seasons 
and a semi-arid to arid agro-ecology, characterized by an intense hot and dry 
season (October to April). December and January are the driest months, typically 
with strong winds. The single rainy season peaks in May and July. Mean rainfall is 
100mm to 625mm annually. Daily temperatures average 30-35°C all year round. 
As a result, the plants grow under very dry conditions. The dominant plant species 
are xerophytes while the soil is rather basic (Thomas, 1943; Weatherby, 1988). 
 
Karamoja provides an example of complex climatic stress, having struggled in 
recent years from an increase in variability of rainfall in terms of incidence and 
amount. Rainfall data is extremely limited, but analysis indicates that the amount of 
rain that is received annually has decreased by about 15-20% over the last two 
decades. In addition, the way in which rain now falls has changed, with 
precipitation being characterised by intense rainfall events of 20-35mm separated 
by long periods of effectively no effective rain (KALIP, 2009). These erratic rains 
exacerbate hunger and crop failure. These effects have been attributed to climate 
change in pastoral areas in East Africa (MacOpiyo et al., 2008). 
 
The people of Karamoja, for the most part, still practice a transhumant lifestyle like 
that of the entire socio-cultural Karamojong cluster of the Horn of Africa. Men and 
their livestock become seasonal nomads in search of adequate pasture and water 
during the intense dry season. This often stretches into extensive drought at their 
manyatta, a semi-permanent collection of huts surrounded by imposing, thick, 
protective thorn walls, protecting families and livestock from raids. Here, women, 
children and elders remain while men travel during transhumant periods. Women 
are depended upon to cultivate, forage and prepare most of the food. Men bleed 
living cattle to drink or, infrequently, slaughter livestock for ceremony and food. 
When animals are available, women milk the cows for all to drink and shepherds 
milk sheep and goats. Livestock products are not preserved, but game-meat is 
dried. In addition to milk, their current diet2 is primarily sorghum and wild greens, 
tubers, fruits and insects, moderately supplemented with relief food. 
 
The transhumant agro-pastoralists of Karamoja experience hunger in the best of 
times, with long streaks of drought and famine. They rely upon a wealth of 
indigenous knowledge to help them cope with their harsh surroundings, which are 
exacerbated by climate change. Their main staple foods have been the products of 
their livestock (meat, milk and blood). The last few generations have started small 
scale agriculture with drought-resistant sorghum and millet. Near Karamoja’s three 
mountains, maize is also grown. 
  
                                                 
2 Historically the Karamojong did not cultivate, but survived on their livestock’s milk and blood and a 
wide variety of wild foods. Relief food was introduced after a severe famine starting in 1979, its 
distribution has continued non-stop to current time. These two introductions have greatly reduced the 
use of wild foods. 
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Like many other people living rurally in developing countries, when these 
foodstuffs fail, they identify, locate and painstakingly prepare a variety of root 
tubers, leaves and tree nuts. These uncultivated and undomesticated plants are 
known as ‘wild, edible plants’ (WEP) or ‘hunger foods’. Hunger foods are 
important in rural communities: people in Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom, Uganda use 
wild and semi-wild edible plants year-round as a major part of their diet (Agea et 
al., 2011). Some of the gathered plants, furthermore, are consumed at a higher level 
than sub-Saharan Africa’s mean per capita consumption of cultivated fruits and 
vegetables (Agea et al., 2002). 
 
Throughout the developing world, WEPs have become even more important in 
times of climate change that involve drought and hunger (Addis et al., 2005; Asfaw 
& Tadesse, 2001). The edible parts of many WEPs actually flourish during hunger 
periods and before cultivated crops are ready for harvest (Addis et al., 2005), thus 
bridging periods of food scarcity (Cook et al., 1998; FAO, 1988). This makes 
WEPs an important source of energy and food during times of famine. WRPs are 
versatile in that they come from a wide variety of plants, therefore some of the 
plants (herbs and grasses) survive and sprout in spite of heavy rains and floods, 
while other plants (such as trees and tubers) can survive long periods of low to no 
rainfall. One can assume that the relevance of WEPs increases as the incidence and 
severity of weather events (drought and flooding) is expected to increase due to 
climate change.  
 
Some key WEPs are more drought-resistant than food crops (Dzerfores et al., 
1995). Freiberger et al. (1998) showed that most wild hunger foods in Niger were 
not only drought-resistant, but also highly nutritious. Some WEPs are antioxidants 
(Cook et al., 1998), while others fulfil 100% of human mineral requirements 
(Elless et al., 2000) and even help with poverty alleviation and the creation of a 
sustainable food supply (Addis et al., 2005; Delang, 2006; FAO, 1998). 
 
Despite the high potential of WEPs to address some climate change induced food 
insecurity, there are challenges to their promotion, use and documentation. Their 
collection and preparation is time-intensive, and the results are not particularly 
palatable. Furthermore, the commencement of relief food distribution by 
international aid organizations after the severe famine of the 1980s has decreased 
the reliance of the local population on WEPs. Today, relief is being exploited as 
another adaptation and coping mechanism, as food handouts continue 30 years 
later. Changing food habits with an increasing reliance on food aid and other new 
food introductions has diverted attention from WEPs in many cultures (Rascke & 
Cheem, 2007; Tabuti et al., 2004). 
 
Another challenge to the consumption of WEPs is that they seem to be becoming 
less available: due to the indiscriminate destruction of their natural habitat, via 
deforestation, land clearing for cultivation, charcoal burning, overgrazing and 
changes in land use and land cover related to population pressure and insecurity 
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(Okia et al., 2011). Therefore, the naturally occurring WEPs are routinely cut down 
and/or ploughed under the increasingly large garden plots. Documenting this 
information is difficult. One must know the local language and have botanical 
knowledge not only to correctly identify WEPs but to find knowledge keepers and 
build trust and confidence so that they will be willing to share. Overall, the 
sustainable use of WEPs is challenged by loss of indigenous knowledge (Tabuti et 
al., 2004) and limited scientific documentation. 
 
Half a dozen studies on WEPs have occurred in limited areas of agricultural 
Uganda (Agea et al., 2011; Tabuti et al., 2004), but not in pastoral areas like 
Karamoja. There is only one reference that lists any WEPs in Karamoja—a 
country-wide technical handbook (Katende et al., 1995). All other known Ugandan 
studies have taken place in different ecosystems and livelihoods. However, there 
has been some effort to document WEPs in pastoral area of Kenya and Tanzania 
(International Center for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), 1992; Maundu et al., 
2001). Although, pastoralists are most vulnerable to climate change and food 
scarcity, most of climate change related researches have focused on urban and 
highland agricultural settings (MacOpiyo et al., 2008). Thus, it is imperative to 
start cataloguing WEPs, in Karamojong especially while they are still being 
actively used. This could give insight into the use of WEPs as a coping mechanism 
for climate change and variability in other similar areas.  
 
WEPs can help lessen the effects of hunger and enhance balanced nutrition, yet this 
knowledge has not been documented or fully explored in Karamoja. Therefore, this 
paper will survey and document ‘hunger food’ knowledge and its utilisation by 
various ethnic groups in pastoral Karamoja. Hunger food application may be 
incorporated into local NGO development and training, while preserving valuable 
cultural knowledge.  
 
The ethnic groups surveyed are the Dodos, Ik (Tueso), Jie, Karimo?, Labwor 
(Leptur), Meni?, Nya?iya, Tepes (Sor) and Upe (Pokot). In the best-case scenario, 
wild indigenous foods could be systematically researched for the sake of 
cultivation, domestication and multiplication: for use not only in Karamoja but also 
in other regions. This paper is a preliminary survey of wild, un-domesticated foods 
which have been and currently are used in Karamoja as a coping mechanism to 
hunger at the household level. Some of the foods are only utilised in times of 
famine when there are no other options. 
 
The objective of this study is to survey wild, edible foods in Karamoja. Specific 
objectives are to identify the local plant name and the botanical one where 
possible; to identify the plant type and what part is used; to document the 
preparation time; to differentiate between ‘hunger foods’, ‘famine foods’, ‘normal 
foods’ and ‘special’ or preserved foods; and to identify WEPs with potential for 
multiplication.  
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2. Methodology  
 
Over the course of five months in mid-2011, four Karamojong districts 
(Nakapiripirit, Moroto, Kotido and Kaabo?, listed from south to north) were 
surveyed. This preliminary study includes the language and people groups3 of the 
Karimojo? (Pian, Bokora and Matheniko), Dodos, Ik, Jie, Me?i?, Nya?iya and 
Tepes (see Figure 1 on page 35 for the geographical distribution of these ethnic 
groups). Kaabo? district includes Dodos, Ik, Me?i? and Nya?iya. Kotido only has 
Jie; Moroto has Matheniko and Tepes; Nakapiripirit has Pian and Tepes. Data 
collection was done by the author in the local language, except in the case of the Ik 
ethnic group where data from the resident linguist was used (Terrill Schrock, 
personal communication). 
 
A variety of methods were used: ethnobotanical survey and identification, walk-in-
the woods, group discussion, open-ended surveys and semi-structured interviews 
(Cotton, 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). Care was taken to locate, photograph and 
collect the plants in situ, prepare and taste if possible, note the plant part used and 
its natural form (e.g. tree, shrub) as well as to differentiate whether the WEP was a 
‘hunger food’, ‘famine food’ or just a ‘normal’ wild but under-utilised food; the 
amount of preparation time was also noted and subsequently categorised into either 
‘no’, ‘minimum’ or ‘significant preparation’ groups.   
 
For this study, ‘hunger food’ is defined as a food product that is utilised primarily 
in times of hunger and is not cultivated. This includes the food that the shepherds 
and warriors would forage while herding animals, or that women would eat while 
out for long stretches of time searching for firewood and building supplies. 
‘Famine foods’ are those WEPs that take a long time to prepare or that have an 
unpleasant taste or taboo that would discourage their regular use. ‘Normal foods’ 
are those WEPs that are a common part of the diet that women search for to 
supplement their family’s diet, even when other food is available. ‘Special’ or 
preserved foods are ones that usually take a long time to prepare but are considered 
a treat, or foods that can be kept for at least a few months, for example dried milk 
or preserved edible white ants. For the purpose of this paper, the term WEP shall 
be used to embrace all ‘hunger’ foods, even if they are not plant-based. WEPs were 
also cursorily assessed for domestication potential, i.e. if they could be put into 
multiplication or cultivation schemes. 
 
As this was a preliminary study, not all of the plants collected and photographed 
have vouchers. Those previously studied have vouchers and are deposited at 
                                                 
3 The terms tribe or clan could likewise be used, however, as these can be controversial terms 
implicating cultural superiority, I prefer to use people or ethnic group. The people living in Karamoja 
are Karamojo? – made up of different distinct ethnic groups. Some (Ik, Labwor, Me?i?, Nya?iya and 
Tepes) have completely different languages while others (Pian, Bokora, Matheniko, Dodos and Jie) 
can understand one another. Many of the Karamojong, regardless of group affiliation, share many 
social and cultural activities, lifestyle and beliefs. 
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Makerere University Herbarium in Kampala, Uganda (Gradé et al., 2009). If 
particular plants were impossible to find, photograph or taste, an extensive 
description was taken including plant type (size and shape), form, soil type, 
availability, colour, taste, preparation time and ingredients, along with as much 
information as possible for the anticipated full study. Data was tabulated in Excel 
and simply analysed using the pivot table functionality. 
 
3. Study limitations  
 
Unfortunately, the Upe (Amudat district) and Labwor (Abim district) peoples were 
not included due to poor road infrastructure and heavy rains during the data 
collection period (April-August, 2011). This warrants further research. Even 
though the Napak district was not visited, the Bokora people who live there are 
closely related to the Matheniko of Moroto district and the Pian of Nakapiripirit 
district that were surveyed. Earlier personal observations of the Bokora have been 
added as the author has been living among the Bokora for over a decade. Napak 
district is also home to the Tepes, but much of their knowledge has been previously 
collected by the author, as the Bokora, but also that of the Tepes of Mt. Moroto in 
Moroto district and Mt Kadam in Nakapiripirit district. 
 
Some of the WEPs listed may be the same plant species but with different local 
names. This is unavoidable as one can find dramatically different spoken languages 
over a small distance, as is the case for example between Dodos, Meni? and 
Nya?iya, who live in Karenga (in Karamoja’s most northern district, Kaabo?). 
Their language is also different to the most common language (?akarimojo?) used 
for this study. Some of the plants listed have the same names but are taxonomically 
different plants.4  
 
Certainly, some WEPs from Karamoja were not documented and others could not 
be located for a variety of reasons. This could be due to seasonality, not all the 
WEPs were available during the survey period. Other reasons could be land 
degradation, loss of knowledge, hesitation to share knowledge etc. Further 
botanical work needs to be done. Vouchers should be taken for all plants described 
and the ethnic groups in Karamoja that have not been surveyed should be included 
in a future exercise. For this preliminary study, local names were collected and the 
author’s botanical background and her previous vouchers were used to identify by 
genus/species. The only other work on Karamoja wild foods is a brief list within a 
dictionary (Loor, 1976) which is based on a personal paper by V. Rada Dyson-
Hudson from 1960, but it is difficult to ascertain how rigorous this research was 
and where the vouchers are located. Some of the WEPs presented here have other 
                                                 
4 For example, as reported in this paper, three different parts of B. aegyptiaca are used, leading to 
confusion because each plant part has its own unique name that often has no reference to the original 
plant name. 
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purposes as well. Those wild plants which have veterinary health services have 
previously been documented (Gradé et al., 2008; Gradé et al, 2009).  
 
4. Results 
 
From all the surveyed districts of Karamoja, a total of 132 wild, edible foods were 
identified (see Table 2). The high number of WEPs shows good local adaptability 
to climate variability by the Karamojo? pastoralists. The most common type of 
WEPs are plants (126) although six were animal or insect protein-based (meat, 
milk products or insects). However, one of these six, EMUNE, has a variety of plant 
seeds in a mixture.  
 
4.1 Common plant type 
The most common plant type for Karamojo? WEPs is trees (51 incidences) 
followed by herbs (47), vines (15), shrubs (8), succulents (3) and fungi (2). These 
results show a wide variability that seems to afford the Karamojong pastoralists 
many choices. Trees are well-known for being able to withstand both drought and 
standing water, whereas herbs can grow quickly after a little rain in the midst of a 
prolonged dry season or even drought (Addis et al., 2005). This concurs with other 
research that shows that many WEPs are drought-resistant and can help hungry 
people have a more balanced, nutritious diet than a ‘modern diet’ that focuses on 
just a few plants (Raschke & Cheema, 2007). Furthermore, WEPs can be a ‘hidden 
harvest’ crop that enables communities in times of food scarcity to make it to the 
next crop harvest or through a livestock disease outbreak. 
 
One of the most utilised WEPs is the EKORETE tree (Balanites aegyptiaca (L.) Del., 
Zygohyllaceae). It is a multipurpose tree that is used for both human and livestock 
health treatments and disease prevention, as livestock fodder and human food, and 
supplies building materials and prized charcoal, as it is a hardwood tree without 
resin (Gradé et al., 2009). Its leaves are eaten as a vegetable throughout its African 
habitat (ICRAF, 1992; Katende et al., 1995; Okia et al., 2011). In Karamoja, three 
different parts of B. aegyptiaca are used—the leaves (?AKORETO) may be cooked 
as vegetables, the edible mesocarp fruit (?IMO?O) may be sucked on like candy 
and the hard, woody endocarp seed coat (AKOIT) can be cracked open and the inner 
nut (ABALIT) pounded, ground, soak cooked and used as oil-rich seed ‘famine 
food’.  
 
Confusion can ensue because each plant part has its own unique name that often 
has no reference to the original plant name. For example, one would expect the 
leaves of EKORETE to be called EDYA KE-EKORETE, or that the fruit would be called 
‘fruit of EKORETE’, but actually each part takes on a new name that is typically 
unique to that tree or plant. A new entry was used for each unique name in this 
preliminary report for the sake of completeness; as plants are scientifically 
identified this list will change.  
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Okia et al. (2011) documented the use and naming of B. aegyptiaca in two regions 
of Uganda. Each group of people, Teso and Madi, had a local name for the tree 
(Ecomai and Lugba respectively) but, except for the fruit (irorokony – Teso) and 
the oil (edu – Madi), no special names were used for any other B. aegyptiaca 
product. The naming of trees and their identification is one of the many challenges 
to rural WEP research, along with finding the community members who are not 
only knowledgeable, but willing to share their knowledge. 
 
In 2008, the United States Nutritional Research Commission (NRC) ranked the 
B. aegyptiaca tree as one of the top 24 priority ‘lost African crops’. The tree is also 
prioritised second of eight indigenous fruit trees with high domestication potential 
in East Africa’s dry lands (Teklehaimanot, 2008) and 99% of those interviewed in 
Teso and Madi used B. aegyptiaca products (Okia et al., 2011). This is at odds with 
the observation that the trees are cut down for charcoal making (even in protected 
areas) and land covered by these trees is ploughed and converted into monocrop 
farms. 
 
4.2 Common plant parts used 
Fruits are the most commonly used plant part. Data also showed that tuber or plant 
roots were used, seeds/nuts or grains, leaves, sap and pith (see Table 1 for a 
detailed presentation).  
 
Table 1: WEP; common plant parts used in Karamoja 
Plant part used Frequency from the 
surveyed WEPs 
Fruit 46 
Tuber 31 
Seed 22 
Leaf 22 
Sap 5 
Pith 1 
Total 127 
 
All plants identified except one (EBUNE – diseased sorghum head) were wild, yet 
sometimes domesticated or other ‘regular’ foods could be added to the ‘hunger’ 
foods. Fruits, the most common plant part used, can be stored for a short period of 
time but, more importantly, like roots they can be easily transported. There may be 
income generation potential from transportable WEPs (Delang, 2006). Tubers, the 
second most common plant part used, are the most drought-resistant of the list. 
Tubers or plant roots are well protected from Karamoja’s scorching sun below the 
soil. In fact, the Bokora pastoralists of Karamoja dig up a particular medicinal plant 
tuber and transplant it at their home (manyatta) to be used in an emergency–they 
call this method something similar to ‘using vaccine cool box’ to preserve the tuber 
(Gradé et al., 2009). Seeds/nuts or grains were not only commonly used, they also 
have the highest domestication and multiplication potential (Termote et al., 2010). 
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Table 3 below has been extracted from Table 2 to highlight those WEPs that might 
be considered for multiplication or cultivation, of which there are 67–roughly half 
of the total WEPs described. Only those plant parts which contain seeds have been 
considered. 
 
Certain preferred WEPs are collected and consumed when available, but may also 
become very important stored ‘famine foods’ during periods of food shortage. 
Leaves can typically be found on trees for all but a few months of the year. Some 
leaves are stored by the pastoralists for use later or to add flavour to soups. Sap 
may be available throughout the year, but the informants claimed that most of the 
five saps recorded should only be extracted at certain times of the year. However, 
the sap, like seeds and nuts, may be stored for long periods. 
 
Similarly, this information should be further examined for domestication of wild, 
under-utilised edible plants (Termote et al, 2010). Development of natural grains 
(see Tables 2 and 3, plant part g in the tables), for example ETOKE Hibiscus 
trionum L., EKAUDA Indigofera vohemarensis Baill. and EWUDUWUDU Indigofera 
spp, appear to be the best WEPs for domestication exploration. Grains can most 
easily be multiplied. Furthermore, as the WEPs are indigenous, they are already 
well suited to growing and potential domestication or cultivation in Karamoja. 
 
4.3 Categories of WEPs: famine, hunger, normal or special 
As defined earlier, there are four categories of foods in this survey: ‘famine’, 
‘hunger’, ‘normal’ and ‘special’. Of the 132 wild foods identified, 63 are ‘hunger 
foods’, 35 are ‘normal’ wild foods, 29 are ‘famine foods’ and 5 are ‘special’ or 
preserved. Once again, this diversity shows wide adaptation to climate variability.  
 
4.3.1 Example of special food: EMUNA is one of the traditional Karamojong foods. 
It is a mixture of seeds, nuts, cow’s butter and dried meat. Making EMUNA is a 
laborious, multi-step process which takes several days to complete. To prepare the 
meat, it is first cut into long, ropey strips. These strips are roasted over fire then 
hung to dry for a couple of days. Once the meat has dried, it is boiled and pounded 
so that all fat, fascia and gristle are removed from the meat. After pounding, the 
meat is finely shredded and placed back in the sun to re-dry. The meat is 
considered ‘dry’ when it is breakable to the touch (approximately 2-5 days). As the 
meat dries, preparation of the seeds can begin. 
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Several different seeds can be used, depending on the availability of the fruit. 
Below is a list of such fruits and preparation process of the seeds:  
 1. ?AKALIO (fruit from the EKALE tree)–selected ripe fruits are washed 
and put in the sun to dry. Once the fruit is dried, it is placed in the mortar and 
pounded. This process causes the fruit to separate from the pit. The pits are then 
pounded into a finer powder.  
 2. ?IKARUKA (fruit found in Namalu, from a tree called EKARUKAE)–the 
fruit is dried and the flesh separated from the seed. The seeds are pounded until 
they are a coarse powder.  
 3. ?ABUBORIO (small figs in general)—Different fig varieties used 
include: EKII (sweeter); EBOBORE; EKUBUI or EKONATOROM (large tree that grows 
beside river beds and has fleshy, sweet fruit). To prepare fig powder, ripe, clean 
fruit (they are not washable) are collected, then the skins opened and the flesh and 
seeds removed from the inside. The flesh and seeds are put in the sun to dry (they 
are traditionally placed on a goat skin during the drying process). The dried pieces 
are crushed by hand to remove the soil and then pounded until they become 
powder. EMUNA will not last as long when using fig seeds as with other fruit seeds; 
on average it will last from one to four weeks.  
 4. ?AKOLIL (cucumber seeds)–cucumbers are washed and dried. The 
seeds are removed and dried in the sun, then washed again and roasted over a fire 
to cook and dry them. They are then ground into a powder. 
 
In addition to the fruit seed powder, simsim (Sesamum spp.) and ground nuts are 
also utilised. Simsim must be washed, roasted, winnowed, and pounded into a fine 
powder. Ground nuts are roasted over a fire, the skins are removed and then they 
are placed in a mortar and pounded into a coarse powder. 
 
All of these ingredients are mixed together. The final ingredient is the melted ‘new’ 
butter, AKIMIET, so that the EMUNA will not be bitter. It is poured on top and stirred 
with a wooden spoon (?IAKOROBOC) until it is well mixed, making the texture 
thick and gooey. The EMUNA is sweetened to taste by adding sugar or honey. If 
properly stored, EMUNA can last up to five months. EMUNA is a favourite among 
the WEPs and is also used as a gift of respect for important men. 
 
4.4 Preparation time 
Most ‘hunger’ and ‘famine’ foods need some degree of preparation; only 20 foods 
need no preparation and are eaten directly, e.g. fruits and berries. Of those that 
require some preparation, most (90) need a significant amount of time, whereas 
20 require only minimal preparation. Some preparations take at least four days 
(?IKEREYE, ?ATOSA and EMUNA). Some of the identified plants are very bitter and 
must be repeatedly boiled and the water thrown away until the bitter (and 
potentially poisonous) extracts are removed. The ‘minimal preparation’ grouping 
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includes all of the tubers, which must to be cleaned and peeled, as well as some of 
the fruits whose hard or inedible covers must be removed before eating.5  
 
In addition to photographic evidence and detailed field notes, 85 of the 132 WEPs 
(64.3 %) were personally sampled by the author. The most common plant type 
tasted from May to August was underground tubers. Some were sweet (EKOLAS, 
EBUNE and EERUT), others were very watery (EPUTAN and ELACA) providing a good 
thirst quencher and loved by shepherds. This was evidenced by the author spending 
nights out in the mobile cattle camps and seeing many holes in certain tuber-filled 
fields as well as the crowd of shepherds wanting a bite of EPUTAN rather than a 
store-bought food. This contradicts the assumption that ‘hunger foods’ are bitter or 
tasteless. A wide variety of plants may have favourable nutritional values and 
certainly support household food security (Addis et al., 2005; Delang, 2006; FAO, 
1998). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Based on the above results, it is possible to conclude that many WEPs are, and 
have been, utilised in Karamoja to help sustain the agro-pastoralists in times of 
recurrent hunger. This study has enumerated 132 different wild foods, primarily 
plants (95.3%). Some of the plants and protein sources are described for the first 
time in the literature. This body of WEP information could be invaluable both 
culturally and for development interventions on food security–most especially for 
assets-based community development approaches which can be more sustainable 
and even honouring to the people and their ancestry (Gradé et al., 2009). Many 
WEPs are used by the Karamojo? pastoralists; this shows the good local 
adaptability to climate variability of the WEPs. As more of Karamoja’s land goes 
into tractor and plough agriculture and as relief food dependence continues, much 
of the knowledge and even the plants themselves are being lost. The cost-benefit 
analysis of allowing land to fall fallow for WEP, pasture land or building materials 
depends on many factors. Cultivated foods in Karamoja are historically unreliable 
and, at best, produce only one or two crops and then only if rainfall and other 
environmental factors are adequate. Meanwhile, the valuable building materials6 
and WEPs are lost, as is livestock fodder. Obviously, overgrazing also reduces the 
availability of WEPs. Given the arid/semi-arid ecosystem, the land is best suited to 
pastoralism mixed with some agriculture. This system has proved to be the most 
resilient in the face of climate variability (Jones & Thornton, 2008; MacOpiyo et 
al., 2008; Morton, 2007). This needs further investigation, and should vary across 
the smaller ecosystems within the region. 
 
                                                 
5 A full description of each preparation and notes are available from the author. 
6 Almost all building in Karamoja is with local building materials of which 100% are plant-based. 
These building materials for example, include: grass for roofing; the sisal for tying, the termite 
resistant poles for walls and roofs; flexible branches and reeds for circular rafters, etc. 
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Certain preferred WEPs that are collected (and consumed at all times when 
available), may also become very important ‘famine foods’ during periods of food 
shortage. Grains can most easily be multiplied and this warrants more 
investigation. Furthermore, as WEPs are indigenous, they are already well-suited to 
growing in harsh conditions and have a good potential to be domesticated and 
cultivated. Finally, the use of wild plants continues to be one of the coping 
mechanisms for climate change induced food insecurity and should be recognised 
in household food security interventions. Strategies should include promotion and 
encouragement of the use of available natural resources and local knowledge in a 
participatory fashion, rather than direct distribution of food aid. This could include 
integration of information on WEPs into school curricula and activities of NGOs. 
WEP use and exploitation holds considerable significance for the Karamoja Cluster 
as well as other vulnerable areas in the Horn of Africa and beyond.  
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Averting the Tragedy of Commons in Visage of Climatic Change:  
Forest Resources Management in Western Kenya in Facade of 
Mounting Pastoral Migrations 
Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale 
Abstract 
Dry land communities such as those who are found in the Horn of Africa (HoA) 
receive very limited rainfall exposing them and their livelihood activities to great 
degrees of vulnerability. In many ways the unstable condition of the dry land 
communities has been complicated by two competing factors: climatic change and 
population pressure. It is of little surprise that climate change is affecting 
biodiversity and ecosystem stability in this region. Historically, pastoral 
communities have responded to this state of affair by migrating to areas with little 
environmental stress. But what is of essence in this context is that the changing 
climate has also resulted into increased pastoral migration to areas hither to 
unconventional to pastoral communities. These areas include forested belts such as 
Kakamega Forest Belt in western Kenya. In light of the above, this paper 
interrogates local forest resource management institutions and the adaptive socio-
cultural methods employed by the Luhya indigenous people of Kakamega in the 
face of increased migrations of the Pokot.
1. Introduction
Kenya has a land area of approximately 582,646 km2, of which only 2.2 percent is 
water. In general, Kenya’s land use can be described as pastoral in semi-humid and 
semi-arid zones, and agricultural in the moist and humid zones. An enormous 
section of Kenya’s land area is mainly arid or semi-arid lands, commonly referred 
to as ASALs, which account for 70-80% of the total area. About 20% of the land 
has medium to high potential for agriculture (Otuoma, 2004). Such lands are 
termed High to Medium Potential Lands, also known as HMPLs. Kenya is 
currently facing a biodiversity and climatic change crisis, and the country’s 
environmental management body, the National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA) advocated the Environmental and Management and Control 
Act (EMCA) (1999) as a framework on environmental legislation that establishes 
appropriate legal and institutional mechanisms for the management of the 
environment. With that in mind, NEMA, embarked on every effort to arrest the 
declining levels of biodiversity resources and avert the potential threats presented 
by the change in climate.   
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Severe drought in the Horn of Africa (HoA)1 threatens over 12 million lives and 
reminds us of the growing dangers facing dry land communities around the world 
(Oxfam, 2011). Dry land areas are those that receive an average of not more than 
600 mm of rainfall per annum. The precarious condition of the dry land 
communities has been complicated by two competing issues: climatic change and 
population pressure. It is little wonder that climate change is affecting biodiversity 
and ecosystem stability in these regions. Pastoral communities seem to be the worst 
hit as their livelihood depends on animal husbandry and associated animal 
products. Therefore, the changing climate can no longer support meaningful 
pastures. This is compounded by limited state intervention in these areas. In that 
regard, increased population and climate change have together resulted in increased 
migration2 by the pastoral communities as one of the measures to cope with these 
challenges (Sachs, 2011). In recent years, pastoralists have stepped up their search 
for viable pasture lands and venture into areas hitherto unknown to pastoral 
communities. These areas include forested belts such as the Western Kenya Forest 
Belt.
According to the 2003 Kenyan biomass survey, forests, woodlands, national 
reserves and game parks account for 10% of the land. Kenya’s pastoralist systems 
hold a significant amount and variety of the country’s human and natural capital, 
including languages, indigenous knowledge, cultures and uniquely adapted 
livestock breeds (Kisekka-Ntale, 2009). In the face of failing climate, forests have 
continued to attract a stream of migrants desperate to take up the new land use 
opportunities. This involves both pastoral and agricultural communities. One such 
forest that has received the greatest number of pastoralist migrants is Kakamega 
Forest in western Kenya.3
Currently, many forests are under threat, indicating a great loss of biodiversity, 
especially in cases where people are using forestland for settlement and agriculture 
or other activities. Increased interest in the restoration of national biodiversity in 
Kenya has been driven by global calls to link development to environmental 
conservation, based on the fact that the environment plays a significant role in 
development. Generally speaking, resources in Kenyan traditional societies are 
used according to set communal rules. These emphasize elements of sustainability 
1 In this paper, the HoA includes the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan 
and Somalia. 
2 It is true that migration has been a common characteristic of the pastoral communities as they follow 
viable pasturelands. However, as noted by Sachs (2011), the scope and magnitude of the pastoral 
migrations has reached alarming heights, including the crossing of national and regional boundaries, 
resulting in conflicts. Pastoral conflicts have increased over the last decade. This violence is, indeed, 
sweeping the entire HoA up to Senegal in West Africa, to the Sahel, across Yemen, through the 
Arabian Peninsula and extending into central Asia including Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
3 The geographical focus of this study is four village clusters in the Kakamega forest belt. The forest 
has experienced several phases of increasing climate variability in the last 100 years, characterized by 
intensifying human activity, including pastoralism, which has impacted on the forest resources upon 
which local people depend for their socio-cultural and economic capital. 
Coping with the adverse impacts of climate change
179
and preservation for future generations. Collective arrangements, decisions and 
guiding principles are usually made at the communal level to regulate access to and 
use of such resources. The organization of the community revolves around parties 
linked to each other by kinship or reciprocation. The rights of control over 
resources are vested in the political authority of the community and derive directly 
from their sovereignty over a given resource area. This rather traditional notion of 
resource ownership and conservation encompasses a more organized and 
institutionalized way of natural resource management.  
Using the “Tragedy of the commons” paradigm,4 I note that, as a rational being, 
each resource user seeks to maximize his gain within an existing pasture land, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, wittingly or unwittingly! For instance we 
are aware that pastoralist entry into a forest belt unleashes some negative 
consequences for the native people of the forest, overtime. Although the effects of 
overgrazing are likely to be shared by all inhabitants, the natives are more likely to 
face extremely negative effects resulting from any particular resource usage 
decisions by the pastoralists. In addition, given that the native people will have a 
particular and different set of local institutions than the newcomers, institutional 
adaptation and reconciliation is called for. Consequently, the degree to which the 
newcomers are welcomed depends on the degree to which they reconcile 
themselves with the natives. In other words, this is dependent on the extent to 
which such newcomers restrain themselves from causing negative consequences. 
In light of the above, this paper interrogates local forest resource management 
institutions and the adaptive socio-cultural methods employed by the indigenous 
Luhya people in the face of pastoral migrations into Kakamega forest. The interest 
in undertaking this kind of endeavour lies in the utmost significance of the forest to 
the socio-cultural heritage of the Luhya people. But the forest is on the verge of 
extinction, and a continuation of this will inadvertently affect the climate of 
western Kenya. In that regard, we set out to find out how the Luhya people 
perceive newcomers such as the Pokot (pastoralists)? How are the newcomers 
incorporated in relation to forest resources? Are they assimilated? What are the 
locally adaptive mechanisms adopted by the Luhya to manage local forest 
resources amidst mounting Pokot migrations and changing climate?
4 Conceived by Garrett Hardin (1968), the tragedy of the commons develops in this way: Picture a 
pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible 
on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably well for centuries because tribal wars, 
poaching and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the 
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning; the day when the long-desired goal of social 
stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates 
tragedy. 
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2. Re-visiting the private versus common property paradigms 
In order to have a meaningful debate regarding the operation of commons, it is 
imperative to re-visit the private versus common property rights paradigms. It is 
true that different types of rights do lead to different outcomes. Agrawal and 
Ostrom highlight that common property implies four types of rights. The first is 
withdrawal rights–the right to use a natural resource in a defined physical area. The 
second set of rights is management rights–rights that relate to the internal patterns 
of resource transformation and improvement. The third type of right is the right to 
exclusion–to determine who will have the right of withdrawal and how the right 
will be transferred. Lastly are the alienation rights–those rights that relate to lease, 
withdrawal, management and exclusion (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001, p. 489). 
Therefore, whether those rights are held juridically or authoritatively, they can 
create varying consequences for the use and management of resources. Pertinent 
questions to ask are: What forms of rights are extended to newcomers within a 
resource regime? And how do they lose or retain those rights? We shall return to 
these questions as we discuss the pastoral rights in the case of Kakamega forest.  
It is true that commonly owned property possesses potential disadvantages 
compared to private property (Adhikari, 2005). One of the commonest arguments 
advanced in support of a free-for-all property regime is that such an arrangement 
provides varied users with a bigger acreage, from which all users seek optimal 
utilization, leading to greater success than a resource sub-divided into private 
pieces (Gibson & Knootz, 1998). Indeed, common property may require much 
lower investments from the users, although it has also been associated with high 
transaction costs.5 This, however, depends on the degree of poverty; if poverty 
increases the marginal rate of time preference to very high levels, then future 
environmental effects of current resource use are optimally ignored. High rates of 
time preference and shorter time horizons may also prevent poor people from 
investing in environmental conservation (Adhikari, 2005).  
Proponents of common property regimes recognize that, for people to cooperate 
there are certain pre-conditions that must be met. It is arguable that the existence of 
these rules constitute the basis for order and organization (Sartorius, 2002). 
Nonetheless, a primary point of agreement among the players in the context of 
common property regimes is that the perceived benefits arising from following the 
instituted rules outweigh the costs. It is, however, significant that under conditions 
of collective or multiple resource usage, resource users can design and enforce 
resource control rules that govern their individual and collective choices so as to 
facilitate the sustainable management of common resources. 
5 Transaction costs in community-based resource management are incurred by resource users in their 
bid to enforce property right rules over common resources similar to those inherent in private 
property rights. 
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Unlike the common property regimes, private ownership has been interpreted to 
constitute an arrangement that helps the owners to achieve the optimal tenure 
arrangement for sustainable management of natural resources (Tucker, 1999). 
Indeed, Tucker has ably pointed out that private property regimes provide owners 
with higher incentives to use resources efficiently and sustainably, because they are 
able to monopolize many of the benefits of wise management, and they bear most 
of the costs of poor management (Ibid, p. 203). The argument posited by Tucker 
seems to suggest that a resource system with property rights (whether common or 
private) attached to it indicates the intention for some party to ensure that potential 
users observe predetermined restrictions or prohibitions concerning access to land 
and other natural resources therein. In pure common resources or common property 
situations, the rights to resources are shared equally and are exclusive to a well-
defined set of people (Edward & Steins, 1999).  
The above postulation also advances the claim that private property upholds the 
strictest rules governing use of resources, hence providing greater incentives for 
private property users and/or owners to value resources. It is also arguable that 
private property rights are also linked to the right to alienation and therefore 
promote voluntary transfers of assets to the market from the lowest to the highest-
valued uses (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). The same claim has, however, been 
discounted by a counter-claim that private property does not, after all, guarantee 
efficient and sustainable resource management. This argument is based on the 
assertion that individual interests driven by the desire for maximum utilization 
usually blur rational judgment (Williamson, 1985). In that regard, private property 
does not necessarily guarantee a resource’s future survival.  
3. Fieldwork methods 
Fieldwork in Kakamega Forest was carried out during the months of July and 
September, 2006. A local mapping survey based on individual households was 
undertaken between the months of July and September 2006. The total number of 
households studied was 220. These were located in Kakamega District, Western 
Kenya. Specifically, the study included all administrative divisions that make up 
Kakamega, apart from the Municipality division. These are: Shinyalu, Ikolomani, 
Ileho and Lurambi. The principal sampling point was the Location, the lowest 
administrative unit of the decentralization structure in Kenya. Households visited 
were arranged into clusters. A total of 11 clusters were sampled from the 26 
clusters in the district. These clusters also fall under the sampling frame used by 
the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Out of the 26 clusters obtained from 
the District Statistical Office (DSO) in Kakamega, the researcher was able to 
identify eligible enumeration areas. Each cluster contained 168 households and 
eventually provided the principle sampling points, the locations, also known as a 
village. In total 220 households were sampled. The sample size for the households 
to be covered in the local mapping survey was statistically determined, based on a 
precision of 5% and a confidence level of 95%. To augment the results from the 
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survey data, Key Informant (KI) interviews were also held with the different 
opinion leaders in and around Kakamega Forest. On top of data collected from the 
individual household respondents, and KI interviews, 11 focus group discussions 
were held. The data collection centred on the nature of Kakamega Forest, its dual 
role: on the one hand it is a conserved forest and, on the other, it is a common 
property, serving the agricultural and pastoral needs of the residents. Specifically, 
information was sought on the institutional history, geography and demographic 
characteristics as well as the management of Kakamega Forest. However, the new 
resource users (Pokot pastoralists) were not covered in the survey.  
4. Contextualizing local knowledge, and resource usage and conservation           
East African rainforests suffer huge over-exploitation by humans and belong to the 
most threatened and least explored ecosystems on earth. Only about 0.1 % (about 
10,000 km²) of the estimated 10 million km² of tropical rainforest in the world is 
found in Eastern Africa. Unlike the vast West and Central African forests, the 
forests of Eastern Africa are highly fragmented–discrete islands surrounded by 
comparatively arid woodland. Tropical rainforests like Kakamega are not only 
centres for high biodiversity, but are also known to be home to many people, many 
of whom, though asset-poor, are rich in enterprise and extractive skills. Land use 
systems range from the extensive use of natural forest vegetation and subsistence 
production through to market intensive peri-urban production systems. Although 
the forest presents a myriad of opportunities, recent studies such as that by Guthiga 
et al. (2006) demonstrate that there is declining biodiversity, punctuated by 
continued ecological loss. This state of affairs is aggravated by challenges of 
changing climate.   
One of the most difficult challenges that has continued to dog international 
resource conservation efforts over the years, has been how best to preserve and 
protect forest ecosystems, especially in tropical developing countries where forests 
have competing users from both within and without. Indeed, people manage most 
of the world’s forests, using them for domestic grazing, tree girdling and tree 
cutting to provide habitats and agricultural areas. At the dawn of the 1990s, global 
concerns centred on the shortage of wood, erosion and the dangers of forest fires. 
However, because of the numerous dilemmas emanating from the increased loss of 
the world’s biological resources, a number of international undertakings aimed at 
recovering from this loss have been started. In recent decades, efforts to arrest 
continuous depletion of renewable natural resources–particularly forests, wetlands 
and marine resources in Africa–have been enormous and have taken centre stage in 
national and international development agendas. The negative effects of climatic 
change, failing rainfall seasons and declining biodiversity in many of these 
countries are exacerbated by two factors: the pressure of poverty and the 
institutional inadequacies which fail to guarantee collective learning processes in 
natural resource conservation.  
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More broadly, natural resource conservation entails understanding species richness 
and interactions in a particular ecological zone. Bearing in mind that, in principle, 
resource conservation is a physical science issue, we ought to point out that it is 
one that overflows beyond the boundaries of the physical science world. It is 
increasingly drifting into the social sciences, because of the complex social and 
demographic factors, giving this debate another interesting twist. One such factor is 
the continuing interest in understanding what shapes peoples’ interests, intentions 
and attributes while using forest-related resources. Therefore, it is imperative to 
point out that there are often diverse and conflicting values regarding resource use 
priorities beyond the conventionally known attributes and interests. As we strive to 
get a clear understanding of the relationships regarding forest resource usage in a 
tropical country like Kenya, it is important to note that communities cannot be 
treated as static and rule-bound wholes, because they actively monitor, interpret 
and shape the natural resource world around them in different ways (Leach & 
Mearns, 1996).  
In order to get a clear picture of the complexities involved in the natural resource 
conservation debate, it is important to focus our attention on the multiple categories 
of actors, with different and often competing interests in the entire spectrum of 
natural resource management. We can do this by looking critically at regimes 
governing forests at sub-national and, more importantly, at local levels. Through 
this analysis, we can carefully understand how repeated actions among 
communities reproduce knowledge and institutions, leading to varied notions and 
perceptions in understanding resource usage at these different levels. As a result, 
limitations regarding the concept of natural resource usage and conservation 
emerge.  
Local communities surrounding protected and unprotected natural resource areas 
such as forests, assign values to the diversity of species found in those 
environments. However, in most cases these are social values and, sometimes, such 
values don’t only reflect direct use values but also cultural and spiritual values. In 
response to such values, communities living around biodiversity hotspots have 
actively maintained biodiversity, knowingly or unknowingly (Toner & Franks, 
2006). Giddens (1999) notes that linking agency and structures emphasizes how 
structures, rules and norms emerge as products of peoples’ practices and 
interactions with their environments, both intended and unintended. However, such 
interactions and values are rarely articulated to give an insight into the social and 
other related processes underlying the varied manifestations of either the natural or 
the human-influenced environments.  
These limitations, therefore, demonstrate the need to reassess the conceptual 
meaning of natural resource conservation, focusing on local peoples’ knowledge, 
understanding and perceptions. We also wish to investigate how such knowledge 
shapes informal regimes relating to resource conservation. Such re-assessment is of 
profound consequence, since it will help us in understanding what happens when 
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the local ecological thinking of natives meets with that of migrants and/or 
newcomers. The foundation for this assessment lies not only in the social and 
resource intermarriage, but also in the likely variations and conflicts that may 
emerge and, as a result, warrant mediation. The desired balance between human 
activity and environmental protection requires a sharing of responsibilities, which 
must be equitable and clearly defined. This must be done in reference to 
consumption and human behaviour towards the environment and natural resources 
(Peluso, 1992). The above postulation implies integration of local peoples’ 
ecological behaviours and choices as constituting the foundation on which local 
and/or traditional knowledge is built and nurtured. It also manifests effective 
dialogue and concerted action among partners who may have differing short-term 
priorities and perceptions (Government of Kenya (GOK), 2005).  
5. Management of Kakamega Forest resources  
The forest is located at an altitude of 1,500-1,700 metres and receives between 
1,500 and 2,300 mm of annual precipitation (GOK, 2005a). Kakamega district has 
a total population of 643,457 people. However, the total number of those living in 
and around the forest is not known (GOK, 2005b). Agriculture is the major activity 
and accounts for 62% of incomes in the households. The area is also characterized 
by migrant labourers and pastoral communities. Although designated as a protected 
area, local institutional arrangements conventionally govern the modes of access 
for those interested in the forest resources. The forest, which is almost the only one 
of its kind remaining in Kenya, plays a critical role in regulating the rainfall regime 
and is one of the catchment areas of the East African region. Though there are 
numerous forest communities, it is not known exactly how many there are. 
However, in this study I was interested in investigating the institutional practices 
and perceptions of communities that have been living around the forest for a 
greater part of their life, and how they reconcile those of newcomers, particularly 
Pokot pastoralists.  
Early accounts of colonial administrations in Kenya show that the country was 
surveyed at the start of the 19th century. The Kenyan biomass map regarding 
vegetation and forest cover shows that, at one time, Malava and Kisere Forests 
were separated. The two forests were only drawn as groups of trees. Isecheno, 
Ikuywa and Yala regions were connected to each other and to the south Nandi 
forest system. Up to 1931, Kakamega Forest was managed by local people, with 
authority in the hands of the village elders. It was then brought under the control of 
the then Forest Department (FD), which gazetted the forest as a Trust Forest6 in 
1933 (Mitchell, 1947). 
6 According the new Kenyan constitution, Trust land is land which is in the Special Areas (meaning 
the areas of land the boundaries of which were specified in the First Schedule to the Trust Land Act 
as in force on 31st May, 1963), and which was on 31st May, 1963 vested in the Trust Land Board by 
virtue of any law or registered in the name of the Trust Land Board. 
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After Kakamega forest was declared a Central Government Forest in 1964, three 
small nature reserves in Isecheno (295 ha), Yala (460 ha) and Kisere (371 ha) were 
officially created in 1967. The motivation was to protect these areas from 
exploitation and to preserve the different forest types of Kakamega. Kisere Forest 
and part of the northern Kakamega Forest, which are part of the 18 forest 
fragments declared as part of the Buyangu National Reserve in 1986 and fell under 
the management of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). The Buyangu National 
Reserve covers an area of about 4,270 ha, of which Kisere covers 458 ha and the 
Buyangu area 3,812 ha (Njuguna et al., 1999).  
The areas outside the Kakamega nature reserves are reserved for afforestation. 
Here trees are planted because of their economic value. In areas managed by the 
KWS, strict rules to conserve the forest are enforced. Any use of forest under the 
control of the KWS is forbidden. The government thinking is that tourism is the 
long-term source of income for the KWS and local people. In addition, direct 
benefits for the locals come from employment as field guides or field assistants for 
several research projects on the unique wildlife flora and fauna in Kakamega 
Forest. This position seems to have been challenged by the locals, who are 
demanding more entitlements beyond their direct service benefits. In a nutshell, 
Kakamega Forest is governed by two different formal management regimes and 
enforced by two different agencies: the FD and the KWS. These two agencies have 
different protection priorities. For, instance, the Buyangu National Reserve, under 
the control of the KWS, is regularly patrolled by game rangers to enforce the 
conservation and protection of the wildlife resources, while the nature reserves at 
Issecheno and Yala are controlled by the FD to prevent local communities from 
harvesting forest resources.
5.1 Geography and climate of Kakamega district and Western Kenya 
Western Kenya is situated to the north of Kisumu and the Gulf of Kavirondo. It is 
also bordered by Mt. Elgon, which extends to the eastern part of Uganda. The 
Bagishu, Bagwere and the Basamia, the Basoga and the Iteso as well as the 
Japadhola in eastern Uganda are neighbours to the Luhya of Western Kenya. In 
large measure, these neighbouring tribes have similar institutional underpinnings to 
the Luhya people.  
The highlands on the other hand are in the region of 2,286 m above sea level, 
especially on the mountain slopes of Elgon in the north. The district is also 
characterised by ridges and valleys lying between 1,371 m and 1,524 m above sea 
level (Ominde, 1963). There are escarpments such as the Nandi Escarpments. 
There are countless hills, some of which are named after the different Luhya sub-
tribes residing in these areas. These include the Maragoli, Nyangori, Samia and 
Bunyore hills. On the extreme lowland side, the area is characterised by low-lying 
zones with two major soil zones. Interestingly, there is a side of this province 
containing high parts of Mt. Elgon with alpine meadows and shallow soils 
alternating with great alluvium and peaty soils (Baringer, 1996).  
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It is also imperative to note that there are very large tracts of land in this province 
that are covered by savannah, making the place look like a park-like zonation. 
Early writers about this province have indicated that it was once covered by forest 
from the eastern part of Uganda. Such writers included Johnson, who formed the 
advance team that laid the foundation for the Imperial British East Africa 
Company. For instance, Johnson asserts that it was the wasteful type of cultivation 
that led to the degradation and eventual disintegration of the tropical forest belt in 
this part of the country (Johnson, 1904). According to him, the whole of present 
day Western Province was covered by forest, which was only destroyed down by 
over-cultivation.
The above analysis has, however, been found to be somewhat hollow by scholars 
like Were (1967). Were, who has extensively researched the Buluya-land and 
Abaluya people, argues that Johnson’s claims were an exaggeration. He states that 
Johnson’s argument cannot be used as a point of departure in understanding the 
reasons as to why the land that was once forested is now not. Were further asks 
why the same type of cultivation that has, apparently, been responsible for the 
destruction of the forested land in Western Kenya has not accounted for the 
destruction of the forest belt in other parts of West Africa? 
While Were seems to have negated Johnson’s synthesis, it was too early for him to 
draw the conclusion. The steady increase in population of Western Kenya can be 
used to justify Johnson’s argument. It is also wise to mention that Were’s writings 
were made forty years ago and, since then, the biodiversity of this area has been 
declining. Were, on the other hand, doesn’t postulate the reasons as to why the area 
seems to have lost its original forest cover. Today’s pastoral migrations are 
certainly not within the context of Were’s argument, given that the area has 
attracted a significant number of newcomers in the last five decades. Newcomers, 
in particular pastoral communities, are attracted by the abundant rainfall received 
throughout the year. The areas of Kaimosi and Cheptul receive the highest amounts 
of rainfall. Lastly, the area is also watered by a number of rivers: Nzoia, Sio, 
Lusumu and Malaba (Lung & Schaab, 2004). 
5.2 Locating the pastoral question in the wider Kenyan political economy 
There is considerable evidence regarding the existence of an anthropogenic crisis, 
not only in the western parts but in the entire country (ICRAF, 1996). This crisis 
should not only be construed on the basis of environmental conditions alone, but 
also the steady increase in the population of these areas and the conducive  
environment in this region compared to the semi-arid conditions in most of Kenya. 
It is this good climate in the region that continues to attract new migrants, 
including pastoral migrants. It ought to be noted that the increase in the population 
has also led to ecological deterioration.
In western Kenya, there are three common pastoral communities. These are the 
Western Pokot, found around the trans-Nzoia river belt and also in north-eastern 
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Uganda; the Turkana and the Kalenjin; the Nandhi who are semi-pastoralists, 
having combined their livelihood with cultivation. Looking at her work through an 
ecological as well as a geographical lens, Tully (1985) argues that people can 
change their lives by moving from one location to another. This is done with the 
rationale of improving their living conditions. However, it ought to be noted that 
such efforts are also driven by the environmental conditions. In the same regard, 
people can also change their economic, social and political situations. 
The archaeological and linguistic evidence regarding the origin and migration of 
pastoralists in East Africa remains incomplete. However, available literature 
suggests that the stone tool and pottery-using nomadic pastoralists were dependent 
upon the humpless cattle, goats and sheep for their livelihood (Zwanenberg, 1975). 
Many of the pastoral communities in East Africa and Kenya, in particular, such as 
the Pokot, Samburu, Masai and Turkana, had migrated from the Sudan into the 
Horn of Africa by ca 5,000-4,000. The rationale for their migration may have been 
the period of widespread aridity in the mid-Holocene that affected much of the 
Sahara and Sahel regions of north-eastern Africa. Having found a home in Kenya, 
the pastoralists became a dominant force, with the Masai and the Somali 
controlling large portions of the territory (Zwanenberg, 1975). Nonetheless, 
dramatic droughts and diseases, particularly smallpox and rinderpest (between 
1880 and 1900), occasioned by a colonial policy favouring settler agricultural 
production and ranching interests resulted in a complete reversal in the fortunes of 
pastoral societies (Ibid, p. 80).  
The colonial policy was also pursued after independence, accentuating the 
impression that dry land environs have been characterised by political interference. 
Adholla-Miggot and Little (1981) note that the interference in the dry lands has 
been in distinct episodes. First, in 1938, then 1954, followed by 1965 and 1976. 
However, the most dramatic of all was the 1938 compulsory destocking, which 
marked the start of range interference and hence, in 1954, a policy in favour of 
settler-dominated agriculture which led to the establishment of new small farms, 
even among the pastoralist dry areas. This orientation towards arable agriculture 
also created a new wave of migrations among those pastoral communities who still 
preferred livestock husbandry to sedentary agriculture, although many changed 
their orientation as they found new areas of settlement coupled with the 1965 
drought that led to the death of a significant number of animals.  
It is worth mentioning that the colonial and post-colonial policy of control, 
including the separation of tribes through demarcation of tribal boundaries, was 
resisted by the Somali, the Masai, the Pokot and the Turkana in north-western 
Kenya. The policy is one which aimed at controlling human and livestock 
movements as well as limiting the herd size to carrying capacity and adequate land-
use through rotational grazing and productive development. Indeed, this policy was 
later reinforced by the Grazing Scheme and supported by the marketing policies. 
This represented a policy shift in the colonial and subsequent post-colonial political 
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economy of assigning another function to the dry and/or rangelands–that of 
transforming dry land into a source of livestock to the Kenyan market.  
This policy shift implied that, away from the politics of pastoral control and 
containment, the pastoral communities were now being incorporated into the 
capitalist economy; however, this was not significantly supported by the post-
colonial state setting. Following the above postulations, it is logical to point out 
that the admission of the pastoral communities into the development realm 
accentuates what Tully (1985) pointed out in relation to the fact that people can 
change their lives by moving from one location to another and from one activity to 
another. In light of the above, victims of drought moved as a survival strategy from 
their home areas to go to the highland and forested areas, riverbanks or even large 
farmed areas. This practice is common among almost all pastoral tribes in Kenya, 
such as the Pokot, the Turkana and the Kalenjin.  
The Pokot have maintained this practice since the 1920s, moving into the southern 
Pokot Highlands as well as the Trans-river Nzoia belt. This particular pastoral 
community, especially the central Pokot, used this as a drought refuge grazing area, 
but many of them have since ended up settling there as agriculturalists after the 
1920s. Indeed, from the 1930s onwards, many pastoral communities who sought 
refuge around the River Nzoia and the forested belt of Kakamega and Charanganis 
especially, burned down the forests to make room for arable farming and 
permanent livestock keeping. What is intriguing to note is that even non-Pokot 
pastoral communities followed suit. Indeed available demographic data indicates 
that, from 1963 to 1969, the proportion of newly-migrant pastoralists in the area 
increased to 8% from 3% of the natives (Zwanenberg, 1975). This begs the 
question, how did the natives and the newcomers harmonise in terms of 
institutional setting, in the face of competing and sometimes contradicting 
interests? To this we now turn our attention in the subsequent sub-sections. 
5.3 Forest resource usage in Kakamega 
In Kenya, indigenous forests cover just over one million hectares, while plantation 
forests cover over 120,000 hectares. About 3 million people in Kenya live within 5 
km of forest boundaries and benefit from a whole range of goods and services from 
the forest. This has resulted in pressure leading to encroachment, excisions, over-
exploitation and loss of flora and fauna (GOK, 2000). 
Talking about forest biological resources entails the summation of the ecosystem 
and the ecosystem functions, species and genes in a given locality – Kakamega 
Forest in this case. Biological resources embrace species richness and genetic 
diversity. Being a forest that has people around it, food, cash crop production and 
livestock are the main land use activities. However, there are individuals who 
exploit different wild forest roots, fruits and vegetables from the forest for food. 
Some of the respondents agreed that they have acquired products for this very 
reason. Further still, there was another category of respondents who answered that 
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they had entered the forest to collect animal products in the form of game meat. 
Kobs and Impalas are some of the animals that were hunted to get animal protein.  
Animals such as monkeys, lions and leopards are demanded for spiritual reasons as 
well as related cultural rituals. Another group of respondents also answered that 
they used forest resources, especially the forest herbs, for medications. The rapidly 
increasing human population in areas around this forest has contributed incredibly 
to the scramble for land for agricultural and related reasons, including the 
pastoralists’ need for pasture lands. 
Many respondents agreed that, even though they are aware of the pressure that such 
land use activities presents to the forest, they badly needed land for food and cash 
crop production. Others want the land for settlement in order to acquire the accrued 
benefits from the forest such as firewood, grass and pasture for their animals. This 
scenario has consequently led to habitat destruction, which has resulted in 
diminished quality of ecosystems in and around the forest. Hence, a review of the 
above competing forest uses demonstrates the intricacies of the impact of the 
human population on the Kakamega Forest environment. The impact of the human 
population on the forest biodiversity is neither new nor surprising, as evidenced by 
Olembo et al. (1995). What is, however, attention-grabbing for this debate is how 
these competing interests are mediated and institutionalised. 
Kakamega Forest’s position in the moderation of Kenya’s climate needs no 
repetition. The forest has other physical and biological resources that are of 
considerable domestic, economic and intrinsic value. It is estimated that the forest 
has over 35,000 known species of animals (Dewees, 1995), which are important to 
both life and the rural economy. These are based in natural habitats such as water, 
rocks and soils within the forest. These and their ecosystems are, however, 
increasingly under pressure from competing users resulting in a situation of further 
depletion. These biological resources, which are sources of food, medicine, shelter, 
income and fuel, are only assured if sustainably used (Dewees, 1995). 
The government as well as the local traditional leadership is making efforts to 
conserve the remaining forests by strengthening management, creating awareness 
and encouraging the planting of trees on farmlands and public utility areas. This, 
however, has been slow. In Kakamega Forest, there are both formal and informal 
institutional regimes to manage the forest resources. The aim is to reduce the over-
exploitation of the species that are found to be under greatest threat. When asked 
whether there are penalties aimed at curbing wanton harvesting and usage of forest 
resources, a large number of the respondents answered in the affirmative. The 
study also learnt that both formal and informal institutional mechanisms were used 
in the enforcement of such penalties. These were the Community Disciplinary 
Council, the Village Chief, Customary Law, the Forest Wardens, the Tribal Heads, 
the Village Council of Elders and even parents.  
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In terms of strict enforcement of penalties, the forest wardens were the most highly 
rated, while village chiefs were rated low. Nevertheless, in spite of all these 
enforcement mechanisms, it was found that crimes relating to wanton forest 
exploitation of rare resources continued and the same offenders commit the same 
crime again, even when the penalties have been served! This same scenario was 
confirmed by Guthiga et al. (2006). When asked why the people committed the 
same crime again, even after enforcement of penalties, the study found that an 
array of reasons accounted for this predicament.  
Informants told the researcher that the penalties themselves were weak and 
flexible. In this, the perpetrators of the crimes found it easier to commit the crime 
and then face the penalties. Another set of respondents informed the study that the 
culprits found it easier to pay bribes and other related incentives to the enforcers of 
the penalties so as to get into the forest and harvest what they wanted. But some of 
the respondents stated that, overall the enforcement mechanisms were weak and 
characterised by weakening customary law in some areas. As rare plant and animal 
species are demanded for different economic, spiritual and medical reasons, it 
becomes difficult for the enforcement mechanism to achieve the desired results.  
5.4 The people of Kakamega 
Kakamega district forms the bulk of the province of Western Kenya. There are a 
variety of peoples in the district of Kakamega, including the Luo, Nandi and 
Luhya. The Luhya are also known as Abaluuyia, but pronounced as Luhia. The 
word Luhya refers both to the people and the Luhya languages. The Luhya are the 
biggest and the most dominant tribe in the district. These Bantu people residing in 
the Western Province of Kenya are bordered by Uganda to the west. They also face 
the windward side of Mount Elgon. 
According to the 1999 Kenya Population and Housing Census, the Luhya tribe is 
the second tribal grouping in Kenya, only rivalled by the Kikuyu. They number 
about 4.6 million people. Kakamega district is one of the few districts in Kenya 
which can be counted as a food and cash crop basket of the country. Land in this 
part of Kenya is very fertile and the area receives reliable rainfall. This, in a large 
measure, explains why Kakamega attracts a lot of people, giving it one of the 
highest population densities in Kenya (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 1999).  
The Luhya tribe is made up of over 17 sub-tribes. These include: Bukusu Maragoli, 
Wanga, Abanyore, Marama, Idakho, Kisa, Isukha, Abatsosto, Tiriki, Kabras, 
Abanyala (Busia and Kakamega), Abatachoni, Abakhayo, Abamarachi and 
Abasamia. The Luhya myths of origin suggest a migration into their present day 
locations from the north. Virtually all sub-tribes claim to have migrated first from 
Misri before settling in what is now central Uganda. The same oral traditions also 
reveal that the Luhya migrated further east, first settling around the Mount Elgon 
area before displacing a pygmy race to settle in their current homeland.  
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On the other hand, anthropologists believe that the progenitors of the Luhya were 
part of the great Bantu migration out of Cameroon (Were, 1967). Other available 
accounts from Luhya oral tradition mention that they may have pushed out of a 
pygmy race in the Central African tropical forest. These accounts are very similar 
to the oral traditions of the Baganda. It is significant to note that the language of 
the Baganda, who have a close migratory history with the Abaluya, is closely 
related to the dialects spoken by the Luhya, especially the Maragoli dialect. This in 
a way points to a common point of origin. 
The Luhya are traditionally agriculturalists, and they grow different crops 
depending on the region in which they live. Close to Lake Victoria, the Samia are 
mainly fishermen and traders, with their main agricultural activity being the 
growing of cassava. The Bukusu and the Wanga are mainly cash crop farmers, 
growing sugarcane in Bungoma and Mumias areas respectively. The Bukusu also 
farm wheat in the region around Kitale. The Isukha of Kakamega and the Maragoli 
of Vihiga grow tea. In Bukura area, the Kisa are large-scale rice farmers. The 
Kabras of Malava area grow mainly maize at subsistence levels, with a few also 
farming sugarcane. 
The farming system in Kakamega district is a mixture of livestock keeping and 
crop production for both domestic use and for sale. Intercropping is widely 
practiced in the district. Farmers intercrop maize with beans or some bush millet. 
Most farmers plant between two and four crops on a piece of land. Many farmers in 
the relatively high areas plant two or three crops on a piece of land; beans, maize 
and/or millet. Farmers in the remaining areas intercrop at least two crops on one 
plot, mainly beans and maize or beans and cassava. The farmers in the highland 
areas grow a wider range of crops and this is due to the different climatic 
conditions.
The lowland and central plateau areas have relatively less rainfall than the 
highlands and, as a result, allow fewer plants to be grown. Through a system of 
intercropping, soil fertility is maintained. In the past, the system of intercropping 
was practiced together with shifting cultivation, a fact which could somewhat 
explain why some areas are not as forested as others. This system of shifting 
cultivation was also combined with charcoal burning. Shifting cultivation was used 
to clear the field to allow new grasses to grow for the animals. It was also a way of 
trapping monkeys and other forest animals which were demanded for traditional 
Luhya spiritual and cultural ceremonies. However, after villagization, especially in 
the late 1960s, and largely because of the increase in the population, shifting 
cultivation declined. 
The recent increase in demand for land and the exhaustion of current farms has 
made some farmers start up farms near the forest belt, a practice which may, in 
future, threaten the forest margins. Another important feature of the farming 
system in Kakamega district is the influence of relief on agricultural activities. In 
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the highland areas, where climate and soils favour a variety of crops, farmers have 
tended to move away from the forest margins, a trend which, wittingly or 
unwittingly, protects the forest belt. In hilly areas such as the Nandi and Kaimosi 
villages, the topography of hilly anticlines attracts extensive cultivation of maize 
and millet.  
Apart from the Luhya, there have been pastoral movements into the Kakamega 
forest belt since the early 20th century. As we have noted earlier, these include the 
Pokot and the Kalengin. While some of the pastoral migrants have converted into 
agriculturalists, others have continued to hold both traditions. On the other hand, 
some pastoral communities have remained true to their way of life. One of the key 
natural resources in the forest is the presence of water, particularly the flowing 
rivers Nzoia and Yala. Water is also made available by the consistent rainfall. It is 
such rainfall that makes the vegetation thicker and readily available for the 
browsers – cattle, goat and sheep. 
In light of the above, the key question one should ask is, how do the newcomers’ 
traditions reconcile with those of the natives? For instance, we are aware that the 
rivers, the hilltops and thick vegetation in the forest constitute important spiritual 
collectives for the Luhya, as native to the forest. So how are the newcomers 
institutionalized and how do they adapt? How are issues like overgrazing and herd 
population in excess of carrying capacity dealt with? To these we now turn our 
attention.
6. Local knowledge and biological conservation in face of newcomers 
Local institutional mapping would be incomplete without discussing the place and 
role of local knowledge in the understanding of local biodiversity perceptions in 
Kakamega. It should hardly be stated that local knowledge derives much of its 
strength from the presence and continuity of local institutions, such as customary 
law. Customary law can be understood as an established system of rules that 
evolved from the way of life and natural desires of the people. It is also seen in the 
local norms as a matter of common knowledge, retained in the memories of the 
chief and the chief’s councillors, and their sons’ sons until forgotten, or until they 
became part of the rules from time immemorial (Agarawal, 1995). 
Therefore like customary law, local knowledge is knowledge held by a specifically 
defined community, following a strict code of procedure and conduct in the 
management and transfer of such knowledge, which provides the foundation on 
which customary law is built; the philosophy that informs life in local 
communities. When investigating the interface between local knowledge and 
biological knowledge in Kakamega, we need to appreciate that the two are 
intimately fused into each other. For instance, most of the respondents linked their 
current protection of local herbs to the local knowledge they had come across, 
either through their parents or through their clan meetings. 
Coping with the adverse impacts of climate change
193
This same scenario was also encountered when it came to investigating the role of 
peoples’ perceptions towards the protection of animals or trees. Most respondents 
informed the study that they did protect specific plant species because, culturally, 
they are forbidden from using and cutting down such species. Asked how the non-
natives such as pastoral communities come to learn about the treasured species and 
places, it was noted that non-natives are taken through an assimilation programme 
through which they are taught about the merits of upholding the values of the 
varied ecosystems.  
As we have earlier noted, most of the respondents referred to their local knowledge 
as the reason why they had come to learn about the protection of local trees and 
animal species. In one of the focus group discussions, the discussants pointed out 
that cutting down a certain tree species that houses some of their ancestral gods had 
led to drought and poor yields in their community.7 Some of the discussants 
referred to the cutting down of particular tree species as invoking curses and undue 
suffering for the same offence. One respondent re-affirmed “When drought comes 
it knows no boundaries and does not discriminate between natives and non-natives, 
so it is our duty as natives to teach the newcomers about our culture and heritage so 
that we can live in harmony.” 
In all, it was established that all these local perceptions helped to build up a strong 
base for local knowledge, ultimately strengthened by customary law. In the 
process, this has shaped future biological conservation, especially in areas where 
there is little formal education. The strict customary law which forbids non-
members from reaching some of the sacred places had helped to keep large tracts 
of the forest biodiversity under community guardianship, especially among the 
Maragori, Tiriki and the Marama. 
6.1 Transfer of local biological knowledge 
In the study, it was imperative to find out how local knowledge, that is known to be 
the cornerstone of understanding local biodiversity perceptions, is transferred. It 
was also important to establish how such knowledge is managed for the 
conservation of forest biodiversity in Kakamega. To attain this, respondents were, 
for instance, asked who they considered to be the custodians of local biodiversity 
knowledge in the area. In response to this, the study found out that the village 
chiefs, traditional priests, village elders, parents and tribal chiefs were the key 
custodians of local knowledge. However, before we delve into further details we 
must observe that there is a significant relationship between the structure of 
traditional authority and the custodianship of local knowledge. 
It was also established that the local Luhya institutions were also central in the 
transfer of local knowledge, be it related to biodiversity or otherwise. More than 
that, age was found to be an important aspect in the control of local knowledge. 
7 Focus Group Discussion: 22 July 2010 
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Old people such as village elders were considered to be the local society 
encyclopaedias concerning institutional norms, belief and values. Lastly, within the 
Luhya institutional setting regarding the transfer of local knowledge, parents were 
regarded as central since they were the first point of contact when a new generation 
of children was born. Similarly, we found out that a smaller section of respondents 
disregarded the village chief, commonly known as the ligulu, as the custodian of 
local knowledge. It emerged that this category of respondents (particularly the 
conservative Tiriki sub-group) perceived some of the village chiefs across the 
regions as lacking ‘belongingness’–they were not Luhya and could not be great 
custodians of Luhya values. This brought to the fore the complex politics of 
identity even after assimilation. 
The respondents mentioned that the traditional priests are regarded as so, owing to 
their position in society. They are perceived to have supernatural powers that 
enable them to have extraordinary wisdom. They are also known to be intercessors 
and, therefore, often visit the sacred places in the forest. They are in constant touch 
with the forest spirits and this makes members in the local community believe that 
traditional priests have a deep understanding of the local forest biodiversity. On the 
contrary, other respondents pointed out that village elders were the custodians of 
local knowledge. These owed their recognition to the fact that they have lived for a 
long time and have a clear grasp of the local institutions.  
Furthermore, village elders are known to be in charge of enforcing the local 
customary law, so they are construed to be the real custodians of local law and 
knowledge as well. Other respondents highlighted the tribal chiefs as the 
custodians of local knowledge. These, the respondents said, are the leaders in their 
respective sub-tribes and, as a result, are seen as torch-bearers as far as traditional 
knowledge is concerned. Indeed as custodians of local knowledge, tribal chiefs are 
consulted on almost all the major issues, including local biodiversity issues.  
Lastly, another section of the respondents agreed that parents and relatives were 
also important custodians of local knowledge. This is largely found within the 
Luhya tradition, which maintains that parents, and especially grandparents, are 
holders of the local wisdom. This arises from the fact that wisdom manifests itself 
in age and, therefore, aged grandparents are hosts of this much desired and 
cherished wisdom. Likewise, they are consulted on the relevance of different local 
biotic and non-biotic issues, and they readily provide the answer. Grandparents are 
also behind the major ceremony of naming newly born children. Many of these 
names have a connection with biological species, especially animals. The aged 
grandparents are also the major teachers in the informal education system that is 
largely based on oral tradition–a method of instruction that has existed since 
ancient times. 
When asked how such people (custodians of local knowledge) are perceived, there 
were a myriad of responses. Some of the responses informed the study that they 
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perceived the custodians of local knowledge as protectors of the local and cultural 
norms. For this reason, they specifically referred to the village elders, whom they 
described as the people in total control of what “was” and what “should be”. They 
are consulted on all issues relating to the local biodiversity, therefore, their wisdom 
is given with a view to keeping the cultural norms regarding such biodiversity 
intact. In another focus group discussion with some of the tribal elders, it was 
agreed that their information is taken seriously but they hastened to add that some 
of it is disregarded. But they emphasised that their advice is given with the aim of 
protecting the cultural norms.  
Some respondents perceived custodians of local knowledge as sources of wisdom. 
This is especially true with respect to the aged. It is believed that most spiritual and 
magical powers are obtained and retained by the aged. This belief lies at the heart 
of old people’s “monopoly of magical power” and is further reinforced by the 
Luhya thinking that the most powerful source of wisdom is age. A significant 
majority of respondents agreed that the custodians of knowledge are also seen as 
spiritual leaders. This is especially in regard to the traditional priests. These are 
perceived to be seats for the ancestral spirits, Baguga, and, therefore, they are 
perceived to be close to the Luhya gods. This means that they are able to obtain the 
goodwill of the ancestral spirits Misambwa-mu-mi-sambwa, an enhancement of 
their ability to guide their people in almost all aspects of the cultural and spiritual 
nomenclatures which, of course, have a lot to do with the local biodiversity in and 
around the forest. 
Finally, with regard to the Luhya traditional religious beliefs, they are in harmony 
with the prevailing Bantu idea that the deceased have a continuing influence over 
the fortunes of the living. This is a crucial aspect of the relationship between the 
people and the traditional priest. It was found that the holders of local knowledge 
are perceived as guardians of society. This is construed to mean that, in a way, a 
society can only be held together by those who have a rich grasp of what the local 
knowledge systems are. Similarly, local biodiversity knowledge can only thrive on 
an enriched system of local knowledge, especially in areas where local institutions 
are well-rooted. It is clear that the local knowledge system informs and guides the 
local decision-making process with regard to local resource development and 
usage. In view of this, the custodians of local knowledge are the guardians of 
society and are also perceived as transmitters of culture. 
6.2 Rights to resource usage and adaptation actions undertaken by pastoral 
migrants
Pastoral rights of access to forestry resources in Kakamega are based on reciprocal 
arrangements between them as migrant pastoralists and the natives as 
agriculturalists. This implies that their stay in the forest areas is usually dependent 
on the social relations between them and the natives. Hence, the ability to honour 
the reciprocal arrangements creates a form of tenure security and resource user 
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rights for the pastoralists. Such reciprocity creates fertile conditions for resource 
sharing between pastoral communities (Cole & Grossman, 2002). We ought to note 
that gaining secondary rights by pastoralists in the agricultural communities such 
as those in Kakamega has been one of the institutional innovations relating to 
gaining resource rights. Pastoralists do this by intermarrying. For instance, 
daughters from the pastoral communities are offered to the natives. Pastoral men 
also marry from the established lineages of the natives. Through this arrangement, 
pastoral communities are allowed to graze from the fields of agriculturalists, 
especially after the harvesting periods.  
It is noticeable that the above innovation is a risk-spreading action, especially 
among the pastoral communities such as the Turkana of northern-western Kenya, a 
practice that has been introduced in Western Kenya. The significance of this 
innovation is that, through marriages between the natives and pastoralists, bigger 
social networks are built while at the same time acquiring new land expanses for 
livestock. It is also a means of spreading risk through the re-distribution of surplus. 
In addition, the offering of gifts in the form of livestock also increases social 
capital among the newly built kinships and friendships (McCabe, 1990).  
In their search for options outside the informal institutional frameworks, pastoral 
communities have also found alternative ways of re-negotiating access to 
resources. One such has been the securing of access through the purchase of land in 
the Kakamega forest belt, especially in the north Nandhi escarpment. This is done 
by following the formal institutional arrangements. Such arrangements include the 
2005 Forestry Act as well as the 2007 National Forestry Policy. Both the Act and 
Policy encourage communities living in and around the forest to get involved in 
forest conservation by the formation of Community Forestry Associations (CFA). 
These consist of user groups such as grazing pastoralists as well as agro-
pastoralists. Under this arrangement, pastoralists are allowed to graze their animals 
after paying grazing fees to the forestry department. In cooperation with the 
farmers in and around Kakamega Forest, some pastoralists have opted to hire land 
from the farmers at a given fee to graze their animals during extreme dry years.  
The above system has created a framework of cooperation and reciprocity, and 
helped to stem conflicts between pastoralists and farmers as well as dealing with 
the negative impacts of pastoral exclusion (Bassett, & Turner, 2007). This formal 
institutional innovation has been lauded as having caused significant resource 
conservation, especially in the western Sahel regions where farmers and herders are 
often in competition over resources, especially during extreme conditions. Using 
the Bokki region in Burkina Faso as a test case, Brockhaus et al. (2003) note that 
the ability of rural communities to prevent and manage conflict is largely based on 
the strength of communication networks between herding and farming interests, 
respected community leaders, and leaders in neighbouring communities. Overall, 
when local institutional arrangements are functional, a high percentage of conflicts 
are effectively managed at local levels. Nonetheless, these need a strong statist 
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intervention as a way of backstopping the traditional institutional networks, as 
competition for resources is sometimes driven by population growth, migration and 
land degradation which can cause institutional dysfunctioning of modern and 
traditional law (Hagberg, 1998). 
As previously noted, some of the pastoral migrant communities in Western Kenya 
and, particularly, in the forests have acquired land (whether through outright 
purchase, lease or otherwise) in the Kakamega forest belt and have been 
assimilated into the Luhya way of life. Some of the Pokot pastoral migrants have 
since become agriculturalists, even though some maintain small herds of cattle, 
sheep and goats. On the other hand, some have remained herders although with a 
view to adapting to existing institutional demands that require selective usage of 
the forestry resources. It is interesting to note that, in spite of the varied livelihood 
interests in Kakamega Forest, there is a high level of mediation between natives 
and newcomers in as far as rights to resource use are concerned. This mediation, 
however, takes place in the spirit of compromise where the herders are given user 
rights based on responsibility to protect the forest biodiversity, especially where 
linked to the Luhya traditional belief system. For the pastoral chiefs and elders of 
herding lineages have the responsibility to manage the herd sizes through 
“taxation” and exclusion of other “outsiders”.  
The aim of the above rule is to create a desired level of carrying capacity in a given 
forest environment–a form of restraint and means to avoid the tragedy of the 
commons. In addition, pastoral chiefs and lineage elders carry the responsibility of 
arbitration and the promulgation of new rules between the varied resource users, 
including natives, non-natives and other insiders, within their area of settlement. In 
that regard, outsiders need to ask permission before bringing animals to graze 
within a specified area of settlement occupied by an existing pastoral group. The 
Pokot, for instance, allow local Luhya and Nandhi who want to use the resources 
for charcoal and brick making on a limited scale. This, the researcher was 
informed, is a measure of conforming to some form of economic justice in resource 
use among the various users.  
Furthermore, in regard to local ecological support, it was found that some of the 
pastoral migrants have been involved in species regeneration in some of the 
overgrazed areas. It was established that this is born out of the mutual collaboration 
and the responsibility for species protection that is championed by the Luhya 
elders. In that regard, some of the migrant Turkana pastoralist communities, led by 
their elders in the degraded area of Buyangu, have been involved in the 
regeneration of Uvariopsis, Funtumia and Antiaris. The elders have also developed 
species use guidelines including those related to harvesting specific tree spices in 
their areas of settlement.  
Indeed, the local Luyha traditional chiefs, working in unison with the pastoral 
elders and village leaders, have developed a wide variety of forestry resource 
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management innovations in areas like Shinyalu and Buyangu. These kinship 
institutional arrangements have attempted to preserve the most valuable tree 
species in their respective areas. In some cases, these efforts are linked to the 
compassionate attempt to encourage both native and non-native resource users to 
conserve the species that are critical to social, economic and environmental 
concerns. Examples of the most valuable tree species that have been aided by this 
innovation include: Lesch, Funtumia, Africana stapf, Prunus Africana, Kalkm, 
Aningeria aubrev and Pellegr antiaris. Kiama and Kiyiapi (2001) also found these 
to be some of the most exploited species in Kakamega Forest.  
Clearly, the above efforts demonstrate that pastoral communities have, in a way, 
obtained extraordinary types of rights. For instance, this is discernible through their 
participation in internal decision-making and through their involvement in the 
species regeneration efforts. This is an indication of a genuine desire for long-term 
investment and harvesting of the resources. In that context, one can argue that the 
kind of rights that the pastoral communities derive over time, are more or less 
similar to those of the indigenous Luhya people. It is not surprising; therefore, to 
point out that, over time, most of the pastoral communities have actually obtained 
the right of alienation – a kind of right to transfer commodity the way the owner 
wishes without harming the physical attributes or uses of other owners (Agrawal & 
Ostrom, 2001). 
In addition, the above innovation has also been reported to have been replicated in 
south-eastern Botswana, where village chiefs banned the felling of village amenity 
trees–used for shade and lavatory shelter for those too elderly to go out to the 
bush–and arranged elaborate zoning for different categories of fuel wood 
collectors. Around Mount Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, sacred groves were used 
as the meeting places or burial grounds of chiefs or the members of senior age sets, 
and, to the extent that these groves symbolized the patrilineage, women were 
banned from entering them. In Ivory Coast, it has been reported that elaborate 
arrangements for protecting and resting the forest were originally in force. 
Punishments for forest misuse, too, are often graded so that villagers are more 
likely to pay lower fines for local crimes than are outsiders (Dyson-Hudson and 
Dyson-Hudson, 1980).  
7. Conclusion
The above treatment demonstrates that migration is a permanent part of pastoral 
livelihoods. It emerges, therefore, that the pastoralists as a people are conditioned 
by environmental conditions and the resources available for their animals to feed. 
This implies that pastoral movements take place in a restricted space, especially in 
the case of migrations into areas that have farmers, such as the forest belt of 
Kakamega. This suggests that pastoral migrations are occasioned by restrictions of 
access, and a possibility of open conflict between the pastoralists and farmers. 
However, it turns out that pastoralists have, over time, learnt the importance of 
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cooperation and building bridges between the different social and environmental 
spheres, especially in the wetter zones which give rise to dense social networks and 
social capital. This has significantly contributed to their adaptation strategies in 
their new-found homes. Indeed, climate change is forcing pastoralists worldwide to 
adopt alternative coping mechanisms for pressures arising directly or indirectly 
from global changes. The institutional response analysis of the pastoral cases 
examined in this paper supports the hypothesis that institutional functioning (both 
formal and traditional) is key to addressing the pressures imposed by global 
climatic changes.  
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with Climate Change 
 
Martha Wagar Wright 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of formal education on the living conditions of the 
Karimojong people in relation to environmental degradation and adaptation to 
climate change. It seeks to understand the role of indigenous knowledge in 
environmental management and its contribution to community resilience to climate 
change. A detailed qualitative study was carried out, and the data provided by the 
Karimojong people offer insights into the role and unexpected outcomes of formal 
education. The main conclusion of the paper is that there is the risk that formal 
education could be counterproductive in enhancing the capacity of pastoral 
communities to manage their resources and cope with the challenges of 
environmental change. Formal education should be of good quality and designed 
with consideration of the social, economic, and historical situation of the 
recipients, to increase the adaptive capacities of pastoralists in Karamoja. 
 
1. Introduction
 
Throughout the world, education is recognised as one of “the social opportunities 
that are central to development” (Sen, 1999), while pastoralism has been seen as an 
obstacle to the development process (Krätli & Dyer, 2009). In the Karamoja region 
of north-eastern Uganda, government agencies and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) alike have claimed for decades that the answers to 
pastoralists’ problems lie in education. The formal education system has offered 
access to the broader economy outside Karamoja to some families, but overall has 
discouraged students from pursuing pastoralist traditions. However, through their 
indigenous informal education, the traditional knowledge of the Karimojong people 
has provided coping strategies which, for generations, enabled them to survive in 
this challenging habitat, one of the most vulnerable to climate change (Mubira, 
2010).  
 
There is concern among community members as well as outside researchers that 
the available formal education in Karamoja may actually be counterproductive in 
enhancing the capacity of pastoral communities to manage their resources and cope 
with the challenges of environmental change. The current system is not appropriate 
to the Karimojong context in terms of timetable, curriculum, language use and 
overall quality of delivery, and indeed may encourage dependence on food aid, 
settlement and increasingly unreliable agriculture.  
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The present exploratory study seeks to identify key issues surrounding the actual 
impact of formal education on the quality of life of the Karimojong, including 
evidence of shifts in livelihoods in response to climate change in the region. This 
paper will examine what relationships may be found between the rise in formal 
education in Karamoja and community practices related to environmental 
degradation and climate change. It will also consider whether any mechanisms 
exist to modify the formal education system and other education programs, such as 
Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK), to facilitate transmission of the 
traditional management strategies, critical at this time to enable the Karimojong 
people to cope with climate change and also to address other socio-economic 
factors contributing to the escalation in environmental degradation.  
 
2. Background to the study 
 
2.1 Karamoja and the Karimojong people 
Karamoja is the Anglo-Swahili name given to the north-east section of Uganda 
which has been inhabited for approximately 200-400 years by the Karimojong 
cluster of linguistically and historically related agro-pastoralists (Pazzaglia, 1982). 
Karamoja covers approximately 28,000 km2 bordering Sudan and Kenya, located 
between 1°30´ - 4°00´N and 33°30´ - 35°00´E. While it is known for large semi-
arid areas, with the highest annual temperatures in Uganda, there is considerable 
variety within the region overall. Some portions are considered most suited to 
pastoralism; others are agro-pastoral, while the study site of this paper is in one of 
the sections of Karamoja where people practice extensive agriculture in addition to 
raising livestock.  
 
In rural Karamoja, the majority of families participate in a semi-nomadic lifestyle 
like that of the rest of the socio-cultural Karamojong cluster who are spread 
throughout the neighbouring semi-arid parts of South Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Depending on available grazing and water supplies for their animals–principally 
cattle, goats and sheep–adult male herders, the warriors, move with their livestock. 
They are accompanied by a few young people, both male and female, who serve as 
support staff, preparing food in the kraal and caring for very young animals. 
Typically the herders and their animals must venture farther and farther from their 
homes during the dry season, as supplies dwindle in the more arid areas. Most 
women, children and elderly people remain in the home settlement, ere in 
Ngakarimojong (plural ngirerya, also often known as a manyatta, from Kiswahili). 
The Karimojong have traditionally determined the course of these migrations on 
the level of the ere, the ngirerya, and, as necessary, through consultations with 
elders from the larger clans or regions; this is also true of organised plantings and 
other collaborations. Major issues would be discussed by more senior elders in a 
formal meeting known as akiriket, perhaps near some sacred trees. More ordinary, 
ongoing management issues would be handled at frequent, less formal ekokwa 
gatherings at people’s homes and kraals (Knighton, 2005). In recent years, some of 
the authority of the elders has been eroded due to government intervention and 
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drastic changes in economy and lifestyle, at the same time as many young people 
are participating in formal education.  
 
Karamoja is considered by most other Ugandans to be a significantly inferior part 
of the country, not only because of its semi-arid climate and limited agriculture, but 
also because of its distinctive traditional culture, including their pastoralist 
lifestyle, their attire and ornamentation, and, most particularly, cattle rustling. 
Traditionally, raiding livestock from neighbouring clans or tribes constituted a 
significant part of the social and economic systems of the Karimojong, as well as 
those of the Turkana, Pokot and Jie. Consequently, and particularly due to the 
widespread availability of automatic weapons since the late 1970s–at the same time 
that devastating famine hit East Africa–Karamoja has suffered from serious 
insecurity. This has led to major economic change in the form of impoverishment 
of many people due to loss of herds, loss of grazing, an increase in diseases 
affecting both livestock and humans, and stagnation of development in all sectors. 
According to my informants, it was the advent of atom–the gun–which was the 
fundamental cause of all these problems.  
 
As is widely reported by community members, government officials and 
researchers, “The region is characterized by the worst humanitarian and 
development indicators in Uganda” (Ferloni, et al., 2010; United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2009). The majority of the 
population, even in the areas best suited to agriculture, have, for the past 30 years, 
since those terrible periods of famine, depended heavily on food aid, known locally 
as rilip–from the English ‘relief’–or euga, supplied in large quantities to the public 
schools and also through intermittent community distributions. The government 
has also attempted to ameliorate the situation by controlling movement of people 
and animals, and encouraging settlement and participation in formal education, as 
well as recent massive disarmament efforts; all of which are, to one degree or 
another, controversial among the Karimojong themselves and outsiders. 
 
In recent decades, Karamoja has undergone rapid changes in many aspects of life: 
increased population, arms proliferation followed by widespread disarmament, 
introduction of governmental hierarchical systems throughout the villages, 
proliferation of NGOs with enormous budgets, intensified agriculture, greater 
interaction with the wider East African economy, introduction of many schools 
through Universal Primary and Secondary Education schemes, vast quantities of 
food distributed by the World Food Programme (WFP), and widespread 
exploitation of the increasingly limited resources of its fragile ecosystem. Instead 
of collaborating with neighbours under the supervision of elders, as in the past, 
individuals now take whatever measures they feel are necessary to their survival; in 
many instances, this means that they plunder the fragile environment to make quick 
money by, for example, selling vast quantities of firewood and charcoal at low 
prices to southern traders. Environmental degradation has escalated at an alarming 
rate as increasing numbers of school-leavers return home to find no job prospects 
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and discover that they also lack the appropriate skills to cope as pastoralists. This is 
particularly true now that both raising livestock and sedentary agriculture face new 
challenges because of crop failures due to change in rainfall patterns.  
 
2.2 Study site  
The site of the present study is Nakaale Village, Napienanya Parish, formerly 
Namalu Sub-County (now Loregae), Nakapiripirit District, in the area of Karamoja 
known as the ‘green belt’ (Wilson & Rowland, 2001). Annual rainfall is 
approximately 1,000-1,200 mm/year, some 30-90% higher than most of the rest of 
the Karamoja region, and the land is so fertile that it is estimated that this portion 
of Nakapiripirit District could feed as many as 2 million people (Apap-Apalokori, 
2009). That number is probably at least double the population of all of Karamoja, 
depending on which estimate is used. The local population was approximately 
1,800 in a 2004-05 survey taken by the Presbyterian Mission in the immediate area, 
including Nakaale Village, Kopetatum Village and portions of Alamacar Village 
near the Mbale-Moroto highway, which together constitute the study 
‘neighbourhood’. 
 
3. Methods 
 
Because this was an exploratory study in a little-researched area, a variety of 
methods were used. One of the goals of the study was to examine local people’s 
perceptions of climate change and knowledge of traditional coping strategies; 
therefore, much of the data was gathered through face-to-face interaction during 
the spring and summer months of 2011. These events included guided group 
discussion, semi-structured interviews and focus group guided discussion as well 
as focused individual and small-group follow-up interviews. In addition, I 
conducted a review of data on regional climate change and related environmental 
exploitation, and a review of the available historical record.  
 
My family and I have resided in Nakaale for most of the past eleven years and have 
also observed some of the climatic, economic and socio-historical phenomena 
reported by Karimojong informants for ourselves. For this study, I reviewed my 
own records and recollections of conversations with neighbourhood residents over 
this time period, notes from participant observation in educational settings and 
informal interactions in communities over the years. I have taught my own children 
as well as community members using Ugandan textbooks, including Social Studies, 
Science and Agriculture, so I am familiar with the content and curricula of those 
subjects.  
 
Because the study was intended to explore the possibility of loss of traditional 
knowledge across generations, I considered one family in particular as a case study. 
I felt it would be useful to conduct the case study with people whose lives we have 
been closely involved with for an extended period, so I chose a family I have 
known since 2000, whom we have interacted with as neighbours, employees and 
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friends. I do not claim that they are representative of all Karimojong families, but 
perhaps a significant number in the study area; only through further research could 
the validity of such generalisations be determined. 
 
The interviews I conducted included 21 active participants, and my research 
assistants interviewed an additional 10. They were Nakaale area residents of 
different ages, from mid-teens to more than 70 years. This is, of course, a 
statistically very small sample, but I considered it adequate in light of the goals of 
an exploratory study.  
 
Interviews were conducted in the Ngakarimojong language with occasional 
interpretation in English. Portions of recorded interviews were reviewed with one 
of the research assistants for translation, typed transcription of selected segments 
and additional discussion, which assisted in achieving more focussed interviews 
with certain informants. Those interviews were the lengthiest, and included audio 
and video recordings. I did not write during the course of the interviews or 
discussions, as I thought it could interfere with the flow of the discussion. Instead, 
noteworthy comments were taken down in writing from the recordings and during 
subsequent review with the research assistants. 
 
The interviews which I did not attend personally were with neighbours, friends and 
family members of my research assistants. In my past experience in this 
community, the presence of an outsider, a mzungu (white person) like myself, can 
suggest to interviewees that there is a development agenda behind the interview; 
responses can, in turn, suggest a project proposal. Therefore, I thought it best to 
absent myself from some of these sessions. However, the responses were reviewed 
as soon as possible after the interviews and written down in summary form, with as 
many direct quotes as the assistant could recall. 
 
In addition to the more open-ended interviews, I included a questionnaire regarding 
knowledge and use of ngamuja nguna ka akoro (hunger foods), using a list 
provided by Dr. Jean Gradé of the Karamoja Christian Ethno-Veterinary Project in 
nearby Nabilaatuk. I also directed several of the interviews into the subjects of 
‘reading’ the weather and environmental signs, as well as traditional knowledge of 
astronomy and other predictive tools such as haruspication (‘reading’ intestines). 
 
Because of limited access to the internet in Karamoja, not all of the published 
resources were available to me before I undertook the community interviews. This 
‘problem’ actually turned out to be helpful in looking at the data I had collected, as 
I could be more confident I had not elicited responses which would merely 
corroborate what I had read–quite the reverse, in fact, as is described in the next 
section. 
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4. Findings of the study 
 
4.1 Perceptions of climate change in Karamoja 
Karamoja, like other arid areas of Africa, is set to experience severe impacts of 
climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has noted 
the severe expected impact of climate change in Africa (Stites et al., 2007).  
 
There has been considerable concern among international agencies and researchers 
about climate change in Africa for some time, and places like Karamoja are 
recognised as being particularly vulnerable (Leroy, 2009). Mubira (2010) notes that 
pastoralists in Karamoja are also aware of the significant changes in their 
homelands. Until recently, it could be stated with reasonable certainty that the 
weather throughout Karamoja followed roughly the same annual pattern: a single 
rainy season (akiporo) beginning mid-March, with peaks in May and July and a 
brief dry spell during June. The dry season (akamu) would then begin in 
November, with December and January the driest months, typically also extremely 
windy. Mean annual rainfall in the more arid areas would be approximately 625 
mm, approximately double in ‘green belts’ such as the study area.  
 
Elderly informants, and younger ones recounting their parents’ recollections, report 
that, some 50-60 years ago the rains came far earlier; clearing could begin in 
December, the rains would begin in January and ploughing could also begin then. 
All informants agree that the ‘usual’ time for rain, up until the past few years, was 
March. However, all informants also agreed that recently, especially in the past 3-6 
years, the rain has become completely unpredictable.  
 
Now, maize may dry up and die during unusually long dry spells, which their 
drought-resistant crops such as sorghum and millet would have weathered in the 
past. In other cases, entire fields will be swept away in torrents of violent rain so 
early that plants have not yet matured to a point where they can withstand the 
force. People then have to try to replant. However, the second planting maybe lost 
to an unseasonal dry spell, or vast tracts may rot in the field, covered with smut 
(the fungus Sphacelotheca sorghi),which destroys the grain heads or even the 
entire plant. People are profoundly frustrated and largely pessimistic or, if they 
have the means, they try to grab opportunities. One experienced agriculturalist 
states he simply plants whenever it rains, hopes for the best and plants again if he 
has to. However, people whose resources are limited do not have that option. 
Worse yet, those who are waiting for government supplies of seed may miss the 
window of opportunity, as distributions may still be organised along now-outdated 
seasonal calendars. 
 
One of the striking features of all the sources I have consulted is the consistency 
throughout Karamoja that, as reported in Moroto District, “the seasonal calendar 
for the area started changing more than 20 years ago but during the last five years 
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the changes have intensified leading to over-exploitation of natural resources” 
(Magunda, 2010).  
 
4.2 Coping with impacts of climate change through harvesting natural resources 
All sources consulted, both published works and local informants, report several 
significant changes in the economy of Karamoja, some of which can be attributed, 
at least in part, to the changes in climatic trends described above. All sources report 
significant crop failures in recent years because of erratic rainfall leading at times 
to crop-destroying floods and field rot, at others to insufficient rain for crops to 
mature. According to my informants, dependence on agriculture is far greater than 
in the past, in part because of insecurity, which has led to a reduction of herds over 
the past generation, as well as encouragement from government and NGOs.  
 
With the failure of now critical rain-fed crops, there has been a drastic increase in 
the need for hard currency in Karamoja. The people there have always been 
reluctant to sell their livestock, but now some have none at all to sell, even if they 
wanted to; in any case, sale is not always possible because of not-infrequent 
quarantines in Karamoja due to diseases such as foot and mouth. My informants 
report that, as a result, exploiting natural resources has taken on enormous 
importance, particularly harvesting trees. In the immediate area of the study site, 
this has been most obvious in the past 2-3 years. Production and sale of charcoal 
(ngamakae) and firewood (ngakito) is reported by all respondents as the primary 
source of cash for most families, along with selling local beer (ngagwe), illegal 
distilled alcohol (etule) or sachets of commercial hard liquor such as Sunny Gin.  
 
The effects of tree harvesting are obvious throughout the region. Informants report 
that the valley of the study site was a ‘forest’ perhaps 30 or 40 years ago, before 
large tracts of land were cultivated by major landowners. The area just beyond the 
seasonal river, the Kakamongole, was indeed a forest until just the last couple of 
years. Neighbours say it is being stripped bare for charcoal production, that it is 
becoming alapatu, a bare clearing. Formerly, the methods for harvesting firewood 
were much more sustainable; people would seek out trees scattered throughout the 
fields, their branches would be coppiced and the trunk left undisturbed, such that 
the branches would simply grow back during the next season. Indeed, many of the 
hillsides in the study area remain intact and are being used in this traditional way. 
But the biggest trees are disappearing entirely, especially from areas which had 
remained untouched for a generation because of insecurity. Local informants often 
expressed concern that what is today alapatu (a bare clearing) will become 
alongisat (desert, wilderness) and that, if there were more trees, the rain would be 
good. 
 
Karimojong respondents, as well as other researchers (Mubiru, 2010; Magunda, 
2010; Stites et al., 2007), report that harvesting these natural resources creates 
many significant problems for the Karimojong:  
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Deforestation and tree cutting were the most frequently mentioned 
biophysical changes that communities observed in the past 30 
years. Several communities in Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Kotido, 
Abim and Amudat reported high rates of deforestation. Apart from 
the known environmental impacts of deforestation this problem 
has affected women in Karamoja in a special manner (Magunda, 
2010).  
 
Not only is the environment being degraded, but the work itself subjects women 
especially to extremely strenuous, time-consuming labour, in addition to the 
excessive workload they already bear. Community women receiving assistance 
from an NGO to combat their children’s malnourishment all reported that they 
spent 2-5 days every week involved in some aspect of charcoal harvesting, 
processing, transporting or selling. In the end they probably make only about 
Uganda Shillings (USh) 1,000-2,000 (less than USD$0.50-1.00) per day for their 
work, which was not at all enough to live on when a tin of maize had reached USh 
5,000 locally. They complained that part of the reason their children were 
malnourished was that, not only did they not have enough money to buy food, but 
they also had to leave the children unattended all day, with no-one to prepare food 
for them.1 Community health workers complain that mothers gone namakae–to the 
charcoal–is a chronic problem in many of the poorest households (personal 
communications, 2010).  
 
There was a remarkable degree of consensus among informants regarding climate 
change, economic change and attitudes toward education in general. All informants 
interviewed for this study reported that they have perceived significant change in 
weather patterns even in the past 8-15 years. Younger people report that they also 
know from what their elders have told them that there have been major changes in 
the environment over the past generation or two, perhaps 50-60 years. At the same 
time, all agree that the more children attend school, the better off Karamoja will be. 
4.3 Climate change and livelihood changes: a Nakaale family case 
Ngikasikou (elderly men) describe with unmistakable joy and affection the times 
gone by in this place, when “alalak ngaatuk NOOI”–cattle were TOO many. 
According to these elders, many families had 100 each, and big men had as many 
as 1,000 in a herd, fenced, well-fed and cared for with the latest veterinary 
techniques of the day. The place was so good for raising cattle that these wealthy 
landowners even introduced exotic breeds which produced far more milk than the 
zebu cattle, and instituted hygienic processing facilities. On these farms, not only 
were there cattle and goats but also pigs, and the owners invested in a large number 
of fruit trees, as well as exotic medicinal trees such as elira (neem) and moringa. 
 
                                                 
1Concern Worldwide Uganda focus groups, multiple personal communications, February 2010. 
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To hear the old people talk, South Karamoja was The Promised Land itself, a land 
of milk and honey. Village children were, in fact, raised on milk morning and 
night, as well as blood, from their family’s herd, which might be 20 or even 100 
cows. Shepherd boys at the kraal could have an entire calabash full each morning, 
enough to save some for rest-time at midday, and another in the evening, along 
with sorghum atap. The rain came at fairly regular intervals and, while there were 
dry spells each year, true famine was an extraordinary occurrence. Women raised 
small gardens of sorghum and millet, which was enough to supplement the milk 
and blood diet, and wild greens and fruits that people could gather among the 
native plants. Wildlife was abundant, including not only duiker and small antelopes 
but even ngikosuwa, massive Cape buffalo now found only in game reserves, as 
well as many kinds of birds and small carnivores of various kinds. The place we 
now see almost treeless was amoni, a forest, all ‘bushy’, back across the seasonal 
river to Akuyam. 
 
Because of the favourable ratio of livestock to people in the past, the Karimojong 
could survive largely on renewable animal products–milk and blood–and local 
plants, along with relatively small amounts of rain-fed crops, which were 
somewhat unreliable in this precarious environment. During the dry season, herders 
would bring back better-fed animals from the kraals to their family homes and 
exchange them for weaker animals which they would then take out to the grassier 
places to fatten up. As a researcher with Oxfam in 1969 noted, “At the grazing 
grounds of the cattle, the men, boys and young girls who are present live extremely 
well. There is no lack of milk and blood and, by report, young bulls are cooked and 
eaten, or wild game” (Aerni, 1969).  
 
One of my main informants, the father of the case-study family, described the 
enormous change which took place in Karamoja during his childhood years. He 
was born and raised in Lorengedwat, a more sandy and arid area than Karamoja, 
about halfway to Moroto along a seasonal river. The Pokot raided his home and 
speared his father to death, then took all the family’s cattle, about 100 at the time. 
In revenge, Lokiru (a pseudonym) chased them, scouted their location, and then 
helped warriors organise an attack, during which he himself speared a number of 
Pokot to death, causing a group of women to flee the village. After that he was 
known as Asurungaberu, the Chaser of Women. 
 
Lokiru did not, however, get back his father’s cows, and he decided to come south 
to the more fertile plains of Napienenya Parish, where some wealthy Karimojong 
landowners kept vast herds and had hugely successful farms. Lokiru mostly gave 
up raiding, and took a job as a groundskeeper on one of the farms, where the only 
guns at the time were in the hands of the landowners’ guards. In those days, people 
still fought with shields and two spears, but there was relative peace, according to 
Lokiru, in this part of Karamoja. Peace agreements had been brokered by very 
senior elders who would meet from time to time to determine how their clans 
would interact with one another. Time and again, Lokiru and other older 
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Karimojong have said to me that the advent of the gun changed everything. Herds 
were decimated, people were displaced, insecurity curtailed grazing, cultivating, 
and even sleeping at night. They believe that God may bring back cows now that 
many of the guns are gone, but realise that surrounding tribes and countries have to 
disarm their people as well, or the Karimojong will be victimised. The study area 
was one of the last to get guns but one of the first to be disarmed. People here, the 
sub-tribe known as the Ngipian (‘spirits’), resent the fact that they are left so 
vulnerable, and many of the homes have thick weeds in the centre where dozens of 
cows were once kept.  
 
Lokiru has mostly raised a few goats for his family over the years, rather than 
cows, and has managed to keep some kind of job. His sons did some herding when 
they were younger but now the eldest, who did not attend school but is quite 
capable in business, works part-time for the Mission and has various small 
enterprises, charcoal among them. His younger brother was sponsored through 
school by American visitors and has worked in various positions for the Mission 
for several years, as he is particularly gifted in both Karimojong and English. They 
have had little involvement in raiding. Lokiru and his sons remember that the last 
raid by warriors from this neighbourhood was in 2004, when ten young men from 
Nakaale and Kopetatum villages went toward Amudat and all were killed by Pokot 
warriors, except one who was an especially fast runner and escaped. According to 
them, this event, which the neighbours remember as a devastating loss to the entire 
community, caused people to give up raiding. The disarmament followed not long 
after.  
 
Lokiru and his sons report that, in recent years, people have become very 
dependent on food aid, both in distributions and through the public schools, 
because agriculture is not reliable. They never know whether they will have an 
adequate crop from one year to the next.  
 
Today in Nakaale, my case-study family report that the first call in the morning is 
the shriek of eko-o-o-o-ni! – “it’s ready”, meaning ‘come and get the beer’. 
Children in villages rarely start the day as their grandfathers did, with milk from 
their father’s herd, but instead may have sorghum or maize porridge, or only scrape 
sorghum husks and residue from the bottoms of the jerry cans their parents have 
drunk beer from. Many rely on the soy porridge the WFP has sent in truckloads to 
the schools, but it usually runs out long before the end of the school term, possibly 
sold or otherwise misallocated. Despite the grossly inflated enrolment numbers, it 
seems the schools never have enough food, not even for a single term. Parents send 
their children to school expecting them to receive breakfast porridge and maize 
posho with beans for lunch, only to find that the children sat at school hungry all 
day, or only received thin, watery soy porridge mid-day. Many ngirerya (homes, 
villages) have no cows at all, as they cannot defend them and it is reported they 
were raided years ago. Some homes do maintain herds, but not in numbers 
proportionate to the needs of the rapidly growing human population. Informants 
Government intervention and adaptation
217  
report high rates of disease among their cattle and veterinary personnel complain 
they cannot even keep enough brucellosis tests in stock to keep up with the 
demand. School feeding programs have become an important coping mechanism 
(Krätli, 2009). 
 
Karamoja is considered by aid agencies to have famine nearly every year, and 
untold tons of food has been distributed here, even in this South Karamoja green 
belt, continuously since the 1980 famine, which was indeed disastrous here and in 
much of East Africa. Local residents remember seeing their neighbours literally die 
of starvation at that time, which we have heard about only very rarely in the 10 
years we have lived here, although both drought and famine have been declared at 
various times in that period. There are not only relief distributions but settled 
organisations people can turn to, which did not exist before 1980. These charity 
groups have provided not only food and other material aid to residents, but 
established schools and clinics, and trained local people in farming and other skills 
which could replace livestock rearing. Some successful government officials and 
NGO employees still mention how much was done for them by Inter-Christian Aid 
(ICA), an NGO functioning in the Namalu, Karamoja area during the 1980s and 
1990s, and local informants talk glowingly of how generous the aid groups were in 
dressing the children in the unipom. Informants of about 30 years old who grew up 
here and in nearby Namalu even said that they recalled no seriously bad years 
because rilip had always come. 
 
However, periods of very little food were considered normal up until recently; 
indeed, the yearly cycle most people expected included several weeks of akoro–
hunger–during the weeding time. As one of the neighbours remarked, one year of 
intermittent rains,“Emam nyerono akoro. Erono edeke!” (Hunger is not bad – 
illness is bad!).2 Such akoro was expected to last only a short time, not like eron–
famine. Those who were better off were expected to provide work for their poorer 
neighbours so that they would have something to get them through these few 
weeks, and weeders could take home the edible greens from their work to feed 
their families. Neighbours note that they send their children lodya–to get greens–in 
Mission cultivated fields, as the group have invested in improving the soil over the 
years and there are far more edible greens there than in surrounding weedy, fallow 
fields. This relationship between cultivation of grain crops and availability of 
indigenous greens may be worthy of further study; some observers are concerned 
that crop cultivation may have a negative effect on soil quality, erosion and overall 
environmental conditions. However, properly managed, cultivated land could result 
not only in adequate food but also in increased availability of indigenous foods, 
particularly in more difficult years, when the indigenous plants would have an 
advantage in surviving erratic rainfall. However, some of the women mentioned 
their concern that excessive tree-cutting is already noticeably decreasing the 
availability of indigenous wild fruits. 
                                                 
2 Adokoro Simon Peter, personal communication. 
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4.4 Traditional knowledge of wild foods and weather patterns: pastoralists’ 
adaptation strategies 
Wild foods have constituted an important component of the diet of the Karimojong 
for generations, particularly during times of less abundant harvest, informants 
explained: 
 
At the time of famine, even the tamarinds produce much–God is 
wise, in those days when there was little rain the wild fruits 
produced more… Ayakasi ngapedur (there were tamarinds), 
ekadelwae, ngimongo (fruits of ekoreete), ngalurui (quails). Any 
terrible year, wild fruits and animals will be many. God will bring 
some substitutes [for crops]. Even one time there was a great rain 
which killed all the rats, and people could just go in the morning 
and pick.3 
 
One of the goals of the study was to see what, if any, correlation there might be 
between participation in formal education and traditional knowledge of the 
strategies employed by the Karimojong people to cope with challenges of climate 
change such as erratic rainfall. To that end, as mentioned above, a group of 
informants were interviewed regarding their knowledge of ngamuja nguna ka 
akoro–“hunger foods”–based on an inventory compiled by Dr. Jean Gradé (Gradé, 
2011) in various parts of Karamoja, including this district. The results of this 
exploratory survey are as follows. 
 
All interviewees appeared fascinated by the questionnaire, insisted that they knew 
most of these foods, and that it was common for people to eat them, even now. 
Recognition of names and knowledge about the plants’ harvesting, use, 
preparation, taste, availability and other details were much greater among the older 
generation, those of approximately 60 years and older. The elderly women 
interviewed were by far the most knowledgeable, and also supplied another dozen 
items for the list. Younger informants, mostly in their 20s and 30s, recognised the 
names of approximately ? of the foods on the list and knew that people ate them, 
but most preferred the tastier fruits, complaining that a number of the hunger foods 
were very bitter. In the family I interviewed at greatest length, the old mother knew 
and used the most by far the entire list plus 15 additional items–the father knew 
nearly all on the list plus a few others. Among the younger generation, the 
unschooled son and daughters knew nearly all. The educated (Senior 3)4 son 
admitted he knew some but had really only heard of most of them and didn’t 
harvest or consume them much himself. However, his wife (also educated, to 
                                                 
3 Tete George, personal communication, July 2011. 
4 In the Ugandan system, there are 7 years of primary school, so Senior2 would be a 9th year and 
Senior 3 a 10th year. Ugandans take school leaving exams following S4 for O-levels 
("ordinary"). They can take an additional 2years, up to Senior 6, for A-levels (“advanced”) if they 
wish to pursueuniversity or professional education. 
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Senior 2) knew perhaps ? of the list, unlike her own mother who also knew them 
all plus another 15. 
 
I also surveyed selected informants regarding their knowledge of weather signs and 
patterns, including knowledge of astronomy. The distinction between older and 
younger informants was not as clear-cut as with the wild foods. The older men 
explained at some length how the ngimurok (traditional religious leaders, 
“dreamers,” healers, wise men) of various types would use their particular gifts to 
predict the coming of rain so that the elders could advise their people. Some would 
kill a bull and examine the intestines for certain patterns (the system of which my 
informants did not know and could not explain). This would indicate whether rain 
was imminent; one informant said they had to kill a bull which was completely 
black–iryono cuc!–and then rain would come. Other ngimurok had the gift of 
foretelling the future through dreams, and they would announce to the elders and 
community what God had revealed to them about rain and when to plant or move 
livestock. Some ngimurok recognised the arrival of certain kinds of birds to mark 
changes in the season, as well as leaves changing colour and/or falling from the 
trees.  
 
Young people interviewed said they knew that old people would do these things, 
and some agreed that they also believed the elders had exceptional powers to know 
how the weather would change; others claimed these were tricks the ngimurok 
played on people to be given chickens or other payment. The younger informants 
explained, however, that they did not have these gifts themselves and did not know 
anyone young who did. 
 
When asked about ‘reading’ the stars for weather signals, the younger interviewees 
from my focus-interview family said that they had heard that old people could do 
that, but they personally had no idea how it worked. Their father, however, said 
that in the old days he could follow the changes in seasons by the positions of stars, 
but that he could not predict weather himself, as only the ‘dreamers’ or other 
ngimurok could do that. A young informant from another family, however, 
reported that ‘everyone’ knew how to ‘read’ the sky and recognise the changes in 
season. 
 
All informants agreed that the skills which were valuable in the past for 
recognising weather changes and planning agricultural or pastoral moves are no 
longer as useful, because the seasons have become so unpredictable and even 
mixed. We often hear people complain that akamu (dry season) has returned, even 
partway through akiporo (rainy season), with long spells of little or no rain and 
even scorching winds from Kenya, or the reverse–unseasonable rains during 
akamu.  
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4.5 Informants’ perceptions of people’s influence on climate and environment 
When asked why such changes have come, informants respond that it is what God 
has ordained: “It is not man who brings about the changing of years, it is God 
himself.”5 They do not claim that anything people have done has caused the 
change, nor can people remedy it. Some educated men, in their 30s and 40s, 
reported that they knew that apukan– the government–had told them they should 
plant five trees for every tree harvested, then corrected themselves, saying even ten 
trees should be planted. However, when I asked if anyone did, they said no, and 
when asked why, they only replied ngao–“I don’t know, who knows?”6 Local 
people explain that it is not customary to plant trees because it is assumed they will 
shift their homes frequently, so it is pointless to invest in a place. Actually, 
however, some of these homes have been here since the early 1980s, and a few 
have a couple of fruit trees. Local residents complain there is no point in planting 
such trees, however, because their neighbours will steal all the fruit and they won’t 
get any. 
 
It is also reported from other parts of Karamoja that there are ‘governance gaps’ in 
managing these natural resources: 
 
Plant-based materials do not fall within the realm of customary 
systems of governance based on ties of social capital and 
exchange...women increasingly attribute natural resource 
availability to God rather than to management decisions within 
direct human control (Stites et al., 2007). 
 
There are reports of some tree-planting schemes in Karamoja, but these were not 
observed in the immediate area during the course of the study. Instead, one can see 
tree after tree hacked down and smouldering by the roadside. 
 
4.6 Education in Karamoja  
The Karimojong are regarded throughout East Africa as illiterate, backward, 
devoted to their traditional culture and fiercely resistant to formal education. The 
Karimojong are barely represented in school textbooks provided by the central 
government, and much of the information is erroneous. However, Karimojong 
people interviewed over the past several years have consistently reported positive 
attitudes toward education in general, particularly if their schools are “feeding 
centres” supplied by the WFP (Hill, 2005; Krätli, 2009; Stites & Akabwai, 2009). 
 
Local informants as well as published reports indicate that the Karimojong believe 
the purpose of education is to provide certain members of their families with the 
opportunity to access salaried jobs: 
 
                                                 
5 Tete George, personal communication, July 2011. 
6 Tete George, Lodim Tomas, Akol Andrew, Nakaale focus group, personal communication, July 
2011. 
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‘It is not just a question of food,’ says Minister of State for 
Disaster Preparedness, Christian Aporu. ‘This programme has 
enabled the Karamojong to value education.’ …policymakers hope 
to use education to integrate Karamoja with the rest of Uganda and 
tackle insecurity in the region by creating skills and jobs. (Cocks, 
2010) 
 
Despite this reported enthusiasm, actual school attendance levels remain the lowest 
in Uganda, especially for girls (Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 
2008a; Krätli, 2001; Stites et al, 2007), and parents and students claim they do not 
see the value of formal education unless it leads to employment or other material 
benefits. Those who have been through the system also express concern that the 
“disculturation” they have experienced leaves them alienated from their people and 
no longer able to participate in traditional Karimojong life and economics (IRIN, 
2006; Mafabi, 2010; Novelli, 1998).  
 
According to the Government of Uganda’s plan ‘Creating Conditions to Promote 
Human Security and Development in Karamoja, 2007-10’, “significant intervention 
in improvement of education” has been achieved, including teacher training, 
infrastructure development and the provision by the World Food Programme of 
massive amounts of food to more than 230 primary and secondary schools. 
However, according to the same report, “Karamoja has remained by far the least 
literate region in the country, with a literacy rate at 6 percent compared to the 
national average standing at over 70 percent currently” (Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM), 2007, p. 21). 
 
…what is perceived as useless is refused…The Karimojong, in 
fact, learn what they are supposed to know, through the experience 
of their everyday life and not through a formal instruction…More 
than to a dialogue, the Karimojong were subjected [in formal 
education] to a sort of monologue on the part of persons of a 
different culture in a different cultural language than theirs, 
proposing things largely incomprehensible and, for this reason, 
irrelevant to their interests. (Novelli, 1999, pp. 305-6) 
 
Another issue is the use of time at school. It is widely acknowledged that the loss 
of rural children’s labour to formal schools is already an enormous sacrifice for 
their families; as Krätli & Dyer (2009) explain: 
 
School-based learning necessitates a trade-off between the formal 
educational experience provided by the conventional system, and 
the fundamental, informal learning opportunities available to 
children as members of a wider caring and complex social 
network. 
Climate Change and Pastoralism
222  
Because of chronic food shortages in the region, the government and aid agencies 
hoped that provision of food to schools would be an irresistible enticement to 
Karimojong parents to educate their children. However, even when the WFP began 
supplying schools, it was reported, “The children with their parents say that the 
school is not profitable to their lives. The gun brings much more profit. With the 
gun one can get in one raid a whole herd of cows” (Apap-Apalokori, 2009).  
In part in response to many complaints about the education system in Karamoja, 
the ABEK program was instituted in 1998-2000, to try to improve educational 
prospects for pastoralist children in much of the region. The original concept 
included mobile schools and a unique curriculum relevant to pastoralists. By many 
accounts, ABEK is popular in communities in that it does bring classes close to 
homes at convenient times, so children involved in pastoralist work can attend. 
According to a recent account: 
 
‘The aim of ABEK is to see children becoming doctors, teachers, 
politicians.’ The syllabus is also adapted to the Karamojong way 
of life. ‘The Karamojong are semi-nomadic,’ explains Henry 
Nickson Ogwal, the coordinator of the Commonwealth 
Educational Fund (CEF), ‘so children look after cows. So we start 
the child’s education with a cow. How many legs does it have? 
How many if you add the number of its front to its back legs? In 
this way, they learn arithmetic.’ (Cocks, 2010) 
 
It is noteworthy that ABEK has become more of a bridge to the formal school 
system than a genuinely pastoralism-oriented program. Notice in the above quote 
that there is no mention of ABEK serving to educate successful pastoralists! 
Recently, according to the NGO in charge, the vision for the programme has 
become: “A full course of primary education can be completed by all children 
directly involved in pastoralism in Karamoja” (Krätli, 2009). 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Environmental degradation as a concern among informants in Karamoja 
At first the connection between increases in formal education and environmental 
degradation might not be very obvious. Indeed, the WFP incorporates tree-planting 
into its provision to many schools, particularly north of the study area where the 
habitat is more arid and fragile. It was reported by the OPM that, “WFP is assisting 
200 schools to establish woodlots and vegetable gardens... 89,314 people are 
expected to benefit from WFP’s Food for Education programme which is valued at 
US$1,616,000 in 2007/08” (OPM, 2007). 
 
Community respondents and local leaders all express concern that environmental 
degradation has escalated at an alarming rate, and they have the expectation that, if 
it continues at the present rate, it will result in desertification of their homeland. 
Government intervention and adaptation
223  
However, my informants believe they have no alternative but to burn charcoal and 
sell firewood, as their need for cash has risen due to loss of herds and increased 
dependence on unreliable agriculture. 
 
At the same time, there are increasing numbers of school-leavers returning home to 
Karamoja only to find no job prospects. They lack appropriate skills to participate 
in the pastoralist economy and not only do a significant number of these 
supposedly educated youth lack basic skills, because of the very poor delivery of 
some teaching, but worse yet they have little or no way of contributing to the 
family economy and repaying the investment their family has made in their 
education. Because their families had counted on these educated members gaining 
access to the economy outside Karamoja and pastoralism, and participating in the 
cash system, families and idle school-leavers now have to make cash some other 
way. The young men typically refuse to work as herders or agriculturalists, 
preferring to pass their days on the roadside, playing cards, drinking and fighting, 
sometimes using what little cash they may get from relatives to invest in legal or 
illegal hard liquor, which they sell for about 10%-20% profit or 50-100% on the 
illegal substances. Still, according to all informants, the primary source of cash is 
charcoal. 
 
5.2 Formal education and adaptation to climate change in Karamoja 
In taking this preliminary look at the relationship between education and coping 
with impacts of climate change in Karamoja, I did not find quite the 
correspondences I had anticipated. I had imagined a greater knowledge gap from 
generation to generation. I did find from interviewing people of different 
generations about their overall perceptions and specific knowledge of hunger foods 
and weather observation techniques, that there is a loss of knowledge amongst the 
youth; however, I do not think that can be attributed only to school attendance, but 
also to the broader change in economic and social practices in this area. I do think 
that school feeding programmes have lessened interest among the Karimojong in 
wild foods and, indeed, have increased young people’s preference for more 
palatable foods such as maize. 
 
Instead of the knowledge gap being the most significant issue, my respondents 
have brought to my attention their concern about their increased dependence on 
agriculture, which the government and NGOs encourage. However, they fear this 
exposes them to extreme risk because of erratic rainfall; at the same time, 
government and NGO encouragement to send all children to school—not just one 
or two, as the Karimojong have preferred in past generations—encourages 
sedentarism, not pastoralism, which further increases their dependence on rain-fed 
crops. Informants also expressed concern that, while the lure of free food is great, 
rumours circulate every year that WFP is going to “pull out” of schools and leave 
families starving who have become dependent on schools as feeding centres for 
more and more of their children. My informants also reported that they recognised 
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that traditional knowledge was not being passed on to many of their youth, but no 
one suggested such knowledge be incorporated into the school curriculum. 
 
Informants also pointed out another relationship among education, the current 
economy in Karamoja, and environmental degradation; this could possibly be a 
contributor to reducing pastoralists’ coping capacity to negative consequences of 
climate change and is certainly a matter for serious consideration in East Africa. 
Informants explained that paying for children’s education actually is a major 
reason for the drastic rise in environmental degradation due to charcoal and 
firewood production. This is because families no longer have sufficient livestock to 
sell and must, instead, find other ways of making cash to pay for school costs; 
however, these are then not paid back, because the schooling does not lead to 
gainful employment. Their household food costs are much higher than previously 
because of poor harvests and lack of livestock to barter for other food. The former 
students’ knowledge gap has become critical as they are not fit to enter the pastoral 
economy, and those with the most education are also the least inclined to take up 
any kind of subsistence farming–they see themselves as now belonging to a 
different class of people, those who do not get their hands dirty.  
 
Informants report that there are now two ngirotin, ‘roads’–classes–of people in 
rural Karamoja: those who attend school and those who do not, whose education is 
training to become agro-pastoralists. Local people refer to schooled youngsters as 
ones who “cannot even milk a cow.”7 In this area, young people report that those 
who have only gone to primary school can still be accepted back into traditional 
society, as in many cases they lived at home throughout their schooling and did 
actually acquire the basics of animal management and agriculture. Many families 
are torn between supporting themselves through pastoralism and investing in 
education.  
 
However, those who have gone to secondary school have usually spent more time 
at boarding school, and many regard themselves as belonging to a class above 
those in their home villages. Some will participate in agricultural work schemes 
organized by NGOs or groups like the Presbyterian Mission, but many refuse, 
preferring to be involved in some kind of commerce, legal or otherwise. Young 
men in the nearest village report they are hoping to have an opportunity to be hired 
by the police or to join Local Defence Units. Few girls reach 20 without marrying 
and/or bearing children, so most of them are focused in that direction. Female 
respondents to a recent survey (Faraone, 2010) indicated they did not hope to 
pursue a paid career, as there are so few available.  
 
A major complaint regarding education is the recent escalation in attainment level; 
formerly, as local informant Lokwii Daudi reported, “It used to be that a person 
                                                 
7 Lokwii Daudi, personal communication, July 2011. 
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could reach P78 and get something, but now you have to go to S49, and that is 
egogong NOOI [very expensive/difficult].”10 Everyone in the study area agrees that 
the cost of boarding, transport and supplies makes secondary school completely out 
of the reach of most families, unless they have a wealthy relative, typically outside 
Karamoja, or some other outside sponsor to pay for their education. In addition, 
families have lost a potentially very valuable contributor to the family economy in 
sending a child to boarding school. When these children return to their villages 
and, rather than getting a paid job, possibly in a town or city, are ‘just seated’ 
around, they become burdens rather than assets; this, in turn, forces the family to 
find other sources of cash.  
 
Data from a recent FAO/EU study indicate, however, that pastoralists can make far 
more money from their livestock than from harvesting natural resources or selling 
alcohol. This is a very significant finding, in light of the tremendous amount of 
labour that goes into, for instance, charcoal production and sale (Levine, 2010). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This exploratory study provides us with a brief look into some of the 
interrelationships between education and the environment in one part of Karamoja. 
It is not possible to identify simple correlations, as they are part of a complex web 
of influences including economics, social networks and belief systems, all of which 
are continuing to undergo significant changes. 
 
The government of Uganda and most aid agencies, indeed most people in 
Karamoja, claim that education can solve most of the problems of Karamoja. Even 
local informants in this study stated firmly that they expected that, when the 
children have been to school and received an education, they would learn to plant 
trees, take care of the environment, and their lives would improve. Of course 
education should ultimately lead to great improvement in the quality of life in 
Karamoja. However, at this time I think the argument can be made that, in its 
current form, formal education is part of a set of processes which are actually 
contributing to the impoverishment and environmental degradation of the region.  
 
The present education system does not train the Karimojong in the best ways of 
managing the resources they have, as it is part and parcel of an overall push toward 
sedentarisation favoured by the central government and many NGOs. One concern, 
perhaps only tangentially related to formal education, is that of the livelihood shift 
                                                 
8 Primary 7 is the highest level of primary education in Uganda.  Passing the Primary Leaving 
Examination is a significant accomplishment for many throughout the country but especially in 
Karamoja. However, because of Universal Primary Education a student can complete this course at 
very little cost. 
9 Senior 4 represents the next highest level of education in Uganda –Ordinary Levels. Very few 
students in Karamoja complete this level of schooling or the O Level examinations. 
10 Lokwii Daudi, personal communication, July 2011. 
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toward charcoal burning, which many cite as contributing to environmental 
degradation. Because of people’s desperation for money–which is needed to 
participate in schooling but is not then repaid or added to by the recipients of that 
education–they are wantonly destroying the environment. At the same time, current 
research cautions dependence on agriculture, because “settlement of agro-pastoral 
and pastoral households is counter-productive…[It] will almost certainly create 
‘artificial droughts’” (Levine 2010). 
 
There are convincing arguments that pastoralism is much more resilient to 
environmental change than settled agriculture, which will always be risky in much 
of Karamoja. However, as found among the Karimojong’s close relatives, the 
Turkana in Kenya, “many projects have been directed by outsiders in a top-down 
manner, and tend to treat the Turkana as helpless–as though they had only needs 
and no capacities. The Turkana have been treated as incompetent and unskilled for 
over 40 years” (Acacia et al., 2002).  
 
It is abundantly clear at the present time, however, that “The literature on 
pastoralism and climate change points out that the future seems to develop 
precisely in the direction of pastoralists’ specialisation” (Krätli, 2009). Indeed, 
rather than “helpless…incompetent and unskilled”, the pastoralists themselves 
have some of the most critical knowledge and experience for managing the 
intricacies of the very world outsiders find impossible to deal with. But is the 
education that people expect to save them actually helping to promote such 
expertise? As Krätli has recommended for the ABEK program,  
 
An overall negative view of pastoralism in Karamoja is still deeply 
entrenched in the mainstream culture, including key institutions 
like the education system. [Improvement] needs to be done by 
challenging the mainstream prejudicial perspective, filling the 
information gap about pastoralism and promoting favourable 
change in attitude, relevant formal institutions and practices. 
 
One of the difficulties with this line of thought, however, may be current attitudes 
and practices among the Karimojong themselves whose their world divided into 
two or more distinct ‘roads’ with education serving solely to provide cash jobs. 
Officials, however, should at least ensure that the schools provide the services they 
are intended to, and hope that, as the youth of Karamoja grow up, they can 
creatively utilise the skills they have acquired to enhance their quality of life.  
 
On a practical level, making available different ‘tracks’ of education might be a 
reasonable solution to the disparate aspirations. Certainly, in the developed world 
such options are offered, so that those who are university-bound can focus on one 
kind of preparation while others pursue vocational instruction. In Karamoja, 
training in traditional knowledge could form an excellent component of an agro-
pastoral programme, rather than the current type of agricultural instruction, which 
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focuses exclusively on sedentary agriculture as practiced in southern Uganda, a 
completely different climate zone with different challenges and approaches to 
agriculture and animal rearing.  
 
Knowledge of indigenous plants for animal and human food and medicines would 
be very valuable in promoting a type of agriculture which is more suited to these 
climates—for instance, cultivating indigenous plants which already flourish despite 
erratic rainfall. In addition, the micro-level study of weather patterns practiced 
among traditional pastoralists might fill the very need, mentioned by a number of 
researchers, for closer monitoring of rain patterns (Levine, 2010). This could 
enable people to adjust their practices to the now wildly erratic rainfall. This close 
ground-level monitoring using traditional signals might actually be far more 
accurate and useful, not only for livestock management but also for agriculture.  
 
To many outsiders and those who work in development in East Africa, it may 
appear ridiculous to claim that education could be a detriment to development in 
Karamoja. Indeed, I would agree that education should be foundational to progress 
and improvement in the quality of life. However, it must be good quality education, 
rather than bad schooling. Good education will have been designed incorporating 
the perspective of wise counsellors from the community, who can bring into the 
system the best qualities of the indigenous culture. Those involved in development 
of curriculum, materials and instruction will seriously consider the social, 
economic and historical situation of the recipients. Bad schooling, on the other 
hand, will not provide actual education; instead, it can condition youngsters to 
expect education to represent something false, a façade, and in many instances 
deception, theft and even verbal or physical abuse. There is, in my opinion, far too 
much bad schooling in rural Karamoja, and it is undermining what development 
efforts there are. 
 
At this stage we have only preliminary concepts and hopes for significant change 
in approaches and attitudes, which are unlikely to occur without well-researched, 
well-thought-through implementation of genuinely appropriate interventions. What 
is needed now is a substantial corpus of information from knowledgeable 
pastoralists throughout the region, along with detailed data regarding current and 
projected climatic conditions. Consultation with a variety of Karimojong, non-
Karimojong residents in Karamoja, education personnel and, possibly, outsiders 
with some experience in education among pastoralists could provide basic data. 
Then authorities can take a hard look at the unexpected impact of formal education 
on environmental degradation in the region during this period of significant climate 
change, and begin to work on changing the “landscape of educational provision” 
(Krätli, 2009) in Karamoja. 
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Pastoralism and Climate Change in the Horn of Africa: 
Comparative Review of Policies and National Adaptation 
Programs of Action 
Yohannes Aberra Ayele 
Abstract 
Global climate is already showing unmistakable signs of significant future change. 
Pastoralist livelihoods are among the first to be severely affected by climate 
change impacts. It is a paradox that pastoral communities, that have proved to be 
resilient to the vagaries of nature through traditional coping and adaptation 
mechanisms, would be so easily weakened by the impacts of climate change. It is 
believed that policies that are neither consistent with the needs of nor responsive to 
the uniqueness of the pastoral system are primarily to blame for pastoral 
vulnerability to climate change. Even when there are policies and intervention 
strategies that are aimed at improving pastoralist livelihoods, they turn out to be 
ill-advised. In view of the need to enhance pastoralist adaptive capacity to climate 
change impacts, the relationship between existing policies and pastoralist 
vulnerabilities has to be clearly understood. More specifically, probing into how 
pastoralist vulnerabilities are addressed in the National Adaptation Programs of 
Action (NAPA) of the respective countries is of critical importance. This paper 
tries to review policies related to pastoralism and explore the preparation 
processes of the individual NAPA documents in four Horn of Africa countries 
(Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Uganda); it also seeks to evaluate how pastoralist-
friendly they are. This is qualitative research based on comparative design. 
Qualitative document analysis (content analysis) was employed to review the 
policy as well as the NAPA documents. The results of the comparative review show 
that, in spite of some largely superficial differences in policy attitudes between the 
states reviewed, there seems to be a consensus about the fate of pastoralism: its 
gradual disappearance. The NAPA documents also have differences in their 
methodologies and how they have addressed stakeholders and vulnerabilities, but 
their unmistakable vagueness in the phrasing of the priority projects vis-à-vis 
pastoralism reveals the prevailing dilemma about what should be done to this 
particular system of livestock production.  
1. Background
For most its existence the human race has survived by hunting and gathering. Until 
the Neolithic period all but a few areas of the world, including habitats from the 
northern boreal forests of North America and Asia to the moist tropical forests of 
Africa and southern Asia, were inhabited by people subsisting by hunting and 
gathering (Bailey et al., 1989). It was only around 10,000 years ago, in what has 
come to be known as the “Neolithic revolution”, that people learned to domesticate 
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plants and animals. The years between 10,000 and 7,000 BC saw the spatial 
expansion of, and increase in, the human population, probably due to the 
amelioration of Holocene climates in the tropical and subtropical areas of 
southwestern and southern Asia, northern and central Africa and Central America, 
enabling people to domesticate plants and animals on a large scale, establish 
permanent settlements and expand urban-based societies (Gupta, 2004). 
Pastoralism is defined by Bianco (2006) as “a finely honed symbiotic relationship 
between the local ecology, livestock and people in resource-scarce and highly 
variable regions, often at the threshold of human survival.” The use of extensive 
grazing on rangelands for livestock production, covering about 25% of the earth’s 
land surface, is an important economic and cultural way of life for 100 to 200 
million pastoralists throughout the world (Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), 2010). This production system has many variations in terms of the 
composition of herds, management practices and social organization. There are 
three theories about the origin of pastoralism, as described in Sleight (2011), which 
are relevant to different regional realities: 
1. Sustained crop farming enabled forage production and, thus, the possibility 
of keeping animals nearby, 
2. Rain-fed crop production could only be realized in limited areas, whereas 
other areas could grow grass but not crops and were left for animal rearing, 
3. Direct transition from hunting to pastoralism, where tribes developed their 
pastoral farming skills from generations of following herds and learning 
their dynamics.  
The latter theory is deemed more appropriate to pastoralism in the dry lands of 
Africa in general, and in the Horn of Africa in particular. As the dry lowlands 
cannot support sustained and reliable agriculture because of high temperatures and 
low, erratic rainfall, pastoralism is well-suited to them. An extensive livestock 
system is practiced, involving mobility according to where and when fodder 
becomes available, and the use of different herd management strategies such as 
herd splitting, herd diversification and herd maximization to spread the risk of 
livestock loss from droughts and diseases (Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), 
2009). Mobility is the key way of life for pastoralists. Mattee and Shem (2006) 
have detailed the positive effects of mobility as follows: 
1. It results in the optimal utilization of existing natural resources, by taking 
advantage of temporal and spatial variations in the distribution and 
quantity of rainfall and forage, as well as the best nutritional status of the 
forage
2. It is an effective way of risk management by evading drought conditions 
and actual or potential disease or pest outbreaks, which usually depend on 
climatic conditions
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3. It avoids the overexploitation of natural resources by reducing 
concentration of livestock in one area, thus leading to conservation of 
biodiversity
4. As evidenced in some African countries, animals reared in mobile systems 
are up to three times more productive per hectare than those reared under 
similar climatic conditions in ranches or sedentary systems in either 
Australia or the USA. 
Global climate is changing and is already showing unmistakable signs of 
significant future change. The looming climate change, which is going to be 
unprecedented in recent human history (Adger et al, 2003), will involve 
temperature rises, precipitation variability, sea level rises and the increased 
occurrence of extreme events, which will have adverse effects on ecosystems, 
water resources, food security, settlements and human health (Intergovernmental 
Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), 2007). Pastoralist livelihoods are among the first 
to be severely affected by climate change impacts. Although projected increases in 
grassland production as a result of fertilization by the extra CO2 in the atmosphere 
may be beneficial, increased frequency of extreme weather events such as flooding 
and droughts may overwhelm the existing resilience of pastoral systems. Moreover, 
diseases affecting livestock are projected to increase in scope and scale, while more 
frequent wildfires are expected to affect the vegetation upon which pastoralists 
depend (CBD, 2010). Climate change in pastoral areas has added further 
dimensions to the old debate about whether vulnerability in the context of 
pastoralist areas is driven by natural or man-made factors (Feinstein International 
Centre (FIC), 2011). Although it is difficult to associate the recent drought in the 
Horn of Africa with the trends in climate change, it has revealed beyond doubt the 
underlying vulnerability of the people affected. It is the worst drought in 60 years 
affecting more than 9 million pastoralists: 3.2 million in Ethiopia, 3.2 million in 
Kenya, 2.6 million in Somalia and over 100,000 in Djibouti (BBC News, 28 June 
2011). 
It is a paradox that pastoral communities that have proved to be resilient to the 
vagaries of the environment through traditional coping and adaptation mechanisms, 
would so easily be weakened to the impacts of climate change. Although the speed 
and frequency of the changes or variability of the elements may test the stamina of 
their long-standing adaptation strategies, it is argued that policies that are neither 
consistent with their needs nor responsive to the uniqueness of the pastoral system 
are primarily to blame for pastoral vulnerability (HPG, 2009). A case in point is the
current Horn of African drought where, according to Oxfam (2011), the worst-
affected areas are those suffering from entrenched poverty due to marginalization, 
conflict and lack of investment.  
Policy attitudes towards pastoralists seem to have been influenced by the world 
views of the decision makers. Colonial administration’s European views of the 
herders, which have most likely influenced postcolonial perceptions, are based on 
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the Kantian argument that the most rational basis for land use is agriculture 
(cultivation). This implies that pastoralism is legally non-existent and the land it 
uses can be taken by anyone else because it belongs to no-one (Biber-Klemin & 
Rass, 2011). Pastoralism is conceived as experiencing limited capacity, 
overgrazing and desertification, and is associated with the tragedy of the commons 
(Morton, 2005). This has fuelled state-sponsored encroachment into traditional 
pastoral lands in the form of national parks and game reserves, and small-scale and 
commercial cultivation (Mattee and Shem, 2006).  
The demise of pastoralism as a social and economic system is of little advantage to 
national development. In fact, the decline or disappearance of pastoralism is 
deleterious to the economy, the environment and social justice. Pastoralism adds 
billions to national economies; the majority of the region’s animal wealth is kept 
by pastoralists in the dry lands; they also produce all the milk and meat they 
consume, contributing to their own food security. There is direct employment in 
the pastoral production system, but also the employment of others in livestock 
trade, transport services, leather industries, slaughterhouses, butchers and 
restaurants (HPG, 2009). There are also significant environmental benefits that are 
accrued from a pastoralist production system. Due to their close links with the 
environment, pastoralists have a significant role in the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity at genetic, species, and ecosystem levels. Moreover, the pastoral 
rangelands, at more than 5,000 million hectares, account for about 30% of the 
world’s soil carbon stocks with a sequestration potential of up to 2,000 metric tons 
of CO2 equivalent by 2030 (CBD, 2010). 
Even when there are policies and intervention strategies aimed at improving 
pastoralists’ livelihoods, they often turn out to be ill-advised. It is felt that 
implementation of pastoral development, which is proposed as a means of 
achieving long-term food security by increasing pastoralist involvement in national 
food and economic systems, could come at a heavy cost to both the pastoralists and 
governments (Cultural Survival, 2010). Rangeland management, the most notable 
approach to pastoral development, according to Mattee and Shem (2006), is 
inspired by practices that come to Africa from totally different and irrelevant eco-
social regions such as North America and Australia. 
In view of the need to enhance the adaptive capacities of pastoralists to climate 
change impacts, the relationship between existing policies and pastoralist 
vulnerabilities has to be clearly understood. More specifically, probing into how 
pastoralist vulnerabilities are addressed in the NAPA documents is of critical 
importance. The NAPA documents are expected to address all groups or 
communities vulnerable to climate change and prioritize projects aiming to 
reinforce their adaptive capacities. This paper tries to explore to what extent the 
NAPA documents have lived up to such expectations, and also how much the 
NAPA preparation process was free from the influence of pastoralist-unfriendly 
policies. No such comparative review of NAPA documents, pertaining to how 
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pastoralist issues are addressed, has yet been done for any region of the world, 
including the Horn of Africa. It is hoped that this may contribute to the 
improvement of the NAPA documents with regard to what should be done to 
reinforce the adaptive capacities of pastoralist communities.  
2. Study area and methodology 
Although pastoralism exists in many parts of the Eastern Hemisphere, including 
eastern and north-eastern Africa, southern Africa, the Sahel Belt, the Middle East, 
Central Asia and Northern Scandinavia, this study is limited to the Horn of Africa. 
Physiographically speaking, what is known as the Horn of Africa is restricted to the 
Somali peninsula that protrudes towards the Arabian Sea. Political geography has 
added more countries to the region; however, the lack of explicit criteria for 
inclusion into the region has resulted in too many variants of the ‘Horn of Africa’. 
Some consider Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea and Kenya to be Horn 
of Africa states. Others add Uganda to this group, while others further incorporate 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi in the region.  
In this paper the Horn of Africa is taken to include the seven member states of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. The review of pastoral policies 
and NAPA documents has been carried out for only four states: Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Uganda. Somalia and Kenya have not yet submitted their NAPA 
documents to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Although Djibouti has already done so, the NAPA document available 
online is in French, posing difficulties for this reviewer in understanding the 
contents. Pastoralists make up 60%, 30%, 12% and 5% of the populations of Sudan, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively (Pastoral and Environmental Network in 
the Horn of Africa (PENHA), 2011).  
The research design adopted for this paper is a comparative design. The research 
strategy is qualitative, relying entirely on qualitative document analysis of the four 
NAPA documents. Specifically, content analysis is employed, searching out the 
underlying meanings of themes in the documents. 
3. Recommended policy options in pastoral areas  
Although there is a deep-seated conviction that the pastoralist system of production 
in marginal lands is more resilient and more adapted to natural stress, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to assume that pastoralism in its traditional form 
will persist merely on the basis of its own intrinsic ability to respond to changes 
(Kisamba-Mugerwa, 1992). Hence, scholars and advocacy organizations have put 
forward some recommendations for consideration in policy making. In this paper, 
national pastoralist policies and NAPA documents from four Horn of Africa states 
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will be evaluated in terms of which of these recommendations are addressed and 
how.
Mattee and Shem (2006) proposed five areas of intervention, which they 
considered to be critical to ensure the sustainability of pastoralist production 
systems: promote efficient utilization of rangelands; improve access to reliable 
water supplies; improve access to veterinary services; empower pastoralist 
institutions and promote income generating opportunities. What Tezera (2011) 
referred to as key areas of policy intervention additionally include: support for 
livelihood diversification; building robust conflict management institutions and 
effective drought mitigation systems; enabling herd mobility and securing rights to 
critical resources like dry season pastures and water; and strengthening the capacity 
of pastoral groups to engage in policy debates on issues directly affecting their 
livelihoods. Inseparable from policies that provide for mobility are policies and 
legislation that recognize pastoralists’ communal land tenure as a viable tenure 
system extremely well-suited to areas of climatic variability (Nassef et al., 2009). 
Legal recognition of this tenure system also needs to be improved. 
The recommendations of the CBD are framed in what are referred to as the four 
elements of good pastoralism practice: policy considerations; management tools; 
economic and financial instruments and capacity building. The former includes 
integrating indigenous knowledge, innovations and practices, securing land rights, 
mainstreaming gender, risk management, mixed conservation-production 
landscapes, improving market access for sustainable production, exploring 
emerging financial mechanisms, and institutional and individual empowerment and 
education (CBD, 2010).   
Policy making must be focused on the removal of the two root causes of pastoralist 
problems; namely, inadequate understanding and misrepresentation of the pastoral 
system, and little influence by pastoralists over policy and decision-making 
processes. Suggestions made by HPG (2009) are: make research findings and 
standardized data accessible to policy-makers; inform and challenge the myths 
about pastoralism; document the contribution of pastoralism to the economy; 
advocate for the need to increase investment in pastoral areas; build pastoralist 
organizations and improve their governance and effective representation. 
The courses of action that are felt by Pavanello (2009) to be indispensable, if the 
livelihoods of pastoralists are to be rescued from deterioration, have emanated from 
her literature review which had three focus areas: pastoralist political 
marginalization, cross-border issues and policy engagement. Thus, she has put 
forward the following recommendations: 
1. support pastoral livelihood systems with timely and appropriate 
interventions such as saving lives by protecting pastoralist assets and 
livelihood strategies, 
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2. enhance pastoralists’ wellbeing and contribute to building their resilience, 
3. promote capacity building of technical know how and skills to influence 
policy, 
4. understand the dynamics and workings of customary institutions and 
mechanisms, 
5. support local institutions and organizations to strengthen the relationship 
between pastoralists and formal institutions, 
6. support a two-way process of strengthening and building the capacity of 
civil society groups, while working with state institutions to change the 
dominant paradigm driving national policies that keeps pastoral 
communities on the margin, 
7. promote peace and reconciliation initiatives to enable cross-border 
movement, access to vital natural resources and trade, 
8. support pastoralist-led cooperatives to improve livestock marketing in the 
region and to address the poor market access of pastoralists, 
9. improve the quality of livelihood assessments to ensure timely and 
effective livelihood interventions which are more prominent in drought 
responses and management.  
4. National pastoralism-related policies  
In this section, pastoralism-related policies and interventions, based on reviews by 
different sources— for Uganda (HPG, 2009; Kisamba-Mugerwa, 1992; Morton, 
2005; PENHA, 2011), for Ethiopia (HPG, 2009; Morton, 2005; Pantuliano & 
Wekesu, 2008; Pastoralist Communication Initiative (PCI), 2011), for Sudan 
(Fahey, 2008) and for Eritrea (Bianco, 2006) will be reviewed in Tables 1. 
Pastoralist policies in the four Horn of Africa countries have more similarities than 
differences. These differences are only superficial, often arising from economic, 
social and political peculiarities of the countries under consideration. It is only the 
constitution of Ethiopia that has explicitly stated that it endorses the pastoralist way 
of life. There are, however, no tangible mechanisms for realizing the constitutional 
provisions. Administrative decentralization in Uganda and Ethiopia can be seen as 
favourable to pastoralist influence in local decision-making, but this benefit is 
dwarfed by other policies and legislation that debilitate pastoralism as an economic 
and social system. Sedentarization is the most powerful strategy in the toolbox of 
policy makers in Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea. Ethiopia’s sedentarization policy is 
not explicit in order to avoid contradicting the supreme law of the land. 
Commercial crop growing on pastoral rangelands is the most favoured policy item 
in the three countries, except Ethiopia, which prefers deeds rather than words in 
this regard. The Pastoral Parliamentary Groups of Uganda and Ethiopia, although 
they have attained some successes, are less representative and less powerful when 
it comes to influencing major decisions pertaining to pastoralism. The uniqueness 
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in policy attitudes towards the pastoralist way of life in Sudan and Eritrea is alleged 
to have been influenced by political and ethnic prejudices.   
5. Review of NAPA documents
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (2011) some degree of 
future climate change will occur regardless of future greenhouse gas emissions. 
That is, adaptation will be necessary to address impacts resulting from the warming 
which is already unavoidable due to past emissions (IPCC, 2007). This is 
particularly true for the most vulnerable Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The 
UNFCCC recognizes the special situations of the LDCs and has decided to support 
their adaptation plans through a global financial mechanism. The NAPA process 
and eventual implementation is meant to address the limited ability of LDCs to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The NAPA documents focus on 
urgent and immediate needs, those for which further delay could increase 
vulnerability or lead to increased costs later on. The documents take into account 
existing coping strategies at the grassroots level. Prominence is given to 
community-level input as an important source of information, recognizing that 
grassroots communities are the main stakeholders.  
Forty-six countries have submitted their NAPA document to the UNFCCC by 
September 2011, 31 of which are African countries. Here the NAPA documents of 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan will be reviewed in terms of the institutional 
arrangements, identified key vulnerabilities, stakeholders consulted, criteria for the 
prioritization of adaptation projects, and the final prioritized NAPA projects. The 
review (see Table 2) will focus on how pastoralism was addressed in the 
preparation processes and the final document.  
The analyses of the NAPAs reveal inconsistency and vagueness in the contents of 
the documents. Meteorological agencies have led the NAPA preparation process in 
Ethiopia and Uganda, and environmental agencies in Eritrea and Sudan. This may 
have resulted from the respective governments’ perceptions of adaptation to 
climate change as a meteorological or environmental phenomenon. Adaptation is, 
however, more of an economic, social, political and technological issue rather than 
a mere analysis of meteorological and environmental trends. This is typified by the 
institutional arrangement needed for addressing pastoralist adaptation to climate 
change impacts, which calls for the social sciences and multidisciplinary fields. Of 
course, members of the steering committees and/or the core NAPA preparation 
teams were drawn from different ministries and academic fields.  
The steering committee for Ethiopia’s NAPA document includes, among many 
other departments and ministries, representatives of the Ministry of Water 
Resources, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Agency, Ecosystem Conservation and Dry Land Research 
Directorate, which are deemed extremely relevant for the purpose.   
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Nevertheless, the assemblage of relevant experts seems to have been wasted by 
relegating the role of the steering committee to only providing overall guidance and 
oversight for the project. Preparation of the entire NAPA technical report was left 
to a private company, which will understandably have been engaged in cost-benefit 
calculations. This has revealed itself clearly in how the entire process of 
stakeholder identification and consultation was carried out. While smallholder 
farmers and pastoralists were pinpointed as the livelihood groups most vulnerable 
to climate change impacts, the nine workshops conducted to solicit information 
about what to prioritize were attended by only experts, a total of 500 experts. 
Although a member of the steering committee, the Eritrean Ministry of Agriculture 
was conspicuous by its absence from membership of their Central NAPA Project 
Team. Given the importance of the available expertise in the Ministry, which is 
indispensable for addressing key pastoral adaptation issues like land tenure, 
livestock and rangelands, absence from the team that does the real job of preparing 
the NAPA seems strange. The Central NAPA Project Team for Sudan can be 
commended for having the most relevant composition of all. The fact that it has a 
member from a University for Women has clearly put them in front of the others, at 
least on gender matters. Uganda can also be said to have had the right composition 
in the steering committee for its NAPA document preparation. However, the actual 
preparation of the NAPA was done by task forces, whose origins were not revealed 
except that they were technical officers drawn from key stakeholders. 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan have clearly indicated that pastoralists are one of the 
key vulnerable groups, but only the latter two have included representatives from 
this livelihood group in the stakeholder consultations. In line with the UNFCCC 
guidelines, there are commonalities between the Horn of Africa states in some of 
the key criteria set for the prioritization of NAPA projects. The potential for 
poverty reduction is set as a criterion by all states. This concerns all communities, 
including pastoralists. Complementarity with national plans is another criterion 
which is set by Ethiopia and Eritrea only. National plans, in most cases, are firmly 
founded on policies which, in turn, are sectoral and growth-oriented. When policies 
and their sectoral strategies become unfavourable for pastoralist production 
systems, national plans, which are based on these policies and strategies cannot be 
favourable. The other criterion, set by all but Sudan, is cost effectiveness. In view 
of the fact that positive interventions to improve pastoralist adaptive capacities 
involve more expenditure than revenue, this particular criterion seems to be an 
anomaly. One of the most basic concerns in pastoralist livelihoods is the status of 
women. Only Sudan and Uganda have given this due regard. Uganda has listed it 
as one of the criteria alongside equity considerations, and Sudan has explicitly set 
women’s empowerment as one of the key criteria for NAPA project prioritization. 
Government intervention and adaptation
247
The final list of ranked priority projects contains 11 for Ethiopia, five for Eritrea 
and Sudan, and nine for Uganda. Those Ethiopian projects that are wholly or partly 
related to pastoralist systems are ranked 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th and 11th. There is no 
doubt about the huge benefits of improved disaster early warning systems for 
pastoralist communities. However, the remaining projects, except the 4th, imply 
sedentarization although it is not explicitly stated. Arid and semi-arid areas are 
predominantly pastoralist; the development of small-scale irrigation (project 3), 
and agro-forestry (project 11) in these zones can only mean that it is the pastoralists 
who are expected to carry them out. Carbon sequestration (project 8) could be done 
on pastoral rangelands. However, in Ethiopia there is much preference for trees as 
carbon sinks. As the woodlands and dry forests, in crop producing areas of the Rift 
system could be the most likely targets attention will be shifted away from 
pastoralists. The lower reaches of the Genale-Dawa basin is a pastoral zone. The 
large-scale water development (project 7) envisaged there implies nothing else but 
the settling of pastoralists or their eviction from the would-be large-scale farmlands. 
Although project 4, improving/enhancing rangeland resource management 
practices in the pastoral areas, could be a genuine intervention into the livelihood 
system of pastoralists, there is a possibility that it could take the form of “modern” 
rangeland management, which is anathema to pastoralists. 
Since pastoralism is the predominant livelihood system of the lowlands, two out of 
the five priority NAPA projects in Eritrea pertain to pastoralists, although this is 
not explicitly stated. As Eritrea has sworn to sedentarize pastoralists, the 
improvement of rangelands and animal breeds in the lowlands could be undertaken 
in the context of settling pastoralists. In Sudan’s NAPA document, three of the five 
priority projects, those ranked 1st, 2nd and 4th, are related to pastoralist systems. 
However, in what context rangeland rehabilitation is to be undertaken is not 
explicit. The proposed improvement of rainwater harvesting practices could hint at 
a desire for reduced mobility. Of the four NAPA documents reviewed, the haziest 
as far as pastoralism is concerned is Uganda’s. All of the nine priority projects are 
relevant to pastoralism, but it seems less likely that they will be applicable to it. 
Pastoralism was neither considered as a vulnerable production group, nor were 
pastoralists consulted during the preparation of Uganda’s NAPA document.  
6. Conclusions 
Pastoralism seems to be experiencing an unfavourable and probably irreversible 
change. There is a great deal of ambivalence about pastoralism among policy 
makers and scholars alike. Be it for political/economic reasons or a conviction for 
social justice and environmental stewardship, the policy attitude towards 
pastoralism swings from one of readiness to allow it to persist, to complete 
rejection of it as an obsolete system. In spite of some, largely superficial, 
differences in policy attitudes of the states reviewed, there seems to be a consensus 
about the fate of pastoralism: its gradual disappearance. The NAPA documents also 
have differences in their methodologies and how they have addressed stakeholders 
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and vulnerabilities, but their unmistakable vagueness about the phrasing of the 
priority projects vis-à-vis pastoralism reveals the prevailing dilemma about what 
should be done with this particular system of livestock production. Pastoralism is 
drowned in the sectoral approach used for the analysis and presentation of the 
NAPA documents, which doesn’t put the projects in a clear livelihood context.  
The fact that the documents are national is another testimony to the existing policy 
attitudes towards pastoralism. Pastoralism in general, and in the Horn of Africa in 
particular, is more a trans-national phenomenon than a national one. Pastoralist 
mode of life knows no political boundaries. If the vulnerability of pastoralists is to 
be genuinely addressed, it has to be in a regional context and not in national 
documents. In view of their uniqueness in the spatial context, adaptation programs 
of action for pastoralists have to be applied separately from other vulnerable groups, 
and have to take the form of a Regional Adaptation Program of Action (RAPA), 
focusing on pastoral communities straddling the borders of the countries of the 
Horn of Africa. 
Government intervention and adaptation
249
References
Adger, W. N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D. and Hulme, M. (2003). Adaptation 
to climate change in the developing world. Progress in Development Studies, 3(3), 
pp. 179–195.  
Bailey, R. C., Head, G., Jenike, M., Owen, B., Rechtman, R. and Zechenter, E.
(1989). Hunting and gathering in tropical rain forest: Is it possible? American
Anthropologist (New Series), 91(1), pp. 59-82.  
BBC News. (2011). Horn of Africa sees ‘worst drought in 60 years.’ Retrieved in 
August 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13944550.
Bianco, A.L. (2006). Land tenure rights and practices of pastoralists and 
implications for poverty reduction: a comparative study of Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Tanzania.
http://www.landcoalition.org/pdf/08_Land_Tenure_Rights_and_Practices_of_Past
oralists.pdf
Biber-Klemin, S.  and Rass, N. (2008). Solutions to securing mobility by securing 
the commons. The WISP land Rights Study-first results. 
http://iasc2008.glos.ac.uk/conference%20papers/papers/B/Biber-Klemm_1473.pdf 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). (2010). Pastoralism, nature 
conservation and development: a good practice guide. Montreal, 40 + iii pages. 
Cultural Survival. (2010). East African pastoralists.
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/east-african-pastoralists 
Fahey, D. (2008). The political economy of livestock and pastoralism in Sudan.
IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative. IGAD LPI Working Paper No. 06 – 
08. www.igad-lpi.org/publication/docs/IGADLPI_WP06_08_Sudan.pdf 
Feinstein International Center (FIC). (2011). Pastoralism and policy in Ethiopia.
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Pastoralism+and+Policy+in+Ethi
opia
Gupta, A. K. (2004). Origin of agriculture and domestication of plants and animals 
linked to early Holocene climate amelioration. Current Science, 87(1), pp.54-59. 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG). (2009). Pastoralism, policies and practice in 
the Horn and East Africa: a review of current trends.
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3303.pdf 
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). (2007). Fourth Assessment 
Report: Climate Change, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/tssts-summary-of.html 
Kisamba-Mugerwa, W. (1992). Rangeland tenure and resource management: an 
overview of pastoralism in Uganda 
http://minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/28978/rp499.pdf?sequence=1 
Climate Change and Pastoralism
250
Mattee, A.Z. and Shem, M. (2006). Ambivalence and contradiction: a review of the 
policy environment in Tanzania in relation to pastoralism. Issue Paper No. 140.
International Institute for Environment and Development (iied). 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12527IIED.pdf 
Morton, J. (2005). Legislators and livestock: a comparative analysis of pastoralist 
parliamentary groups in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Natural Resources Institute, 
University of Greenwich. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D//PDF/outputs/ZC0256a.pdf 
Nassef, M., Anderson, S. and Hesse, C. (2009). Pastoralism and climate change: 
enabling adaptive capacity. Synthesis Paper, Humanitarian Policy Group. 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3304.pdf 
Oxfam. (2011). Briefing Horn of Africa drought: climate change and future 
impacts on food security. 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/briefing-hornofafrica-drought-
climatechange-foodsecurity-020811.pdf 
Pantuliano, S. and Wekesa, M. (2008). Improving drought response in pastoral 
areas of Ethiopia Somali and Afar Regions and Borena Zone of Oromiya Region.
Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1382.pdf
Pavanello, S. (2009). Pastoralists’ vulnerability in the Horn of Africa: exploring 
political marginalization, donors’ policies and cross-border issues – literature 
review. Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, London. 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/12BACBCE020A0C39C1257
690003CF1D0-ODI-HPG_Nov2009.pdf 
Pastoralist Communication Initiative (PCI) (2011). The future of pastoralism in 
Ethiopia: theory vs. practice. http://www.pastoralists.org/pages/posts/the-future-of-
pastoralism-in-ethiopia-theory-vs.-practice13.php 
Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa (PENHA). (2011). 
Pastoralism in Uganda an overview. www.penhanetwork.org/pages/Uganda.html
Sleight, K. (2011). The development of pastoral farming.
http://www.brighthub.com/environment/science-environmental/articles/121989.aspx 
Tezera Getahun. (2011). Climate change is posing danger on pastoralist: How to 
manage excess of its adversity. http://www.pfe-
ethiopia.org/pub_files/Climate%20changes%20posing%20danger%20on%20pastoral
ist.pdf 
US Environmental Protection Agency. (2011). Adaptation.
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/adaptation.html#ref 
Government intervention and adaptation
251
Aspects of Climate Change, Adaptation Strategies and 
Information Sharing in the Nile Basin 
Tesfaye Tafesse 
Abstract 
The mighty Nile River traverses eleven countries (Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania 
and Uganda) that possess varied biophysical and socio-economic features, 
including climate, soils, vegetation, history, culture and politics. Of the varied 
problems that the co-basin countries face, a key one is the vagaries of climate 
change leading to the recurrence of natural shocks, such as droughts and floods. 
The Nile riparian states also differ in their degree of exposure to climate change as 
well as in their capacity to cope.   
In order to design mitigation and adaptation strategies to cope with the problem of 
climate change in the Nile Basin, regional, national and local institutions and 
actors become indispensable. So far, emphasis has been laid on regional 
institutions, such as the Nile Basin Initiative, to facilitate the gathering and 
dissemination of regional information and provide the urgently needed regional 
connection that can enable the formulation of coordinated and cooperative 
regional response strategies. Of late, the Nile Basin Sustainability Framework 
(NBSF) has been established with the intention of providing a conceptual 
framework through which the different basin-wide policies, strategies and 
guidelines—that are needed to attain sustainable socio-economic development 
through the wise use of water resources—can be organized, formulated and 
applied.    
The overall aims of the study are three: (a) to illustrate climate change, its impacts 
and adaptations in the Nile Basin, (b) to assess the mechanisms by which 
information and knowledge exchange on climate change in the Nile Basin has been 
used in the implementation of adaptation strategies, and (c) to draw lessons from 
the Nile Basin that can be adapted by pastoralists in the Horn of Africa. The study 
appraises the role of regional institutions in the exchange of information and 
knowledge on climate change, and proposes the inclusion of local and national 
institutions for the same purpose. The synergy that can come as a result of the 
existence of three-tier information sources, viz. local, national and regional, in 
averting the impacts of climate change is underlined in the study. 
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1. Introduction
The Nile is the world’s longest river that passes through varied climatic regions, 
traversing eleven riparian states.1 The three tributaries of the Nile that spring from 
the Ethiopian highlands contribute 86 percent of the volume of water, while the 
White Nile accounts for the remaining 14 percent. Of the many challenges facing 
the Nile River Basin, the dominant ones are related to climate. The high seasonal 
variations in river flow bring about water shortages; flood risks on the lower flood 
plains; regular drought sequences and cycles, at times leading to food shortages 
and famine; loss of vegetation cover and threat to biodiversity and fisheries stock. 
Climate change could be defined as ‘the variation in mean climate conditions on a 
multi-decadal or long-term scale’, whereas adaptation refers to ‘adjustments to 
systems in response to a sudden or gradual change or stimulus that modify its 
impacts’ (Goulden & Conway, 2008).  
The climate in the Nile Basin is highly variable, ranging between dryness in the 
north and wetness in the equatorial lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands. 
Historical records show variations in climate with periods of dryness alternating 
with wetness. Climate change puts pressure on water resources due to a possible 
increase in the already high variability in rainfall and river flows and changes in the 
geographical distribution of water resources with some areas possibly becoming 
drier whilst others become wetter. In addition, water resources can be exposed to 
pressures from increasing demand from agriculture and other competing uses. As 
stated by Goulden and Conway (2008), water users and water resource 
management institutions at all levels (local, national and regional) have to adapt to 
climate variability, changes in water demand and the effects of climate change.   
Climate change affects the quantity and quality of water resources as well as the 
amount of evapo-transpiration influencing the livelihoods of various communities 
in the Nile Basin, including sedentary agriculturalists, pastoralists and city 
dwellers. There are cases where communities are being forced to adopt different 
lifestyles and use varied survival strategies to cope with the adverse effects of 
climate change. Given these circumstances, it becomes indispensable to develop 
strategies for the exchange and sharing of information and data on climatic 
variables. Towards this end, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has attempted to 
develop basin-wide response strategies and information sharing.  
The overall aims of the study are three: (a) to illustrate climate change, its impacts 
and adaptations in the Nile Basin, (b) to assess the mechanisms by which 
information and knowledge exchange on climate change in the Nile Basin has been 
used in the implementation of adaptation strategies, and (c) to draw lessons from 
the Nile Basin that can be adapted by pastoralists in the Horn of Africa. Efforts will 
1 The birth of South Sudan as an independent state on July 9, 2011 has increased the number of Nile 
riparian states to eleven. 
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be made to appraise the NBI’s attempts to develop basin-wide response strategy 
and information sharing to address climate change. The study relied on secondary 
data and information obtained from various literature and Nile-based organizations.
2. Hydrographic setting of the Nile 
The Nile is the world’s longest river, flowing south to north for about 6,825 km 
over 35 degrees of latitude (4oS to 31oN), draining a 3.1 million km2 catchment 
area, which is equivalent to one-tenth of the African continent. Generally, the basin 
represents a large and highly varied hydrological unit and, as described by Collins 
(1990), the Nile River passes through countries with a variety of climates and 
natural formations, from mountainous highlands to barren deserts. In the Equatorial 
Lakes Region, particularly around Lake Victoria, the average amount of rainfall is 
estimated at 1,400 mm per year and in the Ethiopian highlands around 1,700 mm 
per year (Zewdie, 1990). At the other extreme, when one moves downstream from 
north of Khartoum towards the Mediterranean Sea, the river flows through semi-
arid and arid areas where it gets little or no rainfall. The average annual rainfall in 
Khartoum, Aswan, Cairo and on the Mediterranean coast is estimated at 200, 25, 
25 and 200 millimetres, respectively. Conversely, the rate of evaporation in these 
areas and the Equatorial Lakes Region is higher, with, for instance, the northern 
parts of the Sudan, most parts of Egypt and the Lakes Region having 1,000, 2,800 
and 1,400 millimetres of evaporation per year, respectively (Khashef, 1981). The 
evaporation rate is, however, minimal in the Ethiopian highlands, averaging about 
600 mm per year. 
The Nile River has two major tributaries, namely the Blue and White Niles, and 
about six major cataracts. The White Nile’s source is the upper catchment of the 
Luvironza River that is located near to Lake Tanganyika in south-central Burundi 
(see Figure 1). The Luvironza is a tributary of the Kagera River which, in actual 
fact, is considered by many writers as the source of the White Nile (Khashef, 1981; 
Shahin, 1985). The Kagera River empties itself into Lake Victoria which, in turn, is 
discharged as the Victoria Nile into Lake Albert after crossing through a series of 
cascades known as the Rippen Falls. Lake Albert receives two-thirds of its total 
inflow from the Victoria Nile and the remaining one-third from rainfall. The 
equatorial portion of the Nile’s course ends after the Upper White Nile exits Lake 
Albert and moves northwards to South Sudan. Within South Sudan, until the river 
reaches Malakal it is known as Bahr-el-Jebel. At this stage the Nile carries some 22 
billion cubic meters of water per annum. Inside South Sudan, Bahr-el-Jebel is 
joined by a number of right and left bank torrents including Bahr-el-Arab and 
Bahr-el-Gazal. None of these rivers are perennial but, rather, run in full force only 
after the onset of the rainy period.  
Given the fact that most of the aforementioned torrents, particularly the Bahr-el-
Gazal, lose much of their water while passing through the extensive Sudd Swamp 
(about 6,000 km2 in size) which envelops a good portion of South Sudan, they add 
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no more than 4 billion cubic meters of water per year to the Nile (Kliot, 1994). All 
in all, about 60 percent of the water discharge that enters into the Sudd Swamp, 
about 14 billion m3/year, disappears due to seepage and evapo-transpiration. 
Additionally, the flow contribution of the White Nile tributaries in the Equatorial 
Lakes Region is reduced by the high volume of evapo-transpiration that takes place 
within the region. It is stated that Lakes Victoria and Albert alone lose about 3.5 
and 2.5 billon cubic meters of water per year, respectively (Ibid). 
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The Blue Nile originates in the Ethiopian highlands from a small stream called 
Gilgel Abbay, which is found about 100 km to the southwest of Lake Tana (see 
Figure 1). After exiting Lake Tana, the Blue Nile (known as Abbay in Ethiopia) 
changes direction from southeast to south then west and lastly north until it reaches 
its final destination in Khartoum. In its long journey towards the Sudan, it is fed by 
a multitude of tributaries rising in the Ethiopian plateaus that have elevations 
ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 meters above sea level and rainfall between 1,400 and 
1,600 mm per year, on average. The Blue Nile gushes through deep gorges and 
steep-sided valleys, which at times are as deep as 1,200 meters, until it reaches the 
Ethio-Sudanese border to the west (490 meters above sea level). After crossing the 
Ethio-Sudanese border, the river becomes much gentler and collects two more 
seasonal tributaries that originate in Ethiopia, the Dinder and Rahad, that together 
contribute about 10 per cent of the Blue Nile’s total annual flow. In the end, the 
Blue Nile makes a confluence with the northbound White Nile at Khartoum to 
form the Nile River per se.  
While making its long, gentle and arduous journey towards the Mediterranean Sea, 
the Nile River is joined by one last tributary that originates in Ethiopia, the Atbara 
(known as Tekezzie in Ethiopia), at a location about 320 km north of Khartoum. 
The remaining course of the Nile—about 3,000 kilometres in length—that leads to 
the mouth on the Mediterranean Sea is characterized by two aspects: firstly, it is 
devoid of any additional inflow and, secondly, it passes through a formidable 
environment that has intense heat and little or no precipitation. About 200 km short 
of its final destination at the Mediterranean Sea, the Nile bifurcates into the Rosetta 
branch in the west and the Damietta in the east. These two arms of the delta, also 
called distributaries, are located in the triangular Egyptian Delta that has a width of 
about 200 km. They channel the last drops of the Nile to the Mediterranean Sea.  
Of the four major tributaries of the Nile drainage system, three of them that 
originate in Ethiopia, the Blue Nile, the Sobat (known as Baro-Akobo in Ethiopia) 
and the Atbara, have a mean annual discharge of 59, 14 and 13 billion cubic meters 
of water, respectively. These figures usually rise to 68, 15 and 22 billion cubic 
meters of water during the summer rainy periods, respectively. The White Nile 
contributes, on average, about 14 billion cubic meters of water annually (Collins, 
1990; Kliot, 1994). By virtue of the three river systems, Ethiopia contributes 86 per 
cent of the total volume of water, while the White Nile provides the remaining 14 
per cent. Ethiopia’s contribution to the Nile flow rises to 95 per cent during the 
summer rainy season (referred to as kiremt in Ethiopia) that stretches between late 
June and early September (Tafesse, 2001a). 
3. Climate change in the Nile Basin 
It goes without saying that climate change is one of the major global development 
challenges that human beings face today. Now, more than ever, we see fluctuations 
in rainfall, increase in temperature and rising or falling sea levels that could induce 
Climate Change and Pastoralism
256
droughts and floods, population displacements and changes in the length of 
growing seasons. As mentioned earlier, the Nile Basin’s climate varies between 
extreme aridity in the north (mainly in Egypt and the Sudan) and relative wetness 
in the Equatorial Lakes Region and the Ethiopian highlands. The kiremt, or 
summer downpours, in Ethiopia spanning late June and early September contribute 
the bulk of the rain feeding into the three tributaries of the Nile. These summer 
rains in Ethiopia are associated with the shift of the Inter-Tropical Convergence 
Zone (ITCZ) over the Ethiopian highlands, attracting the southwesterly winds that 
unload their moisture as monsoon rains. The resulting rainfall is often intense, 
causing overbank discharge and rapid runoff, leading to major soil loss and, at 
times, flooding. The seasonal changes in the pattern and movement of the ITCZ 
cause major shifts in rainfall across Ethiopia and some of the Nile Basin countries. 
In some years, the northeastern highlands of Ethiopia, that are located on the 
leeward side of the rain-bearing winds, are badly affected by low and unpredictable 
rainfall patterns, contributing to severe crop failure and drought and, at times, to 
major famine (Nicol, 2003). 
One of the key factors affecting rainfall variability in the Nile Basin Region is the 
El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which is characterized by the occurrence of 
positive anomalies in sea surface temperatures over the Central and Eastern Pacific 
Ocean. This phenomenon can have dramatic global impacts on regional weather 
systems. In the case of the Nile Basin, studies by Whetton and Rutherford (1994, 
cited in Conway and Hulme (1997) have shown significant correlation between the 
ENSO index in May and Ethiopia’s kiremt rainfall. The authors showed that Nile 
floods were significantly lower than average in all El Niño years. 
The variable rainfall patterns in the Nile Basin in recent years have prompted the 
creation of mechanisms aimed to better forecasting of floods and droughts in the 
basin. In particular, the successive years of low rainfall during the mid-1980s, in 
some years barely one-half that of a “normal” year, led to a decline in the level of 
Lake Nasser to such an extent that, by the time a major rainfall event occurred in 
August 1988, the hydroelectricity turbines were just short of being turned off 
(Conway and Hulme, 1997). Such a situation illustrates the degree to which all the 
Nile Basin countries are vulnerable to climatic variations. It also shows the need 
for the development and adoption of a basin-wide information-sharing strategy on 
climate and water resources.  
The climate of the Nile Basin is temporally as well as spatially variable. This 
variability in rainfall has, in turn, resulted in fluctuations in the Nile flows and the 
levels of the lakes in the basin (Goulden and Conway, 2008). The water levels of 
Lake Victoria and the intensity of runoff in the Ethiopian highlands are particularly 
sensitive to variations in rainfall. As stated by the same authors, testimonies to this 
include the climatic extremes observed with prolonged dry period in the 1970s and 
1980s alternating with above-average rainfall that led to sharp rises in the level of 
Lake Victoria and other lakes in the equatorial region in the early 1960s and 
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1997/1998. In addition to changes in the average climatic conditions, climate 
change is expected to cause changes in climate variability, in particular to the 
frequency and severity of extreme events, such as floods and droughts. Surface 
water resources in the Nile Basin will be impacted by increased evaporation due to 
higher temperatures and also due to changes in rainfall patterns. Nile flows and the 
levels of the lakes in the basin will also be reduced unless increases in rainfall 
outweigh the effects of increased evaporation. 
    
4. Impacts and adaptation strategies  
The impacts of climate change on water resources, most particularly those aspects 
that are related to future changes in overall magnitude, variability and timing of the 
main flow events, are the most frequently cited hydrologic issues (Frederick 2002; 
Wurbs et al., 2005). These changes could have a higher impact on transboundary 
river basins such as the Nile, where competition for water resources comes from 
different users and runoff variability in upstream countries can immediately be felt 
downstream. These impacts and effects become much more visible for river basins 
such as the Nile that are sensitive to climatic variations (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Hulme, 1996; Yates & Strzepek, 1998 a,b). The Nile gets all of its water from rains 
falling in upstream countries, most particularly from Ethiopia. Climatic variability 
caused by climate change could seriously affect rain patterns and runoff variability 
so much so that it affects the amount of water available in downstream countries. 
The increasing water demand by upstream countries in the Nile Basin, coupled 
with climate change impacts on rivers and river basins, can affect the availability of 
water resources for downstream countries.  
The hitherto existing studies that have examined the impacts of climate change on 
water resources in the Nile Basin have mostly focused on changes in runoff and 
their consequences for the economies of downstream countries (Conway, 2005; 
Conway & Hulme, 1993; 1996; Gleick, 1991; Sene et al., 2001; Strzepek & Yates, 
1996; Yates & Strzepek, 1996, 1998 a,b). However, the effects of climate change 
do undoubtedly go beyond these changes and consequences. They can affect 
multiple features of water resources, including, but not restricted to, quantity and 
quality of water, flow extremes and water temperatures. All these aspects, that 
affect livelihoods in the Nile Basin, have not received the much desired attention in 
planning for future water allocation and design of water infrastructure. As stated by 
Goulden and Conway (2008), periods of high and low rainfall in the basin lead to 
impacts such as drought and food insecurity; flooding and population 
displacement. Low water levels in rivers and lakes also impact on hydropower, 
municipal water use and irrigation agriculture. As enunciated by Verhoeven 
(2011), a significant rise in the number and frequency of debilitating droughts and 
floods in the Nile Basin can, in turn, produce a systemic crisis affecting agricultural 
production and pastoralist livelihoods. For instance, the Nuer pastoralists in South 
Sudan, who live in the swamps and open savannah on both sides of the White Nile, 
are affected by the impacts of climate change on the basin directly, while 
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pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the four districts of Karamoja in the Equatorial 
Lakes Region and the Beja traditional pastoralists in Sudan, who live between the 
Nile and the Red Sea, are affected indirectly.    
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2011) defined climate 
change adaptation to include all human responses that would be used to reduce 
vulnerability. The capacity to adapt is closely linked to the degree of dependence 
on natural resources and the level of socio-economic development. High reliance 
on natural resources in developing countries has been noted to account for high 
levels of vulnerability and low adaptive capacity to climate variability and change 
(World Bank, 2000). It has also been found that the degree of vulnerability to 
climate change varies, amongst other factors, in terms of geographical location and 
the degree of resilience of the population. The livelihoods of communities in 
environmentally sensitive areas such as the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa have 
evolved under variable climatic conditions and the associated uncertainty in the 
supply of natural resources (Dube, 1992). The survival of communities in the basin 
depended to a significant extent on maintaining adaptable lifestyles, marked by 
multiple livelihood and survival strategies deployed in response to changing 
environmental conditions. These have been noted not only for communities 
inhabiting the Nile Basin but also for similar natural resource-dependent agro-
pastoral and pastoral communities in different parts of the world (Burton, 2004; 
Hulme, 2004; Thomas & Twyman, 2005). The livelihood practices of the 
communities are supported by a traditional knowledge system that has evolved 
through accumulated experiences of changing environmental conditions and 
interactions with land use management systems being cited as one example. It is 
this capacity to withstand climatic variations, known as ‘coping range’ or 
‘resilience,’ that has up until now served and saved vulnerable communities from 
climate-change related stresses such as drought and flood.  
5. Information and data sharing
Sharing of information and data on the impact of climate change on water 
resources and the ecology is central in assessing and responding to the 
development needs of basin states as well as in developing effective and 
transparent institutions and cooperation processes. Part of the challenge lies in 
knowing how and where to develop the basin resources in order to maximize the 
benefits for states through more efficient as well as equitable use of resources. 
When it comes to river basin studies in general, much of the data generation and 
exchange to date has focused on flows due to the desire to address problems of 
water management. 
As stated by Nicol (2003), data collection on the Nile River Basin provided the 
thread that wove together early attempts at collaborative development. The same 
author said that such an attempt on its own falls far short of providing a sound 
framework for development and of overcoming differences and disputes between 
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riparian states. This also partly reflects the concern felt by some co-basin states that 
earlier efforts were little more than a distraction from key water allocation issues, a 
stance repeatedly promoted by Ethiopia over a long period.  
The history of collecting data on the Nile is thousands of years old, and testament 
to this is the proliferation of ‘Nilometers’ along the river. However, real and 
concerted data collection and sharing commenced in the 1960s. The first such 
effort was made when some of the riparian states decided to establish the first Nile-
based organization in 1967. Known by its acronym Hydromet (hydro-
meteorological survey of the equatorial lakes), it was established jointly by Egypt, 
Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. As the name itself implies, its original aim 
was to undertake a ‘hydro-meteorological survey of the equatorial lakes,' including 
Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert. The genesis of the organization could be traced 
back to the sudden and unpredictable increase in rainfall in the equatorial lakes 
region in the 1960s, which caused flooding on the shores of the lakes and in the 
wetlands of South Sudan. In order to mitigate recurrences of this and similar 
natural calamities, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) proposed the 
establishment of the Hydromet project and submitted it to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) for funding.  
The main objective of Hydromet was to collect and analyze hydro-meteorological 
data from the equatorial lakes for the purpose of deriving the water balance of the 
White Nile catchment and, possibly, make predictions. All the Nile riparian states 
except Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) joined Hydromet. 
The fact that the objectives of Hydromet failed to include volumetric water 
allocations forced some of the riparian states to distance themselves from the 
organization. In short, as stated by Tafesse (2001b, p. 586), “suspicions and lack of 
trust amongst the Nile riparian states, the non-membership of principal riparian 
states such as Ethiopia and lack of confidence-building measures by the 
downstream states” could be singled out as underlying factors that hindered the 
implementation of most of the planned Hydromet projects. Notwithstanding this 
state of affairs, the organisation managed to generate important climatic and 
hydrologic data for the Nile Basin, most particularly for the equatorial lakes region.  
Hydromet was succeeded by the formation of Undugu (Swahili for ‘brotherhood’) 
in Khartoum in 1983 under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
It drew its members from six Nile riparian states—Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and DRC—and one non-riparian neighbouring state, the Central African 
Republic. Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya opted to distance themselves from the 
grouping and chose, instead, to remain as observers. The objective of the Undugu 
grouping had been to forge cooperation in areas of infrastructure, environmental 
cooperation, culture and trade. As stated by Bram (2000), the grouping was 
disbanded before achieving what it intended. The member states of Undugu had 
spent most of their time in organizing and attending conferences and ministerial 
meetings that bore no fruit in terms of the desired results. In the opinion of this 
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author, the failure of Undugu can be attributed to two factors: (a) the non-inclusion 
of important Nile riparian states and (b) its digression from the central issue of 
water allocation. The grouping has even failed to generate the much-needed 
hydrologic and climatic data for the basin.  
In the early 1990s, the Technical Cooperation Commission for the Promotion and 
Development of the Nile, known as TECCONILE, came into being. TECCONILE 
was formed as an extended version of the previous Hydromet through the 
agreements reached by the Nile Council of Ministers of Water Affairs (Nile-COM) 
in 1992 in Kampala, Uganda. Six of the riparian states, namely DRC, Egypt, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, became members while the remaining four 
opted to participate as observers.  
Like its predecessors, TECCONILE was concerned at first with issues around 
environment and water quality control. Over time, however, an equitable 
entitlement to the Nile waters by the co-basin states was included for the first time 
as an objective, when a Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP) was drafted and 
submitted in May 1995. Despite such a move, not all of the planned projects came 
to fruition mainly because the money that was actually raised was too small to 
cover the cost of the intended projects. It was under these circumstances that 
TECCONILE’s unfinished jobs, particularly the pending projects, were ceded to its 
successor organization, the NBI.  
As a successor to TECCONILE, the NBI was launched in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, in February 1999. The fact that it contained the issue of water allocation 
in its agenda from day one induced the otherwise non-conformist riparian states 
such as Ethiopia to become fully-fledged members. Ethiopia has all along called 
for negotiations on water allocation issues to be included in the cooperation 
process; in effect, they have become sine qua non for participation in the NBI as a 
full member.  
One of the major outcomes of the NBI is the promulgation of the Nile Basin 
Sustainability Framework (NBSF), the aim of which is to realize the shared vision 
sought by the co-basin countries through sustainable actions based on mutually 
agreed policies, strategies and guidelines that focus on identified priorities. Of the 
many priorities and key strategic directions included in the NBSF, one is related to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Now, more than ever, all riparian 
countries have created awareness about what the changing global climate means 
for them as sovereign nations and co-basin states. That is why all the basin 
countries have opened climate change monitoring offices of some sort and are 
planning to include both mitigation and adaptation measures. The problem that still 
bedevils the basin is the absence of a basin-wide response strategy and lack of 
information sharing to address climate change and climate variability related 
issues. NBI and its component organizations are making efforts to bring basin-wide 
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research together in an integrated way and, more importantly, to provide a vehicle 
for connecting science with policy and strategy development at a regional level.   
Outcomes and actions associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation 
focus on gathering and disseminating basin-wide information, and on providing the 
urgently needed regional connection between science and policy-makers so as to 
enable the formulation of coordinated and cooperative response strategies at a 
regional level. Efforts are now being made to give responsibility to the NBI to 
focus and facilitate cooperation among Nile Basin states in water-related mitigation 
and adaptation measures to climate change. Such a move will assist the states to 
harmonize approaches to addressing climate change, enhance climate and water 
resource data collection and processing, identify measures to increase climate 
change adaptation capacities, and promote sharing and dissemination of 
information on the impacts of climate change on water resources and the ecology.  
6. Implications of the study for pastoralists in the Horn of Africa 
As stated by Oxfam International (2008), pastoralists in the Horn of Africa face 
four major challenges that hinder their livelihood and stifle their adaptation 
capacities. These are climate change, political and economic marginalization, 
inappropriate development policies and increasing resource competition. Of these 
challenges, we will briefly discuss climate change. 
According to data obtained from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) (quoted in Hartman, 2009), climate projections in the Horn of Africa for 
2080-2090 predict a 3.2 OC temperature rise and a 7 percent increase in rainfall. In 
the short run, i.e. 10-15 years from now, pastoralists could be exposed to 
successive poor rains, an increase in drought-related shocks but also unpredictably 
heavy rainfall. When pastoralists are exposed to rains that are far below the norm 
for successive years, pasture availability shrinks and regeneration potential 
becomes very low (Oxfam, 2008). Frequent droughts could deter the rebuilding of 
pastoralists’ assets, including their livestock. Lastly, the heavy rains would damage 
crops and kill livestock.  
Pastoralists employ various coping strategies to mitigate and, if possible, overcome 
the impacts of climate change. It is much more effective to strengthen pastoralists’ 
indigenous adaptation strategies and coping mechanisms to mitigate the impacts of 
climate change among the pastoralists of the Horn of Africa (Nassef et al., 2009). 
Pastoralism receives little or no attention by policy-makers and development 
interventionists or is subject to inappropriate policies that do not allow it to 
function properly. It is high time for policy-makers, governments and non-
governmental organizations to pay special attention to pastoralism with the 
intention of integrating their indigenous coping strategies and traditional 
knowledge into natural disaster management plans (Oba, 2001). 
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Since pastoralists such as the Nuer in South Sudan, and some others in the Great 
Lakes Region depend on the Nile directly or indirectly, the impacts of climate 
change in the basin will have some effects on the livelihood of pastoralists. In order 
to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, one needs to strengthen the 
coping capacities and resilience of pastoral communities living in the Horn of 
Africa. This could be done if policy-makers, governments and non-governmental 
organizations give due recognition to traditional knowledge. If the latter is 
dovetailed with ‘modern’ information sharing and exchange, it could strengthen the 
adaptive lifestyles or survival strategies of pastoralists enabling them to cope with 
adverse climatic extremes, such as recurrent droughts and floods. 
Some lessons can be learnt from the NBI that could be helpful in data and 
information sharing on climate change impacts, regional response strategies and 
adaptive capacities. In the opinion of this author, it is high time for institutions or 
organizations or ministries that are responsible for pastoral affairs in the Horn of 
Africa to establish what one may call ‘Pastoral Societies Initiative for the Horn’ 
(PSIH). Information sharing, as used in the strengthening of the adaptive capacities 
and mitigation strategies of pastoralists to the impacts of climate change, can be 
facilitated by PSIH in two ways. Firstly, the Initiative could be given a mandate to 
collect time series regional data and information on climate and hydrology, analyze 
them by using statistical techniques, such as moving average, and make prediction 
for some years to come. Such an exercise could help in preparing pastoralists to 
mitigate and if possible withstand extreme weather conditions, such as droughts or 
floods.   
Secondly, PSIH could also undertake studies on the ways and means by which 
traditional or indigenous knowledge of pastoralists can be used to predict, mitigate 
and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The synergy that comes out of the two 
study results (traditional and modern) can enable pastoralists to employ more 
effective response strategies and mitigation measures to alleviate the impacts of 
climate change on their livelihoods.  
The study results produced by specific countries and PSIH on climate change 
impacts, adaptation strategies and mitigation measures in the Horn of Africa could 
also inform policy-makers to look for mutually agreed policies, strategies and 
guidelines on climate change mitigation and adaptation in the region. In short, the 
study results by PSIH can improve policy makers’ and practitioners’ understanding 
of pastoral production systems, indigenous knowledge and adaptive lifestyles of 
pastoralists that enable them to cope up with extreme climatic patterns.              
7. Conclusions 
This study has discussed the existence of extreme variability in climate between 
upstream and downstream countries in the Nile Basin. The former are characterized 
by high rainfall and wetness, the latter by aridity and semi-aridity. Data-sharing 
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and better forecasting ability within the basin have been necessitated by the rainfall 
variability and climate change that has characterized the basin for the past five 
decades. The impacts of climate change have been vividly demonstrated by 
fluctuations in Nile flows and by the rise and fall of water levels in the series of 
lakes found in the basin. While the mid-1960s and late-1990s were characterized 
by huge amounts of rainfall, leading to rises in lake levels and flooding, the 1970s 
and 1980s were drier periods with much reduced lake levels. Interestingly, the 
anomalies in climatic patterns necessitated the establishment of Hydromet in 1967.   
Due to population increases and the impacts of climate change on water resources, 
the upstream countries insist time and again on changing the status quo in as far as 
usage of the water resources of the Nile is concerned. In so doing, they are, in 
effect, calling for a fair and equitable utilization of the Nile’s water resources. 
Naturally, the upstream demands have not been welcomed by downstream 
countries. Such unwillingness has brought about a stalemate in the area with the 
‘Cooperative Framework Agreement’ (CFA) still awaiting ratification by all 
concerned parties. Be that as it may, institutions at the national and regional levels, 
and the communities at large, should pay particular attention to the changing 
circumstances in the basin and beyond. In the face of climate change, communities 
depending on the Nile Basin should be encouraged to strengthen their adaptive 
lifestyles, survival strategies and traditional knowledge in order to cope with 
adverse climatic situations.  
If traditional climate change adaptation mechanisms are combined with ‘modern’ 
information/data sharing and exchange, there is a good possibility to build 
resilience and to mitigate the impacts of adverse climatic situations. The NBSF that 
has been adopted by the Nile riparian states is geared towards this purpose. It aims 
at developing basin-wide response strategies and information sharing to address 
climate change and its impacts on communities. The sharing of climate and water 
resources data in the basin will help the states to harmonize the various approaches 
used to address climate change. It will also help to enhance the capacity of local 
communities to cope with the impacts of climate change. Notwithstanding its 
importance, there is still a long way to go in terms of data sharing and information 
exchange among Nile Basin states. In order to fill such a gap, it is recommended to 
build synergy via three-tiered information sources, namely local communities, 
national water and water-related institutions, and regional bodies such as the NBI 
and the upcoming Nile Basin Commission (NBC).  
Since some pastoralists in the Horn of Africa are dependent on the Nile directly or 
indirectly, the impacts of climate change in the basin can have some effects on 
their livelihoods. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change on 
pastoral communities, one needs to strengthen the coping capacities and the 
resilience of people inhabiting the peripheral areas of the Horn of Africa. This 
could be done if policy-makers, governments and non-governmental organizations 
give due recognition to traditional knowledge. If the latter is dovetailed with 
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‘modern’ information sharing and exchange, it could strengthen the adaptive 
lifestyles and survival strategies of pastoralists.      
The author believes that it is high time for institutions that are responsible for 
pastoral affairs in the Horn of Africa to establish a regional body that will be 
responsible to garner climate change related issues to pastoralists. It could serve as 
a think-tank that will be involved in the study of both traditional and ‘modern’ 
climate change impact and adaptation strategies. The regional body could also 
inform policy-makers to look for mutually agreed policies, strategies and 
guidelines on climate change mitigation and adaptation in the region. 
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Fighting in the Rain: Monthly Rainfall Extremes and Social 
Unrest in Africa 
Todd G. Smith1
Abstract
Over the past two decades, studies in the environmental security literature have 
examined the relationship between rainfall variation and conflict outcomes in an 
attempt to better understand potential future consequences of climate change on 
political stability. The literature, however, has yet to converge on a consensus 
about the nature of the relationship or the causal pathways involved. Case-based 
studies have presented several potential mechanisms but lacked generalizability 
while empirical studies have focused almost exclusively on international or civil 
war onset as the dependent variable to the exclusion of other types of conflict. In 
this paper I advance the literature in two significant ways. First, using the newly 
released Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD), I broaden the commonly used 
definition of conflict to include strikes, riots, demonstrations and communal 
conflict, both violent and non-violent. Second, I use deviations in monthly rainfall 
patterns as the independent variable rather than annual aggregates as used by 
earlier empirical studies. This is more appropriate because: (1) climate scientists 
predict increased intra-annual rainfall variability and more frequent extreme 
events – droughts and floods; and (2) changes in historically established rainfall 
patterns can negatively affect agricultural productivity in African countries reliant 
on rain-fed agriculture. I find that, on the continental scale, receiving overly 
abundant rainfall in a given month significantly and substantially increases the 
likelihood of social conflict, but receiving too little rain does not seem to have such 
an effect, at least in the short-term. When the analysis is limited to the nine 
countries of IGAD and EAC, the significant effect of too much rain disappears and 
receiving too little rain actually reduces the likelihood of unrest. I argue that 
receiving too much or too little rain leads to conflict through distinctly different 
causal mechanisms. Additional research using this approach complemented by 
case study investigations is needed to illuminate causal mechanisms between 
rainfall variability and conflict. 
1. Introduction
The dramatic political tumult in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in early 2011 has quite 
clearly demonstrated how social or political unrest can be politically destabilizing 
and can quickly spread throughout an entire region. While decades of political 
repression undoubtedly created conditions ripe for revolution, worsening economic 
conditions in the recent past clearly played an important role in triggering the 
1 This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U. S. Army Research Laboratory 
and the U. S. Army Research Office under contract/grant number W911NF-09-1-0077. 
Climate Change and Pastoralism
272
downfall of long-tenured autocratic rulers. Among the economic woes cited by the 
populations involved are rising food prices that place increasing pressure on 
limited resources. Furthermore, at least major international agenda-setter, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as prominent members of the media 
have connected these rising food prices to climatological events around the world 
in the past year–wildfires that destroyed Russian wheat crops, floods in Australia 
and Pakistan, and droughts in Argentina, Eastern Europe and China (Helbling & 
Roache, 2011; Krugman, 2011). It is this, admittedly tenuous, connection that has 
led some to publicly question whether the future effects of climate change might 
lead to an increase in political instability. Rising food prices, however, might have 
more to do with rising oil prices and market speculation than distant climate events, 
and the global financial crisis of the past few years is more likely the underlying 
source of much of the economic difficulty in these countries. These competing 
views need to be investigated thoroughly, and while past research has shed some 
light on the issue it is far from settled (Gleditsch, 1998; Salehyan, 2008). 
In this paper I attempt to determine the extent to which changes in monthly rainfall 
lead to social unrest. In so doing, I contribute to the existing literature in two 
significant ways. First, I use a new dataset, the Social Conflict in Africa Database 
(SCAD) that expands the definition of conflict by including strikes, protests, 
demonstrations, riots and other episodes of low-level conflict that may or may not 
be violent. This differs from the often-used indicator of armed conflict onset; i.e. 
conflict between rival armed groups, at least one of which is a government and that 
requires a certain threshold of battle deaths (either 25 or 1,000) to be considered. 
Second, I examine the relationship on a much shorter time scale than previously 
investigated. Existing studies in this field focus either on changes in annual 
precipitation totals, which are expected to increase at the high end and decrease at 
the low end, or on the occurrence of drought within a given year. In contrast, I 
focus on deviations in monthly rainfall totals for two reasons. First, climate 
scientists predict increased intra-annual–i.e. seasonal and monthly–variation in 
rainfall and an increase in the frequency and magnitude of hydrometeorological 
extreme events–droughts and floods. Second, changes in rainfall generally affect 
people in less than a year. That is, floods impact populations within days or weeks 
rather than years and crops fail by season, often within weeks (although the effects 
of drought are certainly more extended as will be discussed below). 
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. The first section 
develops a theoretical perspective on the environmental scarcity literature as well 
as the subset relating to rainfall. In this section potential causal pathways leading 
from droughts and floods to social conflict are outlined, although these specific 
causal linkages are not explicitly tested in this study. The second section explains 
the analytical framework including the SCAD, the monthly rainfall deviation data 
and the statistical methods employed. The third section presents the findings and a 
discussion of their potential implications for future research. 
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2. Theoretical perspective 
Climate change is a reality. Even if the world succeeds in limiting the increase in 
global average temperature to two degrees Celsius–the target set in Copenhagen in 
December 2009 and widely regarded to be overly optimistic–the world will 
undoubtedly experience a host of changes to natural systems that will affect human 
societies in a number of ways (Busby, 2010). Chief among these natural 
consequences are: sea-level rise and inundation of low-lying coastal areas; 
increasing variability in access to renewable resources–primarily fresh water and 
arable land; increased frequency and magnitude of hydrometeorological extreme 
events (Buhaug, et al., 2009; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2011; IPCC, 2007). In some 
areas these consequences might be beneficial to human societies. For example, 
parts of northern Europe and Canada may become warmer and more suitable for 
agriculture, at least in the short term (Parry, et al., 2004). 
In other areas, however, these natural consequences will likely lead to new 
challenges and, potentially, to conflict or political instability. In this article I leave 
aside sea-level rise as a long-term challenge to a significant but limited segment of 
the population and focus on consequences associated with changes in rainfall 
patterns–variability in access to renewable resources and increased frequency of 
extreme events (droughts and floods), both of which are driven by deviations from 
historically typical rainfall patterns. Rainfall deviations are likely to be more 
frequent and extreme in a changing climate, but they have occurred in the past and 
the effects of those past occurrences are useful for predicting the potential 
consequences of future deviations. At the extremes, too much rainfall can lead to 
devastating floods, while too little can lead to debilitating drought. More moderate 
changes, however, can also have disruptive effects. In rural areas, changing 
patterns can impact agricultural practices that depend on rainfall in adequate 
amounts at particular times of the year. Urban centers can be left struggling with 
chronic shortages of available water or can find their water management systems 
overwhelmed, especially in informal settlements that already lack adequate water 
supply, sanitation and drainage infrastructure. 
Africa as a continent is particularly vulnerable to climate change and changing 
rainfall patterns for a number of reasons (Boko et al., 2007; Collier, et al., 2008a). 
First, poor infrastructure leaves African populations unable to store water from 
rainy periods for use during dry periods. The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) estimates that only 5.9% of the cultivated land in Africa is equipped for 
irrigation and, if Egypt–where nearly 100 percent of cultivated land is irrigated – is 
excluded from the calculations, then that estimate drops to 4.5% (Food & 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2010). Second, Africa is home to 30 of the 31 
lowest ranking countries on the Human Development Index of the United Nations 
Development Programme and 37 of the 53 African countries are categorized as 
Low Human Development (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2010). 
Low levels of development can multiply the effects of hydrometeorological events 
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on African populations. A flood that would be a minor problem in a developed 
country can have devastating effects on a population that is already on the edge. 
Third, 33 African countries rank in the bottom half across all six of the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators, and another seven rank in the bottom on five 
out of the six (The World Bank, 2010). Poor governance and limited institutional 
capacity severely hamper the ability of governments to respond to 
hydrometeorological events or to adapt to the expected consequences of climate 
change. All of these factors combine to create an ‘ingenuity gap’ that makes 
African countries less able to develop infrastructure, institutions and economies 
that are resilient against changing rainfall patterns (Homer-Dixon, 2000). 
2.1 Environmental scarcity 
Early literature on environmental scarcity was broadly focused on how 
environmental degradation or change can lead to acute conflict. Homer-Dixon 
identified environmental change as ‘only one of three main sources of scarcity of 
renewable resources; the others are population growth and unequal social 
distribution of resources’ (Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 8). He argued that increasingly 
limited access to resources such as water, arable land and forests due to any or all 
of these sources of scarcity can lead either to conflict between states over shared 
resources or to insurrection against the state because of increased popular 
grievances combined with diminished state capacity. Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) 
reclassified Homer-Dixon’s sources of resource scarcity as three ‘dimensions’ of 
the concept of environmental scarcity: supply-induced scarcity associated with 
dwindling stocks of environmental resources; demand-induced scarcity created by 
increased consumption or population pressure; structural scarcity, the inequitable 
distribution or control of existing resources. 
The early literature focused on a myriad of independent variables associated with 
supply-induced scarcities, while also attempting to control for demand-induced and 
structural scarcities. The specified causal mechanisms were extremely complex and 
involved an array of intervening variables, including decreased agricultural 
production, decreased economic activity, migration, political regime type, 
demographic structure, trade openness, level of development and urbanization. The 
empirical findings were also mixed. Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) found that 
deforestation, increased land degradation and reduced freshwater availability all led 
to an increased likelihood of conflict, while Etsy et al. (2004) found that 
environmental change was not directly linked to state failure. Theisen (2008) is 
unable to replicate the findings of Hauge and Ellingsen and, like Etsy et al., finds 
very little support for a link between environmental resource scarcity and violent 
internal conflict. He argues that the complexity of causal mechanisms specified by 
Homer-Dixon and the lack of a direct link between environmental scarcities and 
conflict make large-N studies difficult while case study-based approaches are 
plagued by problems of selecting on the dependent variable. Additionally, he 
argues that aggregation to the national level is often a challenge when linking 
localized scarcities to wider conflicts (Theisen, 2008). 
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Later studies focused more narrowly on the demand-induced scarcities–population 
pressure–either alone (Urdal, 2005) or in combination with supply-induced 
scarcities–environmental degradation; they have found limited, if any, support for a 
connection to violent conflict (Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). At least one study has 
found robust support for the hypothesis that large population and low economic 
development increase the risk of civil war, especially in combination with political 
variables, but no support for the proposition that scarcity of environmental 
resources increases the risk of civil war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). 
Still other studies have found empirical evidence for connections between resource 
abundance and conflict (de Soysa, 2002) and between greater environmental 
exploitation and an absence of conflict (Binningsbø, et al., 2007). These findings 
are more relevant to structural scarcities. This line of inquiry is closely aligned with 
the so-called ‘greed and grievance’ literature, which investigates the relative 
importance of structural inequalities as determinants of civil war (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2008b). These structural inequalities may include 
access to resource wealth, political rights and ethnic and religious divisions.2
2.2 Droughts and floods: Causal pathways to conflict 
Water is perhaps the most important environmental resource and is naturally 
renewed by the process of evapotranspiration and precipitation. Variability in 
rainfall has been an attractive dependent variable in the environmental scarcity 
literature because it generates supply-induced scarcities–limited freshwater 
availability and decreased agricultural production–and is generally not endogenous 
with demand-induced and structural scarcities, as are deforestation and soil 
degradation. In other words, rainfall variability is generally not affected by human 
activities, with the exception of anthropogenic climate change.3
Before investigating causal pathways from rainfall variability to conflict, one must 
recognize that there are qualitative differences between too much and too little 
rainfall. On the one hand, negative or dry deviations–too little rainfall–lead to 
droughts, which are slow-onset events. On the other, positive or wet deviations–too 
much rainfall–generally lead to floods, which are swift-onset events. This is, 
however, not always the case. Floods can destroy crops and lead to the same food 
shortage effects as droughts, while droughts can produce conditions conducive to 
wildfires, swift-onset events with similar destructive impacts as floods. In large 
part, however, too much rain has much more immediate effects than too little. 
2 For a thorough discussion of the environmental scarcity literature see Buhaug, H., Gleditsch, N. P. 
G. & Theisen, O. M. (2009). Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conﬂict. The Social 
Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World, 75. 
3  Some studies have found a connection between environmental degradation and local weather 
patterns. For example, there is some scientific evidence that deforestation on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro altered weather patterns, including rainfall, in the surrounding area. See Fairman Jr., J. 
G., Nair, U. S., Christopher, S. A., & Mölg, T. (2011). Land use change impacts on regional climate 
over Kilimanjaro. Journal of Geophysical Research, 116(D3).
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Whether either type of event rises to the level of a disaster depends on the 
resilience of the population affected and the response of appropriate institutions. 
For the remainder of this article, the use of the term disaster implies that, unless a 
climate-related event has some serious negative impacts on a society, or portion 
thereof, it will likely not have conflict-inducing effects. 
Setting aside conceptual subtleties in resource scarcity, slow- and swift-onset 
disasters have distinctly different causal mechanisms leading to conflict. As a slow-
onset disaster, drought has many of the same characteristics as broader 
environmental degradation. Swift-onset disasters, such as flooding, create more 
acute shortages of basic necessities. 
2.2.1 Swift-onset disasters: In a broad study of the effects of natural disasters on 
conflict, Nel and Righarts (2008) distinguish between the ways in which swift- and 
slow-onset disasters can alter the motive, incentive and opportunity of actors and 
give rise to violent conflict. Swift-onset disasters, they argue, decimate the 
population’s means of survival and create widespread suffering that leads to acute 
competition for scarce resources. At the same time, the state’s capacity to respond 
is tested and its legitimacy may be questioned, if that response is considered to be 
inadequate. The state may also be challenged if it is perceived to be responsible for 
underlying conditions that contributed to the disaster. In contrast, slow-onset 
disasters, typically drought and famine, have longer-term, structural effects more 
similar to environmental degradation. Increased inequality in access to resources 
can lead to increased poverty and rising income inequality. This may, in turn, 
create resentment against the state and can weaken institutions. Ultimately, the 
authors find that swift-onset disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil 
conflict (Nel & Righarts, 2008). 
In the context of earthquakes, Brancati (2007) argues that swift-onset disasters 
increase the potential for intrastate conflict because they increase scarcities in 
‘basic, life-sustaining resources (e.g., food, water, and housing).’ She also draws on 
relative deprivation theory to argue that these scarcities create feelings of 
frustration and desperation among affected populations ‘when they are denied 
material benefits that they once had in the past or that other groups have over them 
and respond to these situations through anger and violence.’ She further claims that 
relative deprivation theories are particularly relevant to earthquakes because they 
‘do not generally affect all groups equally and individuals commonly blame 
government leaders for natural disasters regardless of whether they are actually 
responsible for them’ (Brancati, 2007, p. 722). 
Floods, like earthquakes, do not affect all populations equally and can be 
exacerbated or ameliorated by existing infrastructure. Dams and flood control 
systems can protect populated areas when resources are available to construct and 
maintain them. But the physical vulnerability to flood of millions of urban poor in 
African cities is, in fact, amplified because the informal settlements in which they 
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live are often situated in low-lying areas, flood plains and river basins, and are 
often awash with sewage after even moderate rains that have little discernable 
impact on other urban areas. 
2.2.2 Slow-onset disasters: In contrast to the acute shortages and resulting 
tensions associated with swift-onset events, slow-onset events–i.e. drought, famine, 
desertification and changing patterns of arable land–lead to conflict through 
structural changes in (1) how populations are distributed geographically or (2) how 
resources are allocated amongst populations. The former can be characterized as 
migration mechanisms, while the latter are referred to as economic mechanisms. 
These are not separate and distinct categories; rather, they are often interrelated. 
Migration mechanisms 
Migration mechanisms involve any movement of people from one location to 
another and can be grouped into the following sub-categories: rural-to-urban 
migration, regional migration, and international migration. Rural-to-urban 
migration involves the movement of vulnerable rural populations, particularly 
those reliant on subsistence rain-fed agriculture, to urban centers in search of 
alternative livelihoods after their crops and/or livestock have been decimated by 
environmental shocks. This can lead to resource competition and/or ethnic tension 
between newcomers and existing residents. In cities with public service sectors 
already under stress, the growth of informal settlements–i.e. slums–can lead to 
tension between different groups of slum-dwellers over housing and other 
resources, between slum-dwellers and the government over delivery of public 
services, or between slum-dwellers and other urban residents in the form of 
increased criminal activity (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2011; Theisen, et al., 2009). 
While this type of population pressure might not be as acute as the displacement 
resulting from a swift-onset disaster such as flood, it can have similar detrimental 
consequences and conflict outcomes. Furthermore, rural-to-urban migration can 
either be within individual countries or it can involve movement to cities outside of 
the country of origin. 
The traditional movement of pastoralist groups who travel from area to area in 
order to graze and water their livestock is characterized as regional migration. 
When decreasing rainfall leads to increasingly scarce water sources and grazing 
areas, pastoralist groups are forced to venture farther and farther outside of their 
traditional migration routes. This can lead to competition between pastoralist 
groups over the same water sources or pasturelands or to conflict between 
pastoralist groups and agriculturalists who already reside in areas into which 
pastoralists are encroaching (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2011; Meier et al., 2007; 
Theisen et al, 2009). In contrast to scarcity-induced conflict, Meier et al. (2007) 
argue that overly abundant rainfall can also lead to increased cattle raids amongst 
pastoralist groups because cows fattened on fertile pasture are more attractive 
prizes and high grasses provide more cover for raiders. Just as above, regional 
pastoralist movements can be either within individual countries or across 
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international boundaries. For example, the Karamoja triangle, which includes parts 
of northwestern Kenya, northeastern Uganda, South Sudan and southwestern 
Ethiopia, is home to several pastoralist groups, among them the Karamajong, 
Turkana, Teso, Toposa and Jiye. While some of these groups may reside more in 
some countries than others–e.g. the Karamajong in Uganda and the Turkana in 
Kenya–they largely do not respect national borders and migrate according to where 
they can find sufficient water and pasture. 
International migration includes both of the above types as well the movement of 
people between cities and areas in different countries for a variety of reasons, 
including direct environmental scarcity such as water shortages, or economic stress 
driven by environmental conditions, including changing rainfall patterns. This type 
of migration is closely related to or is the direct result of the economic mechanisms 
discussed below.4
Economic mechanisms 
Economic mechanisms include increasing food prices or general economic decline. 
Some have argued that food prices can be driven up because of failed crops in 
times of drought, which can, in turn, lead to conflict between urban consumers and 
rural producers. Increased food prices can also lead to unrest through increased 
pressure on the resources of urban populations (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2011; 
Theisen et al., 2009). While demonstrations over increasing food prices–so-called 
food riots–have been observed on several occasions over the last few years, it is 
less clear whether rising food prices are the result of failing rains or are the 
consequence of structural changes in the global food system, including population 
growth, changing preferences of consumers in developing countries toward more 
meat-intensive diets and the diversion of much of the world’s corn/maize crop to 
the production of bio-fuels. 
The economies of many African countries are highly dependent on agriculture 
either for domestic consumption or for export to international markets. In 2005, the 
average agriculture value added as a percentage of GDP was 23.72% (The World 
Bank, 2011) and, as noted above, only 4.5% of agricultural land in Africa, 
excluding Egypt, is irrigated. Consequently, failed rains can quickly and easily lead 
to a general decline in national economic output. This can, in turn, lead to unrest 
over the lack of economic opportunities within the general population. 
Alternatively, individuals employed in the agriculture sector, as farmers or 
otherwise, may migrate to other countries or regions in search of alternative 
livelihoods after such a decline. This can, in turn, lead to conflict in the ways 
discussed above. In this way, economic and migration mechanisms are often 
interrelated and difficult to differentiate. Figure 1 illustrates many of these potential 
causal mechanisms. 
4 For a thorough discussion of the potential impacts of climate change on migration and conflict see 
Raleigh, C., Jordan, L. & Salehyan, I. (2008). Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration 
and Conflict. World Bank Seminar on Exploring the Social Dimensions of Climate Change.
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Figure 1: Potential causal pathways from rainfall variability to social conflict 
2.3 Rainfall variability and conflict: Prior research 
Studies relying on these causal pathways have employed a variety of methods and 
datasets, and generated mixed results. The methods and findings of these studies 
are summarized in Table 1. 
In perhaps the only study that sheds light on causal mechanisms, Miguel et al. 
(2004) innovatively use annual rainfall as an instrumental variable for economic 
growth, which they find is strongly negatively correlated with the risk of civil 
conflict in Africa. For the dependent variable they used the Armed Conflict Dataset 
(ACD) from the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo and the University 
of Uppsala (PRIO/Uppsala), which codes for conflict between two armed parties, 
at least one of which is a government, which result in a minimum of 25 battle 
deaths. They use rainfall data from the Global Precipitation Climatology Project 
(GPCP) aggregated annually. 
Levy et al. (2005) conducted a logistic regression analysis of the effect of rainfall– 
measured with the Weighted Anomaly Standardized Precipitation index (WASP) 
aggregated annually–on the risk of civil war, using the ACD data. They used grid 
cells of 2.5 degree latitude by 2.5 degree longitude rather than countries for their 
analysis, but they applied buffers of varying sizes to the conflict events and 
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trimmed them to national boundaries. Ultimately they find ‘a strong relationship 
between rainfall deviations, lagged one year, and the likelihood of high-intensity 
conflict outbreak’ (Levy et al., 2005, p. 17). 
Hendrix and Glaser (2007) again use the PRIO/Uppsala data and an annual time 
unit. They used the GPCP data to develop their independent variables: the 
percentage change in rainfall from the previous year, which they called a rainfall 
trigger, and dummy variables for one and two standard deviations from mean 
annual rainfall. They find some evidence to support the hypothesis that ‘lagged 
measures of increased (decreased) rainfall are negatively (positively) associated 
with the risk of civil war onset’ (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007, p. 700). 
In their analysis of sub-national localized drought, political exclusion and civil war, 
Theisen et al. (2009) use a 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid cell and the PRIO/Uppsala 
armed conflict data. Their independent variable is the occurrence of drought as 
defined using the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI6), which ‘measures 
negative deviation from normal rainfall during the six preceding months’ (Theisen 
et al., 2009, p. 13). This indicator codes annually for the occurrence of no drought, 
moderate drought, severe drought or extreme drought. Although they find evidence 
to support the hypothesis that political exclusion increases the likelihood of civil 
war onset, they find no correlation between drought and civil war. 
Finally, Hendrix and Salehyan (2011) use the occurrence of social conflict rather 
than civil war as their dependent variable. They have developed an the innovative 
new SCAD which records events of low level social conflict–e.g. strikes, protests, 
riots and communal conflict–rather than conflict between two armed groups 
resulting in at least 25 battle deaths. Their independent variable is standardized 
rainfall deviation, which they calculated by dividing each year’s deviation from the 
long-term (1979–2008) annual mean by the long-term standard deviation. They 
find evidence to support the hypothesis that both positive and negative deviations 
from mean annual rainfall increase the likelihood of social conflict. They further 
find that this relationship is strongest for violent events and that positive deviations 
in rainfall lead to the largest increase in the likelihood of social conflict. 
Although most of the studies referenced above use a country-year unit of analysis, 
two of them geographically disaggregate countries to grid-cells along lines of 
latitude and longitude. Such disaggregation is undoubtedly a valuable contribution 
because it captures structural differences between areas within countries. Structural 
differences that might have a bearing on the occurrence of conflict include 
population density, rural and urban dynamics, demographic and ethnic 
composition, dominant economic activities, topographic and floristic 
characteristics, and differences in rainfall patterns that are certainly not the same 
across countries.
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All of the above studies, however, interrogate the correlation between annually 
aggregated rainfall measures and the occurrence of conflict within the 
corresponding or subsequent year. This is perhaps due to the nature of available 
conflict data, but it fails to capture a number of important dynamics. First, climate 
scientists predict that intra-annual rainfall variability will increase in many areas; 
that is, the difference between annual high and low extremes and the monthly 
variance are expected to increase (Meehl, 2005; Räisänen, 2002, 2005; Tebaldi et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, seasonal discontinuities from historic patterns are likely to 
be more important than annual deviations because farmers have particular 
expectations for timing and amounts of rainfall. When monthly, and even weekly, 
rainfall deviates from these historically established patterns, it is likely to be more 
disruptive than deviations in annual totals. Not to discount local resourcefulness, it 
may be possible for farmers to alter planting times or make some very short-term 
adaptations. Still, repeated months with significantly below normal rainfall are 
likely to have negative consequences on seasonal yields. Second, as discussed 
above in the context of swift-onset disaster, individual months with extreme 
amounts of rainfall can be extremely destabilizing as people are displaced from 
their homes and animals and crops are killed in a matter of hours or days. These 
short-term shocks are likely to be captured in monthly data but may not be 
observable in annual rainfall totals. Third, individual and group behavior may not 
be consistent throughout the year. For psychological and physiological reasons, 
people are likely to behave differently during different times and seasons of the 
year. As will be shown below, this holds true for the proclivity to unrest. While 
using annually aggregated measures may balance out many of these intra-annual or 
seasonal differences, it may also fail to capture important factors that facilitate or 
mitigate unrest. 
3. Methods and evidence 
3.1 Hypothesis
Given this theoretical grounding and evidence from previous studies, my 
hypotheses in this study are stated as follows: 
H1a:  Countries experiencing overly abundant rainfall in a given month will 
be more likely to experience social unrest in the same month. 
H1b: Consecutive months of overly abundant rainfall within a country will 
increase the likelihood of social unrest in that country. 
H2a: Countries experiencing overly sparse rainfall in a given month will be 
more likely to experience social unrest in the same month. 
H2b:  Consecutive months of overly sparse rainfall within a country will 
increase the likelihood of social unrest in that country. 
3.2 Unit of analysis 
I use country-months as the unit of analysis. The reasons for the monthly time 
frame are discussed thoroughly above and this innovation is an important 
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consideration in examining the potential future effects of climate change on social 
conflict. Researchers differ over the appropriate geographic unit of analysis. As 
discussed above, sub-national disaggregation can capture important structural 
differences between areas within a country. Similarly, difference in terrain, 
vegetation and bodies of water mean that the distribution of rainfall is not equal 
across countries. This has led some researchers to look for disaggregated rainfall 
effects (Levy et al., 2005; Theisen et al., 2009). Notwithstanding these important 
sub-national differences, potential violent actors are mobile; they can direct their 
action at strategic targets wherever they are located (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007). 
Similarly, potential demonstrators stage their protests where they can be most 
effective. To the extent possible, the events in SCAD have been geolocated, so it 
may be possible to perform a geographically disaggregated analysis. But nearly one 
third (32.7%) of all events are located in the capital city while another 21.1% are 
located in other major cities. Obviously, rainfall does not follow a similar pattern. 
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Dependent variable: social unrest: Following the model of Hendrix and 
Salehyan (2011), I focus in this study on social conflict rather than the more 
narrow armed conflict data used in most other studies. I use the newly released 
SCAD (Hendrix et al., 2010), which includes data on over 6,300 occurrences of 
demonstrations, strikes or riots in 47 African countries between 1990 and 2009. 
These events are categorized by type–i.e. demonstration, riot, strike, pro- or anti-
government violence, extra- or intra-government violence–by actors involved and 
targeted, and by motivating issue(s). These events were compiled from Associated 
Press and Agence France Presse news reports, the major English- and French-
language news services. 
Although the underlying data are the same, I operationalized the data differently 
than Hendrix and Salehyan (2011). While they were interested in the total number 
of each type of event in a given year, I focus on whether a given country is in a 
state of social unrest in a given month; that is, whether a country experienced any 
potentially politically destabilizing event in a given month regardless of number or 
specific type. I recoded the SCAD event data as a set of binary variables, one for 
each type of event (listed above) to indicate whether such an event occurred in a 
given country in a given month.5 The indicators included in this study are: (1) the 
occurrence of any social unrest, nonviolent or violent; (2) the occurrence of non-
violent unrest; (3) the occurrence of violent unrest. 
This methodology has some distinct benefits. First, it avoids the problem of 
determining whether separate events are truly distinct or simply expressions of the 
same grievance on different occasions. Second, while it is undeniable that some 
occurrences of unrest are more severe than others, this methodology removes the 
5 Indicator variables were also generated for whether an event occurred that involved each of the 
issues or targets in SCAD, but these variables were not used in this study. 
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need to make that judgment. One potential source of bias, however, is that events 
lasting only a few days may appear in two separate months while other events 
lasting several days or even weeks may appear in only a single month. This is of 
minimal concern, however, because less than 1.3% of the events (85 events) in 
SCAD are seven days or less and span the end of one month and the beginning of 
another. In contrast, 63% of the events (3,983) are single-day events.  
I should note that this definition of social unrest does not include any normative 
judgment. Included events are not necessarily negative, if they are the legitimate 
expression of popular opinions or demands and existing institutions, political and 
social, are resilient enough to withstand or adapt to such opinions or demands. For 
example, a political demonstration can lead to improved human rights, if the 
government is responsive to the will of the people, or a labor strike can lead to 
better working conditions, if the target company ultimately gives in to employee 
demands. Still, these events are potentially destabilizing and indicate that some 
segment of the population bears some grievance against the government or another 
group. Furthermore, as discussed later, continued non-violent unrest can increase 
the likelihood of violence. 
Figure 2: Social unrest in Africa by month 
An examination of the distribution of violent and non-violent events reveals that 
the likelihood of unrest in African countries is not equal across the months of the 
year. Figure 2 shows that, across the continent as a whole, violent unrest is least 
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likely in August and most likely in May. Furthermore, this is a statistically 
significant difference. Upon closer examination of regional variation (Figure 3), it 
appears that this difference is most pronounced in coastal west Africa but is also 
discernible, at least in part, across north Africa and the Sahel to east Africa and the 
Horn; in other words the northern hemisphere, where August is generally the peak 
of summer.6 These monthly behavioural differences were not, however, further 
dealt with in this study, except to control for months of the year in the final 
analysis. Nonetheless, it is an example of the type of behavioral inconsistency 
across months that could potentially be misattributed to others factors, if not 
recognized.
Figure 3: Social unrest in Africa by month and region 
3.3.2 Independent variable: wet and dry months: The independent variable of 
primary interest is rainfall deviation from monthly norms. This was developed 
using data from the GPCP (Adler et al, 2003; "Global Precipitation Climatology 
6 One might interpret this to mean that people are less likely to strike, demonstrate or riot when it is 
hot outside. This is somewhat in contrast with early research into the effect of temperature on riots in 
the United States that found a positive correlation between riots and heat (Cohn, 1990), as well as 
research that has found a positive relationship between temperature and crime in England and Wales 
(Field, 1992). This observation and its seeming inconsistency with earlier studies certainly warrants 
additional research. 
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Project (GPCP)," 2010). This dataset is a composite of three different sources, rain 
gauge data and two satellite sources, and has the benefit of greater global coverage 
and correction of potential errors in any one data source. These data are reported at 
a geographic resolution of 2.5 degrees latitude by 2.5 degrees longitude, but they 
are aggregated to the country level for this study. The time coverage is for 360 
months from January 1979 to December 2008 for all countries except Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, which are covered from January 1993 to December 2008. 
As discussed above, Hendrix and Salehyan (2011) used standardized rainfall 
deviation as their independent variable. They argue that calculating standard 
deviations from the long-term mean creates an approximately normally distributed 
variable that is valid for both positive and negative deviations from the mean. 
While this may be valid at the annual level, it is not valid when examining monthly 
rainfall deviations because rainfall is not identically distributed across months–it is 
governed by seasonal variations. Furthermore, these seasonal variations differ 
across regions. In statistical terms, this means that the data are skewed. Although 
there are some exceptions, they are generally positively skewed, meaning that there 
is more variation at the upward end of the distribution. In other words, extremes 
above the mean have the potential to be more standard deviations away from the 
mean while deviations below the mean are limited to zero rainfall per month. 
Figure 4 illustrates these seasonal variations for selected countries in various 
regions of Africa.
Figure 4: Distribution of monthly precipitation for Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia 
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I, therefore, use a more robust determination of rainfall deviations. Rainfall totals 
are grouped by calendar months and country. Those months that received total 
rainfall in the top two deciles for each calendar month in each country are coded as 
experiencing unusually abundant rainfall–wet months–and those that received total 
rainfall in the bottom two deciles are coded as experiencing unusually sparse 
rainfall–dry months. For example, of the thirty months of June in Tanzania 
between 1979 and 2008, the six with the most rain are wet months while the six 
with the least rain are dry months. 
Table 2 presents a cross tabulation of normal, wet and dry months with months 
experiencing no unrest, non-violent unrest or violent unrest. Even this basic 
analysis reveals some information about the data. There seems to be an increase in 
the number of non-violent events in wet months. Non-violent unrest occurs in 
12.21% of the wet months as opposed to 9.96% of the dry months or 9.79% of the 
normal months. 
Table 2: Social unrest and rainfall deviations 
 Rainfall  
Unrest Normal Dry Wet Total 
None 4,871 1,437 1,510 7,818 74.19% 74.19% 70.93% 73.53% 
Non-
violent 
643 193 260 1,096 
9.79% 9.96% 12.21% 10.31% 
Violent 1,052 307 359 1,718 16.02% 15.85% 16.86% 16.16% 
Total 6,566 1,937 2,129 10,632 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Next, although floods can occur with less than a day’s heavy rain and crops have 
failed in as few as ten days without rain, it is likely that the effects of unusually dry 
or wet months will be compounded, if they continue for more than one consecutive 
month. This is especially true of dry months that can lead to the depletion of water 
reserves over prolonged time without sufficient rain. Variables are, therefore, 
included for the number of consecutive wet months and consecutive dry months. 
In this data there are twelve occurrences of five consecutive dry months in a single 
country and three occurrences each of six and seven consecutive dry months (see 
Table 3). In no country are there more than seven consecutive dry months. There is 
some indication of increased non-violent unrest with more consecutive dry 
months–16.67% at four, 25.00% at five and 33.33% at six–but the occurrence of 
such pronged dry periods is rare and the significance of these increases is 
questionable. The maximum number of consecutive wet months is six and similar 
patterns are observed in the occurrence of non-violent unrest, but now there are 
noticeable increases in the proportion of months of violent unrest as well. 
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3.3.3 Control variables: It is necessary to control for the time-dependent nature of 
the risk of social unrest. A country that has not experienced any type of unrest in 
the recent past will be less likely to experience unrest in the present. Similarly, 
there is likely to be some temporal inertia to unrest–that is, once it starts it may be 
difficult to stop. Most researchers attempt to control for such effects by the 
inclusion of lagged variables. I include a lag of the dependent variable as well as a 
variable for consecutive months without experiencing unrest and the square of 
consecutive months without experiencing unrest. These variables allow the inertia 
or deterioration effect to take either a linear or curvilinear shape, and should allow 
for unbiased estimates of the rainfall deviation variables. Furthermore, in the 
analysis model for violent unrest, I include an additional variable for the number of 
consecutive months of non-violent unrest because I believe that the longer non-
violent unrest persists in a given country without being adequately addressed by the 
government, the more likely it is that violent unrest will erupt. 
Finally, a collection of control variables suggested by the literature is included to 
satisfy curiosity. These include the Polity2 score from the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2011), the log of population (in millions), the annual 
population growth rate, the log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and 
the GDP growth rate (The World Bank, 2011). 
3.4 Model specification 
Because the dependent variable is an indicator variable for the presence of unrest in 
a given country in a given month, I employed a logistic regression model and 
report the results as odds ratios. Furthermore, I report the results of separate models 
for the occurrence of any social unrest and the occurrence of violent unrest. Robust 
standard errors were used and clustered on individual countries to control for 
potential systematic differences in variances between countries. Other model 
specifications used as robustness checks included linear probability models, and 
fixed and random effects models. 
4. Findings and discussion 
Models were run with and without the time-effect variables, with and without 
control variables, and with and without year and month dummies. The results for 
the models with the dependent variable of any social unrest – non-violent and 
violent – are reported in Table 4. The coefficients are reported as odds ratios, 
meaning that effects above one indicate a positive effect on the odds of 
experiencing unrest, while below one are negative effects. The time controls are 
always strikingly statistically significant and have substantively large effect sizes. 
The occurrence of some form of unrest in the previous month is the best predictor 
for the occurrence of unrest in the present month. There is also strong evidence of a 
linear relationship between the number of consecutive months without unrest and 
the odds of occurrence of unrest. Although the square of the term is significant, it 
has very little substantive effect. Each additional month without unrest decreases 
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In this model, the wet month variable is not found to be statistically significant. 
The variable for consecutive wet months, however, is statistically significant. Each 
additional consecutive wet month increases the odds of the occurrence of violent 
unrest by between 10.0% and 10.8%, and this effect is always significant at the 
95% confidence level. This is further evidence in support of hypothesis 1b but not 
for hypothesis 1a. This may be partially understood in conjunction with the 
findings from the first set of models and the finding that consecutive months of 
non-violent unrest increase the odds of violent unrest. It is plausible that the 
occurrence of a flood event may lead to an increased risk of social unrest, but that 
this unrest is initially non-violent in nature. If, however, people do not receive 
relief, their concerns are not addressed, or they cannot come to a peaceful 
resolution of some sort, this unrest is likely to escalate into violence. As was the 
case with the first set of models, unusually dry months, either alone or in 
succession, are not found to have a statistically significant effect on the occurrence 
of violent unrest. There is still no evidence to support hypothesis 2a or 2b. 
These findings are broadly consistent with the earlier literature. The correlation 
between overly abundant rainfall and social conflict in an individual month could 
plausibly be the result of acute resource deprivation stemming from a swift-onset 
event such as a flood. This is consistent with the causal mechanisms associated 
with natural disasters, as described by Brancati (2007) and Nel and Righarts 
(2008). There is also some support for the pastoralist cattle-raiding hypothesis of 
Meier et al. (2007). The increased probability of violent conflict with consecutive 
months of overly abundant rainfall might suggest that cattle fattened on good 
pasture over several successive months become increasingly attractive to cattle 
raiders. I question, however, whether overly abundant rainfall of the type captured 
by the definition of ‘wet month’ employed in this analysis–rainfall in the top two 
deciles of given calendar months in a given country–would create significantly 
fatter cows than merely sufficient or even moderately abundant rainfall. 
Additionally, cattle are lost in floods just like other resources. Although the 
mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they are distinctly different 
and should be examined further. This is entirely possible by looking into the event 
descriptions in SCAD, but such investigation is outside the scope of the current 
study. 
In contrast, the slow-onset nature of a drought event may take longer to manifest 
social unrest for a number of reasons. First, it may take more than a single month 
of failed rains to significantly affect crop production. Second, if the causal pathway 
to social unrest is expected to operate through increased food prices, crop failure in 
one area may take longer to manifest in national or regional markets. Furthermore, 
the economic effects may be transferred to other countries or regions, if 
agricultural products are bound for foreign markets. Finally, the longer time from 
event to conflict offers more opportunity for intervention or mediation by 
governments or other institutions. This finding is consistent with that of Theisen 
et al. (2009) related to drought and civil war. I further maintain that both of these 
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findings are consistent with Hendrix and Salehyan (2011). Because their study 
examined the effects of rainfall annually it might be expected that they would find 
effects of too little rain that would not be reflected in a monthly analysis. 
This study has, so far, demonstrated a strong relationship between overly abundant 
monthly rainfall and the likelihood of social unrest. While this finding seems 
consistent with the theoretical mechanisms associated with swift-onset disasters 
such as floods, it is far from conclusive. A comparison of the distribution of event 
types–demonstrations, riots, strikes etc.–and issues cited as the source of tension9
reveals no significant differences across SCAD events occurring in normal, dry or 
wet months. This is somewhat confusing. If, indeed, unrest in wet months were 
associated with resource conflict or with resentment towards the government for 
failure to deliver relief supplies, I would expect to observe an increase in the 
number of events citing ‘food, water and subsistence’ as a primary issue or with 
‘anti-government violence’ events. This is not, however, the case. Wet months 
seem to experience an increase in the likelihood of any unrest regardless of type of 
event or issue cited. 
Limiting the analysis to the nine countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) and the East Africa Community (EAC)10 leads to interesting 
changes in the results. Table 6 shows the results of the models with the dependent 
variable for any unrest. In all models, the effect of wet months is no longer 
significant. The effect of consecutive wet months is not significant, either. This 
indicates that too little or too much rain does not have the same effect in all areas. 
The area of East Africa and the Horn varies in climate from the arid and semi-arid 
regions of North Sudan, Somalia, and northern and eastern Kenya to the 
consistently wetter areas of the Great Lakes. There is no reason to think that the 
effect of rainfall would be the same across these different climatic regions. 
Perhaps more interesting are the findings on the effect of little rainfall on violent 
conflict in East Africa and the Horn. As indicated in Table 7, areas that receive too 
little rain in a given month are between 55 and 64 percent less likely to experience 
violent conflict than months with normal or more than normal rainfall, and this 
effect is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. In other words, I find no 
evidence to support any of the casual mechanisms outlined above in the IGAD and 
EAC countries. 
9 SCAD includes coding for fourteen potential issues: (1) elections; (2) economy, jobs; (3) food, 
water subsistence; (4) environmental degradation; (5) ethnic discrimination, ethnic issues; (6) 
religious discrimination, religious issues; (7) education; (8) foreign affairs/relations; (9) domestic war, 
violence, terrorism; (10) human rights, democracy; (11) pro-government; (12) economic 
resources/assets; (13) other; (14) unknown, not specified. 
10 The member countries of IGAD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea 
was a member but has been suspended for the past four years. The EAC consists of Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea and Djibouti are not included in this sample because SCAD 
does not include data for these countries. Although South Sudan has recently become independent, 
Sudan was a single country for the entire period under analysis here. 
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Examination of individual SCAD events leads to further questions about potential 
causal mechanisms. Although it is not possible in a single article to examine all the 
events in SCAD, or even all events occurring in wet months, I did some initial 
investigation into the twelve instances of five consecutive months of overly 
abundant rainfall. Four of these instances were in East Africa–Somalia, Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania–in March of 1998. There was an especially severe El Niño 
event in East Africa in late 1997 and early 1998 that led to widespread flooding 
across the region. Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) 
claimed that it was the worst flooding in 40 years in Somalia, that 200,000 people 
were affected and the flooding in northeast Kenya limited access to isolated 
villages and interrupted delivery of aid to Dadaab refugee camps (CARE, 1998). 
This is exactly the type of shock that we might expect to lead to social conflict. An 
examination of SCAD events occurring in March 1998, however, might lead one to 
question this. Only the events occurring in Somalia seem to have any relation to 
food or shelter–in one event SCAD reports that gunmen shot at a food plane. 
Events in Kenya were student protests at the lowering of medical school admission 
requirements and against the arrest of classmates. Other protests were over tax rate 
increases. In Tanzania, Muslims protested at the police cancellation of a scheduled 
demonstration, and in Uganda, Sudanese prisoners of war rioted against alleged 
illegal detention. Apart from the events in Somalia, which has experienced such 
chronic unrest over the past few decades, it is difficult to assign causality to 
rainfall; these events seem to have no connection to flooding or natural disaster. 
Another plausible explanation is simply that potential protesters were kept indoors 
throughout months of consistent rains until; when the weather eventually cleared 
they took to the streets and gave voice to grievances unrelated to rain in any way. 
Similarly, in his study of the effects of weather and crime, Field (1992) found no 
significant effects of rainfall on crime, but suggested that rain may keep potential 
criminals indoors and thus serve only to postpone their criminal activities. 
Given this evidence, or lack thereof, it is clear that more research is needed to shed 
light on the causal pathways leading from rainfall to social unrest. This research 
should be both quantitative and qualitative. Empirical studies can further 
investigate potential intermediate effects, while case study research can more 
thoroughly analyze individual occurrences of extreme rainfall that led to social 
unrest.
5. Conclusion
Through the innovative use of ‘country months’ as the unit of analysis, this article 
has advanced the literature on rainfall and conflict in both methodological and 
substantive ways. Methodologically, I first observe that the longer a country stays 
at peace, the less likely unrest is to occur and the longer a country experiences non-
violent social unrest, the more likely it is that violence will occur. In other words, 
social conflict within a society, or the absence thereof, has temporal inertia. While 
this finding is not surprising to anyone who studies such issues, it should not be 
Climate Change and Pastoralism
302
forgotten and should be taken into consideration in any analysis. Second, I have 
demonstrated that intra-annual disaggregation can illuminate important patterns in 
human behaviour. That is, the likelihood of unrest is not consistent across seasons 
and months, and this should be addressed analytically. 
Substantively, this article has provided further evidence for the proposition that 
overly abundant rainfall can significantly increase the likelihood of social unrest. 
This issue is, however, far from conclusively settled, in large part because the 
causal mechanisms still remain unclear. The observed correlation between overly 
abundant rainfall and social unrest within a single month suggests that the causal 
connection may be the shock of flood-induced acute scarcities. In contrast, no 
significant effects of overly sparse rainfall have been observed in this study. This is 
likely to be because any potential effects are farther removed, either temporally or 
geographically, and operate through mediating factors that have not been 
considered here. Further research is needed into these potential mechanisms but, 
again, drought and flood are different phenomena and this difference should be 
acknowledged. Alternatively, the explanation for the observed correlation between 
overly abundant rainfall and social unrest may lie in the psychological effects of 
weather. Simply put, maybe people just fight in the rain. 
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Pastoralist Resources, Conflict and Climate Change in the Horn 
of Africa 
Wario R. Adano 
Abstract 
Mobility is the single most important pastoralists’ adaptation to spatial and 
temporal variability in rainfall and rangeland resources in the Horn of Africa. The 
region has experienced continued conflicts and violent casualties. The conflicts in 
the region are attributed to increased populations, growing competition over 
resources, ecological stress and climate change adversaries. The competition for 
environmental resources under climate variability in arid areas is stated to be 
greater among pastoralists, who are most vulnerable to climate related risks. This 
paper examines long-term trends in pastoral conflict in the dry lands of northern 
Kenya. The data for the study was collected through extensive review of archival 
sources and individual interviews. The results show no evidence of increasing 
violent conflict incidents in the long-term perspective. Rather, long-term historical 
rainfall and violent conflict data consistently show more violent casualties in wet 
years than in dry years, and wide deviations of inter-seasonal and inter-annual 
variability in rainfall. The claims of increasing violent pastoral conflicts and 
scarcity-causes-conflict arguments in the dry lands are empirically unsupported. 
Instead, it is the recent subdivision of communal grazing areas to ethnic territory, 
through the creation of more administrative boundaries that severely limits 
pastoral mobility, hinders efficient use of resources, constrains the pastoral 
production system and alters traditional mechanisms for negotiating access to 
rangeland resources. The current changes in the use of pastoral commons along 
ethnic lines has produced a new reality which triggers conflict over territory and 
lead to marginalisation of pastoral groups and increased poverty. An 
understanding of temporal variability and patterns of pastoral conflict would 
demand better weather monitoring and early warning systems, in order to enhance 
herd mobility and improve human security and livelihoods in the dry lands. The 
current climate change phenomenon and increased variability in the dry lands 
calls for better local knowledge of fluidity in property rights and access to 
pastoralist resources, climate change tailored adaptations and cooperation over 
available resources.
1. Pastoralism in the dry lands 
Mobile pastoralism is the most dominant and viable way of life in the Horn of 
Africa’s dry lands, as arable agriculture is feasible only in pockets of highland 
areas. Pastoralists are by definition mobile, which entails movement of people with 
their livestock. Mobility and migrations are absolutely essential if pastoralists are 
to survive in the dry lands.  
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Pastoralists obtain a substantial part of their livelihood and human welfare needs 
from livestock assets, which in turn are heavily dependent on communally-shared 
rangeland resources. The availability of rangeland resources is, in turn, influenced 
by erratic rainfall that varies considerably between and within years (Livingstone, 
1991). The spatial distribution of rainfall in the rangelands also has direct 
implications both for livestock mobility and the grazing pressures of the rangelands. 
The production potential of livestock and the rangeland resources in the arid 
pastoral areas are low due to erratic patterns and low amounts of rainfall. Since 
livestock significantly contributes to production of the pastoralist communities, 
herd size affects human welfare and therefore livestock wealth accumulation is a 
desirable goal. For this reason any restocking effort is stated as a major cause of 
pastoral conflict during drought periods (Osamba, 2000), a time of heightened 
scarcity of key rangeland resources. 
Rainfall is generally minimal in Africa’s dry lands (Scoones, 1995). It varies 
greatly in time and space in terms of both inter-annual and inter-seasonal scales. As 
a result of such environmental influences, the dry land areas are harsh and difficult 
environments prone to high agricultural production risk. The per capita livestock 
wealth of pastoral households has continued to decline over the years due to 
recurring droughts (Adano & Witsenburg, 2005; Dietz et al., 2001; Fratkin & Roth, 
1996). Today, pastoralists rank high in terms of poverty levels when assessed on 
social welfare indicators such as educational achievement and nutritional status 
among children less than five years old. They also frequently face security 
challenges, and inter-ethnic conflicts that are attributed to competition for, or 
getting access to blocked former, natural resources. The creation of administrative 
boundaries (Schlee, 2010) or nature preservation areas also often constrain access 
to natural resources in the community-shared pastoralist areas.  
This paper draws on research carried out between 2007 and 2010 in the Turkana 
and Marsabit Districts of Northern Kenya. Review of grey literature, focus group 
discussions and conflict management related issues was used to collect information. 
In addition, archival sources and participatory observations have been used to 
obtain quantitative data and other qualitative issues of resource related conflict. 
2. Natural resources and conflicts in pastoral areas 
Northern Kenya is largely inhabited by over a dozen different pastoralist groups 
from several distinct ethnic backgrounds, including Turkana, Samburu, Rendille, 
Gabra and Borana. Over many decades, the region has been characterised by 
chronic insecurity and development neglect attributed to conflict and inter-ethnic 
rivalries (Leff, 2009). To date, there are divergent views regarding the relationship 
between the availability of natural resources and the incidence of pastoral conflict 
(Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). Although no consensus exists on the connection 
between resource scarcity and pastoral conflicts, the mainstream stipulates that 
conflict between pastoralist groups result from limited availability of, or access to, 
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resources (Mkutu, 2008). Access to natural resources has diminished because of a 
whole range of interrelated causalities. For example, an ever-increasing demand for 
resources may result from population growth, ecological degradation and 
competing claims over rangeland resources (see Homer-Dixon, 1999). On the 
supply-side the trend is of diminishing resources because of natural and man-made 
disasters, such as climate change. 
Beside divergent views on the relationship between the availability of natural 
resources and the incidence of pastoral conflict, the main arguments about pastoral 
conflict can be framed as follows: First, severe droughts and outbreaks of animal 
diseases regularly occur in the dry lands. These factors cause livestock wealth 
differentiation between households and between different ethnic groups (Fratkin & 
Roth, 1996). Second, the need to rebuild herds after periods of heavy livestock 
losses provides a strong motivation for inter-ethnic raids and violent pastoral 
conflict (Osamba, 2000). According to this way of reasoning the periods after 
drought episodes would show increased incidence of pastoralist conflict, because 
of many livestock mortalities during droughts motivating a greater re-stocking 
effort through raiding ethnic others. Others also remark that pastoralist 
communities fight especially during the dry spell because livestock tend to 
concentrate in the limited sections of the rangelands with pasture and water 
(Mwangi, 2006), while others have pointed out a well site is sacred place where 
violence is strictly controlled (Helland, 1997). The fighting argument builds on the 
common belief that predatory herd accumulation is one of the main causal factors 
of pastoral conflict. According to this view livestock raiding constitutes a vehicle 
for climbing out of herd-poverty as well as for gaining a culturally endorsed social 
status (Mieth, 2007). It has been suggested that the increased frequency and 
intensity of droughts in the past decades, and associated livestock losses in the dry 
lands have increased inter-ethnic conflicts and the number of violent killings in 
recent years compared to the distant past.  
The pastoral system of production is based on a flexible property rights regime, 
negotiable access to resources and on herd mobility that optimises production by 
rearing diverse livestock species and exploiting the varied patchiness of rangelands 
(Scoones, 1993). The pastoral system is based on herd mobility that transcends 
national borders. Studies have consistently shown that the pastoralists have lost dry 
season fallback grazing areas due to other land uses in Africa. The creation of 
protected areas and national boundaries tends to disadvantage the pastoralists’ 
strategic and opportunistic use of rangeland resources. The reduction of herd 
mobility due to restrictive policies results in rangeland degradation (Homewood, 
1995), which subsequently is followed by increased livestock deaths. The low per 
capita wealth of pastoral households’ challenges human needs obtained from 
livestock, puts the pastoral way of life at a critical point and raises doubts about the 
survivability of pastoralism. Thus, geopolitics clearly becomes a factor in 
environmental conflicts and a cause of environmental insecurity as political powers 
define territories and create physical boundaries that hinder herd mobility. 
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Water is the single most important resource in the Horn of Africa’s dry lands. The 
different water sources and their surrounding rangelands are of immense value to 
the pastoral peoples in the dry seasons. The real shortage is of grass and browse for 
the animals, as in time of drought people and animals often die of starvation but not 
of thirst. Thus, the connection between water availability and pastoralism is an 
obvious one. Coping and living with water scarcity is normal and a daily life 
experience in the dry lands. Local elders have over centuries perfected skills to 
negotiate use of communally shared resources, such as shallow wells and pastures 
(United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2010). These notwithstanding, 
there is a popular claim that pastoralists fight over scarce natural resources. This is 
hardly accurate in situations where these resources had nothing to do with conflict; 
political instigation is entirely to blame for this misunderstanding. There is need for 
closer investigation into those who actually engage in fighting and those who 
benefit from conflict among pastoralists. 
To date, empirical evidence on the ethnic (violent) conflicts in Africa has tended to 
rely on isolated incidents (Adano & Witsenburg, 2008), weakening its validity. The 
trend in conflict incidence has yet to be clearly understood, and a better analysis of 
the underlying causes of the problem is urgently needed. This paper uses case 
studies from northern Kenya to assess the significance of natural resources, 
particularly pasture and water availability directly linked to rainfall, as the cause of 
conflict in the semi-arid areas. It specifically describes the cause-effect relationship 
between long-term climate change and conflict. The results are expected to have 
relevance for finding long-term solutions, which address the challenges of 
resource-related conflict in the Horn of Africa.  
3. Rain and conflict in pastoralist areas of northern Kenya
The different views concerning conflict and resource scarcity are testimony to the 
complex issues that have continued to inform academic debate (Homer-Dixon, 
1999; Kahl, 2006). In the Horn of Africa, conflict has persisted due to a number of 
factors, including the proliferation of small arms, failed governance, and a growing 
population (Kaplan, 1994; Mkutu, 2008). Cattle rustling, political differences, 
ethnic differences and, foremost, natural resource related causes, were also seen to 
trigger conflict (Osamba, 2000; Schlee, 2008). Opinions on the relative importance 
of such causal factors differ widely in the conflict literature.   
In Northern Kenya, ethnic violence relating to cattle rustling is erroneously seen as 
an extension of the traditional practice of cattle rustling among pastoral people 
(Osamba, 2000; Mkutu, 2008). Violent conflict among the pastoral groups 
inhabiting this region (estimated to be over 6 million) has existed since the 19th 
century. This form of violence has led to displacement of many people from their 
homes, and caused many human and livestock deaths, and the destruction of 
property and local economies (Pkalya et al., 2003). What prompts mass killing is 
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routinely viewed as competition for the diminishing supply of natural resources, 
especially pastureland and water (Kagwanja, 2001). The conflicts pit several 
pastoralist groups living in the northern Kenya and the neighbouring countries of 
Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia against each other. The negative impact of climate 
change1 on the survival of pastoralism has also been stressed in recent years. The 
connection between rainfall and violent conflict in the Marsabit and Turkana 
districts is the investigation that the paper addresses in the next section.  
3.1. Long term trends in rainfall in the dry lands 
Both Marsabit and Turkana districts are located in northern region of Kenya. About 
75% of the total land surface area in the districts is classified as rangeland and the 
main form of land use is extensive livestock grazing. In addition, 80% of the 
districts’ residents are pastoralists who derive a substantial share of their 
livelihoods from livestock or livestock related industries. The districts are also 
located in the driest region of the country, and experience a bi-modal rainfall 
pattern (long rain March-May, and short rain October-December), with two dry 
seasons. The mean annual rainfall ranges from 200 mm to 1,000 mm depending on 
the elevation. Despite being highly erratic and unpredictable, spatially and 
temporally, rainfall remains the single most important factor that influences the 
productivity of rangeland resources, livestock and human welfare. 
Over the entire data period, Figure 1a above shows that rainfall for Marsabit is 
declining; this corresponds with increasing resource scarcity. Figure 1b shows that 
annual rainfall for Turkana is increasing, indicating decreasing resource scarcity. 
This subsection tests if there is a statistical difference in the mean annual rainfall 
between past decades, by splitting the periods of the available data into two periods. 
The annual rainfall recorded in the Marsabit district, for the periods 1921-1964 and 
1965-2009, does not show a significant statistical difference (t-value: 1.78; 
statistically not significant). But, the annual rainfall recorded for the Turkana 
district, for the periods 1919-64 and 1965-2009 does show a significant statistical 
difference (t-value: 2.16, statistically significant). On the basis of these findings it 
would be correct to state that there is no statistically valid decline in rainfall for 
Marsabit but there is a certain rainfall increase for Turkana over the periods under 
consideration. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2007) suggests that rainfall is likely to increase in East Africa, but also there are 
good data to show that temperature is going to rise in the region as well. This will 
result in more evaporation and the region will become drier, even if rainfall 
increases as figures for Turkana show. 
1  In this paper, climate change is used to refer to a long term or permanent change of the mean 
precipitation and temperature. 
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increased number of violent casualties in recent years (Leff, 2009). Here, this paper 
tests the claim that pastoral conflicts have increased in recent years, compared to 
the distant past (Figures 2a & 2b).   
F ive-year rainfall and violent death averages , Mars abit
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Figure 2a: Conflict and rainfall trend in Marsabit district, 1927 - 1979 
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Figure 2b: Conflict and rainfall trend in Turkana district, 1927 - 1979
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One major result from Figures 2a & 2b is the close association between average 
numbers of people killed (violent conflict) and the average rainfall, 2  both in 
Turkana and Marsabit in the long term perspective. In other words, years that 
receive relative increase in rainfall amount also show a corresponding increase in 
casualties of violent conflicts or intensity of conflict as demonstrated by the 
number of killings. These results are consistent with Witsenburg & Adano (2009) 
who found that more violent conflicts occur in the dry lands during the rainy 
season, as opposed to the dry season. The Turkana data shows increasing rainfall 
trend over the past decades, but this was not accompanied by an increase in 
incidents of conflict. There were more conflict incidents between 1950 and 1964 in 
Marsabit, and a slight rise in conflict incidents between 1965 and 1979 in Turkana, 
which clearly move with changes in rainfall (Figures 2a & 2b). The data also show 
wide variability in rainfall, especially for Turkana. The results however show no 
evidence of more violence occurring in the recent years than in the distant past. 
However, since the conflict incidents have not been normalised for changes in the 
human population, that is changes assessed in per capita terms to allow comparison 
of individual incidents over time, any strong statement cannot be made. But 
conflict incidence in later years would become lower if population numbers were 
taken into account. Thus, in light of this result, while the popular argument is that 
scarcity induces conflict, in fact it seems that resource scarcity might, under certain 
circumstances, bring about cooperation between competing resource users. 
Considering the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is more vulnerable than any other 
region to climate-induced water scarcity, Africa should now be on the frontline of 
climate change adaptation, in order to cope with diminishing resources.  
It should be pointed out that today raids are not carried out for the same reasons as 
in the past, where herd accumulation, appreciation of the raiders by other members 
of the group or the need to earn praise for killing an enemy dominated. Violent 
pastoral conflicts in northern Kenya have escalated, not only in terms of the level 
of violence, but qualitatively as well: where deliberate killing is the aim (Mwangi, 
2006). Conflict has become a way to express resentment against unfair treatment 
by the government, and a means to create new boundaries that exclude ethnic 
others from traditionally-shared local commons. For the marginalised pastoralists 
there is no other way to express resentment of perceived injustices, apart from 
through violent protest and raiding. Conflict is also about opportunity, in the 
presence of security lapses. If one group goes out fighting over land, and sees 
unattended goats or donkeys, there is no way they will leave them behind. In other 
words, during raiding event there is likelihood that the raiding party steals or loots 
anything left for opportunity. Thus, the various causes of conflict show up as 
conflict incidents in the region at different opportune times. 
2 It is possible to carry out a similar long-term investigation of the relationship between temperature 
and conflict incidents given relevant data are available. However, no temperature data is available 
for any of the areas over the same period for which there is rainfall and conflict data.  
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3.3. Seasonal fluctuations in violent conflict and rainfall 
Pastoral conflicts are linked to and influenced by a combination of factors that 
complicate the nature of the problem, and challenge the understanding of the causal 
factors and their interaction effects. Almost all claims about conflict and resource 
scarcity have been based on analysis of only a limited number of incidents and the 
statistical relationship between resource scarcity and pastoral conflicts is limited. 
That is, empirical evidence regarding scarcity of resource induced conflict is quite 
limited (Adano & Witsenburg, 2008; Meier et al., 2007; Witsenburg & Adano, 
2009). 
Adano & Witsenburg (2008) investigated long-term trends and carried out 
empirical testing of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflict 
among pastoralists in northern Kenya. The key research questions were: Have 
inter-ethnic raids and incidences of violent conflict increased with the downward 
trends in rainfall and substantial decline in livestock wealth in per capita terms? 
And, do conflicts mainly occur during and after droughts, and during dry seasons? 
The authors considered both seasonality and general long-term trends of the 
association between natural resources and inter-ethnic conflict. This approach was 
inspired by the recognition that inter-ethnic conflict can be addressed with regard 
to resource availability (with rainfall indicating the level of resource availability) 
and the dynamic changes in livestock wealth.  
The study found a negative correlation between violent conflict and drought, as 
well as in the immediate post-drought periods. Yet these are the periods when 
scarcity is experienced most, and livelihood tensions in pastoral communities are 
expected to be high. Violent conflict clearly occurs more often in rainy seasons and 
during relatively good years, than in dry season and during droughts. The evidence 
further shows twice as many people are likely to be killed in a violent conflict 
during a relatively abundant rain years (i.e. in a time of relative resource abundance) 
than in drought (drier) years. This result supports the view that violent conflict 
diminishes when resource scarcity increases. Thus, it seems clear that there is time 
lag between the times of scarcity (during a dry year) and when that group raids 
(during a subsequent wet year). This finding is supported by herders’ own 
explanations that during difficult times (droughts) animals are weak, survival in the 
dry lands gets harder, and people are more inclined to stop fighting, patch up their 
differences, renegotiate access rules and rights, and reconcile to cooperate 
(Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). This suggests that when survival becomes difficult, 
like during drought, herders decide to defer raids until an appropriate opportune 
time in the future. During the rainy seasons animals are in a good condition and 
strong enough to withstand long distance treks, rain washes away tracks and rich 
vegetation cover reduces visibility. Unlike in the dry seasons when demand for 
labour is usually high, the rainy seasons’ manpower demand for tending livestock 
is low in the pastoral areas, and the additional labour is potentially available which 
can engage in raiding activities. Each, or all of these factors in combination, 
increases the chances of successful raiding in the rainy seasons. 
Climate Change and Pastoralism
316
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Jan-marc Apr-jun Jul-sep Oct-dec
Season
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r p
er
 m
on
th
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Av
er
ag
e 
ra
in
fa
ll 
in
 m
m
raids
killed in raids
rainfall
Figure 3: Average seasonal fluctuations in killings and rainfall, 1960-1994
Source: Witsenburg & Adano (2009, p. 525) 
Based on these results, the view that the scarcity of natural resources causes 
conflict among pastoralists is not supported. One may argue that scarcity in one 
year may cause conflict in the subsequent years. In this regard too, the results 
reveal no direct association between rainfall and conflict incidence in a lagged 
form, and in the occurrence of violent conflict in years following a 
drought/flooding—when pasture and water resources in the dry lands become less 
scarce. Thus, the claim that pastoral conflict is induced by scarcity of natural 
resources may not hold always true (Osamba, 2000); so the cause for these conflict 
remains an intriguing question.  
This evidence raises the question why pastoralists may not fight over resources 
they do not have or only have in short supply; thus hinting at instances of human 
cooperation in the face of resource scarcity in the dry lands. This remark resonates 
with observation in the neighbouring Mandera district, that negotiation for access, 
water use rights and pasture during droughts are common and the neighbours are 
not expected to dishonour such a request (UNDP, 2010, p.14), as long as control 
over resources are clearly defined and not contested.  
Moreover raiding is generally seen as a ‘bad thing’ that should be addressed at the 
community-level. However, according to some informants warriors are often 
secretive about their raiding behaviour and they do not always inform elders about 
when they intend to launch a raid on neighbouring communities, which is a 
common feature of raiding practice among the pastoral groups (see Almagor, 1979). 
This means that the local elders are not always in control of the raiders, and, 
therefore, their attempts to ensure a peaceful co-existence between the groups are 
challenged. Yet other informants emphasised the role of women, who compose 
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nasty poems and provocative war songs, which humiliate warriors and encourage 
their raiding practices. These issues, taken together, are instrumental in providing 
insights into the nature and intensity of ethnic rivalry between pastoral people, and 
in future should attract the attention of researchers and intervention efforts. 
Conflict resolution and peace-building strategies between contentious pastoral 
groups in the Horn should, thus, aim either to ease tension or pre-empt conflict.  
4. New forms of conflict in the dry lands
Theoretically, the traditional common land tenure systems were considered an 
obstruction to development and western management rules had to be imposed to 
bring about efficient land use (Hardin, 1968). The ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ 
justified colonial and post-independence government policies which led to 
privatisation of rangelands—that often failed at the expense of pastoralists (Adano 
& Witsenburg, 2005; Homewood, 1995). For instance, the tragedy of the commons 
argument was used to encourage the settling of nomadic pastoralists (Hardin, 1968; 
Lamprey & Yusuf, 1981). It was also thought legitimate to provide an alternative 
system of production for pastoralists rather than leaving them roaming about with 
excessive numbers of poor quality herds (Brown, 1963). Since the 1980s the 
rhetoric of nomads must settle has become questionable and put in doubt the 
rationale of settlement policies (Salzman, 1980). The emergence of localised 
environmental degradation around water points and permanent settlements in the 
dry lands (Schwartz et al., 1991), due to reduced pastoral mobility, are later used as 
an argument to discourage sedentarisation. The negative accounts of external 
development interventions show how colonial government policies have 
encouraged the settlement of nomadic people and, in so doing, have disrupted the 
traditional pastoral setting, causing more environmental degradation. However, 
Ostrom (1990) explains that self-governing institutions under common-property 
regimes are able to regulate common pool resources, such as water and pasture in 
the rangelands. Much of the conflict in the pastoral areas occurs along ethnic 
border-lines, where institutional structures for resource management are 
themselves weak, or have been weakened by external influences, including politics. 
Ethnic violence relating to cattle rustling in northern Kenya, as described above, is 
erroneously seen as an extension of the traditional practice of cattle rustling among 
pastoral people (Mkutu, 2008; Osamba, 2000). Generally, conflict in the pastoral 
areas’ dry lands is attributable, among many other factors, to culture (the age-grade 
system)3, the proliferation of small arms, socio-economic marginalisation, raiding 
motivated by predatory wealth accumulation and assertion of historic claims to 
grazing territory (Katsuyoshi & Turton, 1979). In addition, the fast growing human 
3  An age-group among the pastoral groups is, theoretically, initiated to fight off the neighbours from 
their territory and raid livestock (the principal pastoralist asset) from the neighbours. The more an
age-group executes successful raids and brings in livestock, the more praises they would 
collectively receive. 
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population and a myriad of social, economic and political changes have become 
causes of conflict in Kenya’s dry lands.  
The creation of political administrative boundaries, without consultation with the 
local populations, features a new form of conflict on top of already existing causal 
factors. This process has led to unclear boundaries that fuel new forms of (violent) 
conflicts that in turn pit different ethnic groups against each other—even in places 
where communities co-existed peacefully for several decades sharing typically 
scarce dry land resources (see UNDP, 2010 for Mandera district). Thus, the recent 
creation of administrative territorial borders in the dry lands apparently becomes an 
additional factor that triggers (violent) conflict, serves to intensify pre-existing 
tensions, or exacerbates conflict between neighbouring ethnic groups. The 
following three examples demonstrate how demarcation of administrative 
boundaries in the pastoral areas has resulted in conflict, with negative impact on 
the lives and livelihoods of the people concerned. 
4.1. Moite on the shore of Lake Turkana 
The creation of administrative boundaries in Kenya dates back to the time of 
British rule. During the colonial period, the colonial administration created 
boundaries, which split ethnic groups. Afterwards there was resistance but despite 
the creation of new boundaries people realised that they could still use local 
resources (Personal Comm., Hilary, 2008). The colonial administration recognised 
and respected what local people said (UNDP, 2010, p.11) and consulted them when 
they drew up new boundaries. Today’s border making process is different, unclear 
and not transparent. 
Different ethnic groups have over the years used Moite, an area bordering the 
south-western shores of Lake Turkana. By 2008, Moite has been already a sub-
location for 20 years. The Turkana and Gabra have been grazing together in the 
region for many years. Then, all of a sudden in 2008, the government said that 
Moite area of Loiyangalani Division, and the new boundary would be the road 
going to Sibiloi National Park, on the south-western shore of the lake. This process 
was not transparent. This demonstrates that boundaries in the pastoral areas are 
never considered with the care and the caution they deserve. It seems that the 
politicians sit down together and decide where the boundary passes, simply using a 
map, but without enough local knowledge to anticipate what problems the 
boundary might cause in the dry lands. Often the community that is marginalised 
by a boundary protests against its imposition afterwards. As one informant 
interestingly observed: 
It is the customary or traditional ownership of the water point that 
demarcates the ownership of the land. And these wells are situated in 
such a way that the Gabra have a well on the Turkana side, and 
Turkana have a well at the Gabra side. It is not measured by 
kilometres or roads. The neighbouring communities know even 
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though water holes are owned by a specific group pasture belongs to 
everyone (Interview Hilary, a local and civic worker for peace 
building organization, August 2008). 
The Gabra are in the north of Moite and Turkana on the south, but each group has 
wells on each other’s land. Pasture belongs to anyone as property right regimes are 
flexible and access rights to resources are negotiable between the groups. The wells 
make the pasture accessible. The people were confused by the new administrative 
boundary in the pastoral areas, so the boundary had the wrong effect, as regards to 
how adjacent communities relate to each other and access resources at different 
times of the year. In effect, the grazing land has diminished because even though 
there is a lot of grazing land, people cannot access it. The development of 
administrative boundaries in the pastoral areas is certainly another and very serious 
way in which pastoralism is being killed off, because boundaries naturally close off 
pasture water points to some groups. In light of the pastoralists’ opportunistic use 
of rangeland resources, influenced by the wide spatial and temporal distribution of 
rainfall, the politically-driven sub-division of the rangelands into parcels has a 
negative consequence for pastoralism.
According to the Constitution of Kenya (2008), the creation of a sub-location 
comes with position of a local chief in line of provincial administration. After 
Moite became a new sub-location and a Turkana chief was employed, 
neighbouring groups feared that they would not be able to use the water point 
anymore. Suddenly ownership rights of range resources have become the 
overriding priority and people have started to resent this. When a new 
administrative boundary is created, it implements a process of control and ends the 
use rights for other groups—which becomes a source of contention between the 
different groups. The fear is real; as the Chief is an ethnic Turkana, Moite 
automatically became exclusively for the Turkana and a no-go zone for other 
ethnic groups. The decision to make Moite a sub-location cannot be reversed, and 
this remains a bone of contention not only about water, but also about land. The 
Turkana feel this land is now theirs, through their claim for use and ownership 
rights of resources, and that other groups should stay away. The other groups will 
not accept this, because they need to access water like before. The fighting will 
only stop if other groups can access the water.  
When a sub-location is created and a local chief put in place, he waves a flag over 
the land. However, it is not the central government which is creating boundaries 
and employing chiefs, rather it is the politicians in close liaison with the local-level 
administrators who use this system to oppose each other. They use government 
officials, such a local chief, to alter ownership, use rights and access to resources, 
such as water and pasture, and to fuel conflict. Usually new boundaries are not 
needed by local communities; rather they result from the actions of a politician 
who wants to gain mileage in the electoral process. In many cases it would have 
been better if the sub-division had not been created. Demarcating territorial 
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boundaries with a view to providing improved local services in the pastoral areas is 
a false goal, as the practice is at odds with the indivisible and flexible nature of the 
pastoralists’ communal rights to land. 
4.2. The Turbi massacre of northern Marsabit area  
Several reports indicate the complex causes and nature of the violent conflicts 
among communities in the borderlands (Bizenuh, 2008; Witsenburg & Adano, 
2009). Between 1940 and early 1960s, the southern Ethiopia borderland 
experienced a growing contestation among the pastoralists for access and control 
over key natural resources. In Kenya, pastoral conflicts were blamed on the 
introduction of the grazing territory, on the lines of earlier grazing blocs 
introduced in the 1920s in the pastoralist inhabited areas, including the northern 
Frontier of Kenya, which was then British territory. In 1965, the Borana claimed 
they were the only victims of violence in the region, but on several occasions 
they attacked neighbouring ethnic groups, such as the Garri and Gabra (Adugna, 
2009; Bizenuh, 2008) and looted stock, contributing to the violence in the 
southern Ethiopian borderlands.  
On 12 July 2005 raiders from the north (northern Kenya-southern Ethiopia) 
attacked the Turbi trading centre in northern Marsabit District, killing more than 90 
people (Mwangi, 2006). This is now referred to as the Turbi massacre. It was then 
argued that raiding between these groups was unusual. Indeed, the communities 
around Turbi had peacefully lived together and shared resources until the Borana 
families and villages near Turbi trading centre moved over night. Children were 
taken out of school and become internally displaced persons, as their families 
moved to the Walda trading centre. It is not difficult to guess who informed and 
moved these people the evening before the early morning raid on Turbi village. 
The northern Kenya borderland became hostile since the 2005 Turbi Massacre 
(Wachira, 2009). An illustration of this is the illegitimate operation of the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) in the southern Ethiopia-northern Kenya borderlands for a 
couple of years already (Salih, 1999). In a regional peace meeting in August 2009, 
Officer-in-Charge and Governor of the Borana Zone of the Oromia Regional State 
of Ethiopia blamed the conflict along the borderlands on the presence of OLF 
fighters in the region. The problem of boundary dispute and scarcity of resources 
are partly blamed for the violent attack on Turbi village. At two separate meetings, 
held in Sololo on 16 July 2005, the issue of boundary creation and the subsequent 
splitting of Moyale from the Marsabit District in the mid-1990s cropped up. In 
meetings called to find answers to the genesis of the clashes a civic leader from 
Moyale requested the provincial administration to clarify on which side of the 
border Turbi village lay. The leader emphasised that: 
We are still bitter for having been thrown out of our area [Turbi]. It is 
common knowledge that it is us [Borana] who developed the area and 
drilled the water hole ... We want you, Bwana (Sir) PC, to tell us 
whether Turbi is in Moyale or in Marsabit district (Njeru, 2005, p. 11).  
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The leader claimed that the water point near Turbi and the school, among other 
social amenities, had been developed with his constituents’ funds but that the area 
has been pushed out by the government through the influence of a local politician 
from a neighbouring community. Thus, the question of boundary disputes is 
intricately intertwined with competition for scarce resources, as the groups dispute 
boundaries that affect the ownership of water points; at the very least, the resource 
question has been used as a pretext for conflict. Consequently, this conflict has 
pitted the Borana and Gabra communities against each other.   
4.3. Tana River in south-eastern Kenya 
The creation of a boundary is also in line with the Tana River problem, which 
touches on the difference between ownership and use rights. While use rights is 
good, ownership rights create tension because a new boundary creates a resource 
map and limits access. Ownership rights also exist in the pastoral areas, but it is the 
use rights that are more important to the herders. In peaceful times, a Pokomo 
herdsman can go anywhere and use the water and the land. He knows he is in a 
land belonging to a specific group, but he is there to graze and then go back. In 
other words, within the traditional property rights regime use rights of natural 
resources override ownership rights as in principle everybody has an access right, 
but the underlying thing is ownership of land in areas which are permanently 
settled.
Land and water resources in the Tana River area have been a cause of conflict 
between pastoralists (Pokomo) and farmers (Orma) (Martin, 2005). The 
government embraces the principle of private ownership rights, which creates a lot 
of problems in the dry lands. Increasingly, political power determines access. The 
government’s land adjudication undermines the pastoralists’ flexible access rights 
to resources. As a result, pastoralists fear the loss of dry season access for their 
livestock. The source of the problem arises from the fact that privatization is not 
compatible with pastoralism. In particular, pastoralists demand access to water and 
riverine pastures, especially during the dry season. This situation is similar to 
creating a sub-location and giving private ownership rights to one group while 
excluding others. If the other groups own a well in the created sub-location, they 
will not be in a position to access those resources. 
All the three cases described above, and many other land sub-divisions across the 
country, illustrate how recent sub-division of former communal grazing areas into 
ethnicized territorial parcels through the creation of administrative borders has 
created conflict over territory (Schlee, 2010). This trend is widespread across 
Kenya. Several violent conflicts have resulted from clashes between neighbouring 
clans within Mandera district over the demarcation of new districts and 
constituencies, and land redistribution following creation of administrative borders 
(UNDP, 2010). The demarcation of land parcels has been the subject of conflicting 
claims because the process assigns exclusive use rights to land over which several 
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clans (subsections of an ethnic group) have had historic and overlapping resource 
rights. As a result, demarcation of parcels in the rangelands increases uncertainties 
associated with pastoral land-based livelihoods. In the same vein, we can draw 
parallels between the processes of land demarcation along ethnic divides in Kenya 
with the neighbouring Ethiopia. Adugna (2010, p. 48), for example, describes how, 
following the constitution of the federal government, ethnic-based administration 
zones divided communities and intensified existing inter-ethnic violent conflicts in 
pockets of south-western Ethiopia.  
As elsewhere, the pastoral groups living in the Horn of Africa’s dry lands use 
seasonal mobility as a major traditional coping strategy that depends on extensive 
and opportunistic use of the widely dispersed rangeland resources. Administrative 
borders attempt to determine control over time-invariant resources and thus, when 
combined with the politics of ethnic differentiation lead to tension and conflicts 
between neighbouring groups (cf. Schlee, 2010). The creation of ethno-boundaries, 
therefore, severely limits herd mobility, hinders efficient use of dry land resources, 
constrains pastoral production, and alters traditional access mechanisms and 
negotiation over territorial and resource claims. Reduced herd mobility has major 
potential consequences for livestock mortality and poverty of pastoralists in the dry 
lands.
5. Concluding remarks
Today, a few thousand pastoralist groups in Africa face a bleak future more 
frequently than ever before. Some scholars view population growth as the main 
cause, while others see frequent droughts, reduced access to former rangeland 
resources, and unfavourable political and economic conditions as other potential 
explanations. Such situations are worsened by the failure of governments to 
address and resolve competing claims and rights for rangeland resources but 
instead, at times, exacerbate contests over territorial spaces and associated 
resources between neighbouring pastoralist groups.  
Since the mid-1990s, a number of development organisations and local groups 
have started discussing the conflict and security problems in northern Kenya. This 
is imperative, as various development plans and initiatives failed to take-off due to 
lack of security. That conflicts between pastoralists are mostly motivated by 
declining per capita livestock wealth or induced by scarcity of natural resources is 
a widely held view. Recurring droughts that diminish livestock populations, 
growing competition over natural resources, and constrained access to rangeland 
resources are often seen to be interlocked with cycles of raids and livestock rustling. 
Yet little empirical evidence exists on the relationships between scarcity of natural 
resources and pastoral conflicts based on long-term time-series data. 
The causes of conflict in pastoral areas are complex to understand according to 
micro/macro-level categories. This paper has shown that more people are likely to 
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be killed in violent conflict in wet periods of relative abundance than in the dry 
times of relative scarcity. The incidence of conflict is not higher in the recent past 
compared to the distant past. Even so, whether climate change constitutes a serious 
security risk would depend not only on the climatic variables per se but also very 
much on the interplay between several causal factors of conflict, including the role 
of traditional institutions, pace of social change and political influences, the trade 
in small arms, and religion. In the absence of a framework to broker peace evolving 
out of local peace-building processes and committed conflict avoidance, finding a 
lasting solution is as difficult as costly. For example, water conflicts are most likely 
to occur when the capacity of governance structures and local institutions to 
regulate resource access are outstripped by changes such as abrupt extreme weather. 
In this regard, weather monitoring and early warning systems will be critical to 
enhance herd mobility and improve security in the pastoralist areas, especially in 
inter-ethnic and administrative border lands. 
The causal factors of conflict are varied across groups and over time, but neither 
can the problem be isolated from today’s global issues such as proliferation of 
small arms, increased connectivity in information flow or differences in geopolitics 
in the Horn of Africa. For example, the lack of a common pastoral policy and ad 
hoc approach to disarmament efforts has blocked a systematic approach to security 
concerns in the borderlands. Pastoral conflicts therefore seem to recur because of 
inefficiencies ingrained in the poor enforcement of the rule of law by African 
countries individually or collectively. In particular, the recent government’s 
subdivisions of the pastoral lands into new territorial administrative units in Kenya 
have led to both ethnic disputes over such decisions and conflicts of resentment. 
What clearly emerges is the role of ‘formal politics’; local politicians create violent 
conflict by manipulating ethnicity and emphasizing the politics of ethnic difference 
for electoral gains, and by the creation of ethnic-based boundaries in the dry lands. 
The recently-established border lines are emerging as causes for conflict in 
addition to the traditional reasons behind pastoralist conflicts. The government 
particularly needs more commitment in resolving such conflicts, by involving 
people in decisions regarding demarcation of new administrative units and 
territorial land parcels in order to nurture peaceful co-existence between 
neighbouring pastoralist groups. 
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Investigating the Link between Environmental Scarcity and 
Conflict in Darfur1
Paul Omondi 
Abstract
Although it is widely acknowledged that environmental factors are seldom, if ever, 
the sole cause of conflict, there is increasing recognition that the effects of climate 
change contribute to security risks as a result of changes in environmental 
conditions and increased competition for natural resources. This paper takes the 
view that an important impact of these environmental stresses in Darfur was 
resource scarcity. In turn, increased shrinkage of livelihoods undermined the 
resilience capacity of the local communities to drought-related shocks, creating 
opportunities for conflict. The central aim of this paper is to interrogate the 
resource scarcity-security relationship, focusing primarily on two types of 
evidence. The first relates to rainfall records, which is primarily associated with 
supply-induced scarcity. Rainfall patterns showed a declining trend and variability 
from the mid-1970s through to the 1980s. The second relates to population 
pressure, which is primarily associated with demand-induced scarcity. On this 
evidence, demographic trends show that a marked increase in population density 
since the mid-1970s has put pressure on both the pastoral and agricultural 
livelihood systems. Placing the above into perspective, this paper provides the 
basis for a more holistic appreciation of the Darfur problem, and for looking at the 
ongoing conflict in depth. 
1. Introduction
Darfur continues to experience violent conflict that severely affect human security, 
resulting in considerable loss of life and displacement. Over the years, the conflict 
has become more widespread, in terms of frequency and geographical spread. It is 
widely recognised that the conflict has been driven by a range of factors, including 
such disparate dimensions as economic and political marginalization and land use 
and ownership differences. In recent years, however, much research has tended to 
situate the conflict within the context of environmental risks. Geographically, 
Darfur lies on the Sudano-Sahel belt,2 a region on climatic stress thresholds, where 
insecurity is also a highly salient issue. 
1 The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law contributed greatly to the 
production of this paper. A version of this paper was previously published as part of the Strauss 
Center's Working Paper Series on Climate Change and African Political Stability. This material is 
based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.S. Army 
Research Office under contract/grant number W911NF-09-1-0077. 
2 Sudan-Sahel Belt is an ecological zone spread across the continent from Senegal to Sudan. The zone 
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Ideally, understanding the climate change context of the continuing conflict calls 
for more analytical attention to the underlying causes of the localised violence prior 
to the outbreak of the civil war. The climatic patterns associated with climate 
change in Darfur started to manifest themselves from the early 1970s. These 
changes occurred during a time when the region witnessed an increase in the 
frequency of localised conflicts. The combination of persistent drought and 
population growth resulted in shrinkage of natural resources and livelihoods and, 
consequently, movements and possible resettlement of the northern Darfur 
populations into southern Darfur. The argument here is that these conditions 
nurtured the circumstances in which ethnic cleavages and violence seethed since 
the mid-70s, contributing to conflict as a coping strategy against scarcity.  
It is clear that, over generations, the inhabitants of Darfur had devised livelihood 
techniques and coping mechanisms that were suitable and sustainable for the 
region, with the apparent goal of mitigating potential security risks between the 
pastoralists and farmers. Mamdani (2007) points to "community-level split inside 
Darfur, between nomads and settled farmers, who had earlier forged a way of 
sharing the use of semi-arid land in the dry season." Unfortunately, the climatic and 
demographic transitions that set in towards the late 1970s seemed to have 
generated consequences that could no longer be covered by these strategies. With 
the disintegration of these livelihood techniques and coping mechanisms, "co-
operation turned into an intense struggle over diminishing resources". In a large 
way, therefore, the resultant conflict can be viewed as a result of diminished ability 
of the inhabitants to cope with the emerging ecological challenges. 
This paper seeks to further the understanding of the relationship between climate 
change and security in Darfur prior to the outbreak of the large-scale civil war in 
2003, and to provide some insights on the changing dynamics of pastoralist-farmer
interaction and emergent risk of conflict. Whereas political dynamics and 
governance issues have also influenced the security circumstances in a major way, 
the main focus of this paper is on the ecological dimension as a possible causal link 
in the insecurity situation. It is therefore important to note that this paper’s 
intention is not to present environmental pressures as the singular cause of the 
conflict, overlooking the role of high politics.  
The remaining sections of this paper have the following structure: section two 
provides a brief conceptual review relevant to an understanding of environmental 
degradation, scarcity and conflict in Darfur. Section three provides a discussion on 
environmental degradation, scarcity and conflict in Darfur, first sketching out the 
broad ecological context of Darfur. The section then proceeds to examine the 
context and drivers of localized conflicts in the region. Finally, this section 
interrogates the resource scarcity-conflict relationship, specifically focusing on the 
constitutes the transition between the hyper-arid Sahara desert to the north and the savanna regions to 
the south. 
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role of rainfall and population. Section four looks at response to climatic risks in 
the context of adaptation versus conflict. More specifically, it examines the 
dynamics of the pastoralist-farmer relationship, providing an assessment of the 
community coping and conflict management strategies, and examining the factors 
that appeared to have contributed to the collapse of these mechanisms. The paper 
concludes with section five, providing two key conclusions: first, that reduced 
resilience and adaptive capacities resulted in the collapse of the community coping 
and conflict management strategies, in turn creating deep-seated ecological traps 
that, over time, transformed the pastoralist-farmer relationship into one of inter-
ethnic competition. Second, that the ethnic dimension of the conflict is largely a 
manifestation of competition for resources. 
2. Conceptual issues 
2.1 Scarcity and conflicts: Exploring the links 
This paper uses the 'scarcity' paradigm as a framework for analyzing the ways in 
which climate change mediates between environmental stress, competition over 
natural resources and conflict. Although environmental degradation does not, of 
necessity, mean scarcity, epistemological perspectives on resource scarcity closely 
link it with environmental degradation. The operative definition offered by the  UN 
Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action succinctly sums up 
'environmental scarcity' as "a situation where renewable resources–such as water, 
forests or productive land–are degraded or decreasing (in the sense that the 
resource is used faster than it is replenished)" (UNEP, 2010, p. 4). Homer-Dixon, 
Boutwell & Rathjens (1993, p. 42) provide broad account of the means through 
which scarcity is generated. Arguably, three processes that constitute sources of 
scarcity include the decrease in quantity and quality of resources at a rate faster 
than their renewal, population growth, and unequal resource access.  
The conceptual development of scarcity underscores the interrelated issues of 
resource competition and violence, and has of recent gained prominence as a 
central point for clarifying conflict motives. A Situational Analysis Report from the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2009, p. 3) 
observed that the pressure on scarce resources like water, biomass and pasture has 
become the trigger for most conflicts in the pastoral regions of Africa.  
Progress made in the exploration of environmental security over the past two 
decades has presented different ways of understanding environment, scarcity and 
conflict. Making a contribution to the understanding of the connection between 
environment and conflict, Libiszewski (undated, p. 12) defines environmental 
conflict as "…traditional conflicts induced by environmental degradation". 
According to Libiszewski, environmental conflicts are characterised by the 
principal importance of degradation in one or more of the following fields: overuse 
of renewable resources; overstrain of the environment’s sink capacity; 
impoverishment of the living space (Ibid). Certainly, Homer-Dixon and the 
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Toronto Group deserve tribute for attempting to disentangle the scarcity-conflict 
dynamics. They operationalized three possible pathways that link environmental 
change or scarcity to conflict. These are classified as: 'Simple scarcity conflicts' in 
reference to resource wars between and within states; 'Group-identity conflicts' in 
reference to conflicts arising from scarcity-induced population movements; 
'Deprivation conflicts' in reference to scarcity induced by economic hardships and 
socio-institutional disruptions.  
Harris (cited in Herrero, 2003) adjudicates the environment, scarcity and conflict 
model, drawing attention not just to the resource scarcity-conflict relationship, but 
ties the occurrence of conflict to diminished resilience and capacity to cope with 
the climatic transitions. He posits that conflict, like many other cultural features, 
was a matter of cultural adaptation to conditions of demographic pressure and 
scarcity of natural resources. From this perspective, we can view environmental 
conflict as a legacy of resource crisis shaped by cultural adaptation rather than, as 
he observes, "an instinctive reaction to ecological stress" (Herrero, 2003, p. 8). 
Viewed in this manner, it is instructive to see conflict as a coping strategy against 
livelihood shrinkage. Harris’ conceptualization offers one fundamental conclusion: 
that conflict is but a means of coping with or adapting to livelihood shrinkage. This 
position indicates that any useful analysis of environmental conflict requires the 
contemplation, in combination, of both ecological transition and capacity to cope. 
2.2 Theoretical alliances 
The theoretical alliances that gather around the scarcity-conflict argument lend 
themselves to the Malthusian assumption, which underlines a possible causal link 
between population increase, resource shortage and violence. This neo-classical 
posture is represented quite explicitly in two schools. One school is represented by 
the aforementioned Toronto Group. Thomas Homer-Dixon, who is essentially the 
most renowned representative of this school, outlines four social effects of 
environmental degradation. These are: a decrease in agricultural production; 
general economic decline; population displacements, and disruption of institutions 
and social relations. Accordingly, the group argues, these social effects generate 
and reinforce instability, leading to violent conflict.  
The second view on the scarcity-conflict viewpoint emerges from the 
'Environmental Conflicts Project' (ENCOP) of the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Zurich and the Swiss Peace Foundation in Bern. The mainstay of 
ENCOP is that environmental conflicts manifest themselves as fighting over 
resources, although the emphasis here is on environmental change or degradation 
rather than on the concept of resource per se. The ENCOP school highlights 
degradation as occurring in the following ways: overuse of renewable resources; 
overstrain of the environment's sinking capacity (to deal with pollution), and 
impoverishment of the living space. Ultimately, degradation leads to environmental 
conflicts that "manifest themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious, 
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ideological or territorial conflicts, or conflicts over resources or national interests, 
or any other type of conflict" (Libiszewski, undated:12). 
The 'Toronto Group' is generally credited with attempting to more thoroughly 
elucidate the concept of environmental scarcity. Howard and Homer-Dixon (1996, 
p. 5) differentiate three variants of scarcity. These are: demand-induced scarcity 
caused by population growth or increased per capita resource consumption; supply-
induced scarcity, caused by degradation and depletion of environmental resources; 
and structural scarcity, caused by an unbalanced distribution of resources that 
severely affect less powerful groups in the society. The three types of scarcity 
provide important conceptual clarifications of the scarcity-conflict nexus in Darfur. 
The three paragraphs below briefly discuss the three types of scarcity and the 
possibilities of increasing the risk of violent conflict in Darfur. 
Supply-induced scarcity: Supply scarcity was generally caused by a decrease in 
rainfall. This was chiefly visible in considerable rainfall variations and decline 
from the 1960s through to the 1990s. One important implication of these climatic 
changes was diminished resilience of the nomadic groups to cope with the climatic 
variations, subsequently leading to conflict as a coping strategy. The most notable 
is the great drought and famine of 1984-85 that "led to localized conflicts that 
generally pitted pastoralists against farmers in a struggle for diminishing resources, 
culminating in the Fur-Arab war of 1987-89" (IRIN, 2007). 
Demand-induced scarcity: Population is identified as an important factor in 
demand-induced scarcity. In Darfur, this can be better appreciated by looking at the 
demographic shifts. Driven by population growth, the period 1973-83 saw 
considerable expansion in population density, growing from 4 to 10 people per 
square kilo meter. As the amount of rainfall declined, large groups were forced to 
migrate from the northern to the southern parts of Darfur, in so doing setting deep 
traps that degenerated into ethnic violence shaped by increasing resource 
competition and emerging anti-'outsider' mobilizations. 
Structural scarcity: An important factor at the core of structural scarcity and source 
of political tension has been land use and land ownership issues. Land resource is a 
central function of the livelihoods, both for the inhabitants of African descent who 
are predominantly sedentary farmers, and those of Arab descent who are primarily 
pastoralists. The two groups have dissimilar land-use requirements and patterns, 
and therefore also customarily asserted control and claimed rights over land in 
different ways. The administrative boundary changes imposed by the 
predominantly Arab regime in Khartoum served to alienate the farming tribes 
(Paglia, 2007, p. 34). Tensions were reinforced by contemporary land 
administration issues influenced by nearly 35 years of land-related legislation. The 
most notable legislative events were the 'Unregistered Land Act' of 1970 and 'Civil 
Transactions Act' of 1984, which underscored the "principle of state ownership of 
the land" (USAID, 2003, p. 46). These legislations conferred ownership of all non-
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registered customary lands to the state, thereby removing the control of poor rural 
communities over their land (Ibid, p. 9). This became the rallying point for 
radicalism and rebellion by the African communities, and as a result, the racial 
meaning (of the term African) came to take a strong hold in both the counter-
insurgency and the insurgency in Darfur (Mamdani, 2007). On the other hand, the 
Arab migrants from northern Darfur, hitherto 'guests', were ready to claim rights 
for establishing their own native administration structures in their new homes since 
the land they occupy belongs to the government (Abdul-Jalil, 2006, p. 18). 
2.3 Conceptualizing the Darfur conflict: Causal link between scarcity and 
conflict
Debate on whether competition over natural resources led to conflict is confronted 
by one critical question: is it logical to expand the notion of natural resources into 
the origin of conflict in Darfur? Attempts to answer this question have rendered 
Darfur a ubiquitous case study as far as emerging discussions of the environmental 
dimension of human security is concerned. 
Figure 1 below presents a conceptual diagram of the causal link between scarcity 
due to climate change and conflict in Darfur. Drawing on the synopsis of the three 
types of scarcity outlined in the diagram, it is easy to recognise that the issues 
related to the environment largely emerge as 'proximate causes'. Due to ecological 
stress, the mainly northern populations moved and settled in the southern parts of 
Darfur, heightening pressure on grazing land and water. The decline of rainfall 
resulted in reduced production, and for compensation, horizontal expansion of 
farming became an option for the farmers. On the other hand, due to population 
increases, the average land holding per household or person has decreased (Fadul, 
2004, p. 36). The result is that ethnic fault-lines became more concrete, with these 
differences expressed through violent conflicts. 
3. Environmental degradation, scarcity and conflict in Darfur 
3.1 A look at Darfur’s ecology 
Darfur is located in the western part of Sudan. The region is relatively expansive, 
covering an area of about 496,400 km², which represents approximately 26 percent 
of the total area of Sudan Republic. Darfur lies within a region where ecological 
risks are relatively high. Virtually the entire Darfur region is characterised as arid. 
In spite of this broad categorization, however, the region has different ecological 
configurations, typically desert, semi-desert and low-rainfall savannah woodland 
settings. The northern region of Darfur is desert, the Sahara, and years may pass 
without any rainfall. The eastern region is semi-desert, similarly with little water. 
The western region of Sudan is generally characterized as arid. The southern region 
of western Sudan is known as the qoz, a land of sand dunes that in the rainy season 
is characterized by a rolling mantle of grass and has more reliable sources of water 
with its bore holes (Bilsborrow, et al., 1990; Robinson, 2004). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual diagram of causal link between scarcity and conflict in Darfur 
The important threats related to environmental deterioration in Sudan, and for that 
matter in Darfur, are primarily linked to long-term aridity associated with increased 
temperatures and decreased precipitation. Thus, for a region that is already exposed 
to many environmental hazards, the existing ecological trends, if not addressed, are 
likely to intensify vulnerability. Climate models in Sudan's First National 
Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) project a scenario of warmer temperatures relative to the baseline 
(1961-1990). Accordingly, average temperatures are expected to rise significantly 
by 2060, by 1.5°C - 3.1°C above the baseline during August and 1.1°C - 2.1°C 
during January. In contrast to the increases in temperature, the projections indicate 
that average rainfall will reduce by about 6mm per month during the rainy season 
(Government of Sudan (GOS), 2007:5). 
One of the most salient features of environmental degradation is annual loss of 
forest and other wooded land. In Darfur, there is a total annual loss of 251,333 ha 
against an annual regeneration of 153,201 ha. Furthermore, Darfur, together with 
Kordofan and Equatoria States, faces a further loss of forest, due to desertification, 
war, and so on. In Darfur, the total annual additional loss of forest is 18,281 ha 
(FAO, 2010, p. 7). 
But perhaps more important is that continued insecurity in Darfur has sustained 
negative impacts on the environment. More specifically, displacement into slums, 
camps and informal settlements sets the stage for continued environmental 
degradation. UNEP findings (2007, p. 104) indicate that impacts related to the 
concentration of people in camps or settlements include deforestation and the fuel 
wood crisis in dry land camp areas; land degradation; unsustainable groundwater 
extraction; and water pollution. However, it should, however be considered that, at 
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another level, massive population movements is a major factor in regeneration of 
vegetation.3
One way to examine the manner in which climate change is inducing scarcity in 
Darfur is to look at potential impact on water resources and agricultural production. 
Both water resources and agriculture are identified in the National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPA) of Sudan to be sectors that are quite vulnerable to 
climate change (GOS, 2007).  
Access to water: Climate change is predicted to pose an ongoing threat to water 
resources in Sudan. It is shown that, at the country level, Sudan's water resources 
will be adversely affected by climate change. Water scarcity is primarily a result of 
decreased precipitation and/or increased temperatures and evaporation, with a 
subsequent impact on groundwater recharge. The projections also indicate that, 
under these conditions, soil moisture is likely to decline (GOS, 2007, p. 6). But 
what is probably of more immediate concern is continued groundwater depletion. 
According to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, "The scarcity of water in 
Darfur is growing, with reports of a significant number of wells drying up," 
(Charbonneau, 2010). 
Agricultural production: Although agriculture remains the major economic activity 
of Darfur, productivity is affected by climatic change and environmental 
degradation. Drought threatens approximately 12 million hectares of rain-fed 
agriculture land, particularly in the northern Kordofan and Darfur states 
(Zakieldeen, 2007, p. 15). The predictions of Sudan’s NAPA for the food 
production system is one of dwindling output, chiefly as a result of desertification 
of arable areas. Accordingly, the humid agro-climatic zones are likely to shift 
southward, rendering areas of the north increasingly unsuitable for agriculture 
(GOS, 2007, p. 6). This representation accords with recent UNEP outlook on long-
term crop production. Using climate model to project the scale of potential changes 
in crop yields for sorghum, millet and gum arabic, the results suggested a 
significant drop in crop production in the region of El Obeid, predicting a drop by 
70 percent, from 495 kg/hectare to 150 kg/hectare (UNEP, 2007, p. 61).  
3.2 Context and drivers of localised conflicts in Darfur 
The scope of the analysis of the localised conflicts in Darfur in this paper covers 
the period 1963 to 2002. This span of time was chosen for the fact that the period 
was characterised by increased incidences of localised tribal violence, and it was 
also considered that the post-2003 data may introduce biases in the analysis 
because most of the violence by then pertained largely to emerging ethno-political 
dynamics, which propelled the conflict into higher-level political dimensions. 
3 Russell Schimmer (2009, p. 324) established a steady increase of non-agricultural vegetation 
coverage and vigour, in formerly agrarian and livestock grazing ranges deserted due to the conflict. 
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The wider literature on Darfur suggests that the region has been an arena for inter-
ethnic conflicts throughout recorded history. Conception of how the ethnic 
dimension has influenced the security circumstances is espoused from two 
perspectives: ethnic identity and means of livelihood. On the basis of ethnic 
identity, the inhabitants are broadly classified as either African or Arab. Ethnically, 
Arabs constitute 39 percent while Africans make up 61 percent (Schimmer, 2010, 
p. 24). Notably, the ethnic pattern of identity seems to be the one that has shaped 
the region's socio-political trajectory.  
On the basis of means of livelihood, the inhabitants are classified as either 
sedentary farmers or nomadic pastoralists. Most people of African descent are 
sedentary farmers and reside mainly in the southern region of Darfur, exceptions 
being Zaghawa and Bedeyat tribes, that together with most people of Arab descent 
are nomadic herders and inhabit mainly the northern zone of Darfur.4
The two sources that were reviewed during the preparation of this paper: UNEP 
(2007, p. 82) and Suliman (2000, p. 12) established a total number of 45 conflict 
incidents occurred over a 34-year period, between 1968 and 2002. According to the 
records, the conflicts involved a total of 34 ethnic groups, comprising 16 African 
and 18 Arab communities, in essence representing 14 sedentary farmer and 20 
pastoralist communities.  
3.3 Livelihood patterns and links to local conflicts in Darfur 
Inherent in the debate around the localised conflicts in Darfur is the aspect of 
livelihoods. The patterns of livelihood are broadly classified as either nomadic 
pastoralism or sedentary farming. Although the conflict that has afflicted the region 
is widely viewed as a conflict between the Arab and Black African communities, it 
is patterns of livelihoods that appear to have, in the main, influenced the security 
threats.
Figure 2 provides information about the livelihoods of the main parties in the local 
conflicts in Darfur during the specified period. Conflict records suggest that, out of 
the 39 incidents for which we are able to identify the main actors, the highest 
number (26) were those that pitted a pastoralist group against a sedentary farmer 
group. On the other hand, 13 incidents involved two pastoralist groups. An 
observation that deserves attention is that none of the incidents played out as a 
‘farmer-farmer’ clash, notwithstanding the fact that up to 14 sedentary farmer 
groups were involved in conflicts with Arabs. Although it is difficult to tell who 
between the pastoralists and sedentary farmers were the aggressor, the pattern of 
violence compellingly suggest that it was the pastoralists. A plausible answer lies 
in the fact that, among pastoralists, migration constitutes an important mechanism 
to deal with climatic stress, putting the pastoralists and sedentary famers into 
conflict with each other. Viewed against the backdrop of the ethnic identities of the 
main actors, the livelihoods issue appears to be a more nuanced factor than 
4 Unlike the Arab pastoralists, the Zaghawa and the Bedeyat are primarily camel herders 
ethnicity, which in a way goes against the inherent assumption regarding the 
influence of ethnicity as the single most important factor in the occurrence of 
violence.
Fig. 2: Livelihoods of the main parties in the local conflict in Darfur between 1968 and 
2002. Sources: UNEP (2007); Suliman (2000) 
3.4 Assessment of the conflict drivers 
The debate over the factors responsible for the conflict in Darfur illustrates the 
intricacy of a conflict that has various dimensions. There is no doubt that many of 
the drivers of local violence in Darfur were, at least in part, environmental. The 
way to corroborate this is to look at causes of conflict at the local level. Figure 3 
presents the issues revolving around the local conflicts prior to the large scale war.5
A clear observation that emerges is that issues related to natural resources–resource 
disputes and territorial disputes–constituted the overriding causal factors of the 
violence. Additionally, aspects of resource issues, notably grazing rights, can be 
discerned as having played an important role, in combination with other factors in 
the occurrence of tribal conflicts. 
Taking the above into account, there is certainty that resource scarcity was an 
important aspect of insecurity in Darfur. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
environmental pressure that prevailed in northern Darfur since the 1970s rendered, 
particularly, the pastoralist groups vulnerable to losing their livelihoods. In the face 
5 For the purposes of this discussion, the conflict drivers are classified into four broad categories: 
Resource disputes (grazing and water rights); Territorial disputes (administrative boundaries, land 
disputes); Administration and leadership disputes (local political); Combined factors (local politics, 
grazing rights and cattle raiding).  
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of these stresses, the pastoralists adopted a range of coping strategies, some of 
these making them more vulnerable to conflict. The findings from the UNEP 
assessment (2007, p. 86) draws attention to three pastoralist coping strategies 
(among others) that generate the risk of conflict. These are: competing directly 
with other grazers for preferred areas of higher productivity (conflict risk), moving 
and grazing livestock on cropland without consent (conflict risk), and reducing 
competition by forcing other pastoralists and agriculturalists off previously shared 
land as a last resort (proactive conflict). 
Fig. 3: Drivers of local conflicts in Darfur between 1968 and 2002 
                            Sources: UNEP (2007); Suliman (2000) 
3.5 Environmental scarcities, vulnerability and conflict risk 
As noted in an earlier section in this paper, the three types of scarcity (supply, 
demand and structural) all predisposed Darfur to security risks, in one way or 
another. As a basis for discussion, however, the analysis in this section focuses 
primarily on the supply and demand variables of scarcity, which are key to the case 
and, therefore of more relevance in this context. The linkages between these 
scarcities and conflict are discussed in detail below. 
3.5.1 The role of rainfall as a contributing cause of scarcity and conflict: The
existing literature is replete with evidence of linkages between rainfall shortage and 
the occurrence of local conflict. It is important to note that, although the analysis 
provided in this section is made for Darfur as a whole, rainfall has a very high 
variability both spatially and temporally. Figure 4 presents the annual mean rainfall 
in Darfur for the period 1963-2002. As reflected in the inter-annual means, the data 
shows evidence of dynamic variability virtually throughout the 1960s to 80s 
rainfall history. The most outstanding negative outliers occurred during the 1980s 
period, which was also associated with the period of the most intense drought in 
Sudan’s recorded history.  
A useful way to look at rainfall trends is also to examine long-period average 
precipitation, in this case based on inter-decadal means. Considered wholesale, 
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there is indication of lower rainfall between 1972-82 and 1983-92 decadal 
interludes. Notable inter-decadal outliers are evident in 1972, 1982 and 1988. 
Kevane and Gray (2008, p. 5) established that the series exhibited one structural 
break in 1972, which accords with the dating of negative outlier in 1972.  
Fig. 4: Annual mean rainfall in Darfur between 1963 and 2002 
Sources: Suliman (2008); Kevane and Gray (2008)6
Table 1 again displays the rainfall estimates for Darfur between 1936-2002, 
presented as minimum, maximum, mean and coefficient of variation (CV)7 in five-
year bases. Overall, the data points to relatively high rainfall variability as reflected 
in an overall CV of 21.0 percent. Of note here is the five-year period between 1983 
and 1987 in which the most variable rainfall was recorded, with a CV of 34.0 
percent.
Having noted this, we can now look at the interrelation between rainfall and 
conflicts in Darfur during this period. In Figure 5, rainfall is plotted against conflict 
records. The conflict data is presented in stacked columns, with each stack 
representing numbers of conflict incidents. It can be seen that the period since the 
mid-70s saw a definite increase in the level of local conflicts in Darfur. It is, 
however worthy of note that fewer violent incidences occurred between 1983 and 
1986 in spite of the particularly low rainfall.  
6 For the period between 1989 and 2002, the overall precipitation estimates are based on the 
combined average for four latitudinal-longitudinal nodes: Northwestern (lat. 13.75, long. 23.75); 
Northeastern (lat. 13.75, long. 26.25); Southwestern (lat. 11.25, long. 23.75) and Southeastern (lat. 
11.25, long. 26.25), based on David Lister, Climate Research Unit. As such, the 1963-1988 and 1989-
2002 datasets are not necessarily comparable. 
7 The CV represents the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the five-year integrated 
precipitation values, and is useful for comparing the degree of variation. 
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Table 1: Mean rainfall for Darfur in five-year period between 1963 and 2002 
Period Minimum Maximum Mean CV 
1963-1967 408 565 462 15 
1968-1972 424 496 469 7
1973-1977 330 468 407 13 
1978-1982 275 451 388 18 
1983-1987 143 381 253 34 
1988-1992 418 520 481 8
1993-1997 455 513 478 5
1998-2002 370 523 440 14 
Overall 143 565 422 21 
                           Sources: Suliman (2008); Kevane and Gray (2008) 
Interestingly, what we seem to observe is that years of negative outliers appeared to 
record none or lower incidents of conflict. On the contrary, an increase in conflict 
incidents appeared to coincide with the years of positive outliers, notably 1990-91 
and 1996-97. It is perhaps for this reason that scholars such as Kevane and Gray 
(2008) critique attempts to correlate rainfall with the emergence of Darfur conflict. 
They argue that, although there is evidence of structural break to a lower level of 
rainfall in northern Darfur in the early 1970s, rainfall in Darfur did not decline 
significantly in the years immediately prior to the crisis. They, however, appear to 
observe caution on this conclusion, noting that, for longer periods of time, say 50 
year periods, there is considerable evidence of a decline.
Fig. 5: Relationship between rainfall and conflict in Darfur between 1963 and 2002 
Sources: Rainfall records: Suliman (2008); Kevane and Gray (2008);  
               Conflict records: UNEP (2007); Suliman (2000) 
To discount the rainfall-conflict linkage, Kevane and Gray make the observation 
that structural break to lower mean rainfall levels appear to be uncorrelated with 
subsequent conflict in other Sahelian African countries, yet levels of violence have 
been nowhere near those of Darfur (2008, p. 2). But probably more interesting is 
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their second observation that many African countries that have not experienced 
structural declines in rainfall nevertheless saw increased conflict over the past 
several decades. To understand the rainfall-conflict relationship, nonetheless, we 
must first acknowledge the fact that pastoralists have over generations become well 
adapted to coping with harsh environments of Arid and Semi-arid Lands (ASALs) 
of the Sahel. Putting this into perspective, analysis of the rainfall-conflict 
relationship can therefore never be based on the presence or absence of 
immediately identifiable violent events, rather, conflict can be understood as the 
effect of long-term reduced adaptive capacity to conditions of low rainfall, which 
makes it more difficult to pinpoint the relationship. 
Having noted the above, it becomes necessary to draw a distinction between the 
conflict drivers relative to rainfall over time. As shown, factors related to resource 
competition have been the most pronounced throughout the history of local 
conflicts. As such, resource scarcity may indeed be the common factor behind the 
eruption and surge in local conflicts. An important observation is that issues related 
to territorial disputes began to emerge during the late 1980s and became 
particularly intense in 1990-91. This may be attributed to the massive movements 
of people as a result of the drought and famine of the mid 1980s, which more 
profoundly affected the pastoralists. Virtually all reports from past studies 
investigating environmental linkages to local conflicts in Darfur cited pastoralist 
movements from the northern to southern parts of Darfur as a major cause of 
conflict. The UNEP (2007, p. 59) assessment shows that "Annual variability and 
relative scarcity of rainfall–in the north of Sudan in particular–have a dominant 
effect on agriculture and food security, and are strongly linked to displacement and 
related conflicts."
3.5.2 Population growth as a contributing cause of scarcity and conflict: The 
notable factor affecting demand-induced scarcity is population growth (UNEP, 
2007, p. 85). That said, population pressure has, in effect, been identified as an 
important contributor to the increase in local conflict in Darfur. Comparison of the 
population growth rates between 1956-2003 censuses portrays a sharp 
demographic shift, indicating a population rise from just over 1 million in 1956 to 
approximately 6.5 million people in 2003 (Fadul, 2004, p. 35; United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2008, p. 18). In line with this growth, the almost half century 
period witnessed a relatively large increase in the population density, growing from 
3 to well over 18 persons per km2 (Ibid).
Differences in growth rates are, however, evident when comparison is made 
between North and South Darfur. For example, between 1983 and 1993, North 
Darfur’s population dropped from approximately 1.3 to 1.2 million. On the 
contrary, South Darfur witnessed an increase from approximately 1.8 to 2.2 million 
(Mundt, 2011). Continued differences in the population growth rates are further 
noted for the period 1998-2003. Expressed as percentages, the population growth 
rates are given as 3.2 percent and 3.5 percent in North and South Darfur 
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respectively (World Bank, 2003, p. 1). This may partly be reflective of the well 
documented population movements and resettlement from the North to South 
Darfur during the period. A review of the literature shows that numerous Zaghawa 
pastoralists lost their livestock and moved south, where they became farmers. 
Tama and Gimir populations also moved south. At the same time, Arab nomads 
from northern Darfur and Chad established damras (nomad settlements) further 
south in Darfur (Tearfund, 2007, p.21).  
Studies of relationship between population movements and unfavourable 
environmental conditions in the greater Sudan confirm that intensified migration 
patterns as a result of unfavourable environmental conditions were in fact not 
confined to Darfur. For example, the drought of the 1980s had a dramatic effect on 
pastoralist movements in the Jonglie region of Southern Sudan. The durations of 
stay seem to range from few months to well over twenty years (Omondi, 2011, p. 
7). It is clear from the foregoing that, the propensity for longer periods of stay is 
what breeds inter-ethnic conflicts. Longer periods of stay can be interpreted as 
going against the customary system of seasonal migration, which is the essence of 
the right of access to resources during the dry seasons (Ibid). 
Other than the general population increase, again what is remarkable is the decline 
of population segment identified as nomadic. A comparison of the nomadic 
population from four censuses conducted between 1956 and 1993 shows dramatic 
decline in Darfur’s nomadic population. Relative to the total population, the 
nomadic population was only about 4 percent, down from about 15 percent and 19 
percent in 1983 and 1973, respectively (Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre 
(DRDC), 2010, p. 25). This, in a way, points to increased motivation amongst the 
nomadic groups to turn to sedentary farming, particularly during the 1980s. This 
perspective accords with the observation that "nomadic groups are currently 
subject to the severe constriction of their pastoralist domain, accompanied by the 
blocking of livestock migration and trade routes by conflict-related insecurity, 
which has in turn badly affected traditional livelihoods" (Mundt, 2011). 
An important implication of the population pressure and increasing demand for 
higher levels of food production, particularly in southern Darfur, is the effect on 
the extent and intensity of land use, which ultimately had a long-term impact on 
food production. Concomitant with this argument, traditional land use has been 
significantly altered. For example, this has led to shorter fallow periods and hence 
to the removal of vegetation cover and the dismantling of the top soil layer on the 
qoz sands, opening the possibilities for reactivation of the consolidated sand dunes 
and the advancement of moving sands (Mangouri, 2004, p. 46). Farming has also 
been extended the light clay and gardud soils on the wadi beds, which previously 
were reserved for dry season grazing areas for the livestock of nomads and settlers 
(Fadul, 2004). 
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4. Response to climatic risks: adaptation versus conflict
4.1 Inter-community mechanisms and conflict management strategies 
While it would be unrealistic to claim that relations between pastoralists and 
agricultural communities in Darfur were consistently good, the capacity of Darfur’s 
inhabitants to cope with the climatic variations in large part was derived from the 
complementary nature of their dissimilar livelihood. It is noted that, until 1970, 
there is also a well-documented history of local resolution for such conflicts, 
through established mediation and dispute resolution mechanisms (UNEP, 2008, p. 
83). For that reason, the level of inter-ethnic cooperation has been a key element of 
both ecological adaptation and conflict management strategies. 
The strategies of the local communities involved livelihood techniques that were 
suitable and sustainable for the fragile Western Sudan habitat where Darfur is 
located. Research shows that communities in Darfur developed a range of coping 
mechanisms that involved regulations governing the use of natural resources. 
These strategies were underpinned by a system of reciprocity between nomadic and 
farming groups. Accordingly, the ecological variations between different duur8
(homelands) encouraged tribal leaders to establish close, symbiotic relations, 
amounting almost to alliances, that became important mechanisms ensuring the 
access of pastoralists to land and natural resources (Young et al., 2009, p. 40). As a 
general rule, the communities tried to avoid acts that would cause tension. 
Essentially, these measures were institutionalised and became well-recognised 
within the local government and community systems. 
One approach involved the accommodation of newcomers, known as hakura. This 
system allowed for settlement9 of newcomers, whether they are individuals or 
groups, provided that they adhered to customary regulations, the most important of 
which is to remain subject to the administrative authorities of the host tribe, 
irrespective of whether they are temporary visitors or have the intent to settle 
permanently (Abdul-Jalil, 2006, p. 17). As noted, for the nomadic groups, this 
arrangement afforded them the advantage of exploiting a variety of resources in 
different ecological zones (Ibid). 
Another approach was the communal grazing scheme known as talaig that tended 
to create a symbiotic relationship between sedentary farming and nomadic 
pastoralist groups. Tailag enabled pastoralists to cope with the harsh environment 
by allowing free use of the crop residue by all the pastoralist communities. Local
governments enhanced the practice by issuing legislation and local acts, by 
determining a certain time after the rainy season for the farmer to collect their 
crops and leave the crop residue to be used by animals from all the community 
(Fadul, 2004, p. 40).  
8 The term duur refers to homelands, and is the plural form of dar.
9 Settlement in this regard did not imply ownership of the land. 
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The third approach involved the designation of cattle routes known as marahiel and 
masarat (cattle routes up and down the region), to prevent potential conflicts 
between the pastoralists and farmers (USAID, 2003, p. 21). Livestock migration 
routes enhanced pastoralists’ ability to cope with climatic variability. Some routes 
were officially recognised by the local government and communities, although 
some tribes also followed routes that were negotiated but not officially recognised. 
In Darfur, this arrangement provided for eleven passages on the eastern and 
western parts of Jebel Marra Plateau (Fadul, 2004, p. 30). 
4.2 Scarcity and collapse of inter-community mechanisms 
The ecological pressures on inter-community mechanisms can be appreciated from 
the well-documented population movements from the north into the central, 
southern and western parts, especially attributed to the drought of 1984-85 (De 
Waal, 1989). However, these movements also created deep-seated ecological traps 
that, over time, transformed the pastoralist-farmer relationship into one of inter-
ethnic competition and conflict rather than cooperation and co-existence. The 
supply- and demand-induced scarcity factors go a long way in explaining the 
collapse of the existing conflict management strategies. It stands to reason that 
these coping and conflict management systems began to disintegrate due to 
reducing rainfall and diminishing resilience of the local communities.  
First, looking at mechanism based on hakura, the collapse of this mechanism has 
been variously attributed to population thresholds. The toll from these movements 
reduced "the ability of local people to adapt to the new realities and the subsequent 
questions of land use and resource sharing continued to threaten peaceful 
coexistence in the area and the social cohesion of the entire community" (King and 
Osman, 2004, p. 12). This makes a case that the migrating pastoralists extended the 
duration of their stay or chose to permanently settle in their new locations. As 
noted, this situation that was destined to incite local tensions and provoke violent 
resource-based conflicts (Ibid). 
The collapse of mechanisms based on tailag is similarly most often blamed on 
changing rainfall. Farmers could not start planting or harvesting according to the 
cultivation cycle. Accordingly, the expected dates of crop harvest became 
unpredictable. On the other hand, the environmental stresses also disrupted 
nomadic grazing practices; pastoralists had to move earlier to escape the drought 
and the lack of grazing land and water (USAID, 2003, p. 44). The migratory 
movements of nomads during the rainy season caused crop damage and eventually 
led to open conflicts between farmers and herders (Okello et al., 2004, p. 10). 
The factors that led to the collapse of the mechanisms based on marahiel and 
masarat are, however, not quite as straightforward, but can possibly be explained 
on the basis of all three types of scarcity. Migration routes that have traditionally 
been used are no longer available due to the introduction of mechanised farming, 
which took away crucial farming and pastoral rangelands and migration routes. To 
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a large extent, this may explain the apparent decrease in the population of the 
nomadic groups. For example, due to the uncontrolled expansion of mechanised 
farming, pastoral migration routes are increasingly becoming narrower and shorter, 
between 150 and 300 metres wide as compared to 2 to 4 miles during the colonial 
time (Babiker, 2011, p. 5).  
5. Conclusion
This discussion has addressed the main issues at the centre of the debate about 
whether climate change and, for that matter, environment, is responsible for the 
human security situation in Darfur. While there is no agreement as to the extent 
environmental phenomena have played a role in producing the current conflict in 
Darfur, the evidence presented shows that the periods during which Darfur 
witnessed climatic transition and a demographic shift overlapped and these periods 
were accompanied by local conflicts. This view corresponds with the large body of 
literature that similarly suggests a link between scarcity and security.  
Revisiting the coping and conflict management strategies in Darfur, it is has been 
shown that pre-existing inter-ethnic relationships were shaped by cooperation and 
interdependence between the herder and farmer communities. These measures were 
well integrated in the local government and community systems. The prevailing 
circumstances in Darfur therefore point to the collapse of the traditional inter-
community mechanisms for coping and conflict management, which in the past 
facilitated accommodation of newcomers, communal grazing and designated cattle 
routes. The failure to practice prudent governance management measures in the 
region included obliteration, through legislation, of the long-established land tenure 
system that played an important role in the pastoralist-farmer symbiotic 
relationship. 
The evidence offered in this paper points to two observations: The first observation 
is that the localised conflicts that eventually led to large-scale conflict were not 
simply the result of environmental scarcity, but rather can be viewed as a response 
to increased vulnerability and reduced resilience. Reduced resilience and adaptive 
capacities as a result of the collapse of the above mentioned inter-community 
mechanisms for coping and conflict management strategies created deep-seated 
ecological traps that, over time, transformed the pastoralist-farmer relationship into 
one of inter-ethnic competition. From this, we take the view that climatic change 
on its own was essentially not an immediate cause of conflict; rather it is the 
diminished resilience and ensuing collapse of the community coping and conflict 
management mechanisms that most critically set the stage for the violence. 
The second observation relates to the ubiquitous ethnicity-environment question. It 
is apparent that the ethnic perspective is often dichotomised on the basis of Arab 
and Non-Arab, continues to be emphatic, and has often masked the livelihood 
dimension in a variety of ways, which is in every respect the most salient factor. 
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Notably, in Darfur, ethnicity and livelihood are closely related aspects of identity 
formation, and it is probably this that makes it difficult to map out causalities when 
it comes to the ethnicity-environment question. Thus, whereas ethnicity lies at the 
heart of this conflict, the ethnic dimension is a product of the wider environmental 
stress, and can therefore be considered, at most, an indirect cause of the conflicts. 
By this account, environmental challenges are a more real and immediate problem 
in Darfur. In contrast, ethnic fault-lines are solidified once conflicts emerge, and at 
that point ethnicity begins to have a more causal effect in perpetuating violence 
(Suliman, cited in Kuznar & Sedlmeyer, 2005, p. 5-6). 
Overall, this paper provides a basis for a more holistic appreciation of the Darfur 
problem, and for looking at the ongoing conflict in depth. The Darfur conflict can 
only be more adequately addressed by getting to the underlying causes, which are 
environmental. Therefore, the following recommendations will be pertinent: 
• It is necessary to separate between the different layers of causes of the Darfur 
crisis, to allow for more focused intervention. Currently, the Darfur problem 
straddles political, security, ethnic, economic and ecological dimensions. 
Placing the above into perspective, what is of relevance to this discussion is 
that the ecological dimension needs to be tackled through relevant approaches. 
This underscores the need to particularly address issues such as deforestation, 
which have significant consequences on the environment.  
• Sustainable natural resource management needs to be incorporated at the local 
community level. This means that the carrying capacity of a given area should 
be assessed against demand and appropriate strategies implemented to ensure 
environmental degradation are mitigated.  
• Policy-wise, this paper speaks to the value of instituting indigenous or 
contemporary adaptation, conflict management and early warning 
mechanisms. This calls for a return to institutionalization of community-based 
mechanisms in order to facilitate collaborative regulation of the use of 
communal resources, including water, pasture and agricultural land, and 
migration routes. 
• Given that Darfur is an ecologically fragile region with economies largely 
dependent on the environment, the over-dependence on primary production is 
very delicate and brings into question the sustainability of current livelihood 
systems. Grappling with the challenges of livelihoods and rising population, it 
is prudent to put together measures that trim down demand-induced scarcity 
by supporting alternative livelihoods away from primary production. 
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Inter-Ateker Discord: The Case of the Nyangatom and the 
Turkana
Gebre Yntiso1
Abstract 
This paper explains the longstanding inter-ethnic discord between the Nyangatom 
and the Turkana, and examines the effectiveness of the dispute resolution 
approaches tried so far. Both groups belong to the Karamojong Cluster (also 
Ateker), an ethno-geographic designation of numerous ethnic groups living in 
Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. The relationship between the 
Nyangatom and the Turkana began to deteriorate after the former lost control over 
their grazing land in the Kibish area during the colonial period. Over the years, 
the steady increase in herd size, exceeding carrying capacity; the changes in 
climatic patterns that led to frequent drought; the cultural values that incite 
violence; and the participation of non-pastoral groups in raids, made the conflict 
complex and complicated. In recent years, the Nyangatom-Turkana discord 
increased in frequency and intensity largely due to competition over scarce 
resources. The major consequences of this rather protracted inter-ethnic conflict 
include loss of precious life, permanent injuries, loss of access to pasture and 
water, and failing livelihoods. Thus far, the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya 
failed to stop the cross-border inter-ethnic conflicts in the Ilemi Triangle - a 
disputed territory. It is high time to devise a comprehensive program intervention 
in the border area to attain lasting peace.  
1. Introduction
This paper explores the relationship between two ethnic groups: the Nyangatom of 
Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya. Both groups are members of the Ateker or the 
Karamojong (also Karimojong) Cluster, an ethno-geographic designation of 
numerous ethnic groups living in northeastern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, 
southeastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia.2 It seems that there is no 
1 A number of individuals and organisations deserve recognition and appreciation for their part in the 
research that led to the production of this chapter. First and foremost, I would like to thank all the 
Nyangatom informants for sharing their experience and valuable insight without any reservation. 
Acknowledgements are due to government officials and experts at the district, zonal, and regional 
levels for providing information. I want to express my indebtedness to Ekal Nettir, the Administrator 
of Nyangatom Woreda, for his unreserved support in providing information, facilitating local 
transportation, and ensuring security. The success of the initial research in Nyangatom was a result of 
the determination and diligence of the translators and field assistants, namely, Lobuwa Kakuata, 
Willimam Achuka, and Markos Lokali. Last but not least, my special gratitude goes to Phillemon 
Nakali for sending from abroad useful insight about the history and culture of the Nyangatom people. 
2Terrence McCabe (1996), in Encyclopedia of World Cultures, wrote, "Oral history and 
archaeological evidence suggest that, prior to A.D. 1500, the ancestors of the Ateker Language Group 
lived somewhere in southern Sudan and most likely subsisted as hunter and gatherer peoples. After 
beginning their southern migration, these ancestral peoples incorporated both agricultural and pastoral 
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clear consensus on which ethnic groups belong or do not belong to the Karamojong 
Cluster. Based on the works of previous researchers, Michael Quam (1999, p. 2) 
identified the Dodoth, Jie, Karimojong (which is further divided into Bokora, 
Matheniko, and Pian sub-groups), Teso, Turkana (Kenya), and one or two groups 
in Sudan, as the core groups of the Karamojong Cluster. The Jiye and the Toposa 
of South Sudan and the Nyangatom in Ethiopia are widely recognized as members 
of the Ateker group. In different online sources, the Chekwi, Kumam, Labwor, and 
Tepes are also reported to belong to the Karamojong Cluster. 
Most members of the Karamojong Cluster speak mutually intelligible languages, 
share certain cultural values and practices and common religious traditions, and 
pursue similar livelihood strategies (agro-pastoralism—although the level of 
dependence on livestock or crop production varies from one group to another). The 
relationship between the various members of the Ateker is characterized by both 
hostility and solidarity. For example, the Nyangatom maintain friendly relations 
with the Toposa and frequently fight with the Turkana. If they all belong to the 
same geographic, socio-economic, and ethnic cluster, what is the reason that they 
maintain solidarity with some and are hostile with others? 
Based on information obtained from the Nyangatom people in the South Omo Zone 
(Ethiopia) and a review of documents, this paper attempts to identify the factors 
that contributed to inter-ethnic discord. There will also be discussions about the 
social organisations of the Nyangatom and the effectiveness of customary and 
official dispute resolution mechanisms. It is important to understand the factors 
which divide the two groups, their historical and cultural relationship, and their 
existing conflict resolution methods, in order to identify the connectors (peace 
potentials) that could be used to revitalise solidarity between the Nyangatom and 
the Turkana.  
The study, which started in 2010 in Nyangatom and continued in Jinka (the capital 
of the South Omo Zone) and Addis Ababa until September 2011, employed 
qualitative research methods (interviews, focus group discussions, and 
observations) and document reviews. The local residents of the Nyangatom (men, 
women, young, and old), government officials at different administrative levels, 
and relevant experts were interviewed at different times. The limitation of this 
paper is the absence of the Turkana perspective on the pertinent issues discussed. 
pursuits, and eventually split into groups that emphasised one subsistence strategy or another.” 
According to another online source (http://www.littlestar.com/karamojong/karmjong/migrate.htm), 
"The Karamojong originated … in what is now southern Ethiopia and Sudan. Traditions of the 
Karamojong group hold that the land they came from was mountainous and blessed with abundant 
rainfall.… Others have pointed to the Omo river valley, a tributary of Lake Turkana, as their point of 
origin. Several hundred years ago, somewhere between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries, a large 
migration of the original people (usually called the Plains Nilotes) began…. These Plains Nilotic 
peoples fanned out heading to west, south, …. The Toposa, the Jiye, and the Nyangatom seemed to 
retrace their steps to the northeast, almost returning to the point from which they began."  
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However, attempts have been made to review relevant studies, which focus on 
insight and experience in Turkana. 
Conceptually, this paper follows certain lines of argument to provide a context for 
broader understanding of the complexity of conflict in the area. Given the fragile 
nature of the physical environment, the variability and unpredictability of rainfall, 
the scarcity of vital resources (water and pasture), the increased human and 
livestock population pressure, and the absence of alternative livelihood strategies, 
conflict is expected. Moreover, given the diversity of the actors (for example, the 
pastoral communities, state players, livestock traders, commercial raiders, arms 
dealers, armed gangsters), it would be naïve to assume that everyone values peace 
or strives to attain it. There might be individuals and/or groups whose interests are 
better served only when conflict prevails. Therefore, both conceptually and 
practically, it is important to recognise the complexity of conflict and the need for 
comprehensive intervention.  
In the context of this paper, inter-ethnic pastoral conflict is conceptualised as a 
confrontation that prevails between groups of people who have or perceive to have 
competing interests to resources (in this case, pasture and water points), power, and 
opportunities. In the context of pastoral conflict, due to certain trigger factors, the 
prevailing confrontational situations often manifest themselves in violence that 
involves the killing and maiming people, livestock raids, property destruction, and 
the creation of widespread insecurity. Not all confrontations culminate in violence, 
as the opponents often have the opportunity to resolve differences peacefully. 
Violence could be averted by addressing the root causes of conflict and by 
preventing the trigger factors. Both strategies require the creation of the conditions 
necessary for the opponents to feel safe and united, and able to benefit from the 
mutual connection. In this regard, at the intervention level, attempts need to be 
made to identify the commonalities that could serve as connectors. Moreover, it is 
necessary to devise new strategies (such as border area joint projects) that promote 
cultural and socio-economic integration. 
The paper is divided into five parts. This introduction is followed by the second 
part, which provides a brief ethnographic account of the Nyangatom people—
background information, for example, on location, environment, history, economy, 
internal division, external relations, and development. In part three, the major 
factors that contributed to and escalated the inter-ethnic conflict between the 
Nyangatom and the Turkana are analytically discussed. The social organisations of 
the Nyangatom, and the various conflict resolution approaches attempted thus far, 
are discussed in part four. Knowledge of social organisations helps to enhance our 
understanding of the identity, role, power, and legitimacy of decision-makers. The 
concluding remarks and the recommendations represent the last part of the paper.   
Climate Change and Pastoralism
354
2. The study area 
2.1 Overview of the Nyangatom world 
The Nyangatom (also known as Gnangatom) people, who belong to the Nilo-
Saharan language family, live in Southwestern Ethiopia, in the border region 
between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. Kangaten, the capital of Nyangatom Woreda,
is located some 848 km southwest of Addis Ababa. According to the latest national 
census, the population of the Nyangatom ethnic group is 25,252 (Central Statistics 
Authority (CSA), 2007, p. 85), and the land area inhabited by the group is 
estimated to be 2,183.6 sq km.3 The official territory of the Nyangatom stretches 
from the Omo river in the east to the Kibish river in the west.4 While those who 
live in the west and central parts of the territory rely heavily on livestock 
production, those in the east largely depend on flood retreat cultivation of sorghum, 
some maize, cowpeas, and tobacco along the Omo River. The Nyangatom send 
their livestock (especially cattle) to cattle camps, located far away from permanent 
residential areas, where only milking cows and small stocks are kept. Those taking 
care of the animals in the cattle camp rely heavily on blood and milk for their 
subsistence.
The Nyangatom people have different social organisations: territorial sections 
(ngiteala, sing. ekitala), generation-sets (ngikasa, sing. ekas), age-sets (ngigerea,
sing ajere), and clans (ngitekerea, sing. ateker). These institutions play different 
roles in the secular and sacred lives of the people. The Nyangatom Woreda, which 
was established only in 2006, consists of three ethnic groups (Nyangatom, Kwegu 
or Muguji, and Murle) and 20 Kebele (local administrative tier). In the last five 
years, the new Woreda has taken encouraging steps in the area of office 
organisation, health provision, school enrolment, agricultural extension, gender 
participation, transportation and communication, and investment attraction. 
Regarding inter-ethnic conflict, the officials worked hard to convince local people 
to refrain from engaging in raids and revenge actions. Moreover, in collaboration 
with NGOs, they organised a series of peace initiatives and motivated people to 
focus on development activities. These efforts are reported to have significantly 
contributed to the reduction in the number of counter attacks from the Nyangatom 
side (CEWARN, 2010a). In the Nyangatom area, modernity is still far from a 
reality. The people continue to lead a traditional life, heavily reliant on their rich 
knowledge to exploit their natural environment.  
Protestant Christianity was introduced in the Nyangatom territory in the early 
1970s by the Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission (SPCM). The Mission made a 
modest contribution, in terms of providing modern education, healthcare, and 
irrigated agriculture. Most of the educated Nyangatom, currently serving or 
representing their people in different capacities, attended the mission school. 
3 The figure for land area was obtained from the South Omo Zone Administration. 
4 The local people claim that the Kibish area (both sides of the Kibish River) was their traditional 
homeland with its western border further west from the river. 
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Although the Church existed for a long time, it was only from the second half of 
the 1980s that teachings of the Bible spread in the society.  
The Nyangatom people are surrounded by eight ethnic groups, namely, the Surma 
(Suri), Mursi, Kwegu (Muguji), Kara, Murle, Dassanech, Toposa, and Turkana. 
While the first seven reside in Ethiopia, the last two live outside of Ethiopia. 
Historically, the Nyangatom maintained peaceful relationships with the Toposa and 
the two small groups, the Muguji and Murle.5 On the other hand, they had a history 
of conflict with the Surma to the northwest, the Mursi to the north, the Kara and the 
Hamar to the east, and the Dassanech and the Turkana to the south. The 
Nyangatom, who were feared because of their reputation as ferocious warriors in 
the 1970s and 1980s, have now became a calm people—in the face of repetitive 
attacks from their neighbours. The decline in the motivation for aggression and the 
number of revenge killings was partly explained, by Christian informants in 
Nyangatom, in terms of religious teachings about sin and forgiveness. Many others 
attributed the reduction in the incidents of fighting to a lack of weapons, especially 
bullets, which ran out when the Sudanese civil war ended. There are still others 
(notably woreda government officials and development experts) who strongly 
believe that the recent development initiatives launched by the government 
significantly diverted the attention of people away from war. For a combination of 
reasons, the Nyangatom people were prepared and committed to lasting peace with 
their neighbours, especially the Turkana. This is an important peace opportunity on 
which to build.  
2.2 Nyangatom migration and inter-Ateker relations 
According to oral history, the Nyangatom migrated perhaps some 200 years ago 
from the Karamoja area, northeast Uganda, together with the Toposa–because of 
drought that caused the deaths of humans and livestock. Gulliver, (1968) (in 
Tornay, 1979, p. 98), considered the Nyangatom as a splinter group of the Toposa, 
who, in turn, originated from the Jie of Uganda. However, Serge Tornay (1979, p. 
98) noted that the separation of the Nyangatom from the related Paranilotes might 
have occurred around 1800, at least concomitant with that of the Toposa. Upon 
arrival, while some of the Nyangatom settled west of the Kibish River, others 
moved further east and settled at Lere, near the Omo River. Informants noted that 
the Arbore6 and the Dassanech were the original inhabitants of the Kibish and Omo 
areas respectively. The Nyangatom were already in the lower Omo valley by the 
time Count Samuel Teleki and Ludwig von Höhnel (travellers) visited the area in 
1888. Tornay (1979, p. 98) wrote: 
5 The Murle were called Narich and treated as one of the seven territorial sections of the Nyangatom 
until recently. At the moment, the Murle are officially registered as constituting an independent ethnic 
group.
6 It appears that there was some kind of Nyangatom-Arbore integration or assimilation. One of the 
territorial sections of the Nyangatom called Ngilingaqol is believed to be related to the Arbore, who 
later migrated east. 
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At the time of the first explorations of the Lake Turkana area (by 
Höhnel and Teleki in 1888) two groups of Nyangatom, one at 
Kibish who were mainly cattle herders (the Dongiro), and the other 
at the Omo itself who lived mainly by cultivation and fishing (the 
Puma), were already settled in the Lower Omo Valley. 
The Nyangatom people recognise the Karamojong as the earliest tribe, from which 
all Ateker members originated. According to one resourceful informant, the word 
Karamojong is made up of two terms: ngikaru (year) and mojong (old). Thus, the 
Nyangatom define Karamojong as their ancestors who had lived for many years 
before their migration to their current location. All ethnic groups that originated 
from the earliest tribe (Karamojong) are collectively called Ateker. The Ateker 
members commonly known to the Nyangatom include the Matheniko, Pian, 
Bokora, Dodoth, Jie, Kumam, Tepeth, Toposa, Jiye, Turkana, and Teso. When 
asked what they have in common, many informants listed the following 
communalities: origin, geographic location (Karamoja), language, religion,7 age-
system, dances, and songs. 
Figure 1: Map of Nyangatom Woreda 
Source: Adapted from CSA map 
7 The common religious beliefs include: Akuj (Sky God), ngikaram (ancestors), and ngipyan (spirits). 
Turkana
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The Nyangatom and the Toposa are close associates and they consider one another 
amuro-katta (grand-mother's thigh), an expression that symbolises common 
ancestry. It is believed that they have descended from the same ancestor, lived in 
the same neighbourhood in the Karamoja area, migrated together, and split away 
only later. Cultural expectations exist between the two groups that stress sharing 
and mutual assistance. For instance, when a Nyangatom slaughters an animal, any 
Toposa (old or young) present is entitled to the hindquarter, as a matter of cultural 
right. Any Nyangatom would expect the same when his Toposa neighbour kills an 
animal. Failure to live up to this expectation is considered mystically dangerous 
and culturally unacceptable. The depth of the relationship between the two goes 
beyond sharing food, pasture, water, and residential areas. They often form 
alliances in fights against common enemies (e.g., Surma and Turkana) or each 
other's enemies (e.g., Dassanech are considered as Nyangatom's enemy, while Jiye 
are Toposa's). 
The Nyangatom fully recognise that the Turkana are also their Ateker-mates. Apart 
from the recognition of common origin, the Nyangatom and the Turkana do not 
seem to have accounts of historical cooperation and cultural responsibilities for one 
another. Some writers noted that the Nyangatom people might have migrated from 
Uganda due to Turkana pressure (Mburu, 2001, p. 150; Tornay, 1979, p. 98), and 
this suggests that the two groups may have been early rivals. However, there exists 
no historical memory, or even folktale, that points to Nyangatom-Turkana conflict 
in olden days. What informants stressed was that the two groups lived together in 
peace when the Turkana moved to Kibish from the Lodwar area, located further 
south. The local people's remarks about the northward expansion of the Turkana is 
consistent with the reports of Alexander De Waal (1991) and Nene Mburu (2003) 
that the boundary of Turkana grazing, and the limits of Kenyan administration, 
moved north over the years. Terrence J. MacCabe (1996) presented the early 
migration and later expansion of the Turkana people as follows: 
    
The period from 1500 to 1800 appears to have been characterized 
by frequent splitting and fusing of ethnic groups, and shifting 
alliances among the groups…. The Turkana people emerged as a 
distinct ethnic group sometime during the early to middle decades 
of the nineteenth century…. Oral histories suggest that the Jie 
seceded from the Karamojong, and that a group split off from the 
Jie established themselves in the region near the headwaters of the 
Tarach River, in what is now Turkana District, sometime during the 
early part of the eighteenth century. By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Turkana cattle camps began to push down the 
Tarach in search of new pastures…. They first pushed to the north 
and east to Lake Turkana, and then to the south, crossing the 
Turkwell River.
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During the early contact period, the Turkana and the Nyangatom were good 
friends, cherished their common identity as Ateker, and experienced intermarriage 
(although mutual raids occurred sporadically). Traditionally, pastoral territorial 
boundaries are flexible, to allow free movement and grant access to pasture and 
water resources. Prior to the colonial period, the Nyangatom and the Turkana 
exploited the rich pasture and water in the Kibish River valley. During the dry 
seasons, they migrated further north and west to share resources with the Surma 
and the Toposa people. Some 60-70 years ago, however, the relationship between 
the Nyangatom and the Turkana began to deteriorate fast. The Nyangatom 
informants firmly believed that external agents (the British colonial administration, 
the Kenyan government, and later commercial raiders) created and perpetuated 
animosity between them and the Turkana. There is a strong feeling among the 
Nyangatom that lasting peace with the Turkana could be attained if the external 
agents could stop interfering.  
3. Factors responsible for Nyangatom-Turkana discord 
The 2002 USAID report identified three major causes of conflict in the 
Karamojong Cluster. These include structural or root causes, proximate causes, and 
triggering factors.
Structural causes of conflict in the Cluster include competition for 
scarce resources, traditional pastoral cultural values, increasing 
frequency of drought since about 1980, and the general poverty of the 
cluster. Proximate causes of conflict in the KC include systematic 
neglect by government of pastoral areas, politicization of conflict, the 
enormous increase in modern weapons, inappropriate government 
responses to conflict, provision of food aid without developing 
suitable livelihood opportunities for the recipients, interference by 
political leaders, weakened traditional authority systems, increased 
levels and non-traditional nature of violence, inflammatory media, 
and the introduction of commercial raiding…. Several factors can 
trigger immediate violent conflict between groups in the Cluster and 
surrounding areas, including a specific violent incident, a series of 
livestock theft, a raid, a government operation, traditional taunting by 
girls and women, a seer's prophecy, an inflammatory media article or 
a politician's speech (USAID, 2002, p. 8).   
These characterizations of the causes of conflict in the Karamojong Cluster 
adequately capture the nature of the Nyangatom-Turkana conflict. With the 
intention of providing a deeper context and appreciation of the details of individual 
cases, the major factors that contributed to and exacerbated the Nyangatom-
Turkana conflict are discussed below. 
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3.1 Colonial land alienation and movement restriction  
The northward expansion of the Turkana became evident during the colonial 
period. In the early 20th century, certain Turkana sections are reported to have 
migrated to Ethiopia to avoid surrender to the British colonial army. According to 
Mburu (2001, p. 154), "Resistance to British military conquest was weak as some 
Turkana sections collaborated with the colonizers whereas those defiant evaded 
confrontation by simply relocating north to sanctuaries in Ethiopia."  
At this stage, the Turkana did not pose a real threat to Nyangatom interests. 
Probably the most serious blow to pastoral economy in the Nyangatom area was 
the movement restriction that followed the colonial demarcation of boundaries. The 
British colonial administration in Kenya imposed several measures that restricted 
free movement and denied access to traditional pastures and water points. In the 
1920s and 1930s, the Ilemi Triangle was created and patrolled by the King’s 
African Rifles (KAR), in the name of protecting the Turkana against the 
Nyangatom and the Dassanech.8 In July 1939, according to Mburu (2003), "Britain 
conducted a punitive raid with the King's African Rifles (KAR), supported by the 
Royal Air Force who dropped 250-pound bombs north of Ilemi."  
The British troops of the KAR occupied Ilemi in 1941 and consolidated control 
over the area when the British entered Ethiopia to fight the Italians during World 
War II. In the 1940s, the British colonial administration in Kenya established "a 
series of police posts along the Ethiopian border at Kokuru, Liwan, 
Lokomarinyang, Kaiemothia and Kibish” (Almagor, 1986, p. 98), thereby 
effectively curtailing the movement of the Nyangatom and the Dassanech to their 
traditional grazing lands. This was a time when Ethiopia was deeply indebted to 
Britain for the help in expelling the Italians, after five years of occupation. 
Although the Turkana, who were perceived as enemies of the British, had to be 
brutally pacified,9 the colonial boundary demarcation obviously expanded their 
grazing territory further north. The Nyangatom-Turkana relationship worsened 
after the enclosure of the Ilemi Triangle.10
8 Paradoxically, during the same period the Turkana needed protection. The British military was 
responsible for the protection of the Karamoja of Uganda from Turkana aggressors (USAID, 2002, p. 
23).
9 However, the establishment of the colonial rule involved brutal military expeditions against the 
Turkana and the consequent disarmament, which made them vulnerable to attacks and raids by their 
northern neighbours (Mburu, 2001).   
10 Nyangatom and Turkana were not the only to experience hostility partly due to the colonial legacy. 
More than half of what became Turkana District was transferred from Uganda to Kenya in 1926 
(USAID, 2002, p. 24), thereby exacerbating conflict between the Turkana and those who had lost 
their land. The report further noted that during the punitive military expeditions in Turkana, the 
British seized a large number of livestock, which were passed on to members of the Pokot ethnic 
group as reward for taking part in the campaign on the side of the colonial power, and this increased 
the animosity of the Turkana towards the Pokot. 
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3.2 The Ilemi Triangle 
The Ilemi Triangle is a disputed territory claimed by Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan 
for more than a century now. From the turn of the 20th Century to the 1970s, 
numerous meetings were held to determine the status of this area. Since the 
meetings were held without involving all disputants, the agreements failed to prove 
binding. Temporary maps drawn during the colonial period, place the triangle 
under Sudan's control. Sudan and Kenya made arrangements for the latter to 
administer the area. Hence, Kenya has de facto control over the triangle today. 
Charles Haskins reported that the inter-ethnic conflicts in the Ilemi Triangle is 
considered as proxy wars to maintain claims to the disputed territory, and he 
warned that the problem was a time-bomb.  
The problems facing people who live in the Ilemi Triangle…have 
up to now remain largely ignored by the outside world.... Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Sudan have each been accused by international 
observers of using the ethnic groups to fight low-level proxy wars 
as a means of maintaining their claims to the disputed territory…. 
Inter-ethnic conflict, competition over dwindling natural resources, 
state neglect, a lack of adequate health care and, more recently, the 
discovery of oil, all make the Ilemi Triangle a time-bomb which is 
ticking inexorably towards disaster (Haskins11).
For the Nyangatom, the disaster is not in the future—it is an ongoing and lived 
experience. The lack of demarcation meant underdevelopment of the area due to 
state neglect, prolonged hopes that land could be reclaimed, and protracted conflict 
to realize this hope. After 100 years, unfortunately, there seems to be no solution in 
sight. In the past the three countries seemed to have chosen to avoid conflict over 
this remote and inaccessible location, which is perceived to be of marginal 
economic importance. With the Ilemi Triangle now described as potentially rich in 
unexplored oil reserves the prospect for peace in the area remains bleak. Therefore, 
it is high time for the three countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan) to 
peacefully resolve the age-old and silent dispute over the triangle in a manner that 
respects the inalienable rights of the original inhabitants of the disputed area. 
3.3 Later and recent Turkana expansion  
The ordeals of the Nyangatom did not end with the end of British colonial rule in 
Africa. Reports and informants revealed that afterwards they continued to lose 
more land and more lives. In July 1988, the Kenyan government, which was 
planning to annex the Ilemi Triangle earlier in that year, massacred an estimated 
700 Nyangatom and displaced the rest from the Kibish river valley (De Waal, 
1991; Matsuda, 1994). De Waal (1991, Pp. 345-6) wrote:  
11 Charles Haskins, in a report titled, "The Ilemi Tirangle: A forgotten conflict" noted that the size of 
the area is between 10,000 to 14,000 sq km. 
http://shalomconflictcenter.org/images/THE_ILEMI_TRIANGLE.pdf 
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[In] July 1988, the Kenyan police clashed with a group of Toposa 
or Nyangatom raiders who had previously attacked the Dassanech, 
and came of worst. Fifteen [Kenyan] policemen were killed, and 
some taken hostage. The Kenyan government responded the 
following day with an attack using helicopter gunships and 
paramilitary forces on the Nyangatom area of Kibish, which 
straddles Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. About 200 Nyangatom 
raiders and a minimum of 500 civilians were killed by the Kenyan 
forces over the following 18 days. In the attack, at least five 
villages in Ethiopia were partly destroyed, the Swedish 
Philadelphia Mission at Kibish was burned. 
The 1988 Kibish massacre is locally known as the dio incident, after the District 
Office of Kenya at Kibish from which the attack was launched. The dio incident 
led to the forced relocation of some Nyangatom eastward as far as the Omo River, 
while others fled further north to Mount Naita. On the very day the Kenyans 
bombed the Nyangatom positions, the survivors fled the area in disarray, 
abandoning their chief, called Loguti Lobotol, who died shortly after the dio
incident. The Nyangatom, believe that the disappointed and humiliated chief cursed 
the people and the land, and the curse is now manifested through natural disasters 
and man-made adversities.   
Soon after the Kibish massacre, the Kenyan government is reported to have 
strengthened its presence by increasing the Police Force, establishing a military 
camp, and reinforcing the district administrative post. Since the 1988 incident, the 
grazing area that stretches from the Kibish River to the Tepeth Mountain has been 
under Turkana control. The Turkana continued to attack and raid the Nyangatom 
by crossing the Kibish River, deep into Ethiopian territory. A large-scale attack in 
December 2008 on the Lebere, Kajamakin and Natikar villages caused property 
destruction and a massive displacement eastwards of the Nyangatom people. In 
June 2011, the Turkana occupied Lobere for weeks and then withdrew; reportedly 
after high-level government officials of the two countries were alerted.  
3.4 Livestock raids: traditional and transformed  
Among most pastoral groups, raiding is widely practiced to replenish lost stock or 
build new herds. A USAID (2002, p. 5) report stated, "In some respects, this 
raiding can be seen as a quasi-legitimate sharing of resources, permitting groups on 
the verge of economic ruin and even starvation to re-establish their systems of food 
production and natural resource management." Legitimate or otherwise, raiding 
and livestock theft remain the hallmark of Nyangatom-Turkana relations. Raiding 
led to the cycle of retribution and violent conflict in the Ilemi Triangle. From the 
Nyangatom perspective, Turkana raiding has increased in frequency and intensity. 
A high-profile raid took place in August 2009, when the Turkana allegedly raided 
more than 13,316 livestock from the Nyangatom (Gebre, 2011).  
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The practice of raiding is reported to have transformed because of the alleged 
involvement of some elements of the Kenyan security forces, livestock traders, 
arms dealers, and jobless armed gangsters. The alleged non-pastoral actors behind 
cattle rustling are reported to be employing sophisticated strategies to ensure 
success in raiding. These include meticulous planning and execution of raids, the 
use of advance automatic weapons (e.g., G3), the use of trucks to load and drive 
the animals away, and the immediate selling of animals. Teshome Mekonnen 
(2010, Pp. 206-7) wrote, "When the commercial raiders sold cattle in distant 
markets, the ability to locate and restore these cattle to rightful owners becomes 
impossible." Regarding commercial raiding, Nancy Omolo (2011, p. 88) wrote, 
“The challenging problem is the way in which livestock raiding has been 
transformed over the years, from a cultural practice/redistributive raiding into a 
more predatory activity/commercial activity…. In Turkana, the increase in 
'commercial' raiding includes cases of 'sponsored' raiding where guns are provided 
to young men by wealthy people who wish to acquire livestock for sale.” Cathy 
Watson (2003, p. 9) states, “Commercial raids are defined as an aspect of the wider 
integration of pastoralists within a market economy, and as such includes both 
raids in which the promoters are not pastoralists themselves, but also those 
involving pastoralists or ex-pastoralists who raid then sell the stolen livestock 
immediately afterwards.” 
 The USAID (2002, p. 6) report also highlighted a new conflict trend, as follows: 
One newer phenomenon in the KC [Karamojong Cluster] is 
roadside banditry, which is often blamed on young men living in 
the towns and centers. They are part of a growing reservoir of 
impoverished and uneducated young men, many of whose families 
have been forced out of pastoralism by circumstances beyond their 
control or who have dropped out of pastoralist way of life while 
their families struggle on. All these young men have limited 
opportunities to earn income so they end up preying on their fellow 
citizens.  
3.5 Other indirect factors  
While some factors directly contributed to the Nyangatom-Turkana conflict, others 
failed to play preventive roles or even exacerbated cross-border pastoral conflict. 
For example, there is lax security on the Ethiopian side of the Ethio-Kenyan 
border. In Nyangatom, there are only two police posts (Kibish and Kakuta) located 
around the border area. They represent a symbolic presence rather than an actual 
force capable of monitoring the long, porous border and protecting the people from 
Turkana attacks. According to the study, Kakuta, Lebere, Lokorlam, and Natikar 
are Nyangatom villages repeatedly attacked by the Turkana. When the 
fighters/raiders from Kenya perpetrate attacks on Ethiopian soil, the border police, 
or special security force, rarely come to the rescue of the Nyangatom. The Kenyan 
side of the border seems to be better protected by the General Service Unit (GSU), 
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the regular police, and the Kenyan Police Reservist (KPR). According to 
Nyangatom informants, the Kenyan forces have the capacity to monitor movement 
on the Ethiopian side of the border, alert the Turkana through by radio, and provide 
cover when the Turkana attackers/raiders are pursued by the Nyangatom. Some 
Nyangatom informants reported to have witnessed the involvement of elements of 
the Kenyan security force in the raids and sharing out of raided animals. It is 
equally important to acknowledge the brave acts of the responsible Kenyan 
security forces, in helping the Nyangatom recover raided/stolen livestock. Sammy 
Ekal (2008), Secretary of Riam Riam (an NGO operating in Turkana), reported,  
On 7th February 2008, the Ngisiger clan of the Turkana from Lapur 
division… raided the Nyangatom…386 herds of cattle and during 
this incident six Nyangatom were gunned down…. On 8th February 
2008…a violent armed clash occurred between the Turkana of 
Ngisiger clan and the General Service Unit based at Kibish when 
the security force was pursuing the Turkana raiders to recover the 
stolen Nyangatom cattle….the armed raiders opened fire at the 
security force injuring three…   
The Nyangatom-Turkana conflict may have been complicated and exacerbated by 
human, cultural and natural factors. Within 23 years, the population of the 
Nyangatom increased fourfold: from 6,087 in 1984 (CSA, 1984, p. 45) to 25,252 in 
2007 (CSA, 2007, p. 85). Given the population growth trend in developing 
countries, it would be safe to assume that the Turkana, the population of which is 
estimated at 497,770 (Omolo, 2011), have also been expanding demographically. 
The rapid population growth, and the high social values attached to cattle, may 
have contributed to the steady increase in the number of livestock being kept. On 
the other hand, climate change, which is evidenced by frequent drought, has caused 
scarcity of water and pasture. In recent periods, the Nyangatom experienced severe 
drought incidences in 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2008. Therefore, environmental 
change, population growth, and increased herd size, combined with a host of other 
factors, have exacerbated competition over vital resources–leading to the escalation 
of inter-ethnic conflict in the hotspot Ilemi Triangle. 
A number of cultural values and practices seem to have had a triggering effect on 
pastoral conflict. In Nyangatom, traditionally participation in offensive/defensive 
action is important, in order to demonstrate masculinity and fitness. Killing 
members of ethnic groups considered your enemy does not necessarily subject the 
killer(s) to negative sanction. The culture allows killers to perform rituals that earn 
them greater reputation, bestows them with killer names, and changes their social 
status. Women, in particular, are reported to be playing a significant role in driving 
men into violence by challenging docility and encouraging/praising aggressiveness. 
When an individual from a group kills a member of another group, the blame is 
laid on his group and any member of that group will be targeted for revenge. 
According to Nyangatom informants, the traditions related to warrior ethos, hero 
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cults, and the cycle of retribution are not different in the Turkana. It is also 
important to underline that guns entered the highly valued cultural repertoire and 
the use of automatic guns since the 1980s has increased pastoral fatality.  
3.6 Environmental and climatic factors 
Some reports, based on insight from the Turkana area, explain the escalation of 
conflict between the Turkana and their neighbours, such as the Nyangatom, 
primarily in terms of how climate change contributed to resource scarcity. Sammy 
Ekal (2008) attributes the increase in conflict incidences between the Turkana and 
all their neighbours as the scramble for available natural resources, following the 
failure of rain. Integrated Regional Information Network (Integrated Regional 
Information Networks (IRIN), 2011) reported, “Cross-border armed conflict over 
resources among Turkana pastoralists in northeastern Kenya has increased 
following the severe drought ravaging parts of the Horn of Africa.” Thijs Berman 
(2011), a Dutch politician and Member of the European Parliament, wrote,  
Last May I visited Kenya's Turkana province, on the border with 
Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia…. I had read about the killings of 
twenty people the week before; it seemed a revenge for a cattle raid 
by an Ethiopian tribe. The government downplayed the news 
somewhat, but during my visit it appeared this was not an isolated 
incident. The struggle for water, for viable land and cattle makes 
the situation very tense.  
Information from the local people also reveal that, over the last few decades, 
temperatures have increased, rainfall decreased, and droughts occurred with a 
frequency and intensity never seen before. Informants stressed that they 
experienced prolonged dry spells and significant seasonal and annual variability of 
rainfall. Although there are indications that climate change does contribute to or 
worsen conflict, it is not easy to link specific meteorological factors to a specific 
conflict. This is partly because conflict occurs due to a number of factors other than 
climate related ones. When the dry spells intensify, people and livestock 
concentrate in resource-rich areas, and it is at this time that resource-related 
conflict surfaces. Yet, a single-year dry season may not lead to conflict, as water 
and grass do not disappear completely within a short period of time. Moreover, 
violent conflict is not considered as the only option to address scarcity. People tend 
to exhibit tolerance in the face of threats and provocations from enemies, in order 
to save human and animal lives. 
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4. Social organizations and conflict resolution approaches 
4.1 Social organisations12
Territorial organisation: There are seven named territorial sections (sing. ekitala,
pl. ngiteala) in Nyangatom. These include Ngilingaqol, Ngkapung, Ngsaqol, 
Ngutokoraman, Ngukumama, Nubune, Ngarich.13 An individual (male or female) 
is born into a given territorial section through his/her father. Section names are not 
place names, rather the collective names of people occupying a given place. Hence, 
sections can best be described as political units where important decisions are 
made. In other words, a territorial section serves as a social identity and 
fundamental organising principle. Individuals and communities participate in 
public life through their territorial sections. As Tornay (1981, p. 160) noted, 
“Members of the sections have rights to settlement, grazing and watering, 
cultivation, and transhumance within their territory.”  
Generation-set: The generation-set (ekas) is another very important social 
organisation in Nyangatom. It operates side-by-side and in total harmony with the 
territorial section. The men of one generation-set father the men of the next 
generation-set. Hence, each individual belongs to the generation junior to his 
father. At any given time, two generation-sets with living members are recognised 
as major and dominant, and they are called the 'Fathers of the Country' and the 
'Sons of the Country.' During the research period, the Gnytome (Elephants) and the 
Gnyorukopi (Ostriches) represented the Fathers of the Country and the Sons of the 
Country respectively. Junior to the Ostriches, are three generation-sets: 
Gnugoleteng (Antelopes), Gnykosowa (Buffalos), and the youngest generation (not 
yet formally named, but temporarily called the Gnykinyaga (Crocodiles), ranked in 
order of seniority.  
Traditionally, secular (administrative, judicial, etc.) and ritual powers are vested in 
the hands of the Fathers of the Country. Serious matters of public concern are 
brought to their attention for deliberation. Since the entire Nyangatom society is 
organised according to the principle of generation-sets, every territorial section has 
the same generation-sets. Hence, in all territorial sections of Nyangatom it is the 
Elephants who are responsible for the management of public affairs. Theoretically, 
the Elephants are the sole decision-makers. Practically, however, they invite a 
certain number of members of the sets called Ostriches, Antelopes, and sometimes 
Buffalos, to attend crucial meetings. The Elephants could delegate power to the 
Ostriches to handle certain issues on their behalf. The Sons of the Country are 
responsible for ensuring the implementation of the decisions made by the 
12 In order to adequately grasp the customary dispute resolution mechanisms, it is necessary to 
understand social organisations. Deeper knowledge of the social organisations of conflicting groups 
would enable us to understand the decision-making processes and the power and legitimacy of local 
actors in pastoral conflict. This, in turn, may serve as an entry point for planned intervention or 
further and detailed research.  
13 The Ngarich section consists of the Murle, an independent ethnic group assimilated into the 
Nyangatom. In recent years, the independence of the Murle has been recognised.  
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Elephants and giving orders to the junior sets, who are responsible for the actual 
implementation of decisions. Despite the introduction of modern administrative 
and justice systems, the Nyangatom prefer to resolve intra-and inter-ethnic conflict 
through traditional mechanisms. In recent years, however, people have realized that 
only bilateral government meetings would resolve the cross-border conflict with 
the Turkana. 
Age-sets: Generation-sets are further divided into a number of age-sets. Age-sets 
consist of age-mates, i.e., males of a similar biological age through an initiation 
ritual called apeyo. Except for the most senior generation-set (which loses most 
members due to aging) and the most junior generation-set (which recruits new 
members), generation-sets in the middle hierarchy have several age-sets. Neville 
Dyson-Hudson (1963, p. 358-9) explained the age system among the Karimojong 
cluster as follows: 
Adult male Karimojong are recruited into named corporate groups 
of coevals, termed ngasapaneta or ngasapanisia, and here are 
spoken of as age-sets. Each age-set comprises all those men who 
have performed the initiation ceremonies within (ideally) a single 
five-to-six years period throughout the entire tribe. Five age-sets 
amalgamate into a named corporate group of wider time span and 
larger membership, termed anyamet, to which I give the name 
generation-set. Each generation-set thus comprises all men of the 
tribe who have performed initiation within the period of 25 to 30 
years ideally covered by its constituent age-sets.   
Likewise, the generation-sets of the Nyangatom are divided into age-sets, which 
are formed in different localities and with different names. Age-mates, willing to 
be initiated into a new age-set, have to demonstrate their readiness by participating 
in some offensive/defensive action. Moreover, they are expected to offer animals 
(e.g. goats) to members of the senior age-sets within the same generation. As 
Tornay (1981, p. 162) noted, the senior age-sets ‘…in return allow the initiands to 
wear the adult mauve plastered head-dress and to adopt the new age-set name,…’ 
The name could be chosen by the new initiates or imposed on them by the elder 
age-mates. The youths continue to join the newly initiated age-set until the group 
becomes numerous and strong enough to declare its autonomy. Although the dates 
of age-set formation and the names given to individual sets vary from place to 
place, the ranks of the sets and the structural equivalence is widely understood.     
Clan: The Nyangatom are divided into 14 (there may be more) named patrilineal 
exogamous clans (ngitekerea, sing. ateker). These include Ngimuyoko, Ngitoroy, 
Ngukuko, Ngikuakurecha, Ngidhocha, Ngikor, Nginyanga, Ngipucho, Ngiribo, 
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Ngithiger, Ngiraputa, Ngilopol, Ngimeturuaba, and Ngikuren.14 The clans of Murle 
(Yirmach) and Muguji (Numuchu) are not treated as Nyangatom clans.15 An 
individual becomes a member of his/her father's clan at birth. Unlike in other 
cultures, such as Somalia, clans do not serve as organising foundations for the 
formation of a political entity. According to Tornay (1981, p. 153), ‘clans should 
be viewed as emblematic entities rather than descent units.’ Most clans are not 
territorial and thus do not claim resources in their names. Clans do not have 
publicly recognized roles in major decision-making processes. However, certain 
clans are believed to have the power to make/stop rain, deceive/trick enemies, cure 
snake/scorpion bites, and control disease. For instance, the Ngikuren are reported 
to be responsible for fire and war.  
4.2 Conflict resolution approaches 
Resolving intra-ethnic conflicts: In Nyangatom, there exits an elaborate customary 
law for resolving intra-ethnic conflicts. The common types of internal conflict that 
are often resolved using customary mechanisms include homicide, adultery, 
impregnating girls, disputes over resources (water and pasture), theft, failure to pay 
debt, and betrayal. When disputes arise, attempts are made to resolve them at the 
family, friends, or neighbourhood level, with or without involving elders. 
Sometimes individuals may agree to resolve their problems within the presence of 
few witnesses. If the matter turns out to be difficult to handle then more elders may 
be invited to participate, while the matter is still kept low key. The 
arbitrators/elders would normally ask the disputants to explain the causes of their 
conflict, before advising them to reconcile rather than hurt each other and their 
loved ones. When such initial efforts fail, the matter is taken to members of the 
senior generation-set (Gnytome) and/or a senior member of the Ngukumama 
territorial section. The Ngukumama are considered as ritual experts, peace 
symbols, and masters of blessing/cursing. The presentation of a case to the 
Gnytome or the Ngukumama is followed by various procedures of hearing, 
evidence verification, deliberation, ritual performance, and provision of 
compensation. 
Resolving inter-ethnic conflicts: After a major conflict, or a series of repeated small 
clashes, inter-ethnic disputes were resolved by traditional mechanisms. In most 
cases, elders from one or more groups expressed the need to initiate a peace 
process through peace messengers, who carried peace symbols—white ostrich 
feathers tied to a tree branch. Following approval of both parties meetings will be 
held in each group to discuss possible reconciliation. Then delegates will be 
identified to attend the peace ceremony. On a date fixed in advance, the guests 
from one group travel to the village of the other group, often to their common 
border area. The Nyangatom are represented by senior members of the Elephants, 
14 Serge Tornay (1981, Pp. 153-4) counted 20 clans in Nyangatom and noted that some of the clans 
have wives acquired from the Dodoth, Lotuko, and Turkana peoples. The reduction in the list of 
Nyangatom clans today may partly be explained in terms of the death of these women.     
15 Further research may reveal that the Murle and the Muguji have more clans than only one each.  
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senior members of the Ostriches, at least one Ngukumama, and other wise elders 
and young men as deemed necessary.  
Upon their arrival, the guests will be given warm hospitality, including the 
slaughtering of small animals in their honour. The same day, or often the next day, 
the peace negotiations would resume and continue for at least a day. In order to 
develop trust and confidence, the deliberations would be held in a manner that is 
open/free and based on telling the truth. Terms of compensation and retrieval of 
animals would be agreed, to the satisfaction of both parties, and implemented 
without any delay. Rituals will be performed to validate and enforce the 
agreements. Since the Nyangatom and the Turkana share the same religious 
traditions and cultural values and practices, the reconciliation rituals are taken 
seriously. Common ritual practices include splashing milk and water on 
participants, placing the belly fat of a sacrificial goat on their necks, rubbing 
hands/body with stomach discharges, holding fresh green grass/leaves, breaking 
and burying spears or guns, cursing evil deeds, and blessing peaceful activities. 
The participants would then return to their respective groups to spread the 
peacemaking news and urge their people to refrain from engaging in any conflict. 
In the past, conflict was intermittent and peace deals lasted for several years. 
Today, peace efforts fail immediately, or last only a very short.  
Community level peace initiatives: The community-based conflict resolution 
mechanisms discussed above worked well prior to the 1970s but not in recent 
years. After the 1988 Kibish massacre, the relationship between the Nyangatom 
and the Turkana further deteriorated. Ten years later, the Nyangatom and the 
Turkana elders met and performed reconciliation rituals at Lokiriyama (Kenya). To 
the embarrassment of the Nyangatom elders involved and the people they 
represented, the Turkana launched an organized attack on the very day the 
Lokiriyama meeting was held. In 2004, elders from the two ethnic groups met at 
Kibish (Kenya) and swore through acts of rituals, not to attack and raid each other. 
Once again, according to Nyangatom informants, the Turkana violated the deal by 
launching an attack shortly after the meeting. However, the Nyangatom explain the 
failure of peace deals in terms certain agents in Kenya who benefit from 
destabilization. One elder noted: 
We know the ordinary Turkana, we know their elders. They are our 
neighbours, our cousins. They want to live in peace with us. When 
we meet, we say: what went wrong? Aren't we Ateker? Why are we 
killing each other? The ordinary Turkana could not understand why 
the peace agreements are violated…. Of course, there are some 
Turkana who come from distant locations to raid. That happens 
rarely. They come for animals, not for land…. The real enemy is 
the father of Turkana [the Kenyan government] who spoiled some 
of his children. He sends them to kill us, to evict us from home… 
Our father [the Ethiopian government] does not protect us.  
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It appears that the traditional methods of resolving conflict are not taken seriously 
by the Turkana, as evidenced by their failure to honour agreements. Some 
Nyangatom informants unequivocally expressed their conviction that elements of 
the Kenyan security forces, local officials, and NGOs operating on the Kenyan side 
of the border, are not interested in ending the raiding. Others felt that the younger 
generation and the educated Turkana do not respect their elders or honour their 
decisions. This may have to do with the dismantling of the traditional dispute 
resolution institutions by the colonial administration.  
Colonial boundaries were introduced that put restriction on 
transhumant migrations and imposed an alien system of resolving 
community disputes, which usurped the gerontocratic authority 
previously vested with community elders…. It is notable that before 
colonialism, chiefly authority constrained unnecessary conflicts and 
when they occurred, it regulated bloodletting and devastation. For 
example, there existed a poly-tribal council of elders known as 
Lukiko, which settled inter-community disputes over water, grazing 
or livestock thefts between the Nyangatom, Turkana, Dassanetch 
and Toposa without recourse to war…. However, this traditional 
institution was destroyed by the British system of colonial 
administration that was backed by the force of modern weapon 
(Mburu, 2001, p. 155). 
District level peace initiatives: The second conflict resolution approach relates to 
peace initiatives taken by authorities of adjacent border districts. The Nyangatom 
Woreda administration, on its own and sometimes in collaboration with other 
agencies, worked to organise or facilitate a series of peace meetings/events. In 
2006, the administration sent a delegate to Loktank (Kenya) to initiate peace talks, 
and this initiative led to the January 2007 initial meeting at Kangaten (Ethiopia) 
and the March 2007 peace conference at Kibish (Kenya). During this conference, 
elders of the Nyangatom and the Turkana signed a comprehensive peace 
agreement, in the presence of district officials from both countries. In October 
2007, a peace festival was organized by a local NGO called Atowokis Ekisil 
Pastoralist Development Association (AEPDA) at Kangaten, with the objective of 
promoting and strengthening the peace effort. People from 18 different ethnic 
groups in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya participated. In January 2008, the Turkana 
violated the 2007 Kibish peace deal and since then have intensified their assaults 
with impunity. The 2008 Turmi Accord was also reportedly broken by the Turkana. 
On the other hand, Riam Riam (2008, online), the Kenyan NGO operating in 
Turkana, claimed that the Nyangatom were in breach of the Turmi agreement, as 
follows:
From Turmi - Ethiopian meeting communities agreed as a 
resolution that a 10 km buffer zone be created within the 
communities for purposes of managing the conflict in the area but 
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… we found Nyangatom livestock [grazing] within the fence of the 
Kenya GSU camp, an issue that had contravened the Turmi 
resolutions. Therefore, we attribute that as a problem caused by 
lack of following the laid down agreement by either communities, 
governments and the civil societies.  
The 2010 CEWARN Country Updates from Ethiopia (for the period of September-
December 2009) recognises the efforts made by the Ethiopian local authorities to 
minimise cross-border counter raids and revenge killings in the face of repetitive 
attacks from the Kenyan side, as follows: 
The active engagement of local authorities in positive peace 
activities was one of the key reasons for keeping the peace 
initiatives…. The Dassanech and Nyangatom administrations had 
worked relentlessly in convincing the communities to refrain from 
launching counter raids in the face of repetitive attacks from 
Turkana. They were tirelessly moving from settlements to 
settlements in an attempt to convince the communities to show 
restraints. This has hugely contributed to the lessening of cross-
border attacks from the Ethiopian side (CEWARN, 2010a, p. 9). 
Regional level peace initiatives: Bilateral border commission meetings represent the 
third peace-making approach. When local peace initiatives failed and the conflict 
escalated unabated, the Governments of Ethiopia and Kenya once in a while 
organise high-level meetings through their border commissions. The latest such 
meeting was held in October 2009 at Nakuru (Kenya) and November 2009 at 
Hawassa (Ethiopia). The Nakuru and Hawassa meetings were led by the Provincial 
Commissioner of the Rift Valley Province and the President of the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR) (Ethiopia). Both meetings 
focused on improving relations between the Nyangatom, Turkana, and Dassanech, 
and an agreement was reached on the retrieval of livestock (CEWARN, 2010a). 
However, this decision was not implemented because the "Turkana insisted that 
they cannot return the livestock because they had died since then due to disease or 
had been raided by other communities" (CEWARN, 2010b, p. 9). Local authorities 
in Ethiopia noted that the Turkana not only refused to honour the Joint Border 
Commission's decision but also derailed the peace process by launching new attacks 
on the Nyangatom shortly after the Hawassa meeting.  
During the research period, the local people and Woreda officials were frustrated by 
the behaviour of the Turkana, who became unpredictable, untrustworthy, and 
increasingly violent. There was a sense of bitterness, on the part of local people, 
who felt that the Ethiopian government did not come to their rescue when they were 
massacred, displaced, and robbed of their lifeline (livestock) repeatedly by the 
Turkana–who, allegedly, enjoy protection and support from the Kenyan police and 
army stationed at Kibish.  
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5. Conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
Based on a study conducted in 2010 in Nyangatom (South Omo Zone, SNNPR, 
Ethiopia), attempts are made in this paper to explain the longstanding inter-ethnic 
conflict between the Nyangatom and the Turkana. The relationship between the 
two groups began to deteriorate after the Nyangatom lost control over their grazing 
land in the Kibish area—the heart of the contested Ilemi Triangle. The British 
colonial administration planted the seeds of animosity by creating the Triangle to 
restrict free movement of pastoralists. The worst conflict happened in 1988 when 
the Kenyan government controlled the land west of the Kibish River, after 
expelling the Nyangatom at gunpoint. The steady increase in herd size, exceeding 
carrying capacity; the changes in climatic patterns that led to frequent drought; the 
cultural values that incite violence; and the participation of non-pastoral groups in 
raids, made the conflict complex and complicated.  
The consequences of this rather protracted inter-ethnic conflict include loss of 
precious life, permanent injuries, loss of access of pasture and water, and failing 
livelihoods. Large tracts of land in Kibish area have been abandoned and wasted 
because of security concerns. Many households displaced by the conflict are on 
emergency aid. The conflict zones in the border areas lack meaningful 
development projects, infrastructure, social services, trade activities, and security. 
The increased attacks perpetrated by both parties over the years with impunity, 
using newly acquired deadly automatic weapons, have exacerbated animosity and 
the cycle of violence. Unfortunately, the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya did 
not pay sufficient attention to the cross-border inter-ethnic conflict in the Ilemi 
Triangle. The Nyangatom-Turkana conflict is far from over and it is high time for a 
lasting solution to be found. 
There exist a number of peace capacities (connectors) to build on. The Nyangatom 
and the Turkana have a lot in common: identity as members of the Ateker, similar 
religious traditions, common language, common cultural values and practices, 
intermarriage, and the culture of sharing. Apart from these historical and cultural 
bases of connectors, it is important to develop the current perception, among the 
Nyangatom, that the Turkana are a friendly people. The existing sense of 
friendship/companionship could be further enhanced through social and cultural 
events (e.g., music and dance festivals, sports events, and religious/ritual 
activities). In the last five years, the Nyangatom have expressed, and demonstrated 
time and again, their readiness for lasting peace with the Turkana. Since it takes 
two to cut a peace deal, genuine commitment on the part of the Turkana side is also 
necessary. The steady decline in resources due to environmental factors contributed 
to the escalation of conflict. This warrants the need to devise joint or separate 
program intervention in the border area. 
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Traditionally, the Nyangatom migrated from the Kibish area to the Omo River 
bank to avoid more loss of human life and livestock through Turkana attack and 
drought. The Ethiopian Government plans to develop 150,000 hectares of land to 
grow sugarcane, which will be processed in six factories to be established in the 
lower Omo valley. Although the Ethiopian authorities claim to have consulted local 
people about this, the ordinary pastoralists in Nyangatom do not seem to have 
adequate and clear information about the project and the way it will affect their 
future. Some people had heard about the construction of a dam (Gibe III) upstream 
and the planned diversion of water to irrigate the sugarcane plantation. It is feared 
that these projects would reduce the flow of the river, thereby threatening 
livelihoods and exacerbating inter-ethnic conflict—as a large number of people 
may be forced to return to Kibish. The Ethiopian government plans to resettle the 
pastoralists and provide access to irrigated agriculture, infrastructure development, 
social services, and agricultural extension services. It is difficult to speculate what 
will exactly happen down the road. After taking their land away, if the Nyangatom 
are left to fend for themselves with minimum support from the government, the 
concerns that the projects may threaten livelihoods and exacerbate inter-ethnic 
conflict will become a reality. On the other hand, if the planned interventions are 
based on proper understanding of the cultures and life choices of the people in the 
area, the projects would mark the end of all social evils—that is, conflict, poverty, 
disease, and underdevelopment.
5.2 Recommendations 
Conflict prevention: Strengthen police posts, local militia, peace communities, 
community vigilance, and early warning systems, to prevent conflict  
Inter-community contact: Launch regular dialogue, review of peace progress, 
cultural events/festivals, to foster mutual understanding and solidarity 
Joint projects: In the border areas, launch common social services (schools, 
clinics), veterinary services, water/grazing schemes, local market/trade, 
infrastructure, to create and promote socio-economic and cultural integration  
Improving livelihoods: Diversify livelihoods, improve livestock quality, promote 
milk/butter production, promote agriculture (where possible), create outside market 
opportunities for pastoral products, to reduce reliance on raising animals.  
Enforce peace accords: Involve major actors in peacemaking, reduce commitment 
to acts of violence through awareness raising schemes, devise mechanisms to 
enforce peace accords. 
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New Regionalism as a Response to Environmental Conflicts among 
Pastoralists of the Horn of Africa: 
The Case of IGAD/CEWARN 
Yonas Ashine 
Abstract 
Environmental problems and their severe impact are nowhere as noticeable and felt 
as much as they are in the Horn of Africa (HoA). Among other things, the nexus 
between environmental degradation and conflict is becoming multifaceted and 
complex in the region. Pastoralist areas are archetypal stages for this kind of 
depressing tragedy. These problems are not limited to the boundary of a state, 
rather they appear to be trans-boundary and collective regional problems, making 
regionalism indispensable. This trend has attracted the attention of states since the 
late 1980s and urged them to collude. It was this incentive that gave birth to the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD, later to cancel 
one of the Ds (Drought) and become IGAD). This study has two separate but 
interrelated objectives. On the one hand, it examines not only the presence but also 
the viability of new regionalism in the Horn. On the other, it explores the evolution 
as well as effectiveness of IGAD and the Conflict Early Warning and Response 
Mechanism (CEWARN) in addressing pastoralist conflict in the region. The study 
uses both primary and secondary data. To substantiate the analysis, theories such 
as new regionalism and new functionalism were utilized. As a final point, the study 
concludes that the regional process in the HoA is incrementally and functionally 
becoming more in line with new regionalism. However, it asserts, for example, that 
the problematic state-civil society relationship, donor fatigue among partners of 
IGAD, negative impact of foreign forces, and the incapability and reluctance of 
members to contribute membership fees are barriers to new regionalism in the Horn 
of Africa. The study reveals the gap in the response side of the CEWARN system, 
which failed to integrate the issues of environment and development and provide a 
permanent way of addressing pastoralist conflict in the region.  
1. Introduction
The Horn of Africa (HoA) is a region that is often associated with famine, poverty, 
instability and conflict. Many scholars (Markakis, 1998; Medhane, 2004; Mesfin, 1999; 
Woodward, 1996) describe it as one of the most unstable and crisis-prone areas of the 
world. As history witnesses, the region was previously an area of confrontation 
between colonial powers, and between the super powers during the cold war. It is also a 
region that defies the anticipation that peace and stability would follow the end of the 
cold war. Since the end of cold war, in spite of regime change and the emergence of 
new states, the HoA has not been free of conflict and tension between member states 
and other sub-national groups (Belay, 1996; Medhane, 2004). 
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The other gloomy aspect of the HoA is the magnitude of environmental degradation, 
which has been linked to long years of instability in the region. Environmental 
degradation, such as soil erosion, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and desertification, 
has been the norm rather than the exception in the region (Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA), 2004; Markakis, 1998; Yohannes, 2003). In addition, global 
environmental change, coupled with the above local and regional environmental 
problems, as well as socio economic and political dynamics of the region created huge 
potential for additional sources of conflict (Gedion, 2003; Hutchison, 1991). This is 
because the above-mentioned environmental problems create, for example, scarcity of 
water, land and other renewable resources. Therefore, there is a clear link between 
environmental problems and conflict, with actors, mainly pastoralists, competing for 
scarce resources to ensure their survival. This is one of the causes of conflict in the 
HoA (Homer-Dixon, 1992, 2004; Hutchison, 1991; Markakis, 1998). 
Hence, when discussing conflict between pastoral communities, the inclusion of the 
environmental factor as a cause, catalyst and consequence is essential. This study 
attempts to determine the nexus between environmental scarcity and conflict among 
pastoral communities, who often try to negate the impact of the harsh environment 
though various strategies, mainly mobility (Markakis, 1998). This strategy fails to 
respect international borders and, hence, pastoral issues are common in all countries of 
the region.1 Because of this trend the study commences by hypothesizing that regional 
co-operation is necessary to address environmental conflicts in the HoA. In order to 
explore attempts to achieve regional cooperation the study focuses on the role of 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development/Conflict Early Warning and Response 
Mechanism (IGAD/CEWARN) in pastoralist areas such as the Karamoja, Somali and 
Dikhil clusters. It also anticipates the challenges to and prospects for new regionalism 
in the Horn. 
2. Regionalism: Old or New? 
Regionalism2 is the formation of regional cooperation in a certain distinct area. It is 
synonymous with terms such as regional integration and regime formation. Soderbaum 
(2003, p. 7) defines regionalism as “…the ideas of identities and ideologies related to a 
regional project.”  In this sense it denotes a condition of collective management of 
regional issues. For Nye (1968, p. vii) regionalism in the “……descriptive sense [is] the 
formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions; and in the 
doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such formation.” Based on these two definitions, it is 
1  States of the HoA–Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya–rank first, third, fifth and sixth respectively 
in the world in terms of pastoralist population size and hold considerable size of pastoral  population 
ranging from 6 percent in Kenya to 60 percent in Somalia. Pastoral rangelands cover vast sizes  of 
each country—52 percent in Ethiopia, 66 percent in Sudan, 70 percent in Eritrea, 72 percent in 
Kenya, 75 percent in Somalia and 100 percent in Djibouti (see Markakis, 2009) 
2 Macro-regions (world regions) are larger territorial (in contrast to non-territorial) units or sub system 
between the state and the global system. Africa, Europe, Asia and other continents could be regarded 
as macro-regions, and meso-regions describe mid-range states or non-state arrangements and 
processes. Regions such as the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa are considered meso-regions. 
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possible to conceptualise regionalism as a collective action and the promotion of the 
collective action as the proper way of dealing with regional problems. 
In the 1980s states in the HoA began to practice regional cooperation, in order “…to 
tackle collectively the recurrent drought and desertification in the sub region.” (Kinfe, 
2007, p. 22). They chose to engage in regional cooperation because they recognised 
their interdependence. There are two forms of regionalism: old or first wave regionalism 
and new or second wave regionalism.  
According to Hettene (2003, Pp. 23-4), old regionalism is the form of regional 
integration which is formed in the bipolar, cold war context. Created from above by 
elites and heads of state towards protecting the state security, it is very specific with 
regard to its objectives (i.e. security or economy) and only involved state actors. This 
approach is directly linked to the sphere of influence during the bi-polar world. 
Moreover, it is dominated by state actors only, therefore often described as “the old 
boys club” (Soderbaum, 2007, p. 187). New regionalism or second wave regionalism 
takes place in the multi-polar order and in the context of globalisation, or “in a post-
hegemonic era” (Soderbaum, 2007, p. 187), on a voluntary basis, among state and non-
state actors, who have an understanding of the value of greater interdependence in 
multi-dimensional and comprehensive areas, such as the environment, transport, and 
ethnicity. In general, the latter is a response to new global and regional challenges 
(Hettene, 2003, Pp. 23-4). Similarly, Shaw (1995, p. 251) explains new regionalism to 
be “… distinguished by their purpose (i.e. less economic or strategic); participant (i.e. 
non-state as well as official actors) and structures (i.e. less centralized, bureaucratized 
and politicized).” Such an approach is promoted by, theory of neo-functionalism. Neo-
functionalism promotes gradual and incremental cooperation between actors to manage 
collective problems. Terms such as ‘spill over effect’, ‘incremental integration’ and 
‘ramification’ are important in explaining new regionalism (See Hass, 1958, 1968). 
Hence, both neo-regionalism and neo-functionalism appear complementary and 
essential to substantiate the analysis in this study. 
The study views the regional response to pastoralist conflicts from the aforementioned 
key characteristics of new regionalism. The justification for the selection of new 
regionalism as a tool is premised on the needs of the environment and political 
economy. Cooperation is mandatory for dealing with environmental problems and 
conflict, owing to their regional character, the nature of shared resources, and common 
problems. The states of the HoA are poor, unstable, conflict-prone as well as lack 
expertise and institutional capacity (Kinfe, 2007; Shaw, 1995; Terlinden, 2004) as a 
result of which they cannot initiate meaningful arrangements for cooperation by 
themselves. Hence, it is necessary for external actors and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) to fill the gap created by the frail and problematic political economy of the 
states. New regionalism promotes the role of CSOs and external actors in regional 
cooperation on functional issues such as the environment (see Figure 1).  
To clearly depict the new regionalism, a conceptual map has been developed. The map 
indicates the state actors, the CSOs, the general population of the region, and the 
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external actors (light gray colour box) interacting and converging (arrows) in certain 
functional areas of cooperation (white colour box), such as in relation to environmental 
problems (see Figure 1 below). The double arrow lines depict the relationship between 
actors and their responses to specific problems. 
Civil societies in the 
region
International 
organisations (external 
actors from multi world)
The public in the 
region
New regional cooperation
as an avenue of functional 
cooperation
Actors
States in the region
Functional areas or problems that demand 
cooperation in the region
Example, environmental conflict
Regional cooperation
Relationships & impacts
Drive of cooperation
Regional response
Key
Figure 1: Model for schematic explanation of new regional cooperation
3. Pastoralists of the HoA
Pastoral areas cover about one third of the earth's surface and nearly two thirds of the 
African continent (Meier & Doug, 2005). In the HoA, 12-20 million pastoralists live 
in seven countries. These people constitute a substantial population and represent a 
huge land size and considerable resources in their respective countries. For example, 
in Ethiopia 10-12% of the total population are pastoralist; 40% of the cattle, 75% of 
the goats, 25% of the sheep and 100% of the camels as well as most national parks 
are found in pastoralist areas of the country (Yacob, 2001). However, in Ethiopia and 
elsewhere in the Horn, pastoralists are the most marginalized and peripheral people, 
in terms of socio-economic indicators and political participation.  
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Researchers have identified the link between the marginalized status of pastoral 
communities and the socio-political economic as well as ecological crises, which 
severely challenges the survival of these communities. For example, Helland’s 
(2006, p. 1), research on the Afar pastoralists indicates that "…resource poverty [as 
result of degradation and encroachment by other actors] is..... becoming a major 
aspect of poverty in pastoral areas." Although the appropriateness of mainstream 
poverty indicators to pastoral conditions is debatable, in Karamoja (Uganda), the 
proportion of population who live in poverty is 82%, which is the highest in Uganda 
(Chapman and Alexander, 2009). Comparatively, pastoral lowlands of the HoA and 
pastoralists inhabiting these lowlands face a myriad of challenges among which 
conflict is a major one (Chapman and Alexander, 2009; Mwaura, 2005). 
4. Pastoral conflict and environmental change 
Pastoral areas are increasingly becoming a textbook case of conflict in Africa. In the 
HoA, the boarders of Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya are very insecure because of 
ongoing pastoral conflict. For this reason it is named with various deprecating epithets; 
for example, Bekele (2010, p. 13) addressed the region as a “…[pastoral] conflict 
hotspot.” The numerical data also supports this gloomy picture. According to 
IGAD/CEWARN about 2,653 human lives were lost between 2003 and 2006 in pilot 
areas of the Karamoja Cluster. In addition, during the same period 116,426 cattle were 
raided. During one particular clash in May 2007 over 50 people were reported killed—
almost all of them women and children—after Toposa pastoral groups attacked 
Dindinga villages in South Sudan (Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment 
(HSBA), 2007). 
In February 2010, 17 violent incidents were recorded in the Karamoja, Somali and 
Dikhil Clusters, causing 14 deaths and the raiding of 129 animals (CEWARN, 2010a). 
In December 2010 a total of 71 violent incidents were recorded in the Karamoja Cluster, 
causing 103 deaths and raiding of 6,290 livestock, and there were four violent incidents 
causing the death of two people and raiding of 157 animals in the Somali Cluster. In 
January 2011, 41 violent incidents were recorded in Karamoja Cluster, causing 33 
deaths and the raiding of 3,690 livestock. Uganda recorded the highest number of 
incidents yet, at 37 violent incidents, which resulted in the death of 13 individuals and 
the raiding of 3,333 livestock (CEWARN, 2010b). 
Environmental scarcity has been identified, by a number of academics, as one of the 
major causes of violent conflict (Cramer, 2008). Homer-Dixon (1992, 2004) explains 
conflict mainly from the context of environmental scarcity. Competition for scarce 
resources, particularly water and pasture, is one of the major causes of pastoral conflict 
(Bekele, 2010; Ethiopian Pastoralist Research and Development Association (EPaRDA), 
2010; USAID/REDSO quoted in Meier & Dough, 2005). 
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Pastoral conflict is not a new phenomenon in the Horn, however in recent decades the 
frequency and severity of pastoral conflicts is increasing: partly as resource scarcity 
increased, population significantly increased and the environment is more degraded. In 
the past there were fewer injuries and deaths resulting from violent conflict and attacks 
on women and children were nonexistent. Moreover, the impact of the conflict was less 
in the past because of the use of traditional weapons, rather than the modern automatic 
weapons used today (EPaRDA, 2010). The major changes in the pastoral way of life 
result from changes to the environment, the proliferation of small arms, and the increase 
in size of both the human and livestock population. Moreover, the legacy of colonialism 
and the civil wars in the region contributed significantly for intensification of conflict in 
the region (Umar, 1997). Thus, the breaking down of traditional institutions, the 
worsening poverty and increasing competition for dwindling resources have created 
fertile ground for conflict.  
Regarding the impact of the environmental variable, climate change is becoming the 
prominent factor in increasing pastoral conflict3 in the HoA. For example, in 2009 
“…close to ten million pastoralists were at risk of starvation due to drought” (UNEP, 
2010a). Recent research in the Karamoja area, which assessed the correlation between 
environmental variables, such as precipitation and forage, with human behaviour 
concluded that “…the violence in the Karamoja Cluster is clearly linked to 
environmental scarcity.” In other words “…low forage availability during the dry season 
prompts pastoralists to migrate in search of productive patches of land and water 
resources…… [Conflict] soared during this time period just before the onset of the rainy 
season." (Meier & Dough, 2005, p. 25). Bekele (2010, p. 145) considers “…recurrent 
droughts [to be] the major factor contributing to resource scarcity" and that "…resource 
scarcity is an important challenge ...to recurrent clashes". UNEP (2010a) argues that 
"…climate change is resulting in unpredictable and extreme weather patterns and 
influencing mobility patterns amongst pastoral communities" and that this inevitably 
"…increases levels of migration and conflict over often scarcer resources" in the HoA. 
The natural environment of the pastoral areas of the Horn is degraded and becoming 
unable to accommodate the pastoral communities and their livestock. And migratory 
routes are blocked by international boundaries and encroachment of land by different 
land users. This has a clear and direct implication for traditional survival mechanisms. 
The desire for peace has been lost and recurrent conflict has become the norm, not the 
exception. Survival becomes a challenge, and in that situation the last resort is conflict. 
The opportunity cost of choosing to fight becomes zero (Hisheliefer quoted in Cramer, 
2008). In general, pastoralists are becoming too poor and impoverished to be able to 
choose peace.  
3 There are literatures which question the correlations between environmental degradation and 
pastoral conflicts. This view is called cornucopian. They recognize that natural resources are 
theoretically limited, but they stress that natural resources are more abundant than realized by the neo-
Malthusians and do not consider scarcity of resources as cause of conflict (see Nils Petter Gleditsch & 
Ole Magnus Theisen, n.d.). Neo-malthusians as opposed to the cornucopians emphasize the role of 
environmental variable in conflict dynamics (Markakis 1998; Home –Dixon, 1992). 
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Although the role of environmental factors in causing pastoral conflicts is undeniable, to 
fully comprehend the nature of other casual variables connected to the localities their 
specific historical, social, geographical and economic make-up needs to be considered. 
This is because pastoral conflict can be explained by other variables, such as poverty, 
the culture of raiding, arms proliferation, land encroachment, ethnicity, external 
intervention, and wider regional and global dynamics (Bekele, 2010; Cramer, 2008; 
Ludi & Tobias, 2004; Meier & Dough, 2005; Mwaura, 2005). 
5. Response to pastoral conflict: Peace, environment or the development 
pillar?
There are various debates among scholars on the ways of managing or resolving pastoral 
conflicts. The available literature frames the response to pastoral conflict in the Horn, and 
elsewhere, by three different pillars: environmental, peace and development (Bekele, 
2010; UNEP, 1999; 2010a; 2010b).4
The peace pillar focuses on operational prevention—short-term efforts using political or 
military means to prevent a conflict or forestall escalating violence (the “fire brigade 
approach”) (Rubin & Jones quoted in Wulf & Tobias, 2009). In this pillar the utilization 
of traditional conflict resolution, and peace conferences for the conflicting parties, are 
examples of the chosen mechanisms. The development pillar focuses on structural 
prevention—efforts through developmental or economic tools to address the root causes 
of conflict, aimed at risk reduction and formulation of better regulatory frameworks 
(Ibid). Creating better accesses to markets and know-how, developing economic 
interdependence and exchange between communities, and improving livelihoods and 
survival mechanisms should also be considered. For example, Bekele (2010) 
recommended that ''…conflict management should be recognized as part and parcel of 
development policies, because development efforts [alone] cannot produce the 
anticipated impacts on the livelihoods of pastoralist." 
The environmental pillar focuses on the rehabilitation of the degraded environment and 
the creation of opportunities and mechanisms which mitigate and help to adapt to the 
changing environment. As UNEP (1999, p. 36) put it "…environmental condition and 
reuse should be the focal point for conflict resolution and conflict prevention… [in 
pastoral areas]." A more practical recommendation is put forward by UNEP (2010a): 
"…urgent action is needed to help pastoralists cope with the rising impacts of climatic 
change including strategies by government to facilitate safe passage across borders in the 
Horn and East African region." The aim is to improve the opportunity for pastoral 
communities to move across international borders in search of pasture and water points. 
Given the complex socio-political, economic, geopolitical and environmental context of 
the pastoral areas in the Horn, the three pillars appear complementary. Addressing the 
4 In some literature the latter two pillars are considered to be structural prevention.  
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crisis in pastoral areas demands the consideration of all the pillars, without 
compromising any of them. The regional response appears worthwhile, given that the 
pastoral issues, in particular, and environment and peace issues, in general, are beyond 
the jurisdiction of any individual state in the region. Therefore the involvement of 
regional organisations and non- state actors, such as CSOs, is critical. With this in mind 
the study will explore the response of the IGAD system, through CEWARN, to the 
pastoral conflict. 
6.  Historical view on the evolution of IGAD  
When one imagines regional cooperation in the Horn, IGAD inevitably and 
predominantly springs to mind. IGAD provides an avenue for the countries of the Horn 
to cooperate on various issues. IGAD was conceived from the understanding that 
tackling environmental problems required regional cooperation (Kinfe, 2007; Saleem, 
1992, p. 114; Shaw, 1995). After its conception, IGAD passed through various 
restructuring steps, aimed at better addressing the multifarious challenges of the region. 
Regional inter-governmental organizations encouraging cooperation emerged in the 
HoA, in the form of Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
(IGADD), in 1986. “The [root cause for the] genesis of IGADD is environmental 
issues”.5 This is true because the raison d’être of IGADD was environmental factors 
such as drought, desertification and famine (Kinfe, 2007, p. 7; Saleem, 1992, p. 114). 
Although it visualized the optimal use of the region’s environmental resources, its action 
plan did not address trans-boundary resource utilization and environmental conflict (see 
IGADD Plan of Action (IGADD), 1986). 
During its first decade, IGADD successfully brought the leaders of the Horn to the 
negotiation table, using their common problems to prioritise the agenda. Hence, the 
primary success of IGADD was its attempt to encourage good relations between the 
members and its survival for such a long time as a regional organisation. It must, 
however, be noted that drought and environmental degradation issues could not be 
resolved within this timeframe.6 Shaw (1995, p. 257) described IGADD as “... the only 
regional institution which has brought major contenders together, especially in its 
instrumental mediation/negotiation in the late 1980’s.” This indicates that IGADD, even 
before the expansion of its mandate, was already established as an avenue of peace and 
security (Ibid). However, the states were not in a position to start the peace process in 
the 1980’s as there was much antagonism in the region. IGADD was able, slowly and 
incrementally, to build confidence, in order to achieve region-wide cooperation on 
drought and desertification—which, in turn, led to cooperation in peace and security 
issues.  
5  Ngeno, Gilbert, Economic Affairs Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa, April 
29, 2010. 
6 Ibid 
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This seems to demonstrate that neo-regional and new-functional paradigms, which 
promote indirect, incremental and gradual penetration of the political sphere, through 
economic, social and environmental decisions, always have political significance (Hass, 
1958, p. 152). The achievement of IGADD in bringing together leaders of countries of 
the Horn, who had been mutually suspicious and distrustful of each other,7 is politically 
significant and this was achieved thorough indirect penetration of the politics of the 
Horn through environmental decision-making.  
It is not possible to claim that the mistrust and suspicion has been totally eradicated. But 
by breaking the political deadlock the continuance of IGADD as a regional vehicle is 
guaranteed. Moreover, crucial lessons were learnt about how peace and security could 
facilitate and strengthen the effort to terminate the drought and desertification process.8
As result the lesson is reflected in the new IGAD—as its objective states that it will 
“…promote a policy of peace and stability in the region in order to attain food security, 
sustainable environmental management and sustainable development” (African Union 
(AU), n.d., p. 2). Peace and security are perceived as a means to an end. It was an 
understanding by decision-makers of the dialectical connection between the 
environment and peace and security that give birth to IGAD. 
Then IGADD, which was solely an environmental organization, expanded its mandate 
to encompass peace and security and economic aspects of cooperation—giving it three 
identities (El-Affendi, 2009, p. 8; Kinfe, 2007). According to IGAD’s profile document, 
“…one of the principal motivations for the revitalization of IGADD was the existence of 
many organizational and structural problems that made the implementation of its goals 
and principles ineffective” (AU, n.d, p. 2). With the identification of various bottlenecks 
in 1996, the heads of state and government of the Second Extraordinary Summit in 
Nairobi approved and adopted an agreement establishing the IGAD. The expansion of 
the mandate of the organisation has been both praised and criticised.  
The critics highlight the poor record of IGADD in achieving its goals and objectives, 
and claim the decision to expand the mandate was ambitious: in that it did not take into 
consideration the problems it would face as a young organisation. They argue IGADD 
was not well established to expand its mandate. Moreover, they stipulate that had it 
focused on narrow, functional areas, it would have been more successful.9
In contrast, many see the expansion of IGADD’s role as success story (Kinfe, 2007; 
Shaw, 1995). They argue that peace and security is necessary for both development and 
protection of the environment. They praised the revitalisation of IGADD and said it’s 
new “… political and humanitarian mandate was a…crucial addition…” (Kinfe, 2007, p. 
7). But this addition was not a particular goal; rather it was the result of circumstances. 
7 Bashir, H. Attalla (Ambassador), former Executive Secretary of IGAD (2000-2008), Addis Ababa, 
April 16, 2010. 
8 Ngeno, Gilbert, Economic Affair, Embassy the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa, April 29, 2010. 
9 Bashir, H. Attalla (Ambassador), former Executive Secretary of IGAD (2000-2008), Addis Ababa, 
April 16, 2010 
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Member states felt a “common agenda” had to reflect their interests in the conflict in 
Somalia and the Sudan.10
Despite its revitalization, IGAD continues to recognise that the environment remains an 
important motivation for regional cooperation. Thus, the issue of the environment is still 
one of IGAD’s three programme areas, offering the organization an eco-regional picture 
where actors converge. In spite of this, and IGAD’s best efforts, the issue of 
environmental resources and their degradation remains a challenge yet to be effectively 
tackled. But these two issues are central in the discourse of both development and 
security in the region. They are linked to the boundary issues, which form one of the 
critical problems in the Horn—as elsewhere in Africa where boundaries have colonial 
genesis. Because the boundaries were conceived this way, member states have not dared 
to discuss problems related to them.11 And this has led to conflict and unhelpful 
competition. One exception to this is IGAD’s new initiative for managing both local and 
trans-boundary pastoralist conflicts in the region—CEWARN. This opens the third 
period in the evolution of IGAD, when it began to address trans-boundary 
environmental conflict.  
7.  IGAD/CEWARN: Regional response to pastoralist conflict 
CEWARN12 is IGAD’s response to severe pastoral conflict in different areas of the 
region, such as Karamoja, Borena, and Somalia—which tend to produce a sort of 
“domino effect”. CEWARN is not an independent or separate organization but rather an 
organ or a “special agency”13 of IGAD. The emergence of CEWARN as an organ of 
IGAD is considered to be a significant juncture in the evolution of the organisation.  
CEWARN is structurally part of the Peace and Security Division of IGAD,14 which is 
mandated to deal with conflict in the region. The system has its own legal and 
institutional basis within the framework of IGAD. It also constitutes an open model that 
involves non-state actors in information-gathering and organisation of their response. 
Hence, IGAD exists to facilitate the gathering and analysis of information, and the co-
ordination of the response to conflict situations (IGAD, 2002). 
Functionally, CEWARN has two wings, the early warning system and the early response 
system. These systems operate in the three clusters (the Karamoja Cluster—border areas 
of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda; the Somali Cluster—border areas of 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya as well as the Dikhil Cluster—border areas of Djibouti and 
10 Mulegeta Gebrehiwot, Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, AAU, Addis Ababa, 
May 11, 2010. 
11 Ibid 
12 An application of early warning system (a process of collecting, verifying, and analyzing 
information and communicating the result to decision makers) to prevent and mange pastoral conflicts 
in the Horn. 
13 Ngeno, Gilbert, Economic Affairs Attaché, Embassy the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa, April 
29, 2010. 
14 Bizusew Mersha, Country Coordinator, Ethiopia IGAD/CEWARN, Addis Ababa, April 28, 2010. 
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Ethiopia) at local, national and regional levels and involve both state and non-state 
actors.
7.1 The early warning wing of CEWARN 
Within the CEWARN Unit, which is the main link between CEWARN and IGAD’s 
Peace and Security Division, there are two functional wings. The first is the Early 
Warning System, involving the National Research Institute (NRI) and a CEWARN 
country coordinator for each member state. This body is responsible for coding and 
analyzing information from early warning reports, based on data collected by field 
monitors (FMs) in each locality (CEWARN, 2006). This network makes visible the 
local, national and the regional network of the system.  
The NRIs in each country ensure collection of field data; provide preliminary analysis, 
to Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs). The analysis is based on 
two types of information collected—quantitative and qualitative time series data. The 
qualitative data monitors both peace and conflict dynamics collected on a weekly basis. 
The reliability of these data depends not only on “…the collection but on the verification 
of the information by our institute [NRI]” (Teemt, April 14, 2010). This open system of 
information exchange is not intended to replace the existing information collection 
mechanisms, but compliment them. Firstly, they created a new more proactive analytical 
approach, methodology and framework to assist and transform the traditional systems. 
Above all, it was designed to foster collective responsibility of state and non-state actors 
on security. Secondly, the new information network, unlike the traditional system, has 
been able to explore trends and patterns of behaviour at the local, national and regional 
levels for a decade or more. This has assisted analysis and understanding of the current 
situation, enabled prediction and prevention of future similar negative scenarios, as well 
as clearly shown the need for a holistic approach. Thirdly, the data-gathering systems 
created a regional link, in which information exchange becomes easier and including in 
trans-boundary conflict.15
The NRI in each country disseminates information to the respective CEWERUs of its 
base country and the CEWARN unit, which in turn disseminates the information to 
relevant stakeholders.16
The early warning wing of the CEWARN system has been very successful. However, 
this does not mean it is without its weakness and shortcomings. Firstly, and most 
importantly, the biggest challenge for the early warning wing is the “deficit of 
infrastructure” in the Horn.17 Secondly, the system has not been linked directly to other 
IGAD organs (mainly Environment and Economic Development organs), although, in 
principle, the system promotes the linkage with other organs of IGAD.18
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid. 
17 Teemt Bekele, Assistant Country Coordinator, Ethiopia CEWARN/IGAD, Addis Ababa, April 14, 
2010.
18 Bizusew Mersha, Country Coordinator, Ethiopia CEWARN/IGAD, Addis Ababa, April 28, 2010. 
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7.2 The early response wing of CEWARN 
This wing has structures at the local, national and regional level (IGAD, 2002). The 
early response wing encompasses the CEWARN response section and the national 
CEWERUs. The national CEWERU in each country consists of a Steering Committee at 
the national level and local peace committees at the local level. The Committee is 
composed of, representatives of, central government, parliament, the provincial 
administration, police, militia, civil society, and academic and research institutions 
(CEWARN, 2006a; IGAD, 2002). 
The CEWERUs are the central unit for analysis and formulating response strategy. 
They, in principle, base their response on the information originated from the NRI. The 
local border committees have a very significant role in the facilitation of this 
communication in cross-border areas of, for example, Ethiopia and Kenya.19
CEWARN’s principle of integrating with the existing structures is visible at various 
levels in different countries. For example in Kenya and South Sudan—the National 
Steering Committee for Peace and Reconciliation (NSC) and South Sudan Peace 
Commission—which are the main institutions tasked by their respective government 
with early warning and response issues of their countries and CEWARN structures are 
one and the same. In Uganda even though there is no early warning mechanism, it has 
incorporated and institutionalized the District Peace Committees that CEWARN has 
helped to establish to do early warning (EW) and early response (ER). In addition, 
CEWARN calls on the existing structures, both government and non-government, to do 
its response including in peace dialogues, and the existing traditional systems are 
employed in all countries. 
Locally, at the root of the response measures are the peace committees. These 
committees involve elders, young people, and administration and CSOs. These 
structures again make the principles of integrating with the existing local structures, and 
the involvement of CSOs a reality. All CEWARN's Rapid Response projects are 
implemented by CSOs. CEWARN as a system encourages working with grassroots’ 
method of peace building (IGAD, 2002). Through facilitating grassroots state and non-
state structures, IGAD, the regional organization is linked, with the local community. 
This link helps IGAD to overcome the common criticism of African regional 
organisations that they are "old boys’ clubs". 
Regionally, there are two structures: the Technical Committee for Early Warning 
(TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS). The TCEW is the 
technical arm of the CPS. CPS is the highest policy-making organ of CEWARN and 
also CEWARN's link to the Council of Ministers of IGAD (CEWARN, 2006a), to 
which it reports. 
19 Tesfasilase Mezigebe, Director, Conflict Early Warning Response Directorate, Ministry of Federal 
Affairs,  Bizusew Mersha, Country Coordinator, Ethiopia, CEWARN/IGAD, April 28, 2010 
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With regard to the response approach, so far the CEWARN system has focused on two 
areas: putting response structures at the national and local level and facilitating 
improving relations between communities through information sharing, peace meetings, 
and communal agreements which create community harmony. The peace meetings 
especially help to air grievances and enable local actors to come together to find 
solutions.20 The Rapid Response Fund (RRF) is providing funds to facilitate some of 
these peace meetings. Funds can be provided, based on a proposal from the local level 
through the local peace committee. The proposal at the national level is reviewed by the 
Technical Support Unit that advises the CEWERU Committee on the relevance of the 
project to the problem. Following the approval of the CEWERU Committee depending 
on the nature of the request for support—urgent or regular projects—it would be 
presented to the RRF Steering Committee. This is applied to regular projects while 
urgent projects that needed to be responded immediately are approved by the CEWARN 
Director once the CEWERU approves.
CEWARN response correlates with the unique nature of the mechanism that reaches and 
coordinates its work from regional up to the local level. Thus it has taken a three tier 
approach where at the regional level it has established forum of discussion to member 
states where CSOs are integral part of decision making process. At the national level it 
facilitates both formal and informal bilateral communication, and established and 
institutionalized EW and ER structures on national and local levels that are now used as 
part of response structures in most countries. It also made sure that CSOs are part of the 
process and structures at all level that are institutionalized.  
On a micro/local level, CEWARN has pursued only the peace pillar as a major 
strategy— to show this trend the type of response taken to manage pastoral conflicts in 
the Karamoja and Somali Clusters is used as example. In 2009/2010 the total budget 
approved for various intervention proposals was about 591,130 USD for Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Uganda. The money was used to prevent conflict by improving relations 
between communities. The proposals included facilitating communal agreements that 
includes resource sharing and promoting indigenous resilience mechanisms, 
intercommunity peace building, capacity building, peace meetings, and cross-border 
peace dialogue. Other activities include using events such as youth tournaments and 
cultural shows to promote peace. In addition, proposals that focused on the 
developmental pillars that were approved and will be implemented in 2012 include 
establishment of markets designed to benefit cross-border communities and support for 
cross border livestock trade. Almost all the budgets approved came under the umbrella 
of the peace pillar, to the exclusion of the environmental and development pillars. 
However, the objectives of the RRF seem to exceed those of the peace pillar. The 
business of the development and environment pillars is mainly left to national 
governmental or non-governmental actors, who do not provide a regional response. 
Nonetheless, the peace pillar is only really available in the short or medium term, unless 
it can be integrated with the development or environment pillar, for programmes which 
20 Teemt Bekele, Assistant Country Coordinator, Ethiopia CEWARN/IGAD in Addis Ababa, April 
14, 2010 
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are feasible on a regional basis. If this is not possible the peace pillar will remain a "fire 
brigade” to the problems.21 In short, although IGAD, through CEWARN, attempts to 
respond to pastoral conflict via its early warning and response system, it does not seem 
to be able to address these conflicts in a sustainable manner.  
Hence, this indicates that, to date CEWARN is only warning and intervening before or 
while the pastoralists fight through strategies which are limited to the peace pillar. The 
root cause of the conflict, chiefly the degradation of the shared environment and 
resources, remains untouched by the system, or is left to the states to deal with, or is 
considered as a national issue. Moreover, development has still not been integrated into 
peace intervention; although it is an area of focus for the IGAD system. Hence, although 
the pastoral issues are considered to be very complex—involving environmental change, 
poverty and conflict—and these are all common issues for the Horn countries, 
IGAD/CEWARN has only dared to tackle conflict resolution, while ignoring the 
environment and development concerns.  
7.3 The role of other (external) actors 
In the IGAD system there has been a continuous increase in the role of other actors, and 
since 1996 it has focused on establishing permanent institutional links with external 
agents and CSOs. The role of other actors or partners such as the AU, the UN, the USA 
and the EU, in regional cooperation has been vital. And the role of these actors in 
stimulating, funding and assisting the regional cooperation in the Horn has dominated 
IGAD’s strategies and literature. The protocol on the establishment of CEWARN, for 
example, states that," CEWARN [doesn't] exist in a vacuum. It will need to cooperate 
with international, regional and sub-regional organizations." The mechanism for this co-
operation was set up by the system and a notable example is the IGAD Partners Forum 
(IPF). Despite this effort, the organization has been suffering from donors fatigue22 and 
the negative impact of these actors on regional cooperation. For instance, the role of the 
super powers in the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrea war has been questioned.23 The presence of 
foreign forces in the region enables foreign actors to impact negatively on regional 
cooperation. All the above trends indicate that the international environment is not ideal 
for regional cooperation in the Horn. 
7.4 The role of CSOs  
CEWARN’s vision is embodied in the basic philosophical underpinning of 
“stakeholders empowered to prevent violent conflict” and the resolution of pastoral 
conflict in a peaceful, sustainable manner (CEWARN, 2006a, p. 14). To this end, IGAD 
has taken various measures to increase the diversity and number of stakeholders in the 
regional cooperation arrangement. The most important measures to mention are the 
successive IGAD-NGO forums over the last decade, the IGAD-business community 
21 Bizusew Mersha Country Coordinator, Ethiopia CEWARN/IGAD, Addis Ababa, April 28, 2010 
22 Bashir, H. Attalla (Ambassador), former Executive Secretary of IGAD (2000-2008), Addis Ababa, 
April 16, 2010. 
23 Mulegeta Gebrehiwot, Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, AAU, Addis Ababa, 
May 11, 2010. 
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forum, and the IGAD inter-parliamentary union forum (Karuuombe, 2008, p. 7; 
Terlinden, 2004, p. 4). 
CSOs are part and parcel of the IGAD/CEWARN system, at the strategic and policy as 
well as operational levels. CSO representatives of each country are part of the technical 
arm of CPS (TCEW), CSOs are part of the RRF Steering Committee, information 
analysis is done by research institutes and responses are implemented through local 
partners including CSOs. The rationale for this is that "…civil society organizations are 
close to the grassroots where the most effective early warning conflict can be discerned" 
(IGAD, 2002). The role of CSOs has become more visible in global governance since 
the 1990s (Charnovitz quoted in Germmil & Abimbola, 1997). It was very important to 
focus on the spirit of the CEWARN protocol and the role of governments, communities 
and CSOs when addressing pastoral conflicts.24 All are represented in the structure of 
CEWARN. 
CSOs are represented in each NRI, CEWRU and Peace Committees. Taking one example 
from Ethiopia, the Inter Africa Group (IAG) acts on behalf of Ethiopia as an NRI, while 
the Ethiopian Pastoralist Research and Development Association (EPaRDA) is involved 
in CEWRU and another local response organs (peace committees) in the Dassanech 
Woreda. Riam Riam Turkana, a network of local CSOs from Kenya, also plays a similar 
role. There are many grassroots organizations assisting the peace committees and serving 
in the steering committees.25 CSOs are an integral part of the CEWARN and are 
considered as part of the regional cooperation process.26
In addition to their proximity to the grassroots, CSOs are important sources of new 
initiatives to address conflict; they empower local knowledge and experience through 
capacity-building programmes; they appear flexible and responsive to change; and they 
also share their expertise to the state structure, mainly at local level. Therefore, they are 
significant contributors to regional cooperation. This role of CSOs is acknowledged in 
the IGAD/CEWARN system. And this means "IGAD fills an important niche, 
promoting a two way communication between governments and CSOs in the IGAD 
region by formalizing the right of civil societies to have access to information and 
analysis" (IGAD, 2002). This is significant as it puts regional cooperation on the track 
of new regionalism. 
However, the nature and role of CSOs, in particular, and their relationship with the state 
is not free from problems. To begin with the nature of CSOs in the Horn is problematic 
because they are either external or depend on external donors, hence exhibit little 
organisational freedom. And some, which claim to be indigenous, are not free because 
they are usually linked to the governments of the countries in the region.  
24 Bizusew Mersha, Country Coordinator, Ethiopia, CEWARN/IGAD, Addis Ababa, April 28, 2010. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Teemt Bekele, Assistant Country Coordinator, Ethiopia CEWARN/IGAD in Addis Ababa, April 
14, 2010. 
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Concerning the role of CSOs, Ethiopian government officials state they do not prioritize 
the interests and needs of the society, and they do not often align themselves with the 
policies of the state for addressing various problems. They try to squeeze the hands of 
government to dictate policy, and they tend to be radical, especially in relation to the 
environment. The similarity of the data gathered from various Ethiopian government 
offices indicates that there is a CSO phobia in the government system. As a result since 
the ratification of the new Civil Society and Charity Organization Law (Proclamation
No 00/2008) 27 various NGOs have withdrawn from their activities, especially in the 
peace and conflict sector. This reflects the problematic state-civil society relationship in 
Ethiopia, in particular, and in the Horn in general. The region is characterized by 
suspicion and mistrust between states and CSOs.28 Here, it is very important to note that 
this phobia is not only because of the problem associated with CSOs; rather it has much 
to do with the issues of democracy and the nature of the regimes in the Horn.  
An additional dimension of this relationship is the status of CSOs in the Horn is not in a 
similar condition in all states of the region. Moreover, CSOs operating in Kenya and 
Uganda have a more harmonious relationship with their governments than elsewhere in 
the region (IGAD, 2002). In Kenya, there is a better understanding of the role of NGOs 
and the government often listens to what they say, and considers their voices as an 
important signal/indicator about how critical the local agenda is. If there is much voice 
from NGOs the government tries to address the crisis at local level to which the NGOs 
have proximity.29
8.  IGAD/CEWARN: Towards new regional cooperation in the Horn of 
Africa 
Looking at it through the conceptual tool of new regionalism, IGADD appears to have 
the characteristics of semi-new regionalism. Firstly, the role of other external actors has 
been crucial. IGADD’s conception is the result of actors such as the UN, the OAU and 
funding by external partners. The significant role played by the international community 
in the formation of IGADD gives the cooperation the feature of new regionalism despite 
the fact that “…it lacks an agreed, transparent mechanism for dealing with crucial donor 
community” (Shaw, 1995, p. 261). Secondly, the main reason for the cooperation was 
the environment, namely drought and desertification. Thirdly, the progress of 
cooperation was gradual and incremental. In general both the casual factor and the 
strategy of cooperation wss new regional one. However, CSOs were not involved. In the 
region, they were weak and linked to the government. As an informant put it, some of 
the NGOs were more of governmental organisations than CSOs.30 Fourth, IGADD was 
27 The option to work in the peace and security sector is restricted by the proclamation, which allows 
CSOs to participate in peace and security only if there is a bilateral agreement with the government.  
28 Bashir, H. Attalla  (Ambassador), former Executive Secretary of IGAD (2000-2008), Addis Ababa, 
April 16, 2010 
29 Ngeno, Gilbert, Economic Affairs Attaché, Embassy the Republic of Kenya, Addis Ababa, April 
29, 2010. 
30 Bashir, H. Attalla (Ambassador) former Executive Secretary of IGAD, Addis Ababa, April 16, 
2010
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conceived and evolved in the era of cold war, or bipolar world,31 where traditional forms 
of regionalism were more likely to be successful than new regional cooperation 
(Soderbaum, 2007, p. 187). Hence, with regard to the first two features, IGADD can be 
seen as being a semi-new regional organisation from its conception. 
Coming to IGAD, the picture entails a better new regional cooperation in various 
dimensions than that of IGADD. The global environment that IGAD started operations 
in was during a time when the world was not as polarised as the 1980s. IGAD attempts 
to involve itself in regional functional areas through which it attempts to step into 
regional politics, where, historically, there has been a considerable deficit of stability 
and good relationships. Hence, this means IGAD meets one of the variables of new 
regional cooperation, where politics is accessed slowly, gradually and incrementally. 
In addition, unlike its predecessor, IGAD has agreed and established transparent 
structures to deal with external actors, mainly bilateral and multilateral donors. One of 
these structures is the Joint IGAD Partners Forum (IPF or JIPF), which is the forum for 
the organisation’s numerous partners, the friends of IGAD and the IGAD member states 
(El-Affendi, 2009, p. 8; Kinfe 2007, p. 17; Terlinden, 2004, p. 4). The IPF holds regular 
international consultative meetings internally and with partner organizations (Kinfe, 
2007, p. 17). The forum includes the UN, the AU, the Arab League, the USA, the EU 
and other non-EU member states of Europe, such as Norway (Ibid; Terlinden, 2004, p. 
4). Including these significant actors as partners in the regionalism process entails that 
IGAD is pursuing the new regional line.  
IGAD also opens its doors, to some extent, to CSOs through the IGAD-Civil Society 
Forum.32 In 2003, the founding assembly of the IGAD-Civil Society Forum, which was 
designated to improve cooperation with CSOs in the region, was held. A similar forum 
was held with the business community, with the aim of increasing IGAD’s links with 
the wider community. In addition, an inter-parliamentary union (IGAD-Parliamentary 
Unit) was created—which is a very significant move (Terlinden, 2004, p. 4). However, 
the interaction of IGAD with CSOs is limited to the ad-hoc level and annual meetings
and the participation of CSOs in IGAD programmes in the region has not been 
significant (IGAD, 2002, p. 9). 
Viewing the IGAD/CEWARN system through the new regional framework, it is clear to 
see that the CEWARN system elevates the regional cooperation in the Horn more to the 
new regional line. Firstly, this is because of the integration of the non-state regional 
actors in the system. Contrary to the tradition in the IGAD system, the CEWARN 
system has created a structural and strategy-based opportunity for CSOs to take part in 
the regional cooperation. The role of IAG, EPaRDA and Riam Riam Turkana in the NRI 
and in the local peace committees is a good example of this. Secondly, the increment of 
31 Mulegeta Gebrehiwot, Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, AAU, Addis Ababa, 
May 11, 2010 
32 Bashir, H. Attalla (Ambassador), former Executive Secretary of IGAD (2000-2008), Addis Ababa, 
April 16, 2010. 
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improved through the IPF, IGAD suffers from donor fatigue.33 The existence of foreign 
military forces (e.g. the USA, Iran, and France), with their specific interests in the 
region has had negative implications. States in the Horn align themselves more with 
external forces, mainly their former colonial masters, rather than their immediate 
neighbours.34 In general, although there is general agreement about the suitability of the 
multi-polar world order to new regional cooperation, various bottlenecks have 
materialised to achieving an effective regional process in the HoA. 
The third deadlock has appeared because of the reluctance of IGAD member states to 
contribute their membership fees. This has already created a financial challenge for the 
regional organisation. This demonstrates both the incapacity and the lack of 
commitment by member states. This funding gap could have been filled by empowering 
CSOs and acquiring considerable finance from external partners. However, in the HoA 
both CSOs and IGAD are weak and are not in a position to play their expected role 
independently. 
10.  Conclusion 
Environmental change is becoming a critical issue in the discourse of development and 
security in the HoA. This is most relevant to the pastoralist community of the region. 
Moreover, environmental issues and the impact of environmental change on pastoralist 
communities are regional issues, which one state cannot address unilaterally. Owing to 
the dependency of the pastoral communities on the natural environment for their 
survival and economic wellbeing, problems associated with cross-boundary mobility 
and conflict among the pastoral communities will likely persist in the future. Hence, the 
environment appears to be among the central, if not the dominant, issues of security in 
the region. Addressing security problems demands inclusion of environmental and 
developmental issues, and vice versa.  
Actors’ understanding of the juxtaposition of the environment, development and the 
security issue in the IGAD region is undeniable; however every attempt to solve 
regional problems fails to be integrative. For example, IGADD began as an 
environmental organization with no focus on security, while CEWARN failed to include 
both environmental and development aspects when addressing pastoralist conflict. 
Hence, this is a critical gap which has undermined the efforts of CEWARN/IGAD, both 
in early warning and early response.  
To continue as an energetic regional organization and be able to solve the pastoralist 
conflict, IGAD has to comprehensively integrate these three complex and interrelated 
dynamics: the environment, security and development. To this end, the role of CSOs and 
external partners is significant. States must act as key players; their political 
commitment is indispensable to regional transformation. And commitment is needed at 
33 Bashir, H. Attalla (Ambassador) former Executive Secretary of IGAD (2000-2008), Addis Ababa, 
April 16, 2010 
34 Ibid
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both the local and national levels, since local political dynamics has implications for 
regional politics. For example, empowering CSOs at the local level enhances its role in 
achieving regional cooperation in the Horn. This in turn minimises the gap created by 
the incapacity of the states and significantly increases local-regional links. All this is 
dependent on the progress of the democratisation process in each region. The success of 
new regional cooperation in the HoA also depends on the existence of a smooth and 
harmonious state-CSO relationship, which is unlikely to appear without stronger 
democratic institutions and culture in member states. 
Regional cooperation is, with no exaggeration, a panacea to the hitherto unresolved 
environmental, political, economic and social crises of the HoA. It can be achieved 
through incremental, functional, and all-inclusive engagement when states of the region, 
CSOs, and the international community converge for the common cause. Regional 
cooperation, as a response to pastoralist conflict in the region, has to go far beyond early 
warning and policy harmonisation to a more concrete and integrative, project-based 
response system, which involves the three pillars and all interested parties.  
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Preparing for adverse impacts of climate change in pastoral 
areas: The way forward 
Jean-Bosco Butera and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe 
Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa will certainly experience climate extremes at a 
higher frequency and severity in coming decades. This will have serious socio-
economic and political ramifications for the communities under discussion, the 
states, and the region as a whole. It is therefore necessary to pursue reflections and 
engagements at various levels in order to find ways of addressing the issues at 
hand. The findings of the articles presented in this volume and discussions during 
the conference brought about a good number of recommendations. The following 
five policy relevant recommendations were highlighted: 
Inter-disciplinary research-guided solutions: Some papers provided empirical 
evidence against popularly-held convictions, for instance that a decline in rainfall 
causes pastoral conflicts. Furthermore, what was recognised as traditional wisdom 
to cope with climate variability and change by some researchers was re-examined 
by another and found to be a maladaptive approach. Furthermore, the diversity of 
the methodologies followed in collecting and analysing data help to achieve a 
robust and whole-rounded outlook on the situation. However, all the papers pose 
more questions than answers: from the lack of understanding of the paleoclimatic 
history of the pastoral lowlands to the need to investigate the potential of wild 
edible plants for domestication and the causation of pastoral conflicts by climate 
extremes. 
Pastoralists have witnessed the kick-off programmes of a number of ill-suited 
development projects in the past and seen them fail. These projects were designed 
with little understanding of local ecological and socio-cultural realities. Efforts to 
augment the adaptive capacities of pastoralists should not repeat this mistake; 
detailed research in the exact sciences as well as the human sciences should 
precede the prescription of methods for alleviating the problems of pastoralists.  
Recognize the experiences and traditional coping mechanisms of pastoral 
communities: There seems to be limited or no consideration of the cultural 
knowledge and adaptation practices of pastoralist communities in the design and 
implementation of responses by administrative authorities at different levels. While 
times have changed and it is in the great interest of pastoralist communities to take 
cognizance of such changes and adapt in ways that best respond to their needs, it is 
also important for governments at all levels to recognize the traditional adaptation 
mechanisms of these communities and adopt a participatory approach in 
developing new adaptation strategies. Indeed, the issue of the survival of pastoralist 
communities need to be tabled and analysed in a candid and sober way. Can their 
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traditional modus vivendi be upheld for time immemorial? Should they evolve 
towards agro-pastoral communities? Should their traditional lands be left out of the 
drive by many governments in the Horn of Africa to develop? The question would 
be to define and implement a development approach that upholds the dignity and 
rights of the communities concerned and guarantees their useful and effective 
participation.
These questions could constitute the subject of another research programme to 
investigate further those aspects of the new development initiatives that are taking 
place in the pastoralist zones, the stake of pastoralist communities or their absence 
in these initiatives as well as the arguments of the developers. It would also be 
necessary to investigate further the role of different constituencies within 
pastoralists communities like women and young adults to try and understand how 
an increasing number of educated women and youths versus the traditional elders 
may impact on the long term perspectives and survival of the pastoralist 
communities in the Horn of Africa. 
Work towards strengthening customary governance institutions: While the 
possibility that climate change-induced scarcity plays a major role in causing 
pastoral conflicts is high, it would be simplistic to limit the causal relationship to a 
single source. Governance also constitutes a major factor in the dynamics of the 
region, both to increase adaptive capacities and decrease risk of (violent) conflict. 
Indeed, government policies and interventions at various levels of authority – local, 
national and regional – do impact both the capacity of the communities to adapt 
and their relationships. We would actually argue that governance is the single most 
important determinant that will have a durable impact on how pastoralist 
communities evolve. 
Long-term development-centred solutions: Quick fixes for climate change-
induced environmental disasters and/or pastoral conflicts, such as food aid, 
mediation and medical aid, only deal with the contemporary situation and work 
towards alleviating the hardship pastoral communities experience. Economic 
development in pastoral areas, preferably with a cross-border nature, will create 
interdependence between communities and increase the opportunity cost of violent 
conflict. Thus, development should be seen as a deterrent to conflict and the 
respective states, regional bodies and NGOs should put more emphasis on creating 
the physical infrastructure that will enhance development opportunities. 
Broader understanding of causation and integrated approaches to resolving 
pastoral conflicts: Pastoral conflicts are usually perceived as tribal, thus having 
their roots in local cultures and practices, or seasons of the year. As is the case 
under complex environmental and social phenomena, single-factor explanations do 
not do justice to reality. Conversely, it can be stated that poor understanding of the 
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causes of a given conflict will not help the efforts to deal with the conflict. Thus a 
better, broader understanding of the causes of pastoral conflicts should precede 
efforts geared towards conflict resolution. Moreover, the task of conflict prevention 
and resolution and of building durable stability in the pastoralist communities is too 
important to be left to a single level or authority – local, national, regional and 
international actors should work collaboratively.      
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